Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis

[Kirkhill]

Four pages on gongs and allowances.

How are things going in Iraq?

I guess that is why buttons and bows aren't just PMO/Heritage thing.

 

[Harrigan]

I seem to recall that the 56 day rotations weren't due to allowances - those kick in 2 weeks after being in theatre generally - but to avoid VCDS waivers so they could be rotated more frequently.  Specialist MO's had the same deal going in and out of KAF with the Role 3 MNMU - this way they could send them back more frequently.

MM

I believe HLTA was based on 60 days.  You have hit on the other main reason: a way to get around that meddlesome requirement to give people at least 12 months at home* between 6 month rotations.  If you send them on 3 x 56 day Rotos in a year, we can get 6 months out of a member without any follow-on 12 month requirement.  That can be done indefinitely - and in some units - was. 

Again, though, the troops figure it out, and see it for what it was - a method used by the CF to get around the rules that are meant to protect the member.  And if the CF shows no loyalty to the member, do you blame them for "looking out for themselves"?

Harrigan

* understanding that 'at home' doesn't actually mean 'in garrison'

 

[Harrigan]

How are things going in Iraq?

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/SOMNIA/article25404069/

I wonder if we have any "national caveats"?

Harrigan

 

[Halifax Tar]

I went to Afg the first time with high hopes and dreams of "making a difference".  The second time I went for cold hard cash.  Don't get me wrong I did everything that was required of me and more. 

But when the government of the day, who sends me into harms way, isn't willing to own up to its responsibilities should I get wounded, and without saying it, would rather I die than be wounded because its cheaper in the long run then ya this is just about cash for me.

I am deploying again in the next few months until late next summer.  Know what my first question was ?  How much extra are we making ?  I'm not ashamed of that at all.  And anyone who thinks these are all about helping people and making a difference is sadly mistaken and has drunk too much of the koolaide.

Feel free to flame away.

 

[Underway]

It really depends on the "troop" whether the 56 day deployment is a good or bad thing.  Now being a family man I would love a 56 day deployment to get out, do some work and then come home to see my kids.  I'd rather the break up in the tour than the 6 months + 7 months pre-deployment, even with the extra leave and HLTA and loosing 12 months at home after the deployment.  If you have to go then its easier to sell to the spouse and kids that you'll only be gone for 2 months, no biggie.  Easier for reservists to get the time off work, jump in help out.  It's no different in many ways to lots of types of civi work.  It actually might lead to better retention as the CAF workforce gets older in general.

Also hasn't the airforce been doing these exact types of deployments domestically for years.  Send some guys up to work at the northern airfields for 2 months, rotate them out?

As for risk allowance etc...  this is going to make me sound like a jerk but I'm going to play devils advocate.  Just because you are dropping bombs doesn't mean there is a risk.  If you're at the coal face generally there is a greater risk and I support that generally they should get more risk allowance.  But aren't we just assuming?  Really...whats the air defence capability of ISIL? There might be more risk from a mechanical issue on the aircraft than getting hit with enemy fire.  It might just be a day on the range for these guys (not that I know...).  I would not be suprised if statistically speaking I have a higher risk of being killed on my daily commute than a fighter pilot dying to enemy fire while flying over ISIL (once again... I don't know and am happy to be proven wrong).  Risk might be higher that you have a suicide bomber at the gate or a rocket attack at the airfield  (or a car accident on base).

Also risk is relative and subject to change.  In retrospect KAF was a safer place to be than Massum Ghar, but what if the battlespace changed and the Taliban did a mass attack at KAF, while ignoring MG?  MG goes silent and now KAF is constantly under siege.  What's my risk as a gate guard at KAF searching vehicles and people for suicide bombs, vice the pay clerk in CNS?  What if (as happened to me) you start the tour with a nice safe job in CNS with an air conditioned office halfway through the tour get an extra 2 months tacked on travelling outside the wire on a regular basis as the job evolved or changed?  What's my risk now? Do I have a punch card with my number of patrols outside the wire or number of TIC's I got in?  Or how about the guys who were there in 2007 vice 2010.  It was quite a bit more quiet in 2010 so maybe we should have clawed back some of their allowance.

It's not a perfect system but you can see some of the issues with risk allowance in the first place and why there are percieved unfair treatments.  I think it can be better, but some of the people here going off are not thinking of all the variables and how difficult it may be to get it right.

 

[GAP]

A 57 day rotation is just mind boggling.....no sooner are you aclimatized and orientated then you are gone, replaced by a new guy just getting aclimatized and orientated.

Them's union hours..... :

 

[Eye In The Sky]

How do you differentiate between levels of risk?  Say (using a Kandahar construct), between a CP-140 crew member who's facing some risk of his plane falling out of the sky or the odd chance of a SAM in his AO vs. an infantry soldier who is getting into 3 TICs a day and walks IED infested trails when he leaves his patrol base?

I actually wouldn't compare the 2, the same as I wouldn't compare Afghanistan to Iraq/Syria.  What I am saying, or trying to, is the risk level for Op IMPACT folks looks something like this.  This is just my opinion from being there and seeing reality.

1.  JTFSC pers/anyone who doesn't leave the camp - nil, not much different than home.
2.  Tanker Det aircrew - some, less than 140 det types
3.  LRP Det aircrew - some, more than the tankers, less than the CF-18
4.  CF-18 Det pers - more than folks in 1, 2 or 3, less than CSOR boots on the ground folks.
5.  CSOR boots on the ground folks.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

A 57 day rotation is just mind boggling.....no sooner are you aclimatized and orientated then you are gone, replaced by a new guy just getting aclimatized and orientated.

Them's union hours..... :

It's not quite like that, and maybe 56 days is just a number being chucked around here but not reality. 

 

[Eye In The Sky]

As for risk allowance etc...  this is going to make me sound like a jerk but I'm going to play devils advocate.  Just because you are dropping bombs doesn't mean there is a risk.  If you're at the coal face generally there is a greater risk and I support that generally they should get more risk allowance.  But aren't we just assuming?

I dunno, I'm guessing the guys driving bomb trucks are the type of guys who get noticed more than those not dropping ordinance.  I don't assume, I just have an opinion from my own experience.

Really...whats the air defence capability of ISIL?

  Nothing anyone on here who actually knows is going to talk about on here or outside Sqn lines, IMO.

 

[Sub_Guy]

Really... What's the air defence capability of ISIL?

Enough to warrant aircrews a higher risk level than the guys in camp.

Work the Google, you will see that they have and use AD systems, that's all you get for free.

Everyone keeps comparing this mission to Afghanistan, it's a completely different mission, with different risks.  I know the system isn't perfect, but the only real risk the folks in camp run is being hit by a motor vehicle (Ali Al Salem).  No one is getting shot at in camp.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

the only real risk the folks in camp run is being hit by a motor vehicle (Ali Al Salem).

*Midnight omelettes* aren't considered a risk?

Well, we give out different medals for the same theatre/operation depending on where people do their business.  Maybe the wording used in the descriptions of those are simple enough to differentiate the differences in risk. 

GCS-EXP

The General Campaign Star (GCS) is awarded to members of the Canadian Forces and members of allied forces working with the Canadian Forces who deploy into a defined theatre of operations to take part in operations in the presence of an armed enemy.

GSM-EXP

The General Service Medal (GSM) is awarded to members of the CF and members of allied forces serving with the CF who deploy outside of Canada - but not necessarily into a theatre of operations - to provide direct support, on a full-time basis, to operations in the presence of an armed enemy.

Seems one group there assumes a little more risk then the other.

As for the AIRCRA aspect, I get $311/month for that when not deployed.  Part of that must be the risk that the plane will crash, or any other normal incident/accident.  The stakes are kind of "upped" somewhat from that happening say, in the North West Territories, to somewhere in and over the Badlands, when your big honkin loud plane goes down in the desert for whatever reason (added fun if there is a big smoke trail pointing down from the sky to tell everyone exactly where you *landed*).  The people coming to look for you aren't SAR, coming with warm milk and cookies to ease your suffering.  Whats the risk of that happening?  Who can say for certain.  No one knew for certain who was going to get hit in a TIC in the last theatre, right? 

Is there a risk of that happening?  There is risk every time you go up that you might come down hard and fast.  The chances of surviving that are loads better in the NWT than they are over the badlands.

 

[medicineman]

There's always going to be the "I've got it harder than you" crowd no matter how the things go.  As an example, during my tour in Croatia, some creature in Ottawa decided that they wanted to cut our risk pay to pretty much nada, since the guys in Bosnia were getting shot at more than us.  However, we actually suffered a good deal more casualties, both actually and statistically, than the dudes across the mountains from us because of all the mine strikes we were having.  I call it the CNN effect - since all the news cameras were not on us but on Sarajevo, Gorazde, Srebrenica, etc., we apparently didn't have any risk.  I believe someone pointed that out to said person...our hazard pay didn't change.

MM

 

[PuckChaser]

Same thing for Op ATTENTION, Roto 1 was told to expect a cut in hardship and risk. Then MCpl Greff was killed and a large scale TB attack occurred in April. The rumors stopped (until they tried it again with Roto 2).

 

[jollyjacktar]

All which makes Rifleman62's yoga video of yesterday all the more relevant.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Should we further make it complicated by giving Pilots/Aircrews an extra Risk Level, but only for the time they're actually in the air in the ops box?

I just wanted to come back to this point, and point out how easy it is/would be to do just this which IIRC was how it went for OUP (Libya).

- The RA/HA for OP IMPACT - IRAQ was announced early winter.  Can't remember the numbers exactly, but lets say that the RA for that location (Iraq) is $600/month.
- The RA for OP IMPACT - KUWAIT is announced at, lets say, $300 a month.
- for the example, lets use a aircrew mbr who did a 90 day ROTO and flew 30 missions.

Using a 30 day month to pro-rate a 'per day' amount for the example, that would equal RA $20/day for IRAQ, and RA $10/day for KUWAIT.

So, dude/dudette flies 30 missions.  That's 30 days at the RA IRAQ rate ($600), and 60 days at the RA KUWAIT rate ($600) for $1200 RA total. 

I am not sure what would be so hard about this and, it would be for a minimal # of people.  Its admin work, which is what clerks are paid to do, same as I am paid to smash buttons and drop things out of the plane.  Pro-rating is also how they figure out FSP for a partial month and they can manage that.

Its not hard, its doable and there is no real reason to NOT do it, is there?  FWIW, even if I wasn't one of the 'monkey in the middle' types, I'd still think and support what I'm saying, because I actually believe it would be fair to the mbr's.

Before anyone starts another "well, in Afghanistan.." argument, please allow me to me say this pre-emptively...

 

[Harrigan]

It really depends on the "troop" whether the 56 day deployment is a good or bad thing.  Now being a family man I would love a 56 day deployment to get out, do some work and then come home to see my kids.  I'd rather the break up in the tour than the 6 months + 7 months pre-deployment, even with the extra leave and HLTA and loosing 12 months at home after the deployment.  If you have to go then its easier to sell to the spouse and kids that you'll only be gone for 2 months, no biggie.  Easier for reservists to get the time off work, jump in help out.  It's no different in many ways to lots of types of civi work.  It actually might lead to better retention as the CAF workforce gets older in general.

Also hasn't the airforce been doing these exact types of deployments domestically for years.  Send some guys up to work at the northern airfields for 2 months, rotate them out?

I agree with you, IF it is only once or twice.  56 days is fine, and easier on the family. 

But in the mid-2000's some units constantly rotated people in and out on 56 day rotos for years, and with only a relatively small number of qualified personnel, that meant 6 months out of 12 for multiple years.  Suffice to say the failure rate on marriages at that unit was extreme.

Harrigan

 

[The Bread Guy]

Why you're not hearing quite as much ....

Expect to hear a lot about the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant during the federal election, just not from the Canadian military.

National Defence has slipped into silent mode for the duration of the campaign and says it will update its website, but won’t hold public briefings about the combat mission in Iraq and Syria, barring something extraordinary.

Canadian warplanes have conducted 29 airstrikes against Islamic State positions and units, including one in Syria, since the last update on July 9 ....

More on the Caretaker Convention (what government officials can/can't do during the federal election) here.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Well, it was bound to happen ... the accusation, I mean ...

This article is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canadian-armed-forces-accused-of-killing-civilians-in-iraq-air-strike/article26138351/

Canadian Armed Forces accused of killing civilians in Iraq air strike

STEVEN CHASE
OTTAWA — The Globe and Mail

Published Friday, Aug. 28, 2015

Canadian fighter pilots have been accused of killing civilians during a Jan. 21 air strike in Iraq – an allegation the military has kept under wraps until now.

The Canadian Armed Forces, which revealed this information in response to a question from The Globe and Mail, say they’ve nevertheless found no evidence to back up this accusation.

The military has been asked repeatedly since last fall whether Canadian CF-18 Hornets have inadvertently killed or injured civilians during the United States-led air war against Islamic State terrorists. This is the first time it’s been revealed such an allegation has been made.

The Forces say they are inviting anyone with more information to step forward.

“In January, 2015, information came to the Canadian Armed Forces that there might have been civilian casualties as a result of a strike by our CF-18s,” said Captain Kirk Sullivan of Canadian Joint Operations Command. “The source of this allegation had himself heard of these potential casualties through a second-hand account.”

The military said it’s willing to collect more evidence and investigate if circumstances warrant.

“Any agency with information that would indicate potential civilian casualties, or aid in clarifying existing allegations, is encouraged to provide it to the Canadian Armed Forces so that it may pursue it with the coalition,” Capt. Sullivan said.

Canada’s CF-18s have been bombing targets in Iraq since November, 2014, as part of the United States-led air bombing campaign to help Iraqi ground forces recapture their country from extremists who have seized large swaths of territory. Canada also began air strikes in Syria in April, 2015, after the Conservative-dominated House of Commons voted to expand the bombing campaign.

Divulging the allegation about the January air strike is a change from the Forces’ line on the matter as recently as seven weeks ago.

On July 9, military spokesman Paul Forget, a naval captain, was asked at a media briefing whether the military was aware of any civilian casualties, “or possible civilian casualties,” as a result of the air-strike campaign. He didn’t mention this accusation.

“Canada is quite confident that with all the strikes that we’ve executed, there is absolutely no evidence of civilian casualties associated with our strikes,” the officer told reporters.

Defence Minister Jason Kenney also told reporters in early August that he knew of no cases in which there were civilian casualties caused by Canadian bombs in the war on the Islamic State – also referred to as ISIS or ISIL.

“All I can tell you is we’re not aware of any claims of civilian casualties as a result of the RCAF bombing ISIL targets in Iraq and Syria, and I believe the United States is only aware of one,” Mr. Kenney, currently running for re-election, said Aug. 3.

Yet the Canadian military now says it’s known of this allegation for about seven months.

The military says after it learned of this accusation – which it did not elaborate on – there was further scrutiny of photos and videos of the Jan. 21 air strike but these yielded no proof civilians were killed during the attack on Islamic State forces.

“The coalition headquarters conducted a review of all available, reliable imagery and video. The review uncovered no evidence of civilian casualties,” Capt. Sullivan said.

The review of the Jan. 21 bombing was conducted by the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve headquarters, the Forces say.

The military says the bombing in question took place northwest of Mosul when CF-18 jets were flying a coalition mission in support of Iraqi security forces on the ground. In January, the Forces said in a news release that the Hornets had struck an Islamic State “fighting position.”

Capt. Sullivan said the military remains confident the targeting was justified.

“It was reconfirmed that the target was a valid military objective from which ISIS was firing a heavy machine gun … at Iraqi Kurdish troops,” the officer said. “The area in question is still within ISIS-held territory.”

The Forces say they didn’t consider it necessary to make public this particular allegation because there was insufficient evident to mount a formal investigation.

They could not sufficiently explain Thursday evening precisely why they have now decided to make the allegation public.

Citing “security reasons,” the military is refusing to identify the source of the allegation – and whether this person is civilian or a soldier – and is referring further questions on the complainant to U.S. Central Command.

Canada’s participation in the United States-led campaign against Islamic State militants is projected to cost more than half a billion dollars by March, 2016 – with the majority of the expenses to come from the air war, which also includes surveillance planes and a refueller.

With a report from Oliver Sachgau

I have only one comment. Note this: "The military has been asked repeatedly since last fall whether Canadian CF-18 Hornets have inadvertently killed or injured civilians ..." Journalism is, now, defined as the business of filing ATI request after ATI request saying, "Have ya done anything wrong yet? Well, have ya? Have ya?"

 

[The Bread Guy]

I have only one comment. Note this: "The military has been asked repeatedly since last fall whether Canadian CF-18 Hornets have inadvertently killed or injured civilians ..." Journalism is, now, defined as the business of filing broad-strokes "shotgun" ATI request after ATI request saying, "Have ya done anything wrong yet? Well, have ya? Have ya?" "what's here that can stand out in a headline?"

FTFY

In all fairness, though, note the wording of the answers ....

• January 2015:  "information came to the Canadian Armed Forces that there might have been civilian casualties as a result of a strike by our CF-18s,” said Captain Kirk Sullivan of Canadian Joint Operations Command. “The source of this allegation had himself heard of these potential casualties through a second-hand account.” "
• July 9 2015:  “Canada is quite confident that with all the strikes that we’ve executed, there is absolutely no evidence of civilian casualties associated with our strikes”
• August 3, 2015:  “All I can tell you is we’re not aware of any claims of civilian casualties as a result of the RCAF bombing ISIL targets in Iraq and Syria”

This is NOT just a Conservative practice (I'm sure there are loads of examples of such wordsmithing from parties of all colours - what do "we" "officially" "know/hear"), but when things are less-than-clearly expressed, the eye can always be drawn.

 

[Lumber]

From the same article:

"The Canadian Armed Forces, which revealed this information in response to a question from The Globe and Mail..."
.
.
.
"They could not sufficiently explain Thursday evening precisely why they have now decided to make the allegation public."

Because you asked them you numpties! Read your own article!