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New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

  • Thread starter Thread starter GAP
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Chris Pook said:
After the war the RCN clung to that role even as the need for convoys seems to have petered out....

You have that backwards.  The RCN specifically went out and specialized in ASW because at the time submarines were the only force that had ever had or could ever pose a direct threat to Canada itself.  The inability of the RCN during the war to find and destroy subs in the Gulf of St. Laurence during WW2 was a massive embarrassment and showed the need for effective ASW in littoral systems.  Hence the ASW helo, dipping/variable depth sonar development etc, etc....  It was actually an example of good naval policy based upon a perceived and real threat, as well as Canada's expected role should war break out with the Soviet Union. 

Where the change came was towards the end of the Cold War when it was obvious that subs were not the only threat to Canada and NATO and that more general purpose ships were needed. Especially after the loss of the Bonnie and the cruisers.  Hence the Halifax and TRUMP programs.  It turned out that these were the right ships for the right time as they came on-line just when the Soviet Union was disintegrating, and thus the threats became varied and different with failed and failing states holding old Soviet weapons.

GR66 said:
What ARE Canada's national objectives in terms of naval forces?

What foreign nation (other than the US) has the naval capability to put a credible surface task force into Canadian territorial waters to pose a threat to our national interest? 

Now let's remove the arctic where others more knowledgeable than myself have pointed out that a surface force trying to push at ant-like speed through the ice or stuck in the narrow confines of the arctic archipelago could best be handled by aircraft rather than other surface ships.

Let's also rule out our close allies since it would be a fool's game to try and build a navy capable of taking on the USN, and is building a navy around the concept of facing your LEAST likely opponents a sound strategy that is likely to produce the best mix of forces you may actually require?

Who does that leave?  China and Russia?  Do either of them have the capability to put surface forces into Canadian territorial waters?  Can anyone provide me a credible scenario where such a Chinese or Russian naval force would NOT trigger a joint Canadian/US response?  Can anyone provide me with a credible scenario where we wouldn't welcome US involvement in repelling such an attack?  Does anyone believe that either the Russian or Chinese navies could defeat the USN/RCN with an expeditionary naval force in North American territorial waters within range of ground-based air support?

I would suggest that the greatest direct military (and political) threats to Canadian maritime territory would be submarines, non-conventional attacks and tests of our sovereignty/ability to respond to incursions.  All of these threats I believe would be best countered by a larger fleet of vessels with the good ASW capabilities that can cover a greater territory.  The need to conduct major anti-surface threats is much less likely and air threats in our own backyard are likely best countered by our own air assets.

Those are our self-defence national interests (in my opinion anyway), so what are our expeditionary national interests?  Have we ever as a nation taken unilateral expeditionary military action against another country?  Are we likely to?  Are we likely to want to?  I think we're much more likely to send our expeditionary naval forces as part of a coalition with our allies.  So the question then is what would be a useful contribution that we could make to a multi-national force?

Last I checked we were partners in the enforcement of the freedom of the seas.  You can't do that with only ASW forces.  You also can't operate with allies in a credible level or with input if you bring ancillary forces that can only plug into a ASW role.  That's like showing up to build a house and your tool box only has a hammer.  The Aussies learned from us during OP Artemis that no one gives a crap if you show up without a Command and Control ship or you can't even deploy your own command team in your own ships.  Canada took a lead role during OP ARTEMIS because we were not specialized and did some very good work there.

During the Libya crisis general purpose was the name of the game.  An ASW ship would have been relatively useless.  Charlottetown did good work and was the first ship since Korea to have been shot at by an enemy. 

As for unilateral action, yep, illegally arresting Spanish fishermen on the high seas.  When our interests are at stake we will act alone if necessary.  Fortunately most of our foreign policy interest align with our biggest allies.  The China/Russia argument is silly.  We don't know what the future will bring so instead of just getting flood insurance on the house, how about getting the full coverage package.
 
Underway said:
You have that backwards.  The RCN specifically went out and specialized in ASW because at the time submarines were the only force that had ever had or could ever pose a direct threat to Canada itself.  The inability of the RCN during the war to find and destroy subs in the Gulf of St. Laurence during WW2 was a massive embarrassment and showed the need for effective ASW in littoral systems.  Hence the ASW helo, dipping/variable depth sonar development etc, etc....  It was actually an example of good naval policy based upon a perceived and real threat, as well as Canada's expected role should war break out with the Soviet Union. 

Where the change came was towards the end of the Cold War when it was obvious that subs were not the only threat to Canada and NATO and that more general purpose ships were needed. Especially after the loss of the Bonnie and the cruisers.  Hence the Halifax and TRUMP programs.  It turned out that these were the right ships for the right time as they came on-line just when the Soviet Union was disintegrating, and thus the threats became varied and different with failed and failing states holding old Soviet weapons.

....

Point taken.

I guess, if there is one tool that I find missing in the RCN's toolbox, that I really wish was there to supply a broad, general purpose, capability, is a corps of marines.  And I don't mean a corps of thousands deployed by battalions.  But a corps capable of supplying platoon and company sized troops deployable in most of the hulls that the RCN sails.  A corps that brings the RCN closer into the shore. 

Ideally the corps of marines could be found from existing land forces - but I have the sense that neither the Square Combat Team army, nor the Blue Water navy are particularly interested in making such a thing happen.  I know that there are other voices but the institutional biases seem set.

Perhaps, a starting point, would be to raise, on the Navy's establishment and under Navy command and control a corps of sea soldiers.  If nothing else it could allow for additional command billets.

How does this tie into building ships?  As has been pointed out - ships are cheap and weapons expensive.  Supplying berths in a hull is relatively cheap.  A hull with room for soldiers adds another broadly utilitarian capability at a relatively low cost.

And yes, I am arguing for some portion of the CSC hulls to be built to something like the Absalon pattern.  The hulls would keep Irving employed and be useful even if it did reduce Lockmart's profits.
 
Chris Pook said:
Point taken.

I guess, if there is one tool that I find missing in the RCN's toolbox, that I really wish was there to supply a broad, general purpose, capability, is a corps of marines.  And I don't mean a corps of thousands deployed by battalions.  But a corps capable of supplying platoon and company sized troops deployable in most of the hulls that the RCN sails.  A corps that brings the RCN closer into the shore. 

Ideally the corps of marines could be found from existing land forces - but I have the sense that neither the Square Combat Team army, nor the Blue Water navy are particularly interested in making such a thing happen.  I know that there are other voices but the institutional biases seem set.

Perhaps, a starting point, would be to raise, on the Navy's establishment and under Navy command and control a corps of sea soldiers.  If nothing else it could allow for additional command billets.

How does this tie into building ships?  As has been pointed out - ships are cheap and weapons expensive.  Supplying berths in a hull is relatively cheap.  A hull with room for soldiers adds another broadly utilitarian capability at a relatively low cost.

And yes, I am arguing for some portion of the CSC hulls to be built to something like the Absalon pattern.  The hulls would keep Irving employed and be useful even if it did reduce Lockmart's profits.
The Maritime Tactical Operations Group is likely a tentative first step.

Link to National Post. article removed due to reference to its author.
 
FSTO said:
The Maritime Tactical Operations Group is likely a tentative first step.

Link to National Post. article removed due to reference to its author.

If so then it is to be encouraged and fed.
 
Underway said:
Last I checked we were partners in the enforcement of the freedom of the seas.  You can't do that with only ASW forces.  You also can't operate with allies in a credible level or with input if you bring ancillary forces that can only plug into a ASW role.  That's like showing up to build a house and your tool box only has a hammer.  The Aussies learned from us during OP Artemis that no one gives a crap if you show up without a Command and Control ship or you can't even deploy your own command team in your own ships.  Canada took a lead role during OP ARTEMIS because we were not specialized and did some very good work there.

During the Libya crisis general purpose was the name of the game.  An ASW ship would have been relatively useless.  Charlottetown did good work and was the first ship since Korea to have been shot at by an enemy. 

As for unilateral action, yep, illegally arresting Spanish fishermen on the high seas.  When our interests are at stake we will act alone if necessary.  Fortunately most of our foreign policy interest align with our biggest allies.  The China/Russia argument is silly.  We don't know what the future will bring so instead of just getting flood insurance on the house, how about getting the full coverage package.

I'm not suggesting that we become ONLY and ASW force.  I'm suggesting that for domestic defence what would seem to serve us best would be a relatively larger number of hulls with good ASW capability.  Area anti-air, land attack and heavy ASuW capabilities would be less important in the domestic role.  The need/desire for more rather than fewer hulls and a limited budget would suggest a design of the large corvette/small frigate type vessel for this role.  I also think that this type of ship would be more than adequate for unilateral domestic actions such as arresting fishermen or boarding cargo vessels, etc.

I think that this is the type of ship that it would make sense for Canadian shipyards to focus on building.  There are only a handful of countries that have similar naval requirements to ours and it would make some sense for us to have the capability to build ships that fit our primary role of self-defence and meet our specific needs (range, endurance, large maritime helo capability, etc.).

What we choose to bring to the table for expeditionary purposes is another story entirely.  There are a number of roles we could choose to fulfill.  We could have flexible multi-role ships, specialized ships for taking a command role, area air defence, land attack, maybe a Mistral-type platform, etc.  There are several options we could choose, but I'd argue that whatever ships we select for an expeditionary role they could be far fewer in number than our "domestic role" ships and could possibly be cheaper to buy from elsewhere rather than try and build them in Canada.

 
FSTO said:
The Maritime Tactical Operations Group is likely a tentative first step.

Link to National Post. article removed due to reference to its author.

Had we gotten the Mistrals , I suspect that we would have a bigger focus on that capability, despite the gnashing of teeth in some quarters.
 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_length_of_coastline

With respect GR66, but we have the world's longest coastline - about 200 to 250,000 km of it.  And those coasts are rich places.

About 70% of our landmass has no road access.  That leaves air and sea as the primary access routes. 

Air is fast but lacks capacity and staying power.  Sea is slow but can carry every resource known to man and keep them available and move them where needed. 

Combine Sea and Air (both land-based and sea-based) and the Government can reach out and touch every part of Canada.  That is why I am a fan of the AOPS concept.

If the RCN were to exploit the MTOG concept and the AOPS concept as the launch point for a littoral capability it would serve domestic needs first - supplying an additional layer of security in some pretty far flung places in our own back yard as well as supplying logistical support that could be effectively employed in disaster relief. 

AOPS, MTOG, add in the Rangers, the Arctic Company Response Groups and the regs IRUs and you have the basis for developing a real combined ops capability that is based around a real need in a real scale.  Those capabilities could be built upon and developed and exported to the expeditionary forces.

And I feel that the Absalon style Command and Support ship has a role in that development both in domestic waters and in higher threat environments. 

Build the hulls. Add weapons to suit the threat and the budget.

Edit: Sorry for failing to mention explicitly the key role of the RCAF in all of this - for moving troops and their supplies rapidly to where they are needed when they are needed and especially the key role of the rotary wing community in all phases of war and in all environments.
 
Why has no one published any pictures of the AOPS under construction (or the OFSV, for that matter)?
 
jmt18325 said:
Why has no one published any pictures of the AOPS under construction (or the OFSV, for that matter)?

There's one or two pictures out there online. I would imagine as the ships becomes more recognizable we'll start to see construction pictures.
 
they have , just not exciting bits yet.

88-15-125-800x533.jpg


Irving20Shipbuilding20-20Centre20Section20of20AOPS20module20underway20-2001Sep2015...[1].png
 
Colin P said:
they have , just not exciting bits yet.

88-15-125-800x533.jpg


Irving20Shipbuilding20-20Centre20Section20of20AOPS20module20underway20-2001Sep2015...[1].png

Interestingly I picked up the new on the street AOPS concept of operations pdf and the updated Kingston Class one as well. Lots on interesting information how and where they will employ both classes of ships in the future.
 
I was hoping for slightly more up to date pictures.  You'd think the OFSV would have progressed a lot in the last 6 months. 
 
Yea I looked but did not see, they might have  prohibition about cameras in site. you could e-mail them for update
 
Colin P said:
Yea I looked but did not see, they might have  prohibition about cameras in site. you could e-mail them for update

That seems like a lot of work ha.  We probably won't see much until they finish building something. 
 
Chris Pook said:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_length_of_coastline

With respect GR66, but we have the world's longest coastline - about 200 to 250,000 km of it.  And those coasts are rich places.

About 70% of our landmass has no road access.  That leaves air and sea as the primary access routes. 

Air is fast but lacks capacity and staying power.  Sea is slow but can carry every resource known to man and keep them available and move them where needed. 

Combine Sea and Air (both land-based and sea-based) and the Government can reach out and touch every part of Canada.  That is why I am a fan of the AOPS concept.

If the RCN were to exploit the MTOG concept and the AOPS concept as the launch point for a littoral capability it would serve domestic needs first - supplying an additional layer of security in some pretty far flung places in our own back yard as well as supplying logistical support that could be effectively employed in disaster relief. 

AOPS, MTOG, add in the Rangers, the Arctic Company Response Groups and the regs IRUs and you have the basis for developing a real combined ops capability that is based around a real need in a real scale.  Those capabilities could be built upon and developed and exported to the expeditionary forces.

And I feel that the Absalon style Command and Support ship has a role in that development both in domestic waters and in higher threat environments. 

Build the hulls. Add weapons to suit the threat and the budget.

Edit: Sorry for failing to mention explicitly the key role of the RCAF in all of this - for moving troops and their supplies rapidly to where they are needed when they are needed and especially the key role of the rotary wing community in all phases of war and in all environments.

And what exactly are the MILITARY threats on our long coastline?  Are you suggesting that military invasion of Canadian territory by a foreign power is a significant enough threat that we should design our force structure and equipment requirements to meet that threat?

I 100% agree that we should have the ability to respond to disaster type situations everywhere in our territory, but is that capability on which we should base our MILITARY procurement?
 
I am suggesting that the Canadian Armed Forces can be used more broadly than simply militarily.

Domestic Disaster Relief
Domestic Constabulary
Anti-Piracy
Anti-Smuggling
and yes, Anti-Pollution.
Sovereignty Patrols.
Search and Rescue.

All of those help to make the case for having an armed government force.  All of them supply training opportunities to hone skills that can be applied in higher threat environments.

Those satellite images that you want.
Those UAVs that you want.
Those trucks that you want.
Those helicopters that you want.
Those transport aircraft that you want.
Those comms that you want.
Those ships that you want.

The more that you can justify their existence domestically the more likely you are to get them.

If you can raise the bar for the budget on the C4ISTAR and Logistics side of the house and show how much of the defence and security budget goes to the mundane, perhaps it will be easier to argue for additional funds for fighting gear.

The forces, absolutely should be focused on warfighting.  But if you are going to hang around waiting for armageddon to justify yourselves to the general public you are going to have a long wait.

You need to be seen to be doing useful stuff in the meantime...
 
Chris Pook said:
I am suggesting that the Canadian Armed Forces can be used more broadly than simply militarily.

Domestic Disaster Relief
Domestic Constabulary
Anti-Piracy
Anti-Smuggling
and yes, Anti-Pollution.
Sovereignty Patrols.
Search and Rescue.

All of those help to make the case for having an armed government force.  All of them supply training opportunities to hone skills that can be applied in higher threat environments.

Those satellite images that you want.
Those UAVs that you want.
Those trucks that you want.
Those helicopters that you want.
Those transport aircraft that you want.
Those comms that you want.
Those ships that you want.

The more that you can justify their existence domestically the more likely you are to get them.

If you can raise the bar for the budget on the C4ISTAR and Logistics side of the house and show how much of the defence and security budget goes to the mundane, perhaps it will be easier to argue for additional funds for fighting gear.

The forces, absolutely should be focused on warfighting.  But if you are going to hang around waiting for armageddon to justify yourselves to the general public you are going to have a long wait.

You need to be seen to be doing useful stuff in the meantime...

As far as I know the RCN does all that now and more.
 
The vast majority of our commerce is shipped by sea.  If you consider the enormous cost to commerce that a rabble such as the Somali pirates were able to extract it doesn't take a great deal of imagination to extend those costs ten-fold with an organized group such as ISIS instead.  Are you going to let the Americans or Brits carry the weight of protecting our commerce or do we pitch in as equal partners?  You can't do that with coastal patrol and ASW vessels; they don't have the legs.  Waiting for the next war to build almost defeated us last time around.  The next war won't give us the time to build it will be fought with what we have in stock.
 
Chief Stoker said:
As far as I know the RCN does all that now and more.

No argument here Chief.  A bit more publicity might be in order.  Also, perhaps, a bit more Jointery? 

I know it is hard to get Tanks on board Frigates.  But it shouldn't be too hard to get muddy boots on the decks?

The point I am trying to make is that the areas that the CAF is weakest in are the very things that have the greatest domestic utility.

And those things are critical to your warfighting and expeditionary needs.  The things that lack glamour, lack glamour precisely because they are so utilitarian.

And no, YZT, I don't want a navy of Coastal Patrol Boats - in part because with 250,000 kms of coastline to patrol and a 200 nm deep EEZ - those just don't make sense.  We are not Ireland or Italy or even the UK.

Our ships need legs and need to ride the Atlantic comfortably.  And precisely because they need to be built to that standard they can deploy over long distances - especially when supplemented by good logistics - which also are beneficial domestically.

Having said that, what portion of our fleet should we be sending to assist in the Somali effort, to work alongside allies, to show the flag, to gain experience, to teach others?  All of those are perfectly valid reasons for deploying overseas and apply equally to the Army and the Air Force.

But start from the position that the primary environment is jackpines and muskeg, snow deserts and mountains, grey rollers and icebergs.  Build to meet those needs first and then figure out where else they can be profitably employed.  Don't build for Pearl Harbour, and 29 Palms or even the streets of Europe.

 

 
So we need ASW, we need AsuW, we need ships with long legs, and we need ships that can take a hurricane in the Atlantic.  That's fine.  We also, arguably, need ships that can defend themselves from arial attack.  That said, do we really, when you consider the massive cost, need AAD?  Would we be better served getting 15 modern ships, equivalent to the Halifax class, at close to the budget that we have available?
 
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