Colin P said:
I noticed that they don't mention which T-72 is the best as there are many version of it and the Merk IV is not even mentioned, likely as the IDF does not release information on their equipment. I will take their list with a large bag of salt.
Colin,
there is a fair bit of information around about the Merk IV some I posted in an earlier forum/thread including where I discovered it. Most of which came from the Israeli press kits and advertsing. A few staff studies have recently surfaced vis via the tanks performance in it's AO. One of the problems with it though is the Israeli's refusal to export. "The second was the cost of development which despite cost sharing attempts no other country was interested. In this regard one of the more interesting features is the fuel tank suppression system. This system was offered to the US but the US refused. It is the main reason that the Merk's went with an up forward tank thus allowing for carrying space in the rear.(Conversation with Israeli Armoured Officers). Having said that there has been recently quite a bit of public source information regarding off the shelf purchases of components from Israel by the US. Business do like to publish their recent successes. Additionally, the book
Chariots of the Desert: the Story of the Israeli Armoured Corps by retired Col. David Eshel is an excellent reference source to the IDF armoured genre. Incidentally, anything by Eshel is worth the read as he has both written and spoken quite effectively in the US. Most recently his area of expertise has been the role of armour in urban counter insurgency warfare.
VP
Edit to add:
"I would also rank the Stug III Ausf G as more important....and that still omits the fact they're all actually a tank destroyers as opposed to tanks."
In disagreeing I think the Stug got the press and in this view mostly from western sources and writtings. Recently most German opinion revolves around the Panzerjäger 38(t) Hetzer. Small, manoeuvrable, good gun and a vehicle by vehicle infantry protection team consisting of a Jnr NCO and three other infantry types. The Americans however faced another dilemma as exemplified " Some American tanks posed a hazard to friendly troops merely by virtue of their construction. In September 1944 the 1st Infantry Division cautioned its units that extreme care should be exercised in firing the bow machine gun with which some US tanks were equipped because the gun was mounted in a low position and was impossible to aim accurately, thereby creating a serious hazard for infantry in front of the tank"(Shrader) In the conclusion of "THE EVOLUTION AND DEMISE OF U.S. TANK DESTROYER DOCTRINE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR" by Bryan E. Denny his closing statement sums it all up in that "Ultimately, it could be said that each of the tank destroyers worked well if was placed on the terrain that most negated its weaknesses." Echoing is the thoughts of Col. Joesph Greene in the tank verses anti tank role in that the "............vulnerbilty of the tank is one of long range, the gun one of short range.......the factor of audibility will be an advantage soley on the side of the anti tank...the factor of visibility, too, will almost invariably favour the anti tank......"
Despite the effectiveness of equipment you still have scenarios such as;
"Despite the obvious problems of a night passage of lines (by the 3d Battalion), the attack jumped off smoothly at 2230. By midnight the 1st and 3d Battalions had taken Kirchtroisdorf and Kleintroisdorf respectively, and three hours later the 2d Battalion passed through and took Putz before daylight in a short but stubborn fight. Only one incident marred the generally well coordinated and successful moonlit attack. The platoon of British flail tanks (four tanks) detailed to follow the 1/117th in the attack on the right toward Kirchtroisdorf strayed left into the 3/117th zone. After proceeding several hundred yards the platoon leader realized his mistake and turned his platoon around. As his tanks again approached the 3d Battalion axis of advance, they were spotted by elements of the 3d Battalion, which had jumped off ten minutes late. The 3/117th and its accompanying armor (B-743d Tank Bn and Troop A, 1st Lothian and Border Yeomanry (-)) and tank destroyer elements (one platoon of C-823d TD Bn) assumed that the tanks were German and took the hapless flail tanks under fire, destroying the entire platoon. In an otherwise well planned, well coordinated and well executed attack, chance, an error, and reduced visibility making identification difficult resulted in a serious case of ground amicicide, as it had so many times before in the European battle area." Interestingly though the author Charles Shrader also states with regard to the 823d TD Battalion "took two prisoners which were its first, suffered its first fatal casualties,
was shot up by its own Infantry and Armored Force and in turn shot up our own Infantry and Armored Force but under all circumstances came through their first critical engagement in fairly good shape and without too serious losses." (Shrader)
Source:
DENNY, BRYAN E. , MAJ, US ARMY "THE EVOLUTION AND DEMISE OF U.S. TANK DESTROYER DOCTRINE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR" Appalachian State University, Boone, North Carolina, 1990.http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA416377&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
Shrader Charles, " Amicicide: the problem of friendly fire in modern war."U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS
http://www.cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Shrader/shrader.asp
