New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

[Swampbuggy]

I don't think people understand how limited shipbuilding within North America is and how tightly planned the NSS actually is. There is effectively no yards that could be used to speed up River class production in any meaningful way without taking Davie and throwing their very important CCG icebreaker contracts to the side. The RCN is not the only Canadian Govt organization that desperately needs ship as well. It is politically infeasible to send that work to Europe or to the United States, given the already signed contracts and contractors/sub-contractors for all of these materials and for the US, the lack of suitable yards.

A more accurate analogy to this situation with NSS would be you've cut your arm badly and EMS is 20 minutes away, so you go cut a bystanders arm and try to do an infield blood transfusion.


The issue is that there is debatably no (or very few) yards within Canada that could reasonably do the world we're looking at for CMMC on a larger platform, even if the arbitrary 1,000t/Combatant NSS limitation is shrugged off. They'll need to go abroad and order them tomorrow if they want to make the Kingston class retirement dates.

This is what I would try before the Red Green blood transfusion, for the record. Or, adjust the scope of CMMC to something actually doable under a 1000t at a smaller yard and really lean into containerized mission kits. @Czech_pivo is right on the money about fleet numbers for a long time to come. I can’t believe we would have to wait until post 2050 to have the same number of surface combatants that we did 15-20 years ago.

It doesn’t look good for the RCN’s stated goal of a sustained 4 CSC Task Group…

So, either that plan sticks and the CSC’s are reserved only for critical deployments overseas, at a much reduced tempo and home waters patrolled by a small number of AOPS (also in demand for OP CARIBBE etc) or they find a way (home build, foreign order whatever) to get something in between to supplement them and distribute some of the weight.

Unless, we’re pinning all our hopes on the 12 sub buy, that is.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The River class had a designed service life of 30 years per hull if I recall correctly, the first vessel is planned to be service in the early 2030's and the last vessel is planned to enter in 2048-2049. Irving may be able to speed this process up as the process goes along, as we have seen with AOPS, but this is likely a decent schedule to look at. Disposal of the first vessel is planned for 2061-2062 and disposal for the final vessel is planned for 2081-2082. There will be a period where all 15 ships will likely be in service, spanning roughly a decade.


This was done to keep the small and irrelevant yards from bogging down the bidding process for the large CCG and RCN orders when they were ultimately unable to deliver. The entire purpose of NSS was to consolidate work in two (and alter three) large yards to maintain said yards long term. There was obviously no view on the Kingston replacement evolving above that 1,000t light limit at the time.

I suspect you could speed up CSC timelines a bit by working on the modules that are currently "fixed" in the design stage and can be constructed now, start on the first ships, if you reach a point where there are no more "fixed" modules, then start on a 2nd hull, so you have 2 sets of modules done, and hopefully further modules reach the "fixed" stage and can be built. Also start placing orders for longer lead items so both ships can be finished sooner. Place an order for 1 each of the new weapon systems that can be mounted shoreside, tested, trained on and people can be certified on.

Also perhaps reconsider decommissioning the Kingston's, with the strong possibility that 1 or more CFP will end up not being able to sail, your abilty to crew them will increase. With the worse of the CFP's decommissioned that frees up money and crews to keep the Kingstons going. Granted you lose a lot of capability, but you may be able to nullify a portion of that by having fuller crews on the remaining CFP and now a source of spare parts, meaning the remaining ones are in better repair.

 

[Halifax Tar]

too true. At the time it was written nobody was imagining that we would be staring at the possibility of a war. The NSS was written to promote Canadian jobs and gain votes, not because anyone believed that we would actually use the damn things.

A sad truth.

 

[suffolkowner]

Ian Mack also erroneously assumed that the yards would set themselves up for more throughput

 

[Kirkhill]

Ian Mack also erroneously assumed that the yards would set themselves up for more throughput

There's that word again...

assumed.

 

[Underway]

too true. At the time it was written nobody was imagining that we would be staring at the possibility of a war. The NSS was written to promote Canadian jobs and gain votes, not because anyone believed that we would actually use the damn things.

At the time the RCN was beliving that we might need them for a war and worked towards the best possible solution for that war. I think they got the 80% solution. Probably needs more throw weight but everything else looks amazing.

NSS was written to increase the RCN's capability, however its primary selling point was as you pointed out. I think that its taken a tembre now that isn't what it started as. Its become more and more important on the military side and less so on the jobs side.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

There is nothing really wrong with the NSS, except it was implemented 20 years to late. Shipyards need new builds in order to recapitalize the yard.

 

[Navy_Pete]

Ian Mack also erroneously assumed that the yards would set themselves up for more throughput

He really didn't, that was the GoC line. His thought was they could, but he seemed to expect that the more realistic longer term was more government builds because he understood the state of the CCG fleet and the rest of the RCN fleet. He had worked with a few others to get things like Target state and performance measuring set up, to try and at least create a culture of continuous efficiency improvement so they would at least be competitive in non government builds while getting better value for money on the GoC projects, but that fell off quickly after he retired, because no one else wanted to argue with the yards that they actually had to meet the requirements of the umbrella contract.

The fact that a lot of the production work is still cost plus, which actually incentivizes the yards to not improve efficiency, is pretty emblematic of it going off the rails. That's almost entirely due to political interference, because when the yards didn't like the NSS lines, they would simple call MPs who would intervene and kneecap the 3 departments at either the DM, ADM or DG level. After a while I think the various levels of public servants got gun shy, which is reasonable after repeatedly getting kicked in the dick by your bosses for doing what you are supposed to do and getting undercut (fairly publically in a few cases).

We still paid a lot to get a Brit to tell us what we should be doing, while they paid an Aussie to tell them the same, and the Aussies paid Mr. Mack. They were all essentially telling variations of the same things they said while in their job, but for some reason a third party telling you something your programm architects have told you has more clout (until the shipyards complain).

Working in that office was eye opening, and an effort in futility and frustration. The same politicians that complain about government waste are the ones that will also interfere with contract and project management decisions that are trying to actually apply contract terms and deliver things at a reasonable cost to the taxpayer.

 

[calculus]

This is what I would try before the Red Green blood transfusion, for the record. Or, adjust the scope of CMMC to something actually doable under a 1000t at a smaller yard and really lean into containerized mission kits. @Czech_pivo is right on the money about fleet numbers for a long time to come. I can’t believe we would have to wait until post 2050 to have the same number of surface combatants that we did 15-20 years ago.

It doesn’t look good for the RCN’s stated goal of a sustained 4 CSC Task Group…

So, either that plan sticks and the CSC’s are reserved only for critical deployments overseas, at a much reduced tempo and home waters patrolled by a small number of AOPS (also in demand for OP CARIBBE etc) or they find a way (home build, foreign order whatever) to get something in between to supplement them and distribute some of the weight.

Unless, we’re pinning all our hopes on the 12 sub buy, that is.

All good points. I think everyone on this forum would agree that there needs to be some creative thinking applied to this problem,. Either we build out another modern shipyard that is not hampered by the tonnage constraints of the NSS, thus offering some shipbuilding "buffer" capacity, or we look to other countries to build us something quickly.

I'm not sure what their capacity is, but Israel comes to mind when I think of corvette-sized vessels that are actually capable of warfighting.

Israel Launches Reshef-class Corvette Program - Naval News

Israel's Ministry of Defense inked the contract to start the Reshef-class corvette program. 5 vessels are being procured for the Israeli Navy

www.navalnews.com

Israel Shipyards - Experience that empowers seagoing ventures worldwide

I acknowledge their AO is significantly different than ours, so hull form might not be ideal for us, but they certainly have mastered getting a lot of "stuff" into a small hull, which seems to match the stated goals of the CMMC.

 

[Rainbow1910]

I'm not sure what their capacity is, but Israel comes to mind when I think of corvette-sized vessels that are actually capable of warfighting.

I acknowledge their AO is significantly different than ours, so hull form might not be ideal for us, but they certainly have mastered getting a lot of "stuff" into a small hull, which seems to match the stated goals of the CMMC.

Israeli ships are similar to their Russian counterparts, weaponry and sensors are given a premium versus basically everything else. Seakeeping, range, stability, endurance, crew amenities, etc are all sacrificed to jam everything into these relatively small hulls. They look good on paper but typically once you peel back what you see only on the outside, they are a mess of compromises internally. Not something Canada should ultimately be looking to emulate, especially with our requirements to endurance and seakeeping vs these other designs.

 

[DBNSG]

Israeli ships are similar to their Russian counterparts, weaponry and sensors are given a premium versus basically everything else. Seakeeping, range, stability, endurance, crew amenities, etc are all sacrificed to jam everything into these relatively small hulls. They look good on paper but typically once you peel back what you see only on the outside, they are a mess of compromises internally. Not something Canada should ultimately be looking to emulate, especially with our requirements to endurance and seakeeping vs these other designs.

Israel does not need to deploy very far . I get the impression that they are a very well armed coastal patrol Navy with mysterious undersea capabilities only whispered about.

 

[calculus]

All good points. I think everyone on this forum would agree that there needs to be some creative thinking applied to this problem,. Either we build out another modern shipyard that is not hampered by the tonnage constraints of the NSS, thus offering some shipbuilding "buffer" capacity, or we look to other countries to build us something quickly.

I'm not sure what their capacity is, but Israel comes to mind when I think of corvette-sized vessels that are actually capable of warfighting.

Israel Launches Reshef-class Corvette Program - Naval News

Israel's Ministry of Defense inked the contract to start the Reshef-class corvette program. 5 vessels are being procured for the Israeli Navy

www.navalnews.com

Israel Shipyards - Experience that empowers seagoing ventures worldwide

I acknowledge their AO is significantly different than ours, so hull form might not be ideal for us, but they certainly have mastered getting a lot of "stuff" into a small hull, which seems to match the stated goals of the CMM

Israeli ships are similar to their Russian counterparts, weaponry and sensors are given a premium versus basically everything else. Seakeeping, range, stability, endurance, crew amenities, etc are all sacrificed to jam everything into these relatively small hulls. They look good on paper but typically once you peel back what you see only on the outside, they are a mess of compromises internally. Not something Canada should ultimately be looking to emulate, especially with our requirements to endurance and seakeeping vs these other designs.

Yeah, I wasn't sure about the hull, so good to know. Makes sense. However, they definitely have some experience jamming capability into small ships, so I still think they could be helpful being involved in some way with the design of the CMMC.

 

[NavyShooter]

The problem with the NSS is that it's 10 years too late.

If we were 10 years down the road, with 2-4 CSC's in the water, and the first of them approaching IOC or FOC, then we'd be in a good space.

We're not.

And there's going to be a lot of pain in keeping the CPF's going that extra 10 years.

The AOPS are going to carry some of that, but they're not warships...so....it will be a juggling act.

 

[Czech_pivo]

The problem with the NSS is that it's 10 years too late.

If we were 10 years down the road, with 2-4 CSC's in the water, and the first of them approaching IOC or FOC, then we'd be in a good space.

We're not.

And there's going to be a lot of pain in keeping the CPF's going that extra 10 years.

The AOPS are going to carry some of that, but they're not warships...so....it will be a juggling act.

By a one-armed individual.

 

[BdaDug]

I just ma

I don't think people understand how limited shipbuilding within North America is and how tightly planned the NSS actually is. There is effectively no yards that could be used to speed up River class production in any meaningful way without taking Davie and throwing their very important CCG icebreaker contracts to the side. The RCN is not the only Canadian Govt organization that desperately needs ship as well. It is politically infeasible to send that work to Europe or to the United States, given the already signed contracts and contractors/sub-contractors for all of these materials and for the US, the lack of suitable yards.

Well, Davie owns a Finnish shipyard (since 2023) that specializes in icebreakers. If it genuinely was vital to our nation's strategic interests to advance warship construction in the near term, we could at least consider a scenario where some of the icebreaker work is offshored to Helsinki Shipyards and existing contracts honored. Cost savings could be realized from using the more experienced/efficient overseas builder to cover the increased costs of comingling the supply chains.

Wishful thinking I'm sure ... but Canada does need to contemplate all potential options if things are as dire as the forum suggests.

 

[quadrapiper]

Wishful thinking I'm sure ... but Canada does need to contemplate all potential options if things are as dire as the forum suggests.

Keeping as many CPFs, AORs (soon), subs, and AOPS as possible somewhere other than Halifax and Esquimalt?

 

[foresterab]

I don't know much about boats vs. ships other than some cost a crap ton of money and others make for better pirate ships than others.

But to my limited mind I think of deep ocean RCN vessels which are the frigates and supply ships - I guess what some call blue water navy.

And then I think of the inshore vessels which in Canada could Coast Guard/Great Lakes operations but had me thinking also about the Caribbean and OP CARRIBE. I was trying to think of a smaller vessel - maybe used by Coast Guard in Canada - that could be produced "cheap" for use in the Caribbean with limited weaponry....the old Corvette style of WW2 with maybe .50 caliber machine guns. Something more than a speedboat, more than a Zodiac but also some thing with some better capacity that could be sold to Caribbean nations to augment their small armed forces.

I think of larger boats than I've seen for deep sea fishing sport fishing boats for example as you might need space for detention and/or small unit boarding parties...but you also might not need a frigate.

I'm sure there's also a point where mission taskings start adding up so much that moving the bar slightly ahead to a full blown frigate is the cost effective move. Or does it become a cost shared vessel between multiple nations if the USN is not going to be reliable?

For context there exists (information pulled via Google and Wikipedia so laugh at my errors)
Royal Dutch Navy - 2 ports and Marine company
French Navy - 1 frigate stationed to support overseas territories.
Mexican Navy and Marines
Antigua and Barbuda Defense Force - 2 patrol boats and some smaller vessels.
Royal Bahamas Defense Force - 10 patrol boats + landing craft + commando unit and Air Wing for surveillance
Barbados Defense Force - 3 offshore patrol boats + smaller vessels
Public Force of Costa Rica - 6 patrol boats and smaller vessels (coast guard). Mostly police force
Cuban Revolutionary Navy - 19 mixed of frigate/submarine/minesweepers + ground units.
Dominican Navy - 9 patrol boats + other vessels.
Haitian Coast Guard - 8 patrol boats
Jamacia Defense Force - 6 patrol boats + other vessels. Also ground and air assets.
St. Kitts and Nevis Defense Force - 1 patrol boat
Royal St. Lucia Police - The navy fits under the police but details not found fast.
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Coast Guard - 5 patrol boats and other vessels.
Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard - 14 patrol boats and other vessels.

Patrol boats - which seem to be the dominant type...range from 27foot to 190 foot lengths. Mostly sourced via the USA but also some Dutch and British builds cited. Also Australian and Chinese ships. Many are crews of 20 people or less which aligns with what I've seen from the small barracks in many island nations.

How does this align with DFO/CCGS/???? and is there a inshore need for such a vessel in the RCN? Maybe? Is this a perfect sized vessel for RCN Reserve units? Don't know enough other than to avoid pub crawls with the navy especially when you start at the mess.

How does it fit in the priority list for manning? A better discussion.