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Lets get real, Canada and talk defence.

One of the biggest things I think I see through the fog is we need to decide WHAT our army is. Mech? Air Mobile? Armoured? This "general purpose" capability is a fail safe that fits into no category. With a real defence policy and outline, we can decide what and how we do things. Then spend the damn money. No excuses.
 
One of the biggest things I think I see through the fog is we need to decide WHAT our army is. Mech? Air Mobile? Armoured? This "general purpose" capability is a fail safe that fits into no category. With a real defence policy and outline, we can decide what and how we do things. Then spend the damn money. No excuses.
Chicken or Egg?

We cannot possibly build a role for any aspect of the CAF until we have a coherent Defence Policy. We can't have a coherent Defence Policy until we have a coherent and consistent Nation Secuirty and Foreign Policy. We can't have any of the above until we have a holistic, all party commitment to what Canada as a whole wants to be on the world stage.

Buddha said:
"Your work is to discover your work and then with all your heart give yourself to it."
 
But

100x this

New $55M armoury opens in Halifax​

armoury2-INSIDE-mainweb-1024x576.jpg



5.5 BCAD for Reserve Infrastructure
I'd love to see the break down of material vs design work vs labour on that 55m. Defense isn't cheap, and we have neglected too long
 
But

100x this

New $55M armoury opens in Halifax​

armoury2-INSIDE-mainweb-1024x576.jpg



5.5 BCAD for Reserve Infrastructure

Its not as big as it looks. Its too small. We still have ARes units in portables, crumbling WW1 era hangers, and in former barracks.

That should have been built doubled in size and the entirety of 36 CBG (With CBG HQ) in HRM could call it home.
 
Chicken or Egg?

We cannot possibly build a role for any aspect of the CAF until we have a coherent Defence Policy. We can't have a coherent Defence Policy until we have a coherent and consistent Nation Secuirty and Foreign Policy. We can't have any of the above until we have a holistic, all party commitment to what Canada as a whole wants to be on the world stage.
So never then. 😑
 
Chicken or Egg?

We cannot possibly build a role for any aspect of the CAF until we have a coherent Defence Policy. We can't have a coherent Defence Policy until we have a coherent and consistent Nation Security and Foreign Policy. We can't have any of the above until we have a holistic, all party commitment to what Canada as a whole wants to be on the world stage.
The reason I say never, is that there is nobody of influence within the government or it seems the public service as well, screaming from the roof tops that we are doing the defence review completely ass backwards. There is no coherent foreign policy; Peacekeeping and Convening Meetings is not a foreign policy. A clear eyed identification of our interests in regards to NA, WH, and the World would be start, followed by an identification of our self interests, our strengths and our weaknesses and how we exploit both. Tell Canadians our true status in the world and follow up with a convention with the other political parties of our general strategic wants and needs and how a vision of the foreign policy of Canada will survive a change in government. Then we tailor a defence policy that supports that overall strategic vision of the nation.

Right now the MND is going on the media circuit talking about the defence review of SSE. I have not heard a fucking word from GAC about a foreign policy review. So the end state of all of this is that the CAF is fucked for another generation at least.
 
Briefly....

1. CAF priorities:
-Defence of Canada.
-Defence of North America.
-NATO.

To enable those priorities:
-Be one of the worlds top naval powers (we have a huge coastline and three oceans, holy fuck shouldn't we be good at water stuff?)
-Be one of the worlds top air powers (huge airspace over country and leading to it, should have state of the art air capability)
-Be highly specialized in niche capabilities (highly developed SOF, cyber etc. We have a small population and can't support a big navy, air force and large army formations, but would still need a well equipped ground force, not sure what that looks like). If large formations of ground troops is required - that is where PRes comes in.

2. Remain a part of NATO and other coalitions. for certain. Contributions vary.
The one big alteration I would make is the 3rd point on question 1 should have a / between NATO and appropriate Pacific equivalent. ABCANZ / AUSCANNZUKUS formalized, maybe add SK and Japan?


Re: the rest quoted- completely agreed. But for the purpose of this thread I'd say that "Top Power" is too vague- we need a true goal for that power. When I look at the list of priorities, and take stock of the views of the Canadian populace and what they could "believe" in, there is a pretty clear overlap at the concept of defense and deterrence. NATO tablestakes dictate some heavy land capability, but other than that tactical usage, is any kind of forced entry or "taking of ground" truly a priority for Canada? That's where I come to a heavy A2/AD leaning for all three services. Sell the Canadian populace on being able to defend our allies and be a key cog in denying large swathes of the globe to our enemies. It's a bit of double speak because doing so inherently requires long range fires and offensive capability, but the principle informs force design and the weight put on pure power projection.
 
The one big alteration I would make is the 3rd point on question 1 should have a / between NATO and appropriate Pacific equivalent. ABCANZ / AUSCANNZUKUS formalized, maybe add SK and Japan?


Re: the rest quoted- completely agreed. But for the purpose of this thread I'd say that "Top Power" is too vague- we need a true goal for that power. When I look at the list of priorities, and take stock of the views of the Canadian populace and what they could "believe" in, there is a pretty clear overlap at the concept of defense and deterrence. NATO tablestakes dictate some heavy land capability, but other than that tactical usage, is any kind of forced entry or "taking of ground" truly a priority for Canada? That's where I come to a heavy A2/AD leaning for all three services. Sell the Canadian populace on being able to defend our allies and be a key cog in denying large swathes of the globe to our enemies. It's a bit of double speak because doing so inherently requires long range fires and offensive capability, but the principle informs force design and the weight put on pure power projection.

I s uspect that that AUKUS, or even ABCANZUS, may have to be broadened to include not just Japan and South Korea but also Singapore and Malaysia in the east and the Netherlands, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland in the west.

I am still trying to figure out Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and the Balkans, Italy, Spain and Portugal.

Turkey is following its own destiny these days.
 
The reason I say never, is that there is nobody of influence within the government or it seems the public service as well, screaming from the roof tops that we are doing the defence review completely ass backwards. There is no coherent foreign policy; Peacekeeping and Convening Meetings is not a foreign policy. A clear eyed identification of our interests in regards to NA, WH, and the World would be start, followed by an identification of our self interests, our strengths and our weaknesses and how we exploit both. Tell Canadians our true status in the world and follow up with a convention with the other political parties of our general strategic wants and needs and how a vision of the foreign policy of Canada will survive a change in government. Then we tailor a defence policy that supports that overall strategic vision of the nation.

Right now the MND is going on the media circuit talking about the defence review of SSE. I have not heard a fucking word from GAC about a foreign policy review. So the end state of all of this is that the CAF is fucked for another generation at least.

Is anybody in government concerned about Canada's self-interest? At all?

They seem happy enough disposing of Canada's available advantages (energy, minerals, forestry, agriculture and fisheries immediately come to mind).

Does our government perceive of our self interest? Does it acknowledge self interest as legitimate? Does it accept that it should be defended? Does it want it defended? Does it want to defend it?

Keep in mind that this the same party that has refused to recognize a right to personal property for the last 40 years and the 1982 constitution.
 
Is anybody in government concerned about Canada's self-interest? At all?

They seem happy enough disposing of Canada's available advantages (energy, minerals, forestry, agriculture and fisheries immediately come to mind).

Does our government perceive of our self interest? Does it acknowledge self interest as legitimate? Does it accept that it should be defended? Does it want it defended? Does it want to defend it?

Keep in mind that this the same party that has refused to recognize a right to personal property for the last 40 years and the 1982 constitution.
They don't take defence seriously at all

Until its too late.

That is the downfall of many a nation. And we only need look at the last 100 years to see this pattern repeats itself over and over.

Canadians have enjoyed the security umbrella (the safety bubble so to speak) for the last 80 some odd years (Yeah I am a cold war child and remember when that was a possible threat).
 
For context, Lets look at the cold war

in 1962, my father is a gunner in 2RCHA and the attitude was "WHen the soviets attack the west, not if..." Look at our armed forces

in 1980, I am a 7 year old boy, my father, long out of the army "Well, lets hope the soviets don't attack the west..." Now we are well under Trudeau SR minimalist attitude of defence but yet our armed forces were at a certain strength

in 1990, young Rick (me) joins the P Res, the attitude was " Well, back when we thought the soviets would attack, this was how we would have fought..." Look at defence then (shortly there after the Reg F had decided to reduce the 3rd battalions to 10/90, a symptom of the times)

in 1998, Corporal Rick " Well shit, aint gotta worry about the Russians now, the Yugo war is over, whats next?" General Canadian attitude we don't even need a military just some "peace keepers" (eye roll)

in 2001, Some planes crash into the WTC and the white house, "Damn, so this is the new war now?" Canadian attitude very confused

in 2001-2014 Time frame, a lot of attitudes changed in both the military and Canadians in general. The biggest problem was "It happens over there.." or "Its America attacking/colonizing/invading everyone.." attitude.

in 2022, Russia FULL on invades the Ukraine (not the nibbling off of some territory in 2014), the general Canadian attitude seems to be "Huh, war still bad but don't spend money on defence"

Canadians just don't get it.
 
Good point and at no time will this current government consider swinging anything unless its a swipe at its own intelligence service.

There are traitors in our midst and the government doesn't want to admit it.

In fairness to our government it is not just them who are reluctant to take a swing. This is no longer the country of Gordie Howe, Bobby Hull, Bobby Orr and Don Cherry. Of John Ferguson and the enforcers.

 
Shaun Pinner, a former British infantryman who fought at Mariupol as a Ukrainian contract marine, says no amount of money, threats or cajoling can force a man to fight, knowing he might die. Morale is achieved by strong leadership, team cohesion that makes you risk your life for the man to your left and your right, knowledge that your family and your country depend on the fight you put up, and the belief that what you are doing is right.


Everything else is fluff.

The sentiments do not apply to Canada.



Ukraine’s secret weapon should terrify Putin​

The Kremlin’s campaign of fear has failed – and Kyiv now has a huge advantage over the Russian military
RICHARD KEMP7 March 2023 • 7:00pm
Richard Kemp


Ukrainian soldiers are seen during their shooting training at the front

Ukrainian soldiers training with US-made weapons near the frontline this month CREDIT: Anadolu Agency
Ashocking video has been circulating in the last few days that appears to show a Ukrainian prisoner of war being gunned down by his Russian captors as he utters what he knows are the last words he will ever say: “Slava Ukraini” – glory to Ukraine. This image of heroic defiance against appalling brutality should send a chilling message to Vladimir Putin after a year of butchery in Ukraine: you can murder and torture us all you like, but you cannot defeat our will to fight.
This defiance is the opposite of what Putin expected when his forces rolled into Ukraine last February. His “special military operation” was not planned as a war at all: it was an armed, psychological action intended to instil fear, install a puppet regime, and bring the country back to heel. That’s why he attacked with too few forces to defeat a determined opponent.
Putin’s intelligence services, led by the FSB, successors to his own KGB, told him that Russian-speaking Ukrainians would welcome the invaders with open arms. Russia’s security services had been paid vast sums over many years to ensure that this would happen, and to position collaborators to take over the government and whip opponents into line (or do away with them).
Before the invasion, the FSB knew that they were on shaky ground, with sources giving them a very different picture. But how were they to explain that to the Kremlin after all the resources that had been ploughed into subverting Ukraine?
Indeed, it turned out Russia’s intelligence agencies were wrong on all counts. Collaborators in Kyiv and elsewhere did not deliver the goods. Woefully ill-prepared Russian forces encountered a level of resistance that took them by surprise, including subsequently in Russian-speaking areas where partisans have been fighting against them. And it was not only Russia that was left humbled by its initial intelligence failures. The assessment of US agencies, in an inversion of their over-confident predictions about Afghan forces’ ability to hold out against the Taliban, was that Ukraine would quickly collapse.
How did the Ukrainians prove both the Russians and the Americans so wrong? The answer to that question takes us back to the murder of the unknown soldier in the Ukrainian woods. Morale, which he symbolised even at the point of death, is the linchpin of success in war.
Shaun Pinner, a former British infantryman who fought at Mariupol as a Ukrainian contract marine, says no amount of money, threats or cajoling can force a man to fight, knowing he might die. Morale is achieved by strong leadership, team cohesion that makes you risk your life for the man to your left and your right, knowledge that your family and your country depend on the fight you put up, and the belief that what you are doing is right. Pinner witnessed the infectiousness of high morale. It led him and his comrades to fiercely hold out at Mariupol for so long.
The incompetently led Russian troops, many of whom have no idea what they’re fighting for despite the propaganda they are fed, lack any such advantage. There are stories of some being forced into battle at gunpoint.
High morale and fighting spirit, however, are not enough on their own, as the French learned to their cost in 1940. Their collapse was due above all to intelligence failure, poor strategic leadership, and operational and tactical inferiority to the Wehrmacht.
Thankfully Ukraine does not have these failings. One of the most important reasons Putin’s plans were frustrated last February was Zelensky’s leadership, remaining in Kyiv and rallying the country by his own example. His army, trained by the West, has the operational and tactical upper hand over the sclerotic Russians. Ukrainian military intelligence has proved exceptionally successful, thanks in part to direct input from Britain and the US.
Of course, Ukraine has also been kept in the fight by Western money and arms. This support, which again Putin failed to anticipate, does not just equip troops to fight but is also fundamentally important for morale. On that, Afghanistan provides a salutary lesson for Ukraine today. Having fought hard for years, in 2021 the Afghan forces disintegrated the minute that the Americans pulled out.

Colonel Richard Kemp is a former infantry commander
 
Not sure this is the proper thread for this, but if you want to provide input to the next Defence Policy Update, which I would highly encourage, here is the place to do it:

 
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