Hezbollah is formenting violence and fanning the flames of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its bloody track record makes it a natural target in the war on terror, but the USA's only option is to confront Hezbollah indirectly: by getting its backers, Syria and Iran, to help change its focus from militancy to politics.
In my opinion, any war on terror must target Hezbollah and that military action be considered against the movement's state sponsors, Syria and Iran.
Given the organization's record of bloodshed and hostility, the question is not whether Hezbollah should be stopped; it is how. A campaign against it similar to the US effort against al Qaeda -- killing the group's leaders and ending its haven in Lebanon -- would probably fail and might even backfire. Syria and Iran openly support it, and much of the Arab world regards it as heroic, for its successful resistance against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon( might add, the only time that Arab arms have forced Israel to surrender territory
), and legitimate, because of its participation in Lebanese politics. Its no secret that western officials have acknowledged the value of its social and political projects.
The upshot is that although Washington should indeed confront Hezbollah, it should do so indirectly. However morally justified an all-out attack would be, reducing Hezbollah's terrorist activity requires avoiding the temptation to overreach. Instead, our friends to the south
must apply pressure through Syria and Iran. Only Damascus has the necessary intel assets and force on the ground in Lebanon to shut down Hezbollah's militant activities.
Pressure on Iran, meanwhile, would help cut off hezbollah's global network and might persuade it to focus on Lebanese politics rather than anti-Western violence.
With skill, Washington can transform Hezbollah into just one more Lebanese political faction -- one that continues to be hostile but no longer poses a major threat to the US, its neighbors, and its interests.
At home, Hezbollah is as much a social and political organization as it is a terrorist or guerrilla movement; abroad, its violence serves the interests of Tehran and Damascus, both of which helped create it and still actively back it. It is embedded in Lebanese politics and society and, unlike al Qaeda, is a stakeholder in the existing regional order, not a force bent on destroying it. This position has made Hezbollah stronger but has also forced it to become more cautious, cunning, and subtle.
Iran and Syria use Hezbollah operations to further their foreign policy objectives, but their close ties to the group make them responsible for its trespasses.When Tehran and Damascus feel threatened by the possibility of retaliation, they do not hesitate to rein Hezbollah in.
If the West can successfully defuse Hezbollah's militant activity, the organization might well move more squarely into the political arena. Such a shift would set off a cycle, as Hezbollah's continuing political success would depend on its ability to bring stability and prosperity to its Lebanese constituents instead of on its violent efforts against Israel and the US. Hezbollah would remain a force in Lebanon, but it would no longer be a "terrorist group of global reach." Given the moral rhetoric of the war on terror and Hezbollah's bloody history, this outcome may not be entirely satisfying -- but appears to be the only realistic option available.
