LAV 6.0

[Infanteer]

I believe the TCVs are meant to replace the M113 TLAVs being used in in Artillery and Engineer units to move sections around.

I should have clarified this by stating that the M113 allocation was based off Force 2013, which was the last significant Army Reorg.  The units are probably using different platforms, due to divestment, maintenance issues, and Army EMO rejigging the structure.

What teenage boy doesn't want to be a mechanic on an armored vehicle?;

:rofl:

 

[Infanteer]

5) Here's a thought. Seriously review the staffing at various levels of headquarters and convert the funding for them to maintainers and warfighters. Just as an example, there are enough lawyers and support staff in the CF to man a small battalion of infantry (and if you convert their pay and benefits due to their higher rank levels to squadies--a whole battalion. As a further more detailed example, in total, the prosecution and defence arms of the legal branch are roughly established/manned at 2 Reg F Cols; 4 Reg F LCols; 21 Reg F Majs; 9 full-time civ assistants; 2 Res F LCols and 13 Res F Majs in order to annually handle some 62 courts martial, 9 appeals and various ancillary services). Ottawa is full of these types of examples. During the period 2004 to 2010 civilian personnel in the department grew by 33%, staff at headquarters above the brigade level by 46%, and within the National Capitol Region by 38%. We've become enamored with administering ourselves rather than creating a warfighting force that's a credible deterrent. Lack of equipment (whether new or old) for the Reserves is one giant part of this deficiency.

Oh, I'm with you.  But I have the challenge to the assertion that we need some sort of mechanized reserve.  We aren't Israel or Poland, where the reserves can be expected to fall into some depot and run out to fight with the equipment they train on.  If mobilization isn't a requirement, then we need to ask how our reserves are structured (but that's for another thread).

6) Why can we always find excuses as to why the Reserves are not capable of holding/maintaining equipment that they can use to augment/expand our defence capabilities (and thereby eliminating our deficiencies) rather than fixing the problem? Don't tell me its money. DND get billions and billions every year. It's how DND chooses to spend it that's the real issue.

I don't know, but google can give you a list of 3 and 4 star generals, DMs, and MNDs who could answer the question for you.

 

[dapaterson]

1) Reserve units put much less running time/year on their equipment which translates to less maintenance needs over the years and a longer service life;

Yes, to an extent.  But unused vehicles rapidly become non-operational vehicles, which drives increased effort to maintain them.  It's not a linear relationship.  (Plus, less experienced operators tend to have more accidents, driving up the repairs required).

2) every Reserve Brigade has a service battalion with a maintenance company. Refocus recruiting and retention and Class B contracts to up organic maintenance support within the Bde. What teenage boy doesn't want to be a mechanic on an armored vehicle?;

Maint Coys were removed when the Res Svc Bns were restructured to have FSGs with Maint Pls.  Besides, it's a mistake to assume that Res Svc Bns are comparable to their Reg F counterparts in terms of manning or equipment - it would be like expecting the Canadian Scottish Regiment to force generate the same personnel and equipment as 1st Bn, PPCLI.

And class B growth is the problem, not the solution - it's a way to try to do full time on the cheap to avoid addressing the inherent institutional structural flaws of the CAF enterprise (Reg and Res) - which you speak to later on.

3) These classes of military vehicles do not need large or new housing barns to overwinter and generally do not need to be used in large numbers during the winter. Winterize and tarp most of them at the end of the summer training cycle for the next spring;

You might be surprised what protection is optimal, and what parts of the equipment are required to be properly protected - for technical or security reasons.

4) Run a proper refurbishment program at the time of transfer so that serviceable vehicles are properly inspected and put into running condition (or analyzed and catalogued for parts) before being put into reservists hands;

Given current elevated rates of VOR taxing current maintenance personnel, and that many requests for Res F augmentation are met with no fill becasue the Res F individuals already have viable full-time careers, who will do this work?  (Not arguing against the work, just wondering who will do it)

5) Here's a thought. Seriously review the staffing at various levels of headquarters and convert the funding for them to maintainers and warfighters. Just as an example, there are enough lawyers and support staff in the CF to man a small battalion of infantry (and if you convert their pay and benefits due to their higher rank levels to squadies--a whole battalion. As a further more detailed example, in total, the prosecution and defence arms of the legal branch are roughly established/manned at 2 Reg F Cols; 4 Reg F LCols; 21 Reg F Majs; 9 full-time civ assistants; 2 Res F LCols and 13 Res F Majs in order to annually handle some 62 courts martial, 9 appeals and various ancillary services). Ottawa is full of these types of examples. During the period 2004 to 2010 civilian personnel in the department grew by 33%, staff at headquarters above the brigade level by 46%, and within the National Capitol Region by 38%. We've become enamored with administering ourselves rather than creating a warfighting force that's a credible deterrent. Lack of equipment (whether new or old) for the Reserves is one giant part of this deficiency.

"First thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers"   But yes, regardless, we need a top to bottom rethink of how we are structured, who does what, what capabilities need to be full time, what can be part time, what facilities and equipment are needed to do so.  In my less imperfect world, we train on common fleets whether Reg or Res, and design our force to enable that, including full-time support (whether military or civilian) to enable it.

6) Why can we always find excuses as to why the Reserves are not capable of holding/maintaining equipment that they can use to augment/expand our defence capabilities (and thereby eliminating our deficiencies) rather than fixing the problem? Don't tell me its money. DND get billions and billions every year. It's how DND chooses to spend it that's the real issue.

Every opportunity the Army has had to fix the Reserves the folks made responsible decided nothing was broken, and wasted the opportunities, and sustained the status quo.

Pogo Possum clearly identified and articulated the problem.

 

[Brad Sallows]

If Pte (T) A and MCpl B (each of whom is either inf or armd) show up for a Roto, how long does it take to teach Pte A to drive and MCpl B to crew command (a turretless TCV)?

 

[McG]

So basically increasing our LAV fleet by a third, to almost 1000 LAVs CaF wide. I wonder what the varient breakdown is for all of them.

Look at the current variant break down for Bison and TLAV families. This will be just a little more than 1 for 1 replacements.

Please tell me that we'll keep the surplus TLAVs and Bisons in some form of war stocks or assign them to the Reserve Force and not sell them for scrap and cut them up like we did the M109s.

These vehicles are old, worn, and tired. Nobody should be hoping we keep any of these to fill roles of lesser importance. If there is a need for more armoured vehicles, we should be asking why the ACSV buy is not for more platforms.

We just gave the armoured reservists TAPVs. I don't see this as much different.

We gave TAPV to PRes, but we did not buy it for them (in fact, the CLS who launched the project quite specifically said “I will never waste limited defence procurement dollars on buying an armoured vehicle for the reserves.”)  The requirements people were saddled with the task of linking too many incompatible roles on a single vehicle including reconnaissance, liaison, and cheap mechanized infantry. When the Army realized what it was doing, it was committed to the purchase and so it needed a place to hide the vehicle and save face. The PRes. So don’t confuse the TAPV at a PRes unit as any indicator as signs of an intent to equip the PRes for grander roles.

I believe the TCVs are meant to replace the M113 TLAVs being used in in Artillery and Engineer units to move sections around.

The arty should be using the TCVs for their gun crews. The MTVE is a purpose build engineer section carrier and will be replaced by a purpose built engineer section carrier. If it is not more of the in-service LAV 6 based Engineer Section Carrier, it will likely be an upgrade of that vehicle. A simple APC would make a good fit for an Engr troop CP though. A TCV would also be a good fit for unit and brigade transport organizations that have to shuttle casualty replacements forward.

 

[FJAG]

Oh, I'm with you.  But I have the challenge to the assertion that we need some sort of mechanized reserve.  We aren't Israel or Poland, where the reserves can be expected to fall into some depot and run out to fight with the equipment they train on.  If mobilization isn't a requirement, then we need to ask how our reserves are structured (but that's for another thread).

SSE states the following ay p. 50:

... Recent years have witnessed several challenges. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea is an example that has carried grave consequences. Activities in the South China Sea highlight the need for all states in the region to peacefully manage and resolve disputes in accordance with international law, and avoid coercion and other actions that could escalate tension.

The re-emergence of major power competition has reminded Canada and its allies of the importance of deterrence. At its core, deterrence is about discouraging a potential adversary from doing something harmful before they do it. A credible military deterrent serves as a diplomatic tool to help prevent conflict and should be accompanied by dialogue. NATO Allies and other like-minded states have been re-examining how to deter a wide spectrum of challenges to the international order by maintaining advanced conventional military capabilities that could be used in the event of a conflict with a “near-peer.” ...

and from a Rand paper by David Ochmanek:

The gold standard of deterrence and assurance is a defensive posture that confronts the adversary with the prospect of operational failure as the likely consequence of aggression

The SSE then goes on to assign a hodge podge of mission options that deploy nothing stronger than medium-weight LAV equipped battle groups. While technically we have the personnel and equipment to deploy three medium weight brigades and a divisional headquarters we have absolutely no capability or plan to deploy them en masse outside Canada.

Correct me if I'm wrong but if our estimate of the situation is that we will have several small scale low-level emergencies or conflicts to deal with on a day to day basis and a large scale conflict that we need to deter and possibly have to engage in in an extreme situation, then wouldn't the solution be to have full-time light to medium weight forces to deal with the day to day engagements and have a strong less expensive mechanized reserve force together with plans to develop and deploy it in the event of the unthinkable. As it is, we've ceded the possibility of ever engaging with our allies in a war against a heavy-weight enemy or of even deterring that enemy.

IMHO we should never turn away from doing the necessary because we see it as difficult or even impossible. Break it into doable chunks and work at it. Retaining usable superseded  equipment "in reserve" is a start and a common practice with many countries in order to expand overall force capabilities.

The only positive thing that I can say is that we're not the only military with our heads up our butts.

:cheers:

 

[Infanteer]

If Pte (T) A and MCpl B (each of whom is either inf or armd) show up for a Roto, how long does it take to teach Pte A to drive and MCpl B to crew command (a turretless TCV)?

About 3 weeks individual training, and probably a few weeks collective training.

 

[Good2Golf]

...Correct me if I'm wrong but if our estimate of the situation is that we will have several small scale low-level emergencies or conflicts to deal with on a day to day basis and a large scale conflict that we need to deter and possibly have to engage in in an extreme situation, then wouldn't the solution be...

Whew, I’m glad to see that you used a lower-case ‘e’ for estimate.  I’m pretty certain not many people were conducting an Estimate for SSE...

 

[dapaterson]

About 3 weeks individual training, and probably a few weeks collective training.

Individual training provides individual skillsets at a basic level.  The experiential pillar of development often gets ignored - individual training provides the basics; collective training provides experience.

Think of it as going to see a doctor: for complex surgery, do you want someone who's just graduated and never done it before, or someone with experience who has done the procedure hundreds of times before?

 

[Brad Sallows]

>About 3 weeks individual training, and probably a few weeks collective training.

Like so many other skill sets, then, if Res F crew can be spun up during pre-deployment trg I find it hard to see a case for modern AFVs in our Res F given current funding and staffing.  We are well past steel boxes on wheels with simple weapons.

 

[Kirkhill]

>About 3 weeks individual training, and probably a few weeks collective training.

We are well past steel boxes on wheels with simple weapons.

Are we, though?  I kind of think you can never have too many simple logistics vehicles.  Especially after people start beating up the ground between your dock/airhead/railhead/highway and your operating area.

Please send more trucks, with or without armour and weapons- preferably amphibious.

 

[quadrapiper]

...a case for modern AFVs in our Res F given current funding and staffing.

As a convenient place to stash a fleet of active (versus drained, mothballed, and preserved) AFVs as an equipment reserve in case of need, while incidentally ensuring that reservists are trained on The Platform versus A Platform?

 

[FJAG]

Okay, I'm just going to do one more post and then bow out of the discussion.

The US Army National Guard has 5 armored brigade combat teams, 1 Stryker (LAV3) BCTs, 19 Infantry BCTs, 8 combat aviation brigades, 2 Special Forces Groups and, together with the Army Reserve, approximately 137 support brigades including artillery (cannon and rocket), AD, engineer, manoeuvre enhancement, military police, intelligence, signals, CBRN, and a whole hockey sock of divisional and theatre command resources. All of them are equipped even though some may not have the latest and best equipment but does include a whole lot of these which are all pictures of NG units:

Please stop telling me it can't be done, that we don't have the money and that reservists aren't capable of handling mechanized units. We've told ourselves that we are useless for so long that we've become useless.

We just need to find the will and then make the way. We need to radically change the structure of our reserve force terms of service and composition. And incidentally, cull our headquarters' herds and their ever bigger rice bowls.

:cheers:

 

[Infanteer]

We just need to find the will and then make the way. We need to radically change the structure of our reserve force terms of service and composition. And incidentally, cull our headquarters' herds and their ever bigger rice bowls.

You've just answered your own question.  This is what needs to be done to make the Reserves more relevant, not giving them a bunch of M113s that we procured in 1964.

 

[Underway]

>About 3 weeks individual training, and probably a few weeks collective training.

Like so many other skill sets, then, if Res F crew can be spun up during pre-deployment trg I find it hard to see a case for modern AFVs in our Res F given current funding and staffing.  We are well past steel boxes on wheels with simple weapons.

The difference between a PRes Cpl and Reg F Cpl after a 6 month pre-deployment is negligible.  Similarly for the Lt's.  It's the MCpl/Capt and above where the experience really differentiates even after a pre-deployment.  The right coursing could reduce that time significantly.

US National Guard stuff....

US National guard get approx. the same amount of training as the PRes do initially (though they don't have the BS weekend BMQ option).  However to retain their pension and health benefits they must do their 2 week (consecutive) mandatory training, miss that, lose pension.  Plenty of PRes soldiers never do more than parade the bare minimum to stay off of NES status.  Weekend exercises just don't cut it for experience the same way.

 

[MilEME09]

US National guard get approx. the same amount of training as the PRes do initially (though they don't have the BS weekend BMQ option).  However to retain their pension and health benefits they must do their 2 week (consecutive) mandatory training, miss that, lose pension.  Plenty of PRes soldiers never do more than parade the bare minimum to stay off of NES status.  Weekend exercises just don't cut it for experience the same way.

This is a symptom of the bigger problem,  would you show up if you had the option not to if you came in to get no real training value.

The number 1 thing being preached the the ARes right now is augmentation is prio 1. If the reg force wants that as our prio 1, then start acting like it. Stop this bull shit that we are less capable, less experienced, less trusted to do the job, and start training us to be able to augment you all properly. That means we all train on the same kit. Do we use it all the time? Maybe not but if you have a group of reservists come for work up training, the smaller that training delta is the better.

 

[ballz]

The number 1 thing being preached the the ARes right now is augmentation is prio 1. If the reg force wants that as our prio 1, then start acting like it. Stop this bull crap that we are less capable, less experienced, less trusted to do the job, and start training us to be able to augment you all properly. That means we all train on the same kit. Do we use it all the time? Maybe not but if you have a group of reservists come for work up training, the smaller that training delta is the better.

I had a post written up about this earlier but this thread has gone a bit off the rails. But since you're going down a similar road as I was going down...

I would have *zero* issues with having the PRes augment the Reg Force day-to-day (i.e. not just for tours) and then we can provide them all of this training and integrate them into the grind that one must endure to keep a LAV fleet maintained and LAV crews trained.

But this idea that the reserves, with zero resources, can take on a LAV fleet and do it all internally is just silly. The reserves simply don't have the resources to do this internally. The *people* may be as capable but the Units as a whole simply aren't. That's why they augment the Reg Force with troops, not with with Battle Groups. It's also not "augmenting" the Reg Force at all. If anything it will end up sucking more out of the Reg Force as the PRes just won't have the resources required to do it, and they'll need Reg Force assets.

FTSE is a perfect example where we should be giving troops Class B contracts to go join a Reg Force unit. All the infrastructure is in place to employ them, provide good training, have them take part in good training, and lord knows when I was trying to "train" my platoon with 7 troops in the summer time because they are all tasked to frig, I could have used some augmentation. If a mechanized Battalion was full of reserve augmentees in the summer it would be a lot better way to keep the PRes folks engaged in mechanized infantry stuff than sending the PRes units a bunch of LAVs they can't maintain, can't store, and can't operate, and saying "hey, figure this out yourself."

But instead during FTSE the PRes Units are expected to be like a Reg Force Unit for the summer.... and I've seen the plans on how they intended to keep the now idle troops occupied, like running back-to-back-to-back first aid courses.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

If they are meant to replace the Bison, wouldn't the last variant be the NBC recce vehicle?

I am sure that the department wouldn't want people to consider that we still take "nuclear" into consideration: Way too warlike. 

 

[PuckChaser]

Without getting into OPSEC type stuff, which I realize may prevent an answer on this particular subject, but curious...what capabilities are we generally lacking in in regards to the terrible EW suite?  Ive heard from multiple sources that the EW capabilities are very much lacking, and like you said, the ones we have aren't the most reliable....just curious if there was anything anybody could say without violating OPSEC type stuff about what capabilities they would like to see and/or are doable in the near future for us?

In a nutshell, it doesn't reliably (sometimes at all) deliver what's promised. Its 1980s doctrine built on 1990s technology for a static peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. Very limited use of Software Defined Radios, which is critical to a modern EW vehicle. It's using the same contractors who have failed to provide working solutions for over 15 years without them being fired, and when fixes do come its usually in the form of a bigger and more cumbersome antenna system that still won't deliver the fidelity and systems reliability that is demanded of the limited amount of vehicles we have. There's also a big bunfight (or there was when I left the unit) between where TacEW ends and SIGINT begins, again limiting operational effectiveness. Successes in Afghanistan were built solely on the hard work of the crews to push through terrible kit to get proper Indications&Warnings and Threat Warnings out in a timely manner to actually save lives.

Unfortunately you're right, the actual scope of the waste in that project would make yours and the CBC's head spin, but the details are at the SECRET level. We're so much further behind every other FVEY nation in TacEW its laughable.

 

[MilEME09]

https://buyandsell.gc.ca/procurement-data/tender-notice/PW-20-00907488


Any one know if this is the planned surveillance suite for the LAV 6?