LAV III Mobile Gun System (MGS)

[geo]

Thanks for comments from the horse's mouth  Stryker 11A

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Welcome aboard Stryker_11A!  Your ability to speak on the employment of the Stryker from first hand experience is most welcome. 

T2B

 

[Stryker_11A]

I am happy to contribute what I can.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

So what are your dislikes/needs improvements?

 

[Stryker_11A]

The MGS carries a limited amount of ammunition, 12 rounds. This needs to be doubled or tripled.

The rate of fire is 6 RPM, and should be increased. The Rapid Deployment Force – Light Tank (RDF-LT) program concept vehicle, the M-8 Buford had a 12 RPM rate. I seriously doubt that United Defense would be willing to share their proprietary technical information with GDLS though.

The Stryker is not just a vehicle, but a combat enterprise system which includes an entire brigades worth of assets, which gives it an edge over any other infantry transport ever fielded. I am still amazed at some of our capabilities, how quick and accurate the systems are. A Stryker Brigade Combat Team is a deadly organization and shouldn't be undersold for perceived weaknesses, because backing up that "weakness" is an overwhelming strength.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

So would you say that the MGS on its own by itself would be severly limited in what it could do with out its other organizations?

 

[Stryker_11A]

Yes and no. As long as you have supporting infantry, it would still perform well as an assault gun. Without the systems that attach it to the brigade, it would not have the situation awareness, C3, and immediate access to support that the rest of the SBCT provides which greatly enhances it's capabilities.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Ok.  Do you know enough of the Canadian Army to speak on whether it is a capability we should again activly aquire?  Including considering the loss of tanks for the MGS.

 

[Stryker_11A]

The MGS is not a tank replacement. The only time that I would intentionally employ an MGS against tanks is if I was out of Javelins and could not call in CAS due to weather. Even then I would use the MGS as a part of an anti-armor ambush with the infantry, shoot and displace to the next fall back position.

For the CA, I would select a tank and utilize it in the MGS role for the motorized LAV battalions and in a traditional role in armor battalions. I feel for you guys and your procurement/logistics system. I am amazed at what you accomplish with the little that you have.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Thanks for your insight.

 

[Stryker_11A]

Please write an open letter to the Canadian Main Stream Media, the Treasury Board, the strategic planners and Public Works and Government Services Canada saying same.

Hell, they don't even want to award you guys our medals for valor that you earned. I will approach this another way, I will file a report on This Hour Has Twenty-Two Minutes.

 

[McG]

For the CA, I would select a tank and utilize it in the MGS role for the motorized LAV battalions and in a traditional role in armor battalions. I feel for you guys and your procurement/logistics system. I am amazed at what you accomplish with the little that you have.

If Canada could buy enough vehicles to fill both roles, why would you not recommend both types of vehicle?

 

[Stryker_11A]

Considering that the Canadian defense budget is not as robust as the US, I think a dual role tank would be more efficient in allot of ways. But if it can be afforded for the equipment life cycle, get both. The reason that the US went with the MGS is solely due to the interchangeable logistics of all Strykers. There are better vehicles out there, but the additional cost of supporting them and difficulty in support them out-weighed their advantages.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Courtesy of Manic Moran of Tanknet

Back end of the ammo carousal, not the lack of protection for the ammo and no division between it and the crew.


http://img505.imageshack.us/my.php?image=img1181wf9.jpg

 

[ArmyRick]

Guys, I know we are not getting the MGS but I had a chance to get some first hand info from an MGS PL SGT who has served in Iraq. I had a conversation with him and I got some direct answers from him.

"there are quite a few people who talk a lot of shit to include my own armor guys. its normal for people to not like what they don't understand. i will say that the vehicle does have some flaws that need to be worked out to make the vehicle better but i was asked by the secretary of defense is the vehicle worthy and i told him that as of right now it is as good as it needs to be. its a infantry support vehicle and the dismounts on the ground love it. i have not had a firefight last over 3 minutes. the best thing about it is its maintenance cost, fuel costs, reliability, speed and maneuverability. it were not for the lav we would not have the mgs. i would be stuck on a hummer if it were not for the mgs so the future tankers going to stryker units better be thankful."

and this as well, from the same guy but it was posted on a web site.

"i am a mgs platoon sergeant and i will say that the MGS has proven its worth in combat if you would like to have any questions answered feel free to shoot me an email. i see there are a lot of myths out there like flipping over when fired, not being able to shoot on the move, etc"

I realize that the MGS is not ideal for our army (only so many dollars, so many pers and so many capabilities but this is to shut people up who simply TRASH talk it to death, have no expirience on it and do not understand its role.

 

[George Wallace]

........do not understand its role.

That was the biggest problem.  We weren't giving it the proper role, nor giving it to the proper Branch.  We were using it as a replacement for tanks.

 

[daftandbarmy]

That was the biggest problem.  We weren't giving it the proper role, nor giving it to the proper Branch.  We were using it as a replacement for tanks.

You mean like the Cougar? Give me 76mm in a tough little infantry gutter scrap or give me death. We worked alot with Scorpion on various exercises in the UK and it was first rate.

This 'wheeled light tank' would also be an ideal system for the reserves to master (and to back up the regs) as it's obviously far easier to get an MGS onto the armoury floor for the weeknight/ weekend of training than a Leo 2.

 

[George Wallace]

You mean like the Cougar? Give me 76mm in a tough little infantry gutter scrap or give me death. We worked alot with Scorpion on various exercises in the UK and it was first rate.

This 'wheeled light tank' would also be an ideal system for the reserves to master (and to back up the regs) as it's obviously far easier to get an MGS onto the armoury floor for the weeknight/ weekend of training than a Leo 2.

You just confirmed my statement.

The MGS should never have been thought of as a replacement for the tanks we had (not to be confused with a "Tank Replacement".), nor should they have been for the Armour Corps.  They would have been a great supplement to the Inf Bn Support Wpns Coys, as would the Mortars, HMGs, etc.

The Cougar was a mistake for the Armour Corps, and we also saw what happened with the "Tank Trainer" that was never to be deployed.  It was the match of a fine turret from one fine vehicle, to the hull of another fine vehicle, to create of a piece of junk (sorry for the rant).

The older members of the Armour Corps remember this.  They also looked at a vehicle that really did not teach or maintain key skills required of Armour soldiers, a vehicle that did not carry a large Ammo load and required a long amount of time to replenish, and a vehicle that was better suited for the Infantry as a support wpn.

The Armour Corps now has a great "Surveillance" platform, and is getting tanks once again.  They now need a good Recce veh.  The Armour Corps also has to start equipping the Armour Reserve Units with the same equipment as the Reg Force or Reservists will no longer be able to fill posns in Reg Armd units............which is the current state of affairs already, but continuing to get worse. 

The MGS would not have done anything for Armd Reserves, other than provide a Gunnery platform to train on.  Driver skills would not be taught to the extent needed.  Commanders would learn all the wrong lessons for Veh SA.  All crews would learn bad lessons (as with the Cougar) on the use of ground and Tactics.  Maintenance would be a serious problem.  The list goes on and on, and it is compounded by the fact that the gap between Reserve Trg and Reg Trg in the Armour Corps is continuing to widen.

 

[ArmyRick]

I talked to a couple of our older armoured guys and even they admitted a 76mm HESH round was pretty nasty thing to have flying at an enemy bunker or even firing a 76mm canister round.

 

[George Wallace]

I talked to a couple of our older armoured guys and even they admitted a 76mm HESH round was pretty nasty thing to have flying at an enemy bunker or even firing a 76mm canister round.

True.

However, it was not a tank, nor a real "Tank Trainer".  It did not teach, or reinforce, use of ground and tactical use of ground, as I witnessed in Suffield when other Armour (Cougar) units used our tanks for a Live Fire Exercise with a 2 Km wide trace, and all four troop tanks were litterally fender to fender - frontage of 50 m as opposed to 1.5 km.  Many poor lessons were learned. 

The loss of tanks meant the loss of many skill sets, not only in the Armour Corps, but in the whole of the Cbt Arms.  Infantry, Engineers and Artillery loss their knowledge of how to work with and employ tanks.  The Cougar was not a substitute for that, nor would the MGS have been.