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New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

  • Thread starter Thread starter GAP
  • Start date Start date
I don't. Kirkhill seems to think we should want to.

Ostrozac: That was a pretty shrewd observation from a "truck driver". Signed: OGBD, a ferry driver.  ;D
 
FSTO said:
We wasted 10 bloody years chasing that STUPID ALSC idea and we still don't have a replacement for our AOR's. If we would have just built an AOR back in 2002 we maybe could have been in a better position to take the Mistrals if they are actually up for sale. Instead we are still wallowing about the halls of Ottawa scrapping the money to build a ship we really really need.
The ALSC idea was stupid... it was trying to make a combined AOR and joint operations ship, all for the cost of an AOR... wasn't going to happen; same with JSS.  We finally selected an AOR to support the Canadian Task Group concept...

which is also stupid; and I'm still convinced in large part driven by the need of the RCN to feel like their a first world navy, on a 2.5 world budget.  And the best way to do that is have a blue water fleet to go do blue water stuff just like we did in the cold war, and a little bit of anti-piracy their; no matter that some of their core warfare skills (like ASW) are withering.  Oh, and make sure we get lots of major combatant (which every other Navy seems to realize are actually minor combatant, commands to create little Admirals with.

FSTO said:
There are days that I curse the former CDS who opened a door to an idea (the big honking ship) that nobody else in the world was contemplating. The RCN walked right through that door and then got pole axed by the real world waiting on the other side.

Nobody else, except (leaving the USN out because it is a core part of what they do):
- RN (to the point they realize that they need to be able to use the QEs as outer littoral amphibs since Ocean will be gone
- French
- Dutch
- Spanish
- Italians
- Russians
- Indians
- Indonesians
- Singaporeans
- Australians
- Kiwis
and that's just a partial list I pulled out of my butt.  The RCN did not walk through that door, they reached in with both arms to see if there was any cash laying around on the other side; and got caught in the vortex of a history of failed Jointness in Canada.  It's ironic that we have a unified military but refuse to be joint, with the RCN closely following the RCAF's lead in that department.

But hey, gives them more time to work on their individual identities, new ranks anyone?

Edited to add: if you're ever wondering why the Canadian public on the whole doesn't understand what you, its because the arguments that are made for a blue water maneuver force don't make a whole lot of sense to them; nor can they see the impact way out there in the ocean.

Don't get me wrong, I understand more than most while we need a latent capability to operate with our Allies in that environment, the Navy doesn't bring a lot to bear on a lot of our current problem sets; it is excellent at showing Canadian resolve with little risk, but that BHS you deride so much would be even better.

As I've said elsewhere, do you think anyone at NORTHCOM gave a hoot about where our Frigates and Destroyers where for Katrina?  They did care where the Coast Guard was fixing nav buoys, and would have cared where a BHS loaded up with supplies and helos were.

Same in Haiti; I remember seeing an article explaining how important we were there... the ironic part was one of the accompanying picture was of the 280 taking fuel from an American amphib that had at least four 53s lined up just starboard aft.  Yep, a Sea King is delivering some irreplaceable effect there all right ;-)
 
To all the ferry and truck drivers out there - brave and skilled as you are - how do you think it feels to be one of Her Majesty's Odd Job men and lumped in along with all the other ammunition....  ;D

On the subject of capabilities - it is dead easy to prove you don't need a capability you have never had.  On the other hand if you have a capability I am equally sure somebody will find a use for it.

As to the issue of operating frigates in the Eastern Arctic

nanook.jpg


HMCS Montreal, Jones Sound, Nunavut.

Now, in the event of a MajAid event, wouldn't it be nice for 450 to get its Hooks up there and know there was a gas station in the area?

Jus' sayin'. 

It could be an AOPS or it could be a staging point on the way to Eureka or Alert.  It is a matter of increasing the options available to HMG.
 
Baz said:
The ALSC idea was stupid... it was trying to make a combined AOR and joint operations ship, all for the cost of an AOR... wasn't going to happen; same with JSS.  We finally selected an AOR to support the Canadian Task Group concept...

which is also stupid; and I'm still convinced in large part driven by the need of the RCN to feel like their a first world navy, on a 2.5 world budget.  And the best way to do that is have a blue water fleet to go do blue water stuff just like we did in the cold war, and a little bit of anti-piracy their; no matter that some of their core warfare skills (like ASW) are withering.  Oh, and make sure we get lots of major combatant (which every other Navy seems to realize are actually minor combatant, commands to create little Admirals with.

Nobody else, except (leaving the USN out because it is a core part of what they do):
- RN (to the point they realize that they need to be able to use the QEs as outer littoral amphibs since Ocean will be gone
- French
- Dutch
- Spanish
- Italians
- Russians
- Indians
- Indonesians
- Singaporeans
- Australians
- Kiwis
and that's just a partial list I pulled out of my butt.  The RCN did not walk through that door, they reached in with both arms to see if there was any cash laying around on the other side; and got caught in the vortex of a history of failed Jointness in Canada.  It's ironic that we have a unified military but refuse to be joint, with the RCN closely following the RCAF's lead in that department.

But hey, gives them more time to work on their individual identities, new ranks anyone?

Edited to add: if you're ever wondering why the Canadian public on the whole doesn't understand what you, its because the arguments that are made for a blue water maneuver force don't make a whole lot of sense to them; nor can they see the impact way out there in the ocean.

Don't get me wrong, I understand more than most while we need a latent capability to operate with our Allies in that environment, the Navy doesn't bring a lot to bear on a lot of our current problem sets; it is excellent at showing Canadian resolve with little risk, but that BHS you deride so much would be even better.

As I've said elsewhere, do you think anyone at NORTHCOM gave a hoot about where our Frigates and Destroyers where for Katrina?  They did care where the Coast Guard was fixing nav buoys, and would have cared where a BHS loaded up with supplies and helos were.

Same in Haiti; I remember seeing an article explaining how important we were there... the ironic part was one of the accompanying picture was of the 280 taking fuel from an American amphib that had at least four 53s lined up just starboard aft.  Yep, a Sea King is delivering some irreplaceable effect there all right ;-)

I should have said ALSC instead of BHS. If (a second coming of Christ is more plausible) we were in position to take the Mistrals off the French Governments hands I would be four square for it. That type of capability is something I would be willing to sacrifice ALL of the AOPS for.
 
The  ALSC wasn't total garbage.  There were things about it that was OK.  If they'd at least kept the promise made when they briefed us on PRE in 99/00 they would have been in service for some years now and all would be well, or at least better than they are today.
 
A further thought about Jointery/Jarmy....

In what way can the Army assist the Navy so as to increase the Navy's capabilities? What do you need from the Army? Or even from those Extra-Speshul Army types in Tan hats.
 
Kirkhill said:
As to the issue of operating frigates in the Eastern Arctic

nanook.jpg


HMCS Montreal, Jones Sound, Nunavut.

One photo op does not constitute a capability.  Our frigates have very thin hulls.  Just because you can sneak something up far enough north to find an iceberg for a photo in the middle of summer at 3kts does not mean that it's something that make sense to do, or should be considered an ability of the platform.  Any time a standard warship is in an ice environment you're really just one big submerged chunk of ice away from a major damage control event.

Ice capable ship design involves a whole lot more than just thickening a hull.  And to add those elements to a standard warship involves making design decisions that are going to make it perform poorer in almost all of its other primary tasks.

The North is huge.  And even purpose-built icebreakers go slow once they find thick enough ice, which lasts all year around in a large area of the Arctic Archipelago.  In any sort of emergency disaster relief scenario it's more than likely going to be too late before even a dedicated icebreaker gets anywhere close.  The army is good at landing in the middle of nowhere and setting up shop, let them continue to do that.
 
So long as a CSC HELAIRDET is CH-147f HIFR-qualified, I'd say that's about as far as I would 'specialize' anything on CSC to accept Hooks. Sea Basing aviation (Army/non-dedicated SOF assets) is not something I'd spend much time on. Since Alert is literally a single fuel stop in Iqaluit and 12 hours away from Petawawa, looking for a tin-foil hulled slowly-puttering capital ship during two, possibly three months of the year isn't something I'd count on to 'help' me get where I want to go up North.  Don't get me wrong, Kirkhill, if the occasion arose where someone thought dropping off, or picking up 10t of stuff from a ship made sense, fine.  Perhaps strengthening the deck to take a 27t (54k #) helo would be enough...but to be honest, I don't foresee CSC having that much steel aft.

Cheers
G2G

P.s. SM2/ESSM/Harpoon-equipped ferries would be pretty nasty things to run into if one was an evil-doer... ;)
 
I yield G2G.

:cheers:

I would be happy enough with the capability being available even if it was an extraordinary occurrence.  I don't want to degrade the performance of any platform unnecessarily but if capabilities can be added at minimal cost then I would like the platforms to be as flexible/useful as possible.

And I agree - a ferry packed with VLS cells would certainly be an interesting addition to the fleet.  ;D
 
Support to forces ashore has been a goal of the RCN since before Leadmark 2020 was released in 2001.  You can find it all over documents everywhere as the missions that Canada has been sending the Navy on would have benefited greatly from having that capability.  The GTS Katie, Somalia, East Timor, Haiti, Haiti, Haiti, some hurricane relief in the US, Red Sea anti piracy (SOF basing), Libya (a naval fire to shore would have extremely useful tool here), every single arctic operation involving the army (remember the pics of sailors carrying Van Doo's ashore so their boots don't get wet).

To say that the navy doesn't want this capability and blame it on the Hillier is incorrect to say the least.  The Navy's internal evaluation of how we can be most effective came to that obvious conclusion all on their own, if you're gonna blame someone then look in the direction of Adm Buck who was point for a lot of this stuff.
I know Horizon 2050 hasn't been publicly published but I guarantee that support to forces ashore is in there.

BUT, the conditions for logistics deployment in the CF have changed.  When all this big honkin ship stuff was being worked on we had exactly 0 C-17's.  With the addition of the C-17 fleet we have a much greater domestic and foreign deployment capability.  The new chinooks also change this equation as they can in some situations self deploy (I don't know if they have air refueling capability, I know its possible on a chinook but no idea on our birds if that's something that we do), especially domestically.

As for Arctic deployability, look at the AOPS design.  Its essentially a constabulary support to forces ashore ship.  The large crane, the storage space for arctic vehicles, the container systems which can add equipment, people, etc... and the ability to deal with Griffins or CH-148`s if needed.  Its a ship designed to crush up into ice,  pull the snowmobiles out of the garage and tell the rangers to have a nice trip back to Resolute or whatever.  It`s an icecapable minivan with fold down seats.  Essentially the flex deck that Kirkhill is so infatuated by...  ;).  So with that in mind the navy can now conveniently check off their support for forces ashore for arctic box and walk away from that as a problem.  The rest of support to forces ashore is going to come from a 5 inch gun.

The priority is AAW and C4 functions and replentishment at sea.  Without these we drop from a level 3 navy to level 5-6 by our own classification system (see quote below).  Adding in extra`s that go outside of these core functions is not something that the RCN cares about.  We also don`t do flex like the Danes.  There`s a reason the Danish did flex, and a reason that no other navy does it the same way.

Rank 1: Major Global Force Projection Navy (Complete)— This is a navy capable of carrying out all the military roles of naval forces on a global scale. It possesses
the full range of carrier and amphibious capabilities, sea control forces, and nuclear attack and ballistic missile submarines, and all in sufficient numbers to undertake major operations independently. E.g., United States.

Rank 2: Major Global Force Projection Navy (Partial) — These are navies that possess most if not all of the force projection capabilities of a “complete” global navy, but only in sufficient numbers to undertake one major “out of area” operation. E.g., Britain, France.

Rank 3: Medium Global Force Projection Navy — These are navies that may not possess the full range of capabilities, but have a credible capacity in certain of
them and consistently demonstrate a determination to exercise them at some distance from home waters, in cooperation with other Force Projection Navies. E.g., Canada, Netherlands, Australia.

Rank 4: Medium Regional Force Projection Navy — These are navies possessing the ability to project force into the adjoining ocean basin. While they mayhave the capacity to exercise these further afield, for whatever reason, they do not do so on a regular basis.

Rank 5: Adjacent Force Projection Navies — These are navies that have some ability to project force well offshore, but are not capable of carrying out highlevel naval operations over oceanic distances.

Rank 6: Offshore Territorial Defence Navies — These are navies that have relatively high levels of capability in defensive (and constabulary) operations up to about 200 miles from their shores, having the sustainability offered by frigate or large corvette vessels and (or) a capable submarine force.

Rank 7: Inshore Territorial Defence Navies — These are navies that have primarily inshore territorial defence capabilities, making them capable of coastal combat rather than constabulary duties alone. This implies a force comprising missile-armed fast-attack craft, short-range aviation and a limited submarine force.

Rank 8: Constabulary Navies — These are significant fleets that are not intended
to fight, but to act purely in a constabulary role.

Rank 9: Token Navies — These are navies that have some minimal capability, but this often consists of little more than a formal organizational structure and a few coastal craft. These states, the world's smallest and weakest, cannot aspire to anything but the most limited constabulary functions.

 
Thanks for that Underway...

Much appreciated.

I guess where I have been coming from is not so much requesting/requiring that the RCN/HMCG adopt the Danish solution to support for forces ashore as simply offering that solution as an alternative to having no capability.

I am not a big fan of people saying they can't afford to do things "properly" and use that as justification for doing nothing at all.  I continue to offer the Danish solution as an example of what can be done on a skinny budget..

Equally, I am quite enamoured of the Dutch solutions, which move up the cost ladder but somehow are found affordable on a skinny budget.  Some of that is a result of the accounting rules in effect.  Some of that is a result of some design compromises that perhaps the RCN isn't comfortable with.  That is up to you lot. 

But please, from a concerned and interested citizen, please do try and get some sort of capability in place regardless of the budget and political constraints.

There is always another way to skin a cat. I am agnostic on the method so long as the cat doesn't squeal.
 
Kirkhill said:
Thanks for that Underway...

Much appreciated.

I guess where I have been coming from is not so much requesting/requiring that the RCN/HMCG adopt the Danish solution to support for forces ashore as simply offering that solution as an alternative to having no capability.

I am not a big fan of people saying they can't afford to do things "properly" and use that as justification for doing nothing at all.  I continue to offer the Danish solution as an example of what can be done on a skinny budget..

Equally, I am quite enamoured of the Dutch solutions, which move up the cost ladder but somehow are found affordable on a skinny budget.  Some of that is a result of the accounting rules in effect.  Some of that is a result of some design compromises that perhaps the RCN isn't comfortable with.  That is up to you lot. 

But please, from a concerned and interested citizen, please do try and get some sort of capability in place regardless of the budget and political constraints.

There is always another way to skin a cat. I am agnostic on the method so long as the cat doesn't squeal.

@Kirkhill: I wasn't trying to be snarky (hence the winky face) and upon a re-read it looks a bit like a shot at you.  It was more intended as a friendly tease as I really enjoy your posts, though for the longest time I thought you were a plant for the Danish shipbuilding industry, lol!  I agree entirely with the Dutch type solution.  I quite like a lot of what they've done, and how they've done it, their equipment loadouts, their choices of radars, and their fleet mix.  We are going to have a larger force by nature of our budget and country size but we can't be to far wrong if we build ships like theirs.

On an interesting side note I've come across a fairly relevent article on the Australian
situation that seems to match what we are discussing here.

In particular this quote:

That’s starting to sound to me like a ‘two tier Navy’ which that has serious combat power to provide in an alliance framework, while operating a lighter force closer to home. I have a mission statement for it:

The mission of the Royal Australian Navy is to raise, train and sustain combat-ready naval forces capable of helping our allies to win wars, deter aggression and maintain freedom of the seas, while maintaining the independent capability to locally maintain order and support other ADF force elements.

If we had a white paper or something other than this shopping list we might not be arguing in a vacuum.
 
Underway said:
@Kirkhill: I wasn't trying to be snarky (hence the winky face) and upon a re-read it looks a bit like a shot at you.  It was more intended as a friendly tease as I really enjoy your posts, though for the longest time I thought you were a plant for the Danish shipbuilding industry, lol!  I agree entirely with the Dutch type solution.  I quite like a lot of what they've done, and how they've done it, their equipment loadouts, their choices of radars, and their fleet mix.  We are going to have a larger force by nature of our budget and country size but we can't be to far wrong if we build ships like theirs.

.....

No offense taken (this time)  :cheers:

PS - The Aussie Mission Statement works for me - but there again they too, like the Dutch, are one of my preferred role models.

And I agree with you on the CFDS.
 
As I'm on a document bender right now here is an Australian perspective on their frigate replacement project.  They narrow down the same group of ships (FREMM, T26, F125 and family) that we have identified here without the Dutch ships.  At least for MOTS versions.

Sea State: future frigate contenders
16 Mar 2015|Amelia Long

As ASPI’s Future Surface Fleet conference draws closer, we take a look at the three design options, some of the international design contenders and the debate around the build location for Australia’s future frigate under project SEA 5000. Defence is planning to seek first pass approval to conduct a tender process around 2019–2020. With the eight Anzac-class frigates scheduled for decommissioning in the mid-2020s, debates about the future frigate’s design and build location are rife.

It’s likely that the future frigates will be larger than the Anzacs, and will be designed ‘with a strong emphasis on submarine detection and response operations’. As ASW platforms they’ll be equipped with an integrated sonar suite with long-range active towed-array sonar, a maritime-based land-attack cruise missile capability, and be capable of embarking both naval combat helicopters and maritime UAVs.

But what of the design options? In its Keeping Major Naval Ship Acquisitions on Course study, RAND has determined that there are three routes the Government could take to replace the Anzac-class frigates.

The first is the pure military off-the-shelf (MOTS) option—the procurement of an existing foreign design, built either offshore or domestically. The second is the new design option, building a new class of ships designed specifically for SEA 5000. The third option is evolved MOTS, whereby an existing frigate design would be appropriated by the Royal Australian Navy, and then built mostly or entirely in Australia.

The pure MOTS and evolved MOTS options have been previously utilized by RAN: in the procurement and later upgrade processes for Oberon-class submarines, which originally came from the UK, and the Anzacs themselves, which were based on the German Meko-class. For SEA 5000 the first international option is the British Type 26 Global Combat Ship. The Type 26 was designed by BAE systems with the goal of undertaking the Royal British Navy’s three core roles for their workhorse frigate fleet: ‘warfighting, maritime security and international engagement—on the world stage’. This frigate is currently being developed by BAE and the UK Ministry of Defence, and has been designed to be able to accommodate systems specific to prospective international partners of the UK. With the first of these vessels beginning service in 2021, the development timeline of the Type 26 fits nicely with RAN’s needs.

The second is the FREMM European Multi-Mission Frigate, which is currently under construction for the French and Italian navies. Designed by France’s DCNS and Italy’s Fincantieri, these vessels are scheduled for delivery from 2013 through 2021. By including a ‘silent mode’ that enables the frigates to engage in anti-submarine warfare operations, the FREMM frigates address one of the key concerns of the 2012 Defence Capability Guide.

The third and fourth options on the table are both designed by German firm ThyssenKrupp and built by Blohm+Voss; the Meko 600-class Escort Frigate, and the Class 125 Frigate. The Meko 600 is described as being ‘particularly suited for blue water escort of high value assets and the defence of national offshore key points.’ There’d be some continuity benefits, with the new frigates sharing some design philosophy with the Anzacs. The Class 125 is currently under construction for the German military, and it’s claimed that the vessels can be deployed for up to two years before needing to return to the home base. They’ll be delivered to the German Navy between 2016 and 2018.

For the Australian polity though, there’s also the question of where the future frigates will be built. While the pure- and evolved MOTS options have the potential to be less costly and more time efficient for RAN, there’s always the chance that by taking one of these, they won’t be built in Australia for reasons of efficiency. The new design route offers more opportunity to grow and sustain Australian ship design and construction resources.

In a June 2014 announcement detailing the timeline for the future frigate fleet, then-Minister for Defence David Johnston commented that building in Australia was merely an ‘option’—despite the widespread assumption that the vessels would be built locally, as ASPI’s Mark Thomson discusses here. However, as ASPI’s Andrew Davies points out, although RAN and Australian shipbuilding companies may push for an Australian build, the decision to build domestically would ‘amount to a long-term bet on the enduring demand for particular platform types’. Thus, as Thomson commented, it’s important that the government maintains an ‘open, orderly and transparent competition’ for the SEA 5000 project.

For a deeper look at these issues and more, be sure to register here for ASPI’s Future Surface Fleet conference, to be held at the Hyatt Hotel Canberra from 30 March to 1 April. The conference will feature a stellar line-up of international and Australian speakers. Last year’s conference on submarines was a sell-out, so make sure you don’t miss this year’s.

Amelia Long is an intern at ASPI. Image courtesy of Flickr user Horatio J. Kookaburra.
 
Underway -

One of your finds needs to highlighted.  It was seemingly misfiled

The Future of The German Navy

The key note element is the F125 Stabilization Frigate - Lots of Little Flex Decks - not as useful (IMHO) as one big Flex Deck (or Boat Deck) if you want a more traditional name.

Also I note that the German Navy future may also include a BHS......

Thanks.
 
To OGBD,

It is my belief that we are in the absolute infancy of UUV technology.  That within 10-15 years we'll see the introduction of capable UUV's tethered to surface vessels for power, that will push both active and passive sonar to positions advancing the ship, as opposed to VDS or towed arrays which trail.  Further that it will be determined that arrays of five or six of these tethered UUV's will be better than just one.  Ergo, it makes sense to try to build the capacity to launch and retrieve significant numbers of these UUV's from a bay of some sort, seem quite wise as opposed to ignoring the technology and then trying to retrofit that capacity later.


Cheers, Matthew. :salute:
 
I wouldn't say that UUV are in quite in their infancy, but barely out of it.

I won't discuss here any matters of the efficiency/lack of efficiency etc of tails, for security reasons.

On the UUV working ahead of the ship with sonars, however, you should know that those exists, whether tethered ones or radio controlled by way of an above water extending antenna. We use those for mine hunting. But the constant problems the same: If by way of tether, you must go slow because any speed puts too much stress on the tether and snaps it, and if by radio with a surface antenna, then you have  a  limited depth you can achieve. It all has to do with the fact that radio signals don't travel well in water (you can only use extreme low frequencies at shallow depths) so that neither control orders, communication of information gathered back to "mama", nor situational info such as GPS signal can be transmitted to the UUV and that the alternative - sound - has a very, very limited bandwidth.

Underwater arrays, wether tails or lines of sonobuoys, remain and will remain the best option until someone figures a way to break the bandwidth barrier. Somehow, I can't see that happening in the foreseeable future, but we can hope, and if it happens, I hope it will be for our side.
 
I supported the SFU Underwater Research Lab on that very issue OGBD. Hence the reason I like the idea of tethered "Mother" ROV's supporting small AUV's that can transmit directly to "Mom" who is normally within the same density/temperature layer.

I can see smaller flying UAV's with dipping sonars working off a ship. The challenge will be the recovery process in a sea state. However these same small UAV's might make good coastal search and suppression of subs in the littoral areas near important harbours and waterways. They could operate from mobile units on trucks and work in conjunction to passive arrays and manned assets.
 
Cdn Blackshirt said:
It is my belief that we are in the absolute infancy of UUV technology.  That within 10-15 years we'll see the introduction of capable UUV's tethered to surface vessels for power, that will push both active and passive sonar to positions advancing the ship, as opposed to VDS or towed arrays which trail.  Further that it will be determined that arrays of five or six of these tethered UUV's will be better than just one.  Ergo, it makes sense to try to build the capacity to launch and retrieve significant numbers of these UUV's from a bay of some sort, seem quite wise as opposed to ignoring the technology and then trying to retrofit that capacity later.

Isn't this a bit cart before the horse?  Since we have no idea what a future UUV launch/revcovery system would look like the UUV developers might work within the constraints that the ship already has.  Launch via davit or perhaps the torpedo tubes.  Perhaps VLS launched UAV's etc...  or a small enough launch/recovery system that can fit onboard the ships existing space.  A launch recovery system that can be set up or taken down quickly off of the flight deck.  There are so many options that don't require a ship to be redesigned.
 
Kirkhill said:
The key note element is the F125 Stabilization Frigate - Lots of Little Flex Decks - not as useful (IMHO) as one big Flex Deck (or Boat Deck) if you want a more traditional name.

Excellent find Kirkhill.  Interesting to see that they use TEU's for the FLEX deck concept.  AOPS uses the same option just don't call it a FLEX deck for some reason.  I guess we aren't selling it to anyone.

Of particular interest is slide 2 where it refers to the size constraints of even a 5600 ton ship.  Then slide 13 goes into the sales pitch referencing specifically the CSC.
 
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