New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

[Edward Campbell]

My first bike was a Norton. Oh, how I wish the Prince of Darkness had provided the third option of "dim."   

Oh, yes .. as the old saying goes, amongst the Austin Healy and MG-B owners: "If you can't buy best, buy British!"

                                                                                            That meant a whole generation of young army officers back circa the 1960s.

 

[Old Sweat]

Oh, yes .. as the old saying goes, amongst the Austin Healy and MG-B owners: "If you can't buy best, buy British!"

                                                                                            That meant a whole generation of young army officers back circa the 1960s.

Not forgetting those of us who drove Triumph TR3s. The pinnacle of British technology's contribution to mobility was the pace stick.

 

[Kirkhill]

Not forgetting those of us who drove Triumph TR3s. The pinnacle of British technology's contribution to mobility was the pace stick.

Since we have digressed this far -

I believe we did a bit better than that.  Here's my "Best of British"  -  LNER's A4 Mallard.

And I would have loved to see this

But I wouldn't let a Brit electrician out of his cage.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Ah, the Daimler Dart (SP250):

http://www.daimlersp250dartownersclub.com/

Mark
Ottawa

 

[jollyjacktar]

A thing of beauty. I saw one once at the Dockyard parking lot in Halifax.  Some retired naval officer's wheels. 

 

[chrisf]

She is no high speed frigate, agreed, but neither is she simply a floating box with a pointy end.

If you want to get a little closer to comparing "apples to apples" comparing a civillian ship to a warship, look at something like the Technip Deep Explorer.

Room for a large crew, significant redundancies in the the machinery space built in as a requirement to be DP3 capable, a helideck (could easily be moved to the cargo deck with a hanger added) and lots of space for "extra" equipment.

It's not a warship, but it's a much better comparison than factor trawler.

You won't find the speed needed in any civilian designs though.

 

[Kirkhill]

We are taking an approach called FA-XX. We’ll [start a study] next year that would assess all those missions the F/A-18 E/F plugs into, in the air wing. How could we capture those capabilities in another way instead of buying another very high-end, very expensive platform replacement? Certainly there will be platforms involved, but do they have to be platforms that look and feel and operate much like an F/A-18 E/F or an F-35 does today? Could it be done differently? Could we do the mission sets different?

For example, we talk a lot to NAVAIR [Naval Air Systems Command] about future designs being more of a truck that has an open architecture design, so you can plug different sensors, different payloads and weapons into that for a specific mission, and be able to move those sensors and payloads around so you can do multiple different missions on different days, or different sorties, instead of trying to build everything into a jet — that becomes very expensive.

It is very much in line with [the direction of Adm. Jonathan Greenert, chief of naval operations], where he talked about payloads over platforms. In other words, the payload piece is what is important. Getting the right payload in the right place, at the right time is also critical. But what kind of truck that payload rides around on is what we are really after.

So we want to look holistically at all of the things that contribute to a mission. They include space-based. They include other platforms that are already part of the air wing — E-2D Hawkeyes, EA-18G Growlers — and the rotary wing component. How do we do a system-of-systems look across all of those platforms, and decide what capability gaps we need to cover as the F/A-18 E/Fs start to fall off?

Now we try to tell industry that we are just opening up the aperture to have a conversation about what they think the art of the possible is. I have had some great discussions with industry partners about this. Do not just look to walk in here with a new design, a sixth-generation aircraft. I am not interested in that conversation yet. I am interested in what are the technologies that you think you can bring? And specifically propulsion, which drives future capability. That is the timeline driver. If you are looking at a game-changing propulsion capability, whether it is long dwell, fast and high, all of those types of attributes to a propulsion capability, we have got to start working that now to lead to whatever the truck looks like.

And as you are developing that propulsion capability, then you can start to look at what kind of payloads? What kind of sensors? What kind of integrating capability that you want to develop across the air wing, so you continue to have the same effect of a different shape, a different mix of an air wing in the future.

This is all about aircraft but it encapsulates what I was thinking about ships.  The ship as a flexible, reconfigurable truck with the military focusing on sensors and weapons and the civilian side focusing on the truck.

Not as Sigs Op.  I like the OSVs as well and I get that they don't go as fast as the navy needs.  But the issue in my mind is not the details of the hull form or power plant but the manner in which construction occurs and how well it is managed.

I remain convinced that any market that can manufacture vessels with hullforms that can break ice sideways

can build you any hull shape that you want.  Regardless of the metal.

And OGBD: Similarly, I am going to continue to stump for building ships at minimum cost, that can be sailed with minimum crews, and that can fitted with the weapons and the weapons crews that the mission demands. Just like any other cargo and passengers.

I keep hearing about how the navy can't recruit the numbers to man the ships they have at the levels wanted/needed.

I keep hearing that the navy can't afford to buy the ships they want/need with the weapons they want/need.

And yet I don't hear any appetite for doing things differently even though the existing plan is stressed to or beyond the breaking point.

I'm honestly not trying to pick fights.  I guess I am just really intrigued by the psychology. 

I saw this for the first time a couple of days ago. And it applies to me as well - I don't do change personally very well at all.

Final thought:

This from Tomahawk 6's posting on the SM-6 "repurposing"

Given that modern warships are not the armored battlewagons from the battleship era, it is relatively easy to achieve a “mission kill” on a current-generation surface combatant. That means even with its small warhead, the SM-6 should be more than effective against, for example, a Russian Kirov-class battlecruiser due to the warhead's speed. The kinetic energy from a very fast missile can do enormous damage by itself.

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/sinking-enemy-warships-the-us-navys-fiery-new-weapon-15132

I don't understand how a few more knots of speed will allow the threat to be outrun.  Is the cost of specialization, of optimization, worth the coin?

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Seriously, Chris: The motor ship Baltika?

That thing, which BTW costs $200M Canadian when all is taken into consideration, is half the size of the AOPS and can only deal with 60 cm of ice.

Anyway, I get a feeling we are not getting through with our explanations: Yes, building a proper hull for a warship and fitting that hull with more powerful engines is more expensive than the  hull/machinery combination for a merchant ship, but its no big deal. In the grand scheme of things, on a 1.2 B$ frigate, paying 100M$ more for the hull and power plant than for a similar sized merchant ship is not what is going to break the bank. And the value you get for that extra money is essential (i.e. merchant ship's don't care if they have a big hole in their hull in one of the cargo holds because they know they will sink - period and therefore don't care about the various holds actually being built to prevent water spreading from one to the other; nor do they have to be airtight for nuclear fall out, biological or gas attacks resistance - merchant ship don't have back up main engines capability, or double extra electrical generation capability, because if the mains fail or they lose electrical power, they just drift until fixed or rescued.)

Like we said many times before, it's the weapons, weapons systems, sensors, sensors integration and platform integration that represent 2/3's to 3/4's of the cost of a warship.

And no, weapons flexibility like the one the Air Force may be looking at is NOT an option. If I am in the middle of the Atlantic and get attacked by air when I am carrying ASW weapons, I don't have the ten days required to sail back home, switch my weapons load and go back to where I was to face the attack. Each ship must carry all it needs for her own self protection in all aspects, and then have room left for the mission for which she is optimized.

Where we do get flexibility is in the loading of weapons. For instance, a Mk41 launcher can carry VLS ASROC's, or quad ESSM's or SM-2, SM-3 or SM-6, or Tomahawk, and soon the nextgen Harpoon etc. You vary the mix, you automatically vary the optimized mission you can carry out. But the sensors cannot be so mixed-and-matched. The radar systems, optical systems and EW sensors, together with the communications systems, have to be designed, organized and mounted on the ship permanently and as a whole, because (1) some of them are too large for bolt-on/bolt-off modularity and (2) the most important aspect: they all generate some form of interference with one another and therefore, their placement must be such as to eliminate or minimize any such interaction and where need be, build in the sequence of use so that they don't suffer from the effects of such interference and are used in the right order (for instance, the radar detection systems of the EW suite must be set up and programmed so they don't get overwhelmed by the ship's own radars).

Finally: Yes, those few extra knots are essential - not to outrun a supersonic missile - but for the aspect of the operation of the ship and of carrying its mission. For instance, a frigate assigned to provide ASW escort to a merchant ship (or a few merchant ships in convoy) has to be able to sprint 30 to 40 NM ahead of the group, stream the tail and loiter at slow speed to determine if there are any contacts that warrant prosecution or if the area is sanitized, then pull the tail and sprint again when the convoy has closed to about 10 NM. If you only have 2 or 3 knots advantage on the merchant ship, then you get about seven to ten hours of useless sprinting for every two hours of listening/prosecuting - that is only 17 to 22% of the time spent doing your job. At ten knots advantage, that ratio falls to two hours of sprinting for two hours of listening/prosecuting - or 50 % of the time doing your job. Is that worth an extra 100M$ for the hull and power plant in a 1.2B$ frigate? I would say yes, personally. And that is just one example where that extra speed may be required.
   

 

[chrisf]

This is all about aircraft but it encapsulates what I was thinking about ships.  The ship as a flexible, reconfigurable truck with the military focusing on sensors and weapons and the civilian side focusing on the truck.

Not as Sigs Op.  I like the OSVs as well and I get that they don't go as fast as the navy needs.  But the issue in my mind is not the details of the hull form or power plant but the manner in which construction occurs and how well it is managed.

I remain convinced that any market that can manufacture vessels with hullforms that can break ice sideways

Speed can be increased not a problem, thing about the OSV, DSV, construction vessel, etc, they're all built pretty much from the outset to be modified now, not quite "modular" only because there's no standardization between equipment, but definitely able to modify quickly and easily.

We built a cable layer out of one recently, only took 48 hours.

 

[Kirkhill]

Probably not before time: I yield.

 

[Kirkhill]

Coming at my Johnny One Note desire to get muddy boots in the RCN's ships from a different tack:

I was looking at our near peer navies - the Aussies, Brits, French, Italians, Spaniards, Dutch and Danes  - and I discovered that for every navy but the Italians there appears to be a relatively constant fleet ratio of Crew to Passengers (including flight dets and wings amongst the passengers) of 1 to 1.

For the Aussies and Dutch 1 to 1.
For the Danes it is 1.17 : 1
For the Brits (including RFA lift) it is 1.08 to 1
For the Spanish it is 0.82
For the French it is 0.70
For the Italians it is 0.45

Virtually all the new vessels, down to the minor Patrol vessels like the BMMs and the BAM-Meteoros have relatively even split between Pax and Crew.

PDF attached below.

Not all the navies adopt the same strategies obviously.  Some spread the passengers more uniformly across the fleet.  Most maintain some "pure" navy vessels and some "pure" lift vessels.  But all the fleets have a significant lift capacity.

Could a similar metric be applied to the RCN?  Could the RCN accomodate a Government of Canada / CDS requirement, within the existing budget, that the fleet be able to lift as many passengers as it has crew berths?

I suggest that the Dutch fleet presents its government with the following options:

It can deploy an AAW Zeven Provincien and a Holland OPV to the Caribbean or the Gulf with an embarked Platoon in the Holland that can be augmented by an additional Company, also in the Holland if the circumstances demand.

It can deploy a Battle Group in one of its LPDs.

Combining all assets it can deploy a Brigade Group with armoured and rotary wing support.

Can't we aspire to, and accommodate, that level of capability?  And still maintain a strong blue water RCN?



On a side note:

One other thing that became apparent to me was how many different classes of ship were to be found in each navy.  Particularly in the French, Spanish and Italian navies.  I am not talking about different capabilities but simply numerous small classes of the same capability.

They don't look at a single 15 vessel build but at 5 builds of 3 vessels (or 3 builds of 5 vessels), each incorporating new capabilities and technologies.  And they don't seem particularly bothered by the logistics of maintaining that variety of vessels in service.

When the Brits said that they needed 19 Destroyers/Frigates and they ran out of money they retailored their suit to suit the cloth.  They have decided to build 6 Type 45s, 8 Type 26s and 5 Type 31s.  Should we not be looking at the same for our CSC buy?

Also, I note that the Brits are not shy about saying that they are purchasing Patrol Vessels solely for the purpose of keeping yards open and maintaining skills.  The Patrol Vessels may come in handy, have short service lives, minimal crews and minimal weapons and sensor suites.  They take some of the coastal load off the high end vessels as well as some of the training burden.  But their bigger contribution is keeping they yards open.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Coast Guard vessels being built by Seaspan Vancouver a big budget problem too:

Budget for building oceanographic research ship inadequate, cabinet told

The federal cabinet will soon be asked to pump more money into one of the key civilian projects under the national shipbuilding strategy in what's expected to be the first real test of the Trudeau government's commitment to stick with the Conservative-era program.

The Canadian Press has learned that federal bureaucrats have warned the Liberals that the current $144 million budget for the offshore oceanographic science vessel is inadequate and will need to be topped up in order to complete the vessel.

The science ship will be built by Vancouver-based Seaspan shipyards as part of a package of non-combat vessels meant to replace the coast guard's aging fleet, including the nearly 52-year-old CCGS Hudson research vessel.

If approved by the Trudeau government, it would be the second funding injection for the program in the last eight years.

A series of documents leaked to The Canadian Press show the initial cost of the new research vessel was pegged at $108 million in 2008 and a year later the federal treasury board was required to pump an additional $35 million into the project.

[No need for any leak--those figures have been publicly available here, scroll down to "Progress Report and Explanation of Variances":
http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/rpp/2015-16/SupplementaryTables/mcp-eng.html#s1.3

Note also the timetable: "Request for Proposal for Design Issued: April 2010"; "Delivery of Offshore Oceanographic Science Vessel: 2017-18"--that's eight perishing years!]

A spokesman for the Fisheries Department, which oversees the coast guard, would not confirm the size of the new funding increase -- or the specific reason for it, but suggested the situation is still in flux.

"No increase to the original ... budget has yet been determined," David Walters said. "Costing information will continue to improve as engineering work for the new vessel progresses."

But a slide deck briefing, dated Nov. 16 and provided to federal ministers, warned that "significant funding decisions" were required for both the navy's planned frigate replacements and the oceanographic science vessel, specifically "whether to provide the budget increase required to complete the project."

It comes at an awkward time, as a cabinet committee is reportedly set to review a controversial decision related to the military shipbuilding project [[see "RCN Ship Procurement, or, the Curse of Irving: Canadian Surface Combatant Section"
https://cgai3ds.wordpress.com/2016/02/12/mark-collins-rcn-ship-procurement-or-the-curse-of-irving-canadian-surface-combatant-section/ ].

The oceanographic vessel is separate program from three planned fisheries science vessels, which are already under construction at Seaspan and have had their own budget woes. The briefing shows the budget for the fisheries ships increased by 181 per cent to $687 million between 2009 and 2015.

Part of the escalation had to do with the federal government's inexperience in managing "multiple, complex ship projects" in an industry that under previous Liberal and Conservative governments had become moribund.

The documents note there was also a steep learning curve for the Vancouver shipyard, which "needed to find skilled staff, establish capability to undertake design work and learn how to use new facilities -- (something that) led to delays and increased cost for offshore fisheries science vessels."..
http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/budget-for-building-oceanographic-research-ship-inadequate-cabinet-told-1.2778567

Mark
Ottawa

 

[CougarKing]

Avoiding an embarassment? Too late!

Canadian Press

Shipbuilders call for federal strategy overhaul to avoid an 'embarrassment'
[The Canadian Press]
Murray Brewster, The Canadian Press

February 17, 2016

OTTAWA - The Shipbuilding Association of Canada is hoping the Liberal government will change course when it comes to the renewal of the country's navy and civilian fleets.

The industry group said Wednesday that the current strategy, laid out in the former Harper government's national shipbuilding program, is not working and has led to "unaffordable and untenable" renewal programs.

It also wants to see the overall marquee strategy reopened "to include any Canadian shipyard capable of delivering ships to the program."
(...SNNIPPED)

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Interesting the ship building Association includes Seaspan and Davie, but not Irving, perhaps this is code for "Irving is making a massive mess of this" but politically they can't say that.

 

[GR66]

Frankly I'd be happy if the shipbuilding strategy was revised to provide long-term supply of the "must haves" for the RCN and leave the more specialized requirements for separate contracts.

Something like shipyard "A" produces 1 x General Purpose Halifax-type replacement patrol frigate every two years while shipyard "B" produces one corvette/OPV Kingston-type replacement in the alternating years.

Have this an ongoing contract that would keep the RCN supplied with 12 x GP Frigates and 12 x Corvettes/OPVs with each vessel retired (or shifted to the Reserves?) after 24 years of service.  Production could be done in Blocks of 3 or 4 of each class with a review of the design then taking place every 6 or 8 years.  This would allow for ongoing improvements to the designs/equipment without need to send the entire class in for a mid-life refit.

Other contracts (AAW Destroyers, Supply Ships, specialty vessels, etc.) could then be tendered as smaller, easier to manage contracts.  With Canadian shipbuilders already given the lion's share of the ship building with long-term contracts for ongoing Frigates/OPV's it might even then be easier politically to go offshore to purchase the specialty vessels.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

:goodpost:

+1

 

[Bearpaw]

I completely agree with GR66---the NSPS must be broken into smaller pieces and some rational thought given to exactly which type of ships should be produced domestically to ensure a viable ship-building industry.
The CSC program should be broken into an AAW-Destroyer program and a Halifax-like frigate replacement program.
The current projections of the CSC program have the AAW-destroyer hulls far too small for effective AAW in the future swarming attacks that could occur---the AAW ships should be extremely heavily armed.  IMHO the RN type 45 is well equipped for radar, sensors,.. but is quite likely under-armed in terms of numbers of missiles,.... for the type of attacks that may come.  The Arleigh Burke class is about the right size for the AAW-destroyer so that it can have a sufficient missile load-out.

Domestic warship production should concentrate on corvette-class and coastal defence class ships---these are the ONLY types of ships we could possible sell to Tier 3 navies.  There should be NO expectation of producing AAW-destroyers or frigates and being able to sell them.  The only nations that can afford to buy those types already produce their own.

A future Submarine replacement program should be domestic----mainly for maintenance and support reasons.

Good post GR66!

Bearpaw

 

[Karel Doorman]

I completely agree with GR66---the NSPS must be broken into smaller pieces and some rational thought given to exactly which type of ships should be produced domestically to ensure a viable shipbuilding industry.
The CSC program should be broken into an Destroyer program and a  frigate replacement program.
The current projections of the CSC program have the AAW-destroyer hulls far too small for effective AAW in the future swarming attacks that could occur---the AAW ships should be extremely heavily armed.  IMHO the RN type 45 is well equipped for radar, sensors,.. but is quite likely under-armed in terms of numbers of missiles,.... for the type of attacks that may come.  The Arleigh Burke class is about the right size for the AAW-destroyer so that it can have a sufficient missile load-out.

Domestic warship production should concentrate on corvette-class and coastal defence class ships---these are the ONLY types of ships we could possible sell to Tier 3 navies.  There should be NO expectation of producing AAW-destroyers or frigates and being able to sell them.  The only nations that can afford to buy those types already produce their own.

A future Submarine replacement program should be domestic----mainly for maintenance and support reasons.

Good post GR66!

Bearpaw

Bearpaw,I'm not Canadian(Dutch in fact)but( in my view)to think that Canada would buy something like the Arlieghs is crazy,
-Far too expensive(both in buying and upkeep)
-you'll have to redesign them(or make adjustments)for them to take APAR/SMART-L,if you'll go that way
-I'm sure there are other reasons why Canada wouldn't buy them

Apart from the fact offcourse that the Burke's are big enough to put a lot of missiles on them(that much is true) ;D

But when is enough,enough?(missiles)30?40?50?etc

As for the T-45 also big enough,but also far to expensive,think (as many do here)Canada would be better of with an European design(whatever it might be,Iver,F-124,DZP,F-100 all will fit nicely)and use American weapons(missiles)as they do.

Whether  it would be better to built them yourselves or buy them overseas(that's a political decision,money flowing back into own economy,jobs,but also more expensive) all things that should be taken in account(building/designing experience is another)

I think(again my opinion as a Dutch  [Xp )Canada's navy should be more like the Dutch Navy(bigger offcourse  )but with about the same capabilities.

As for the Subs(replacements)same story really.The Netherlands and Canada need a same sort of boat(as they have now)Walrus and Vics are quite comparable(in stealth,range,weaponsoutfit etc)
So as i posted in the"what i don't understand" topic,in the next  months a decision is being made for the (future)replacement of the Walrus-class,as this will go through,hopefully(more budget is needed,now 2.5  B for 4 ,need at least another 1.5 B to be able to do that )it might be interesting for Canada to see what happens.
-Both navies (i think )will go for a 3000 t boat
-as great a range(at least)but probably bigger as what the Walrus has
-newest systems(weapons)
-etc

Also these boats will be build simultaneously with Swedens and the Norwegian new boats(at least that's what i got from the plans)Which means a bigger series(not all the same Sweden and Norway will order smaller boats)but they will be more boats built simultaneously,which offcourse means price can(hopefully)come down,learn from first boats and learn/addapt accordingly.
And offcourse as more Navies have some sort of the same boats upkeep and upgrades can be done in group.
Imagine what this could mean for Canada when they would join(learning from each other,upgrading together,etc)

This is my idea of what Canada should do and get alot more "bang for their buck" so to speak.

I love to hear all of your views in this matter,

gr,walter

PS i don't know how many shipbuilders Canada's got but offcourse when the decision is made divide the work(or let 2 off them build the frigates,1 OPV's etc.)We(Netherlands haven't got that much of a choice being that Damen is the primairy (and only) shipbuilder for the Navy.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

we have 3 major yards, Seaspan, Davie and Irving

 

[Kirkhill]

PS i don't know how many shipbuilders Canada's got but offcourse when the decision is made divide the work(or let 2 off them build the frigates,1 OPV's etc.)We(Netherlands haven't got that much of a choice being that Damen is the primairy (and only) shipbuilder for the Navy.

So... all your projects are sole-sourced to a privately held, family run company and costs are contained?

So un-Canadian.