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New MBT(Leo 2, M1A2, or Challenger 2), new light tank (Stingray), or new DFSV (M8 or MGS)?

  • Thread starter Thread starter Wm. Harris
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I'm not sure where this guy has gotten his info, but Russian tanks do not dominate the world market because they are good, but because they are cheap. In addition to the various weakness pointed out in previous posts, Russian tanks have always been built around a philosophy that calls for overwhelming the enemy with mass artillery and breaking through with hordes of tanks. This means build lots and build quickly.

The reliability of Russian tanks is notoriously low, the crew ergonomics is non existant and they have to carry their fuel in large external drum tanks (hardly where you want your fuel to be in a battle). The Russians didn't care because they considered regiments, brigades and even divisions to be "fire and forget", just pass the next one up through the burning wreakage. As a BTW, I have tried this in various board and computer wargames, and it works often enough, you as the commander simply have to be extremely ruthless and cold blooded......

 
Not to change the subject or anything but i noticed that when the Australian Army announced their decision to buy new MBT'S they made several good points.

Aftering studing all the options and looking at the worlds best armys lit is clear that combined arms is the only option.
The MBT is the cornerstone for combined arms.  It would be criminaly negligent to send soldiers into combat without
MBTS in the combined arms team. We do not see ourselves doing massed tank charges but they will support our infantry.
Simply put they save lives. We will find a way to deploy them overseas with our troops if necessary.

Amazing how our great military minds at NDHQ think  so far outside the box with futuristic ideas.
Imagine the antequated idea of saving lives and having a thought of the infantry.

toodles  Stoney
 
These are clippings from the overall article that can be found at: http://www.iraq.net/displayarticle5830.html

How Technology Failed in Iraq

In theory, the size of the Iraqi attack should have been clear well in advance. U.S. troops were supported by unprecedented technology deployment. During the war, hundreds of aircraft- and satellite-mounted motion sensors, heat detectors, and image and communications eavesdroppers hovered above Iraq. The four armed services coordinated their actions as never before. U.S. commanders in Qatar and Kuwait enjoyed 42 times the bandwidth available to their counterparts in the first Gulf War. High-bandwidth links were set up for intelligence units in the field. A new vehicle-tracking system marked the location of key U.S. fighting units and even allowed text e-mails to reach front-line tanks. This digital firepower convinced many in the Pentagon that the war could be fought with a far smaller force than the one it expected to encounter.

Yet at Objective Peach, Lt. Col. Ernest â Å“Rockâ ? Marcone, a battalion commander with the 69th Armor of the Third Infantry Division, was almost devoid of information about Iraqi strength or position. â Å“I would argue that I was the intelligence-gathering device for my higher headquarters,â ? Marcone says. His unit was at the very tip of the U.S. Army's final lunge north toward Baghdad; the marines advanced on a parallel front. Objective Peach offered a direct approach to the Saddam International Airport (since rechristened Baghdad International Airport). â Å“Next to the fall of Baghdad,â ? says Marcone, â Å“that bridge was the most important piece of terrain in the theater, and no one can tell me what's defending it. Not how many troops, what units, what tanks, anything. There is zero information getting to me. Someone may have known above me, but the information didn't get to me on the ground.â ? Marcone's men were ambushed repeatedly on the approach to the bridge. But the scale of the intelligence deficit was clear after Marcone took the bridge on April 2.

As night fell, the situation grew threatening. Marcone arrayed his battalion in a defensive position on the far side of the bridge and awaited the arrival of bogged-down reinforcements. One communications intercept did reach him: a single Iraqi brigade was moving south from the airport. But Marcone says no sensors, no network, conveyed the far more dangerous reality, which confronted him at 3:00 a.m. April 3. He faced not one brigade but three: between 25 and 30 tanks, plus 70 to 80 armored personnel carriers, artillery, and between 5,000 and 10,000 Iraqi soldiers coming from three directions. This mass of firepower and soldiers attacked a U.S. force of 1,000 soldiers supported by just 30 tanks and 14 Bradley fighting vehicles. The Iraqi deployment was just the kind of conventional, massed force that's easiest to detect. Yet â Å“We got nothing until they slammed into us,â ? Marcone recalls.

In this grand vision, information isn't merely power. It's armor, too. Tanks weighing 64 metric tons could be largely phased out, giving way to lightly armored vehiclesâ ”at first, the new 17-metric-ton Stryker troop carrierâ ”that can avoid heavy enemy fire if need be. These lighter vehicles could ride to war inside cargo planes; today, transporting large numbers of the heaviest tanks requires weeks of transport via land and sea. â Å“The basic notion behind military transformation is that information technologies allow you to substitute information for mass. If you buy into that, the whole force structure changes,â ? says Stuart Johnson, a research professor at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at National Defense University in Washington, DC. â Å“But the vision of all this is totally dependent on information technologies and the network. If that part of the equation breaks down, what you have are small, less capable battle platforms that are more vulnerable.â ?

The welter of postmortems from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars tell many stories. But one thing is clear: Marcone never knew what was coming at Objective Peach. Advanced sensors and communicationsâ ”elements of future networked warfare designed for difficult, unconventional battlesâ ”failed to tell him about a very conventional massed attack. â Å“It is my belief that the Iraqi Republican Guard did nothing special to conceal their intentions or their movements. They attacked en masse using tactics that are more recognizable with the Soviet army of World War II,â ? Marcone says.

And so at a critical juncture in space (a key Euphrates bridge) and time (the morning of the day U.S. forces captured the Baghdad airport), Marcone only learned what he was facing when the shooting began. In the early-morning hours of April 3, it was old-fashioned training, better firepower, superior equipment, air support, and enemy incompetence that led to a lopsided victory for the U.S. troops. â Å“When the sun came up that morning, the sight of the cost in human life the Iraqis paid for that assault, and burning vehicles, was something I will never forget,â ? Marcone says. â Å“It was a gruesome sight. You look down the road that led to Baghdad, for a mile, mile and a half, you couldn't walk without stepping on a body part.â ?

Yet just eight U.S. soldiers were wounded, none seriously, during the bridge fighting. Whereas U.S. tanks could withstand a direct hit from Iraqi shells, Iraqi vehicles would â Å“go up like a Roman candleâ ? when struck by U.S. shells, Marcone says. Sitting in an office at Rand, Gordon puts things bluntly: â Å“If the army had had Strykers at the front of the column, lots of guys would have been killed.â ? At Objective Peach, what protected Marcone's men wasn't information armor, but armor itself.


This seems to be a very clear example of why you need combined arms with heavy MBT contingent and not upgunned Strykers, aka MGS.

MHO
 
True, but.....

The question should really be resolved by our doctrine, since every type of tank has its own particular advantages and disadvantages. When the focus was on defeating the USSR on the plains of Germany, MBTs needed more and more protection and firepower. Generation Two tanks like the Leopard 1 or AMX-30 had to be uparmoured from their 30 tonne design weights, while Generation Three vehicles like the M-1, Leopard 2 or Challenger tipped the scales at 60 tonnes or more. The proposed Block III tank program launched under President Reagan was looking to replace the M-1 with a totally new vehicle which was projected to be almost 80 tonnes in weight!

If our focus is to be an expeditionary force, then monsters like the Block III are clearly unfeasable unless there is a giant commitment to the supporting transport and logistics infrastructure as well. The next thing to consider is what sort of work the expeditionary force is supposed to do. A "Cavalry" force designed for screening and flanking tasks could probably do with light tanks or FSVs derived from APC and IFV hulls, since the focus is not shock action or direct battles with the enemy. Our force, as defined in the "White Paper", is supposed to ba a general purpose force, so by doctrine and government mandate, we would need a medium tank in the 30-50 tonne range armed with a high velocity 120mm cannon, advanced fire control system and a range of active and passive offensive and defensive measures.

Issues raised in How Technology Failed in Iraq fall under doctrine and organization, i.e. how information is used and distributed, rather than  any particular issues with the tanks themselves. Well designed and built tanks in any weight range will be more survivable than crappy ones, well deployed tanks with well trained crews will always do better than poorly deployed tanks with unmotivated crews. (German tanks were generally inferior to French tanks in 1940, but superior doctrine and morale negated the potential advantages of the French).
 
Alright, I've a read a whole bunch of the opinions and theories, not all of them but most.  Here's what I know ( by the way don't let the airforce symbol stop you, I'm an ex Fort Garry Horse and Strathcona).

Canada is in the market to eventually replace the Leopard C2.  Which is something they should do.  The C2 turret is actually on older hull's than our last tanks.  At least the ones that were delivered to the Strat's were that way.  I was watching CSPAN and I actually caught the minister talking about the LAV 105.  He wanted to purchase 66 immediately so the country could save money by tagging onto the US order.  The main problems of the LAV 105 as I can see it are these.  It's a 105.  Unless Canada changes it's mind on depleted uranium rounds, a 105 will only piss off anything we might shoot at.  Second, for those of you who logged any time in a cougar will remember shoots on the range.  You can't shoot over the side or you tip, get out of the 45 degree zone and you are SOL.

In my opinion, until we have a government who is willing to put us in harms way, Canada does not require a MBT any more.  I say that with reservation because I truly believe it would be stupid for us to not have that capability.  If we were to replace the tank, I would throw my hat in on the Leopard 2 or if the Germans can ever find a buyer to trial it, the Leopard 3.  It would make sense to buy this.  The supplier for parts is the same, thus cutting down logistics.  It is not as wide as the M1 or Challengers, which would make useful all over the world.  I like the Markavva, however I don't see Canada buying it.  The M1 although close to us and that is nice, has the problem with the US government never allowing us to have the same one as them, we would always be 2 or 3 steps behind them.

Someone mentioned the T-90.  Last I heard it never went into production.  There are specs for it and probably a few prototypes, however it is an unproven weapon.

Well that's all I've got to say about that.  Just one man's opinion.

Oh ya..Congrats to LGen Hillier on his next promotion to CDS (once the red tape is done).  It's nice to see a zipperhead in charge.
 
Hear hear on the zipperhead in charge. About bloody time and we may just see a new MBT because of it.

As for going into harms way. 

What do you call most of the missions? Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Somalia, Afganistan. Yes, only Kosova involved US sending MBT's, but that doesn't mean we shouldn't have in other areas.

The Leo II would be my choice. Its been offered to us cheap by the Germans on several occasions, and will be again I'm sure. Conversion wouldn't take all that much and there is a ready supply of spare parts. As well, something the CAF has always been proud of over the Americans. The fact that our armoured crewmen can repair their own vehicles to a point in the field in comparrison to the yanks who have to wait till their rear elements come up. Something the diesel Leo II has over the M1's.

And please don't limit us to "light and medium" just beacuse that is the lion share of missions we go on. That self defeating attitude is much the same as them asking why we should have a military in the first place? You cannot train peacekeepers for war as easily as training warriors for peacekeeping. Same thing applies to training for low to medium intensity conflicts in a possible high situation. Train for High intensity, be prepared, and you will be able to handle anything.

Sorry, but this idea that keeps popping up that there will never be another large conflict is just plain nieve. Read history. If the human race can kill each other in large numbers, they will do so. Its not nice, it won't happen soon, but to say it won't happen is scary.

 
As for going into harms way.    

What do you call most of the missions? Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Somalia, AfAfghanistanYes, only Kosova involved US sending MBT's, but that doesn't mean we shouldn't have in other areas.

Alright I'll coconceden the wording of my statement.  I should have not said "in harms way".  I agree that all those tour have put people in harms way, one way or another.  With that said, I have done Bosnia ( SFOR 1 '97) and Afghanistan (OP APOLLO, Kandahar) both with Recce Sqn LdSH(RC).  I have know guys who have done Croatia and Somalia.  Bosnia, by the time I got there was quickly turning into Cyprus without the view.  So in my opinion Bosnia wasn't as dangerous as other tours. 

In regards to sending tanks to Kosovo, it was my previous Regt that sent the tanks to Kosovo.  Speaking with guys from the troop that went first hand, they did nothing.  The tanks were there for presence.  However how much presence is there in a 4 tanks and a spare.

I will restate my opinion on this matter with slight changes.  I don't mean Canada should scrap what we have until it can replace them.  But until we do replace them, do not buy the LAV 105 to help us out.  They will sit in Canada and rust ( no matter how much care our guys put into them).  I believe Canada will not send any kind of heavy armour to anyplace soon.  Kosovo was an exception to the rule. 

We could have used TANKS in Afghanistan.  Clearing routes in a coyote was not my idea of fun.  Even our little Leo would have put a little scare into the locals with the T-64's.


Zipper, I will whole heartedly agree with you on the capability of soldiers.  I do not believe my comments were of a self defeating attitude.  However until we have a government that is willing to spend the money on us and someone to convince the general public we will usually be on the short end of the stick.  I also agree with you on tank of choice though, as you probably read in my post.

That's all I've got to say about that.  Happy hunting and lets hope for a good budget for the army.
 
I bow to your wise words Swin.

Did anyone here read in the paper (forgot which one) about the Army being made into the main focus of the military? And how the Air Force and Navy will be support only? Wow.

And does it mean more money for the Army to get the equipment (tanks) that it needs?
 
Zipper, sorry buddy. No maple leafs painted on the side of the Leo2A5. Love to see it happen though.

Our Govt doesn't want tanks so we will lose 'em.
 
Hey! I can go on dreaming can't I? A miracle could fly out of the collective Canadian butt? :o

Yeah, I thought so...

Anyway, I was looking at the British Army website, and was rather impressed at the array of light armour that they have all based off the same chassis. And all tracked too.

I would love to get a hold of the wanker who thought up this whole wheeled thing in the first place. Grrrrrr... :threat:

Thanks
 
Zipper, the Brits are going wheeled for their Medium forces as well.  In fact the Brits have always had a strong wheeled component in their arsenal.

Most recently it was the Saxon APC / Fox Recce Vehicle / Land Rover.  Before that, in the sixties, when they were still doing the imperial policeman thing, it was the Saladin/Saracen/Stalwart series of 6x6s.  The Saladin was the original platform for the 76mm gun on the Cougar.  The Saracen was an armoured APC and the Stalwart was and amphibious logistics ATV.

They Brits only got rid of them when they ditched the "East of Suez" taskings and focused on BAOR on the North German plain.  No need to go running very far.  The war was going to come to them while they were in garrison.  Tracks were fine.

Now they are looking at Global Deployments again and back come the Medium Weight Wheeled Units into the Order of Battle.

Wheeled Units also contributed strongly in WW2 in the North African, Italian and NW Europe Campaigns as Light Cavalry / Recce and in the Interwar Years, again on policing duties.

Tanks have their place, as do heavy APCs.  I am a fan of both. And we should have a few around to supply support in "penny-packets" - that should be deployable. But thundering hordes on Luneburge Heide are not likely to be seen any time soon.

Policing is the name of the game.  It is the name of the game for all armies..... Brits and Yanks included.

Now what happens when two Police Forces end up facing off against each other when trying to police the same piece of ground - as almost happened at Pristina when the Russians got to the airport first and US General Wesley Clark ordered UK General Mike Jackson to move the Russians out - that's another matter.  (Jackson, currently head of the British Army politely told Clark to get stuffed, he wasn't starting WW3 just because Clark's mates in the US forces couldn't get off the line of departure in time and held up the exercise).

Having a few heavies around at that time would no doubt be useful.

Cheers.
 
Bah...      ...lets just buy the whole damn farm then. Or at least some decent wheeled vehicles. I don't know why, but I don't have much faith in the LAV's. Maybe because their GM products? I don't know.

Ah, the pristina affair. I'd forgotten about that. I laughed my ass off when I heard about that.

No argument on the use of wheels in WWII. My regiment was Divisional recce at the time (5CAD). I'm just a big fan of track. Yes they both have their place and uses, but to lose one for the other...
 
Although the "sub" thing may have made people allergic to the idea of buying used, herte is an inexpensive alternative to the Leo 2A6 or M-i family: the IDF Magach 7.

Based on the M-60, the Magach 7, has a new suite of armour, up to date fire control, and is reasonably mobile (It is a Generation 2 tank, not one of the all powerful Generation 3 machines with 1500hp on tap and an advanced suspension system to handle the power). It is also available, since Isreal is currently converting some of their 1000+ M-60s to that standard, or we could buy surplus M-60s from the US and have them converted in a factory here. Turkey was offered an up-gunned version called Sabra, with a 120mm cannon.

Like any tank, the Magach requires more money on support infrastructure, fuel, tank transporters etc. , but if the CF is willing to divert resources to support that call, then we will have a fairly potent fighting machine for the CF.

 
Nice looking piece of equipment. I haven't heard of it before? Hmmm...        ...I'll have to look around and see what the stats are on it.

Not that it is likely ever to happen, but do you think it is wise to buy another gen 2 tank as opposed to going to a gen 3? And I'll also say NO to the M-60. Upgrading the Leo 1 circa 1970's is bad enough. But to upgrade a circa early 60's tank? Sheesh.

 
Lots of armies upgrade T-55s, a late 1950s era tank, so the idea is not invalid on its own.

The key here is to exploit an inexpensive and available system, which has the benifit of being both combat proven and upgraded with some of the latest "lessons learned" incorporated in the design. The M-60 itself was a decent machine, large and reliable with lots of room inside for ammo and equipment.
 
Your right on all points. However, I think it would be politically embarrassing for Canada as a G-8 nation to be buying refurbished late 50's tanks. However it is incredible what the Israeli's have done to the M-60 over the years. To turn it into a totally different tank is amazing. For myself, I would almost love to see us in any tank. Heck, even an M-60 would be nice. But the fact remains that countries like Greece can buy into the most advanced equipment, while Italy can develop its own is rather ridiculous.

But then again, priorities.

 
Tanks are needed to manoeuvre under contact, but in an urban operations situation, maybe a "tank" isn't what we need. AFVs will be "gunfighters" to provide observation and fire support to the dismounted Infantry and Engineers.

If we are limited to the LAV family of vehicles, then situational awareness improvements like the "fisheye" lenses to provide 3600 observation while buttoned up will have a big payoff, followed by improved passive defenses like the "cage".

Starting from the ground up, Infantry "Urban Gunfighters" will probably resemble the ACHZARIT with multiple OWS stations to cover each quarter, since even with the best possible SA, the vehicle and crew could still be caught in a 3600 gunfight. High or hypervelocity missiles like shrunken LOSATs are probably a "must" when dealing with hard targets at short range. A built in dozer blade will also be a big plus in urban ops. Perhaps these could be cheaply converted from surplus tank hulls, or maybe a more modern vehicle like the CV-90 or SEV can be adapted to this task.

 
a_majoor said:
Starting from the ground up, Infantry "Urban Gunfighters" will probably resemble the ACHZARIT with multiple OWS stations to cover each quarter, since even with the best possible SA, the vehicle and crew could still be caught in a 3600 gunfight.

Why does it sound like the old idea of the castle is going to come back? Except it is portable and can be set up in a urban enviroment.

 
i think canada should get the best tank in the wrold (what would be the point if they wouldn't?), so i suggest getting the Merkava 4 or the Merkava 3.

i myself drive on Merkava 2 but it's rather old.

7 - ×?ת החטי×'×”
 
Zipper said:
Why does it sound like the old idea of the castle is going to come back? Except it is portable and can be set up in a urban enviroment.

Isn't that called a mobile PILLBOX.......or a Tank?
 
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