New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

[PuckChaser]

We can't get surface combatants without major cost increases, yet someone is proposing we start a domestic submarine manufacturing capability from scratch? Waiter, I'll have what they're smoking...

 

[MilEME09]

We can't get surface combatants without major cost increases, yet someone is proposing we start a domestic submarine manufacturing capability from scratch? Waiter, I'll have what they're smoking...

must be some good stuff, because at the rate we are going all these big projects are going to be half the federal budget before long.

 

[ArmyRick]

What the heck, since the real world got tossed, I am throwing in for 2 aircraft carriers as well! Disband the senate and redirect the funds as down payment?

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Sorry to disappoint ArmyRick, but two carriers require more fighter planes than Canada currently owns and operates.  :nod:

 

[MarkOttawa]

Oldgateboatdriver:

Sorry to disappoint ArmyRick, but two carriers require more fighter planes than Canada currently owns and operates.  :nod:

Not necessarily--see regarding the RN's two QE class carriers:

...
The maximum capacity for F-35s is reportedly 36 aircraft, but during routine operations, each carrier might have only a dozen F-35Bs on board...

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/09/uk-commits-to-2-carriers-fully-crewed-f-35b-numbers-tbd/

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Kirkhill]

Other end of the spectrum.

RN looking at building 8 Type 26s and 5 yet unidentified Type 31s as light frigates.

BMT's hat in the ring for the Type 31 a 4000 tonne, 25 knot hull with a range of 7000 nm at 15 knots.

Crew of 85 with additional berths for up to 124 (39 Pax)

http://www.bmtdsl.co.uk/media/6102250/BMT%20Warships%20Venator%20110%20General%20Purpose%20Light%20Frigate%20Technical%20Brief.pdf

Scalable weapons fit.

 

[jmt18325]

I would say that light frigates are the answer to our budget problems.

 

[MarkOttawa]

JMT18325:

Or maybe a mix of CSCs and OPVs, especially if some hulls not built in Canada, er, Irving?

Italian Navy’s Offshore Patrol Vessel Plans (RCN?)
https://cgai3ds.wordpress.com/2014/10/27/mark-collins-italian-navys-offshore-patrol-vessel-plans-rcn/

Orders:

Seventh PPA ordered for Italian Navy

http://www.janes.com/article/55973/seventh-ppa-ordered-for-italian-navy

Just one example.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Kirkhill]

I think the issue is, no matter what you call them, you always have a choice between high capability ships and low capability ships.  Depending on how much water you want to put in you wine you can end up with 1 ship costing 20 Billion Dollars or 200 ships costing 100 Million Dollars.  You can put 2800 people into the crew of you single 20 Billion Dollar ship or crew your 200 ships with 14 each.

Or you can build an assortment of ships on a sliding scale of capabilities for the same budget.

That discussion has to happen long before anybody starts asking me for any more tax dollars to build the ships they would like to sail.

Slainte.

 

[jmt18325]

JMT18325:

Or maybe a mix of CSCs and OPVs, especially if some hulls not built in Canada, er, Irving?

Orders:

Just one example.

Mark
Ottawa

That could work as well.  The reality is, many of the missions that the RCN does require very little in the way of heavy weaponry (pirate patrol, drug patrol, now refugee patrol).  If we had 6 very capable ships (Spanish 105 type, for example) and 9 like the above ship, we'd have a good compromise.

 

[Half Full]

I think the issue is, no matter what you call them, you always have a choice between high capability ships and low capability ships.  Depending on how much water you want to put in you wine you can end up with 1 ship costing 20 Billion Dollars or 200 ships costing 100 Million Dollars.  You can put 2800 people into the crew of you single 20 Billion Dollar ship or crew your 200 ships with 14 each.

Or you can build an assortment of ships on a sliding scale of capabilities for the same budget.

That discussion has to happen long before anybody starts asking me for any more tax dollars to build the ships they would like to sail.

Slainte.

What we need to do is stop trying to fit acquisitions to a fixed budget.  Money should not drive strategy.  We need the government to tell us exactly what their expectations of the Military are (capabilities, readiness levels, etc...), and then fund those requirements.  I am hopeful that the Defence Policy Review will go a little ways towards that, however it will be flawed without an overarching Foreign Policy and National Security Policy reviews.  All this talk about how many CSCs, how many OPVs, etc... mean absolutely nothing without a document/policy/strategy that indicates why, what, where and when we need the Navy (or the CAF for that matter).

 

[Colin Parkinson]

1 super hull can only be in one place and if damaged your out of the game completely, while we do plan to have a number of hulls, will we have enough to do all of the tasks and replace damaged hulls. If we need 15 ships, then we really need 20 hulls with 5 going through upgrades/mid life/repairs/warm layup. In my perfect world you have a core of 1x AA/Command destroyer, 1x Mistral type ship, 1x full JSS, one of the Davie type light JSS, 1x sub on both coasts. Around that core you have a number of Halifax's, AOPS and Kingston class. That leaves 1 sub as a rover and one in refit 

 

[Kirkhill]

What we need to do is stop trying to fit acquisitions to a fixed budget.  Money should not drive strategy.  We need the government to tell us exactly what their expectations of the Military are (capabilities, readiness levels, etc...), and then fund those requirements.  I am hopeful that the Defence Policy Review will go a little ways towards that, however it will be flawed without an overarching Foreign Policy and National Security Policy reviews.  All this talk about how many CSCs, how many OPVs, etc... mean absolutely nothing without a document/policy/strategy that indicates why, what, where and when we need the Navy (or the CAF for that matter).

Money drives everything.  Full Stop.

If we had the Yanks' budget we could rule the world.  We don't.

With respect to the tasks, roles, strategems etc.: It has been amply demonstrated time after time that we do what we want to do - not what we need to do.  Even during WW2 we had the USN and the RN between us and the threat.  Our services were welcome and contributory, even critical. But we did what we wished to do, not what we were forced to do.  Unlike the Aussies who were actively invaded by Japan.

In peacetime that applies even moreso.  And apparently our fellow citizens don't wish to do very much.  So the question becomes how much can you accomplish with what money is available.

I argue, with Colin, that there is value in numbers and that not all vessels need to be built to meet the same threat level, or to perform the same tasks.

I would much sooner see a large variety of vessels with a large variety of capabilities, than a single class of ships that can only do one thing.  I would also prefer to see a much greater reliance on technology over manpower.

The Halifax has a nominal complement of 225. Given that the personnel budget is approximately half of the capability budget then it follows that increasing the reliance on technology and reducing the manning level by 50% will free up more money for additional hulls for the "unemployed" crew.  Perhaps enough money to build and man an additional pair of large OPVs like the Holland.  Or a single light frigate like the Venator, or even a gutted frigate with half the engines that can still be used militariliy in support like the Absalon, or a Bay class LSD.....

We get presented simple, single outcome solutions and told that it is only this or nothing. Send more money.  I reject that entirely.

What I would like to see from the professionals is a full array of the opportunities available given the funds available.  Then we can start to make policy decisions.

Cost and analyze the capabilities of a fleet of MGBs operating out of Esquimalt and Halifax and tell Canadians what they can and cannot do.  And what the remaining threat is.

Then start moving out from there to OPVs for the EEZ, to transports, to escorts.... etc.

Those studies should only have to be done once and then updated every generation or so.  And if they already exist then publish them.

The sad fact remains that the CAF has to sell itself to the Canadian Public, not just as an employer but as a capability.  And it does a piss-poor job of it.  The politicians won't do the job for you so you have to do the job yourself.

And by the way, before you dismiss the merits of an MGB fleet out of hand

http://navaltoday.com/2015/02/17/eunavfor-sweden-and-the-netherlands-fight-pirates/

From each according to his ability.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1035509
Government of Canada selects expert to advise on National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy

For Immediate Release

February 22, 2016  —  Gatineau, Quebec

The Honourable Judy M. Foote, Minister of Public Services and Procurement, in partnership with the Honourable Harjit S. Sajjan, Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Hunter Tootoo, Minister of Fisheries, Oceans, and the Canadian Coast Guard, and the Honourable Navdeep Bains, Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development, today announced that Steve Brunton, has been selected as Expert Advisor to assist on the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS).

Steve Brunton is a retired Rear Admiral from the Royal Navy (United Kingdom), with extensive experience in overseeing shipbuilding programs and naval acquisitions. He will provide Ministers and senior government officials with independent expert advice on multiple facets of the NSPS, including risk and program management, construction benchmarking and competitiveness, and performance and operational improvements.

Through the NSPS, the Government is supporting the renewal of the Canada Coast Guard fleet, and is ensuring that the Royal Canadian Navy is able to operate as a true-blue water maritime force. The NSPS will also bring long-term economic benefits to the marine industry and related sectors in communities across Canada.
Quick Facts

    Steve Brunton, CBE MSc MCGI CEng FIET FCMI, is currently providing strategic program and risk advice to the UK Ministry of Defence. In addition, he worked for the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy for 36 years, most of which was spent in the area of acquisitions.
    The contract is for one year, with potential one-year extensions up to 10 years. The annual value of the contract will vary depending on the tasks performed by Steve Brunton.

Quotes

    “Steve Brunton’s extensive experience and expert capability make him particularly well-suited for this work, and provide excellent value to Canada. Engaging him will help us to anticipate and address challenges face on, and to continue to make progress on our commitments on the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy.”
    The Honourable Judy M. Foote
    Minister of Public Services and Procurement

    “I would like to take the opportunity to welcome Steve Brunton as Expert Advisor to assist on the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy. I look forward to working with him as we deliver critical capabilities needed by the brave naval men and women of our Royal Canadian Navy so that they can defend Canadian waters and take part in international missions well into the future.”
    The Honourable Harjit S. Sajjan
    Minister of National Defence

 

[Baz]

What we need to do is stop trying to fit acquisitions to a fixed budget.  Money should not drive strategy.  We need the government to tell us exactly what their expectations of the Military are (capabilities, readiness levels, etc...), and then fund those requirements.  I am hopeful that the Defence Policy Review will go a little ways towards that, however it will be flawed without an overarching Foreign Policy and National Security Policy reviews.  All this talk about how many CSCs, how many OPVs, etc... mean absolutely nothing without a document/policy/strategy that indicates why, what, where and when we need the Navy (or the CAF for that matter).

Money drives everything.  Full Stop.

Yep.  If for no other reason as soon as the government said "what their expectations of the Military are,and then fund those requirements" every single empire and office in Ottawa would pile on about how thier pet project is part of those expectations, and the cost would run completely out of control.  There is no way the government should, or will, give the military a blank cheque.

In my perfect world you have a core of 1x AA/Command destroyer, 1x Mistral type ship, 1x full JSS, one of the Davie type light JSS, 1x sub on both coasts. Around that core you have a number of Halifax's, AOPS and Kingston class. That leaves 1 sub as a rover and one in refit

I think you are a little heavy: if you are going to have the Amphib it should be center of the task group and the Command ship, so:
1x Expediationary (ie Mistral or Canberra) type ship, 1x full JSS, one of the Davie type light JSS, 2 x sub on both coasts, around that core you have a number of Halifax replacements (like Type 31s with AAW capability, Strike [ie Tomahawk in VLS, with Standard SM-6, Harpoon until the replacement is here, and maybe ASROC], and basic littoral maneuver [ie maybe a stern ramp]) and AOPS.  No destroyers, no Kingston (ie do not replace), and maybe as few as 4 Hailfax replacements per coast.  Might need something light?

Rational: The Expeditionary, JSS, and light JSS are going to need down time, so it gives flexibility.  Best case Expeditionary and JSS, pretty good Expeditionary and light JSS, acceptable JSS and light JSS, not desirable just one of them.  Expeditionary stays with the task group while JSS / light JSS can make supply runs.  Expeditionary makes a much better center of the TG and Command ship.  However, those first three won't be cheap and need crew (and lot's of aircraft) so need to give somewhere, hence the much lower number of replacements for the Halifax's.

In my perfect world, international deployments would routinely be an Expeditionary, JSS, or light JSS plus one Halifax replacement to give flexibility forward all the time.

 

[Cloud Cover]

Steve Brunton, CBE MSc MCGI CEng FIET FCMI

Yes, but can he speak French?

 

[Kirkhill]

What would happen if?

Rather than one BIG HONKING SHIP we were to consider basing our inshore/EEZ fleet on the small Enforcer class LPDs.

Instead of AOPS and MCDVs we were to base our EEZ force on the Enforcer 8000.

Consider putting 3 on each coast, two at sea at any time.  They would provide a base of operations for helicopters, UAVs and high speed interceptors like the CB-90.

They would have onboard LCUs and Bv206s, an ability to export power and water to shore, a proper role 2 hospital and the ability to lift people and materiel into and out of harms way.

As domops assets they would support small communities along the coast and Other Government Departments.  They have relatively small crews of about 90 and some / all of those could be reservists.  They don't need to be fitted with weapons but could be fitted for CIWS stations.

For expeditions one or two could be retasked from domops and rely on the RCN for escort, just like the civilian vessels the RCN will likely be escorting as well.

Big fat landing spots in a bumpy ocean.

Damen's description:

GENERAL

Basic functions

Amphibious transport, disaster relief, helicopter
operations, evacuation operations, operation
support, maintenance support, joint operations
command, training

Classification

Lloyd’s Register of Shipping: 100 A1,
Amphibious Transport Ship, both intact and
damage stability according SOLAS

http://products.damen.com/en/ranges/landing-platform-dock/landing-platform-dock-8000

DIMENSIONS
Length o.a. 133.00 m
Beam mld 24.80 m
Depth no.1 deck 15.00 m
Draught 5.20 m
Displacement full load 8300 tonnes

PERFORMANCE
Speed 16-20 knots
Range at 16 knots >6000 nm
Endurance 30+ days at sea crew only
15+ days at sea with full complement

PROPULSION SYSTEM
Propulsion system Diesel-Direct + PTI (hybrid)
Propulsion engines Diesel engines + Electrical motor
Propulsion power 12.000 kW
Propellers 2 x CPP
Bow thrusters 2 x

AUXILIARY SYSTEM
4 x Diesel generator sets
1 x Emergency diesel generator set

ACCOMMODATION
Air-conditioned spaces for 95 crew and 450 embarked marine
forces (troops), consisting of cabins, stores, galley, mess rooms and
sanitary spaces.

MEDICAL FACILITIES
Role 1, examination room, sickbay fitted for 6 patients and dentistry
facilities.

TRANSPORT CAPACITY
Flight deck 2 spots medium size helicopter (NH-90 o.e.)
1 spot suitable for heavy helicopter (Chinook o.e.)
Hangar 2 x medium size helicopter
Dock 2 x LCM-1706 or equivalent
Flight deck 1250 m²
400 lane meters
RoRo space 1100 m2
290 lane meters
Ship Stores 100 m2
Cargo/Ammo 480 m2

EQUIPMENT
Stern ramp 70 t
Side ramp 50 t
RO unit(s)
1 x Cargo elevator 25 t
2 x Deck crane 25 t
2 x LCVP in Davits
2 x fast RHIB
Cargo hatch

WEAPON & SENSOR SUITE
1 x 30mm gun
2 x .50 machine gun
2D Surveillance & target indication radar, IFF
Electronic support measures
Radar / electro optical fire control
Combat management system, CIC
Integrated internal & external communication system

NAUTICAL EQUIPMENT
Extensive navigational equipment, GMDSS, echo sounder, powerand
ship’s management system with integrated ECDIS.

OPTIONS
NBCD citadel
Wash down installation
Shock protection
Underwater noise reduction

Broadly similar to the Kiwis Canterbury in role and size.

 

[Cloud Cover]

What would happen if?

Rather than one BIG HONKING SHIP we were to consider basing our inshore/EEZ fleet on the small Enforcer class LPDs.

Instead of AOPS and MCDVs we were to base our EEZ force on the Enforcer 8000.

Consider putting 3 on each coast, two at sea at any time.  They would provide a base of operations for helicopters, UAVs and high speed interceptors like the CB-90.

I think you may have just inadvertently made an argument along the lines of "quantity has qualities of it's own", in large or small numbers.  Would not the concept of the two ships "at sea at any time" with their crews, helo's etc imply a very high operational cost and quickly induce a parts/life cycle attrition problem? 

What is wrong with a a large number of far more basic (very basic) and cheaper to operate vessels and non shipborne maritime UAV's that do just as well.  I realize this does not address the expeditionary capability, but we don't have one now. 

I agree that nothing says "fuck off" to an adversary better than a fleet mix of heavy destroyers, submarines, fleet replenishment and support ships, along with LPH's and all the other kit. But again, the RCN does not have any of that now, except for the subs and some modernized frigates that (in a pragmatic sense) can barely defend themselves except for prosecuting a submarine. I think the case might be made for a better equipped RCN if it loses it's CF-18 aircover, the Aurora fleet fades away there is no suitable replacement for either.  Not that I am wishing a pox on the RCAF...
 
       

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Yep.  If for no other reason as soon as the government said "what their expectations of the Military are,and then fund those requirements" every single empire and office in Ottawa would pile on about how thier pet project is part of those expectations, and the cost would run completely out of control.  There is no way the government should, or will, give the military a blank cheque.


I think you are a little heavy: if you are going to have the Amphib it should be center of the task group and the Command ship, so:
1x Expediationary (ie Mistral or Canberra) type ship, 1x full JSS, one of the Davie type light JSS, 2 x sub on both coasts, around that core you have a number of Halifax replacements (like Type 31s with AAW capability, Strike [ie Tomahawk in VLS, with Standard SM-6, Harpoon until the replacement is here, and maybe ASROC], and basic littoral maneuver [ie maybe a stern ramp]) and AOPS.  No destroyers, no Kingston (ie do not replace), and maybe as few as 4 Hailfax replacements per coast.  Might need something light?

Rational: The Expeditionary, JSS, and light JSS are going to need down time, so it gives flexibility.  Best case Expeditionary and JSS, pretty good Expeditionary and light JSS, acceptable JSS and light JSS, not desirable just one of them.  Expeditionary stays with the task group while JSS / light JSS can make supply runs.  Expeditionary makes a much better center of the TG and Command ship.  However, those first three won't be cheap and need crew (and lot's of aircraft) so need to give somewhere, hence the much lower number of replacements for the Halifax's.

In my perfect world, international deployments would routinely be an Expeditionary, JSS, or light JSS plus one Halifax replacement to give flexibility forward all the time.

The Russian modified Mistral if built in France could be had cheap enough to get 3 (rotating 1 through refits) But they are not well armed, hence the AD destroyer. From my reading your AD ship needs to be big enough to carry a sustainable amount of reloads and we need 3 of those as well with one in refit. The Halifax's can provide ASW, the AOP's may fill the constabulary role both over seas and in the North, so minimum 5, (1 on each coast to sail with the fleet and the other to head north to support CCG ops in the spring/summer/fall plus refit) The Kingstons will still be needed to maintain a presence on the coast while the fleet is deployed and AOP is up North. These can be primary Reserve crewed, long term task naval reserve unit to provide crews and if they know they are going to have X number of slots from x date to x date every year, they can use that as a recruitment tool. Eventually we are going to need some smaller northern based vessels manned by local reservists and reg support staff, perhaps tuk and Frobisher Bay? 

 

[Kirkhill]

I think you may have just inadvertently made an argument along the lines of "quantity has qualities of it's own", in large or small numbers.  Would not the concept of the two ships "at sea at any time" with their crews, helo's etc imply a very high operational cost and quickly induce a parts/life cycle attrition problem? 

What is wrong with a a large number of far more basic (very basic) and cheaper to operate vessels and non shipborne maritime UAV's that do just as well.  I realize this does not address the expeditionary capability, but we don't have one now. 

I agree that nothing says "fuck off" to an adversary better than a fleet mix of heavy destroyers, submarines, fleet replenishment and support ships, along with LPH's and all the other kit. But again, the RCN does not have any of that now, except for the subs and some modernized frigates that (in a pragmatic sense) can barely defend themselves except for prosecuting a submarine. I think the case might be made for a better equipped RCN if it loses it's CF-18 aircover, the Aurora fleet fades away there is no suitable replacement for either.  Not that I am wishing a pox on the RCAF...
 
     

I agree entirely that quantity has a quality all its own.  As to the tempo of ops I would be happy if it broadly mimicked the anticipated tempo described in the original AOPS SOR of 2009

17 weeks arctic, 8 weeks sovpats, 4 weeks trials and WUPS, 7 weeks available in port, 6 weeks leave and 10 weeks maintenance.