New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

[GR66]

Wouldn't a corvette be the platform of choice for pirates and other coastal pests? The eternal brig/schooner/gunboat+boats and boarding/landing parties role, for which subs and fighters aren't well-suited. Being able to reach inland seems useful for that sort of thing.

I don't recall any nation launching land-attack missiles against Somali pirate bases as pirates typically live within civilian infrastructure. The Houthis are different being a semi-State power...but isn't that why we have the River-class?

This is what I mean my role creep. Are we saying every RCN ship has to have the full capabilities of a CSC? A CMMC that has a weapons load-out approaching that of our current Halifax-class certainly will not lack in suitable missions to fulfill even without strike-length VLS.

I'd also argue that cramming them into a smaller hull like the CMMC will force a reduction in other important features/capabilities. For the rare occasions where flinging large quantities of munitions down range I'd suggest an uncrewed/minimally crewed Arsenal ship would make more sense.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

This is what I mean my role creep. Are we saying every RCN ship has to have the full capabilities of a CSC?

No. And that's why the vessel I proposed above, in the 2000 tons range, can be built in a 105 m L.O.A. and is basically an ASW vessel with AAW self-defense capability. It's not meant to have all capabilities (even though every warship with .50 cal and above can do constabulary/anti-piracy), its meant primarily for close ASW escort or independent ASW work, possibly contributing a little bit to the air umbrella here and there on occasion.

For info: 105 meters is 345 feet. The St. Laurents were 366 feet. Make the following changes in your mind: On the St. Laurent, put the helicopter landing at the stern (like on the HAL's) and move the hangar and the bridge superstructure aft accordingly. In the space now created in front of the bridge put the 16 VLS cells and forward of it, the main gun. Then shorten by by 20 feet. The real estate is all there , no problem.

 

[GR66]

No. And that's why the vessel I proposed above, in the 2000 tons range, can be built in a 105 m L.O.A. and is basically an ASW vessel with AAW self-defense capability. It's not meant to have all capabilities (even though every warship with .50 cal and above can do constabulary/anti-piracy), its meant primarily for close ASW escort or independent ASW work, possibly contributing a little bit to the air umbrella here and there on occasion.

For info: 105 meters is 345 feet. The St. Laurents were 366 feet. Make the following changes in your mind: On the St. Laurent, put the helicopter landing at the stern (like on the HAL's) and move the hangar and the bridge superstructure aft accordingly. In the space now created in front of the bridge put the 16 VLS cells and forward of it, the main gun. Then shorten by by 20 feet. The real estate is all there , no problem.

The problem is the 10 year timeline. What we need is something MOTS.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

But, as FSTO and I like to remind people, there is no such thing as a MOTS warship.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Assuming that you want to defend our coastline from surface threats: I have to wonder that with us having such a rugged coastline and limited access to it. Would it make sense to have "Coastal defense ships" that carry long range anti-ship missiles and can move from anchorage to anchorage and fire the missile based on targeting data supplied?

 

[Furniture]

Assuming that you want to defend our coastline from surface threats: I have to wonder that with us having such a rugged coastline and limited access to it. Would it make sense to have "Coastal defense ships" that carry long range anti-ship missiles and can move from anchorage to anchorage and fire the missile based on targeting data supplied?

Why use a ship for that when you can use aircraft?

 

[lenaitch]

I can see the crews using the MG's to protect the boarding party or to be a threat to ships they want to inspect.

Fine, but they need the legal authority to do that. The civilian CG needs the legal authority to have them and the operating crews need to legal authority to use them. That is a legislative change and, as mentioned, done with the stroke of a pen, but it is also a matter of training and a knowledgeable and accountable chain of command all the way to the top.

Police services and other agencies that are primarily law enforcement do it quite well and effectively; it's their line of work. When you get into areas where law enforcement and all of the ancillary things that go along with that are only a tiny portion of the overall business of the department or agency, in my experience in the Ontario government, it is done rather poorly. Most often, not for want of the front line folks tasked with doing it.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Fine, but they need the legal authority to do that. The civilian CG needs the legal authority to have them and the operating crews need to legal authority to use them. That is a legislative change and, as mentioned, done with the stroke of a pen, but it is also a matter of training and a knowledgeable and accountable chain of command all the way to the top.

Police services and other agencies that are primarily law enforcement do it quite well and effectively; it's their line of work. When you get into areas where law enforcement and all of the ancillary things that go along with that are only a tiny portion of the overall business of the department or agency, in my experience in the Ontario government, it is done rather poorly. Most often, not for want of the front line folks tasked with doing it.

As I mentioned, the biggest challenge will be changing the mindset of the Captains and management. You can teach them the ROE's, but can you bring them to the point of using force even when required and authorized?

 

[quadrapiper]

No. And that's why the vessel I proposed above, in the 2000 tons range, can be built in a 105 m L.O.A. and is basically an ASW vessel with AAW self-defense capability. It's not meant to have all capabilities (even though every warship with .50 cal and above can do constabulary/anti-piracy), its meant primarily for close ASW escort or independent ASW work, possibly contributing a little bit to the air umbrella here and there on occasion.

For info: 105 meters is 345 feet. The St. Laurents were 366 feet. Make the following changes in your mind: On the St. Laurent, put the helicopter landing at the stern (like on the HAL's) and move the hangar and the bridge superstructure aft accordingly. In the space now created in front of the bridge put the 16 VLS cells and forward of it, the main gun. Then shorten by by 20 feet. The real estate is all there , no problem.

Are VLS cells and the void within which they fit something of an invitation to flexibility, both in the loadout and as far as future-proofing?

Has anyone come up with a stacking insert for smaller missiles? Two boxes of four each, say, with the upper box being ejected once spent, and replaced with the lower one?

 

[Halifax Tar]

I see the point you’re making, Colin, but even RCN boarding parties are made up from a very wide variety of trades. I’m sure there are people better informed than me that can vouch for how diverse boarding party backgrounds can be. Might be the very thing that provides a nice change of pace for someone who wants a break from buoy husbandry.

Boarding parties are made up of representation from every Dept. From A1 - A10 every Dept has a member or more on the team. As a killick storesman I was A6.

I don't recall any nation launching land-attack missiles against Somali pirate bases as pirates typically live within civilian infrastructure. The Houthis are different being a semi-State power...but isn't that why we have the River-class?

This is what I mean my role creep. Are we saying every RCN ship has to have the full capabilities of a CSC? A CMMC that has a weapons load-out approaching that of our current Halifax-class certainly will not lack in suitable missions to fulfill even without strike-length VLS.

I'd also argue that cramming them into a smaller hull like the CMMC will force a reduction in other important features/capabilities. For the rare occasions where flinging large quantities of munitions down range I'd suggest an uncrewed/minimally crewed Arsenal ship would make more sense.

Canada shouldn't have a 'warship' that cant throw and take punches.

 

[Maxman1]

Boy, Kirkhill, you really like to talk to yourself, don't you.

Just kidding!

I want to see those MCDV replacements. i want to see them fast, and I want them to be very much non-USA dependent.

Here's my dream:

Made in Canada Corvete (or light frigate - your choice of denomination) 2,000 to 2,400 tons displacement, 120 meters approx. length with: 32 CAMM-MR, 76 mm Leonardo main gun, 2x 35 mm remote controlled gun, SMART-S Mk 2, CANTASS, 2x French SLAT anti-torpedo system, CANTASS, hangar for one Merlin ASW helicopter, CCS330. Size of purchase: 12 but not, repeat not, at the expense of any of the RCD's.

However, bought as an emergency program, with the Halifax's being brought home from oversea deployment as training ships to get these ready for front line employment.

Why not Bofors 57mm? Reuse it and any other equipment from the Halifax class as they retire.

And keep the design on file like the Americans do with the Arleigh Burke so we can order more if needed after the original tranche.

 

[Furniture]

That kit will be more than 20 years old when the CMMC comes out. Why would you hamper a new ship with old and outdated kit?

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

You could use them. But the Vulcano 76mm gives you an incredible range of types of munition for various scenarios that the Bofors 57 doesn't.

 

[Rainbow1910]

I've said it previously I think but generally, I don't think all the effort and funding required to force the CCG into a role they obviously want no part of is worthwhile. CCG and DFO employees are overworked and have enough to deal with as it is, trying to bring them into additional armed enforcement roles seems like a bridge too far. I've heard from multiple CCG staff that they have no interest in doing this kind of work and would have joined the Navy or DFO enforcement if they wanted to tote guns around. Their ships are not designed for such a role either, nor is any of the legislation especially suited to take these duties on.

The obsession with having every branch of the Govt armed and ready to fight is a bit silly to me, people view a Coast Guard that isn't directly modeled off the USCG as entirely useless. The "Canadian" (more like the British) way of operating a CG is entirely valid and hence why we have stuck to it for all this time, having this discussion over and over does not seem produce except to satisfy some peoples bordering on fetish for militarization.

I understand your viewpoint and if Irving has the capability of initiating another entire assembly line within a year or two at most then go for it. From what I can see, we have contracted one shipyard to build the River Class which will keep them thoroughly occupied for the next several decades by which time they will be starting on the next iteration. Davies was contracted to build icebreakers because it wasn't possible for Seaspan to produce the number of ships that the CG requires plus add to the needed icebreaker fleet plus build the navy's non-combatants. I put Irving in that same position: they just can't do it so find another yard and have them work under contract for Irving if necessary but get them built

Irving is legally the only combatant supplier within the National Shipbuilding Strategy and that is not going to change anytime soon. There is no other domestic yards that are active now or that could be brought up within effectively any timeframe that could jump in to speed up River class production for the first of the class that we need to replace the Halifax class. Davie was also contracted as a political move to throw some meat into the basically dead company for the French Canadians, there is no other yard to divert River class production to. I will mention again, NSS is specifically designed to not do this, as how the Halifax class was built and proceeded to kill all of the yards afterwards due to zero work.

Boy, Kirkhill, you really like to talk to yourself, don't you.

Just kidding!

I want to see those MCDV replacements. i want to see them fast, and I want them to be very much non-USA dependent.

Here's my dream:

Made in Canada Corvete (or light frigate - your choice of denomination) 2,000 to 2,400 tons displacement, 120 meters approx. length with: 32 CAMM-MR, 76 mm Leonardo main gun, 2x 35 mm remote controlled gun, SMART-S Mk 2, CANTASS, 2x French SLAT anti-torpedo system, CANTASS, hangar for one Merlin ASW helicopter, CCS330. Size of purchase: 12 but not, repeat not, at the expense of any of the RCD's.

However, bought as an emergency program, with the Halifax's being brought home from oversea deployment as training ships to get these ready for front line employment.

The primary reason I can't get onboard with this type of vessel is that there is simply nowhere near enough Cyclones and manpower to effectively utilize them all. It's also over the tonnage and length restrictions put on the CMMC as well. We need something with an effective mission deck to utilize all of the various future containerized platforms that the Kingstons will need to be replaced with, a sizable flight deck and hanger always eat into this capability on a smaller vessel. I'd also be worried such a procurement would eat into the River class.

 

[FSTO]

Reading the article that outlines CCG issues, I was amazed that the CCG had no responsibility nor legislative authority to give positional reports of suspected or suspicious activities/vessels to the MSOC’s (or whatever they are called now).

Giving the CCG the mandate and the communication capability to do surveillance while carrying out the regular duties would be an easy win in my mind.

I’ll see if I can find that report.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I've said it previously I think but generally, I don't think all the effort and funding required to force the CCG into a role they obviously want no part of is worthwhile. CCG and DFO employees are overworked and have enough to deal with as it is, trying to bring them into additional armed enforcement roles seems like a bridge too far. I've heard from multiple CCG staff that they have no interest in doing this kind of work and would have joined the Navy or DFO enforcement if they wanted to tote guns around. Their ships are not designed for such a role either, nor is any of the legislation especially suited to take these duties on.

The obsession with having every branch of the Govt armed and ready to fight is a bit silly to me, people view a Coast Guard that isn't directly modeled off the USCG as entirely useless. The "Canadian" (more like the British) way of operating a CG is entirely valid and hence why we have stuck to it for all this time, having this discussion over and over does not seem produce except to satisfy some peoples bordering on fetish for militarization.

Having been part of the CCG, in my opinion a certain level of armament is actually appropriate, often it will be the only government vessel in the area and may be called upon for a variety of constabulary duties. Prior to the big LNG push on the west coast, CCG was busy trying to get out of the navaid business, getting rid of manned lighthouses, navigation aids and not wanting anything to do with derelict vessels. Had it not been for the international agreement on SAR zones, they might have gotten rid of most of the fleet out here. In fact we were down to one smallish buoytender out here for awhile. It was the LNG export terminal push and all the TERMPOL review that forced them (management) to change their attitude. Then the big political push, complete with money on derelict vessels.

 

[Swampbuggy]

I've said it previously I think but generally, I don't think all the effort and funding required to force the CCG into a role they obviously want no part of is worthwhile. CCG and DFO employees are overworked and have enough to deal with as it is, trying to bring them into additional armed enforcement roles seems like a bridge too far. I've heard from multiple CCG staff that they have no interest in doing this kind of work and would have joined the Navy or DFO enforcement if they wanted to tote guns around. Their ships are not designed for such a role either, nor is any of the legislation especially suited to take these duties on.

The obsession with having every branch of the Govt armed and ready to fight is a bit silly to me, people view a Coast Guard that isn't directly modeled off the USCG as entirely useless. The "Canadian" (more like the British) way of operating a CG is entirely valid and hence why we have stuck to it for all this time, having this discussion over and over does not seem produce except to satisfy some peoples bordering on fetish for militarization.


Irving is legally the only combatant supplier within the National Shipbuilding Strategy and that is not going to change anytime soon. There is no other domestic yards that are active now or that could be brought up within effectively any timeframe that could jump in to speed up River class production for the first of the class that we need to replace the Halifax class. Davie was also contracted as a political move to throw some meat into the basically dead company for the French Canadians, there is no other yard to divert River class production to. I will mention again, NSS is specifically designed to not do this, as how the Halifax class was built and proceeded to kill all of the yards afterwards due to zero work.


The primary reason I can't get onboard with this type of vessel is that there is simply nowhere near enough Cyclones and manpower to effectively utilize them all. It's also over the tonnage and length restrictions put on the CMMC as well. We need something with an effective mission deck to utilize all of the various future containerized platforms that the Kingstons will need to be replaced with, a sizable flight deck and hanger always eat into this capability on a smaller vessel. I'd also be worried such a procurement would eat into the River class.

I can’t speak for everyone, but for myself the draw to having CCG fulfil a stronger maritime security mandate stems from the RCN running out of resources and already being overtaxed themselves. I less see that as less being military fetishized and more as searching for a practical solution to a very serious looming problem. Again, not talking about turning the LARSON into a sub hunter, but having at least some personnel vested with the authority to apply and enforce laws. If DFO officers are currently short staffed and overworked, my hope would be an expansion of their ranks. Is it easier to recruit and train people to do that than serve in the RCN?

I think we all get the structure of the NSS and its intent. The issue is that the ball started rolling too slowly and we’ve lost a lot of ground. If the CPF’s had been given the same type of structural love that the combat systems did during FELEX, it would have bought more time, but here we are. I don’t see the problem with yards running out of work if Canada were to start turning over ships at an earlier stage in their lives. HUDSON, LSTL, the CPF’s, 280’s etc are all examples of ships that were forced to last much longer than they should. With an expansion of the fleet (CMMC included here, possibly) and all the various current classes that are being and will be replaced there will be ample opportunity for continuous work for the next multiple decades, if planned properly. Canada needs to consider a 25 year lifespan on major fleet units to guard against rust out/exhorbitant maintenance costs and to guard against downtimes in shipyards. It also needs to find a way to get at least some new useful ships quickly to bridge the upcoming gap. Until then, we bluesky stuff like arming CCG ships.

 

[Rainbow1910]

I can’t speak for everyone, but for myself the draw to having CCG fulfil a stronger maritime security mandate stems from the RCN running out of resources and already being overtaxed themselves. I less see that as less being military fetishized and more as searching for a practical solution to a very serious looming problem. Again, not talking about turning the LARSON into a sub hunter, but having at least some personnel vested with the authority to apply and enforce laws. If DFO officers are currently short staffed and overworked, my hope would be an expansion of their ranks. Is it easier to recruit and train people to do that than serve in the RCN?

I think we all get the structure of the NSS and its intent. The issue is that the ball started rolling too slowly and we’ve lost a lot of ground. If the CPF’s had been given the same type of structural love that the combat systems did during FELEX, it would have bought more time, but here we are. I don’t see the problem with yards running out of work if Canada were to start turning over ships at an earlier stage in their lives. HUDSON, LSTL, the CPF’s, 280’s etc are all examples of ships that were forced to last much longer than they should. With an expansion of the fleet (CMMC included here, possibly) and all the various current classes that are being and will be replaced there will be ample opportunity for continuous work for the next multiple decades, if planned properly. Canada needs to consider a 25 year lifespan on major fleet units to guard against rust out/exhorbitant maintenance costs and to guard against downtimes in shipyards. It also needs to find a way to get at least some new useful ships quickly to bridge the upcoming gap. Until then, we bluesky stuff like arming CCG ships.

I simple do not see the point in bringing the CCG into the picture to dump part of the burden upon them, versus actually providing the support and funding required to the RCN to properly do the job they are required to do. Fund each organization to do what they are mandated and required to do, don't cross pollinate them into each others responsibilities.

There is no realistic way to gain back that ground and honestly, meddling with the system as it spins up now is only a recipe for disaster. It makes no sense to have put all of this money and effort into yards like Irving if the plan is to steal away their work, spit in the face of the NSS and magic up another yard to split that work away. Those ample opportunities for continuous work are already set in stone with the few yards we have, I am struggling to see why we would even entertain screwing the process up at this critical juncture. The Halifax class simple have to wait for the River class to come online, there is really no way to get around this while Irving builds those ships. There is no way to speed this process up without hurting Irving and the other shipyards with their currently unfolding programs.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I simple do not see the point in bringing the CCG into the picture to dump part of the burden upon them, versus actually providing the support and funding required to the RCN to properly do the job they are required to do. Fund each organization to do what they are mandated and required to do, don't cross pollinate them into each others responsibilities.

There is no realistic way to gain back that ground and honestly, meddling with the system as it spins up now is only a recipe for disaster. It makes no sense to have put all of this money and effort into yards like Irving if the plan is to steal away their work, spit in the face of the NSS and magic up another yard to split that work away. Those ample opportunities for continuous work are already set in stone with the few yards we have, I am struggling to see why we would even entertain screwing the process up at this critical juncture. The Halifax class simple have to wait for the River class to come online, there is really no way to get around this while Irving builds those ships. There is no way to speed this process up without hurting Irving and the other shipyards with their currently unfolding programs.

Looking at tasks and distributing them accordingly is good business. And that can evolve and should be adjusted as needed. If the RCN feels it is doing something that would be better done by the CCG and free up RCN resources then that should be investigated.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I simple do not see the point in bringing the CCG into the picture to dump part of the burden upon them, versus actually providing the support and funding required to the RCN to properly do the job they are required to do. Fund each organization to do what they are mandated and required to do, don't cross pollinate them into each others responsibilities.

I remember HMCS Restigouche having to arrest a drug smuggling ship with it's main gun turret jammed in one direction. Having all major CCG vessels armed with .50cals gives you a larger pool of assets to support LEO boarding parties. It adds value to a already expensive asset and does not add a significant training or maintenance burden.

As to the poor Fishcops, much of their problems is a dismal payscale and management that treats them like dirt. It's miracle anyone signs up for the job. The management certainly does not deserve the employees they have. Fun fact I used to have to use part of my travel budget to put fuel into DFO boats so they could support my work and allow them to do theirs. DFO routinely cut their fuel budget to the point where they could not leave the office.