• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Justin Trudeau hints at boosting Canada’s military spending

If an outsider could see this. We are struggling to project obsolescent capability to an Ally so that our political masters can avoid the requirement, moral and otherwise, to equip its own forces. There are days when I wish my parents had chosen to emigrate to a real country
While as one of the first to enjoy throwing Canada under the bus, no country is perfect.

Canadians have made a choice - or been ambivalent enough to not make a choice about the needs of the CAF.

It’s fairly disappointing to watch, especially due to the time I spent in the CAF.


While at least my tax dollars down here go towards a fairly robust DoD, we have a fair amount of other issues…
 
Have you never done a combat team attack / breach ? It is very very common, and involves those assets.
Cbt Tm Atk, yes on crse. Breach, yes, as a Cpl in Germany 1968. Different perspective of course.
My point is the eqpt we have is going to get good troops killed because it is not adequate. E.G. Would you rather do a Breach with an IFV or a LAV?

Remember this from March: The Canadian military will fast-track the purchase of new anti-tank missiles, air defense systems and counter-drone equipment for its battlegroup in Latvia.

Only for the BG in Latvia? Fast-track delivery is supposedly Aug 2026.
 
Cbt Tm Atk, yes on crse. Breach, yes, as a Cpl in Germany 1968. Different perspective of course.
My point is the eqpt we have is going to get good troops killed because it is not adequate. E.G. Would you rather do a Breach with an IFV or a LAV?

LAV is an IFV. The only real solid definition lies in the armament, which is 20mm and up is an IFV. In terms of protection the LAV6 is in the same boat as most IFVs.

Remember this from March: The Canadian military will fast-track the purchase of new anti-tank missiles, air defense systems and counter-drone equipment for its battlegroup in Latvia.

Only for the BG in Latvia? Fast-track delivery is supposedly Aug 2026.

Oh yeah no don’t get wrong, serious problems. Just hyperbole helps no one, and ranting to the sky when the situation isn’t as you describe is just that.
 
Cbt Tm Atk, yes on crse. Breach, yes, as a Cpl in Germany 1968. Different perspective of course.
My point is the eqpt we have is going to get good troops killed because it is not adequate. E.G. Would you rather do a Breach with an IFV or a LAV?

Remember this from March: The Canadian military will fast-track the purchase of new anti-tank missiles, air defense systems and counter-drone equipment for its battlegroup in Latvia.

Only for the BG in Latvia? Fast-track delivery is supposedly Aug 2026.
That's generally the scope of a UOR - the operational need in theatre and a reasonable stock in addition for training, reference spares and spare operational stock.

The M777 is a good example of a UOR that led to an eventual funded capital project to equip the force (albeit we can argue until the cows come home about whether the number was enough and the system the right one for the whole force).

🍻
 
LAV is an IFV. The only real solid definition lies in the armament, which is 20mm and up is an IFV. In terms of protection the LAV6 is in the same boat as most IFVs.
I’d rather breach with a tracked system- simply due to the off route mobility advantage (and my issue with tires) - but I’ll concede your point about the LAV 6.0 technically meeting the IFV characteristics.
Oh yeah no don’t get wrong, serious problems. Just hyperbole helps no one, and ranting to the sky when the situation isn’t as you describe is just that.
I happen to enjoy yelling at clouds ;)
 
I put this in the Faint Hope file....


Alexander Dalziel: Canada should follow Nordic way of being pro-oil, pro-defence​

Trudeau has lessons to learn from Scandinavian colleagues this weekend

Author of the article:
Alexander Dalziel, Special to National Post
Published Jun 23, 2023 • Last updated 16 hours ago • 3 minute read

At the Nordic Prime Ministers’ Meeting in Iceland this weekend, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau will meet the leaders of Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland, along with the heads of Greenland and the Faroe Islands as well as Finland’s Åland Islands.

In an uncertain world, fostering closer ties with the Nordics makes good sense. The Prime Minister’s Office observes we are like-minded on many fronts. We agree on the seriousness of climate change, and see the need for reconciliation with Indigenous peoples. The Nordics share Canada’s view on the importance of a predictable world order governed by rules and institutions (not the whims of power) as reflected in their support for the United Nations, World Trade Organization and now NATO. Canada and the Nordics recognize the essential role of the U.S. in our defence and the global order.

The differences, however, are what is worth the most attention.

Take defence spending. The Nordics are rapidly nearing NATO’s baseline of allocating two per cent of GDP to defence. Finland was already close when it joined NATO in April. Norway plans to get there by 2026. As recently as 2021, Denmark spent the same as Canada on defence (1.3 per cent), but has since committed to reaching the two per cent threshold by 2030, tripling defence spending in the next decade. Sweden spent less than Canada did in 2021; now it is slated to reach two per cent as soon as 2026. Canada must follow suit. (Iceland does not have a military.)

The Nordics also invest more in defence capability. For instance, Denmark and Norway in 2022 each spent over 10 per cent more than Canada on major equipment and research and development (Canada spent more on personnel, operations and maintenance).

While the Nordics’ geographic location near Russia drives these investments, Russia’s proximity to Canada across the Arctic Ocean is insufficiently integrated into our geo-strategy. The Nordics have a comprehensive long-term picture of the Russian threat to their homelands — not just militarily, but also to civilian, informational and electoral infrastructure. Talking to the Nordics to better understand a belligerent Russia is a must.

Hopefully Trudeau’s pre-trip briefing book contains the many publicly available strategic foreign policy, defence and intelligence documents the Nordics have formulated in recent years. Nordic governments have strategic cultures that engage the public on foreign policy. Canada is catching up on that front with last year’s Indo-Pacific strategy and the upcoming defence policy update, but we are still missing a comprehensive foreign and security strategy. Canada’s last such document was issued in 2005.

Successive Canadian governments have acted as if foreign policy is something they only need to tell Canadians and the world about on an ad-hoc basis. Undertaking such an exercise now would concentrate official minds on matters of the day in a comprehensive fashion, thereby sharpening a sense of Canada’s objectives and capabilities abroad. It would give the Canadian public a reference point for the national debate, and a means for holding the government accountable for its foreign policy actions (or lack thereof). The Nordic example is an excellent guide.

Finally, Norway exhibits geopolitically savvy energy strategy. Its strategic documents are replete with references to developing their oil and gas sectors sustainably, alongside the push for greener fuels. This is embedded in policies to manage the green transition and develop better technologies to deal with environmental accidents such as oil spills.

Canada should coordinate with Norway to become known world leaders in sustainable energy production, jointly promoting the reliable, ethical, clean(er) options we can offer. This would include oil and gas. Research from the Macdonald-Laurier Institute shows that Canadian and Norwegian oil and gas production is among the globe’s cleanest. Even the International Energy Agency’s most optimistic scenarios for future world energy mix include oil and gas. If players with strong accountability records like Norway and Canada don’t take the lead, we will be ceding the market to environmentally irresponsible and unaccountable states like Russia and Venezuela.

To do so, however, Ottawa must be clear with Canadians about the fact that oil and gas are not going away for a long time. A national strategy on the green transition, Canada’s energy assets and the roles of Canada’s different regions would make for a more stable, healthier world — and a more effective Canada.

That would indeed be a Canada-Nordic like-mindedness with a difference.

National Post

Alexander Dalziel is a senior fellow of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.
 
Canada should also have a population of 5M, fully Caucasian and culturally homogonous, with an energy sector worth $1T+ and a land mass the size of France (less than 1/2 the area of BC) that they don't have to share with anyone else ;)

Norway ... maybe.
You haven't been to Malmo or Copenhagen recently, have you?

Among those born outside Sweden, the most common group comes from Iraq. In 2021 there were 11,705 Iraqis living in Malmö. Other common countries of origin of Malmö residents are Syria (8,920), Denmark (7,564) Yugoslavia (7,109), Poland (6,646) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (6,389).

 
That's generally the scope of a UOR - the operational need in theatre and a reasonable stock in addition for training, reference spares and spare operational stock.

The M777 is a good example of a UOR that led to an eventual funded capital project to equip the force (albeit we can argue until the cows come home about whether the number was enough and the system the right one for the whole force).

🍻
UOR?

Or are you talking about a SOCD (Statement of Operational Capability Deficiency)
 
UOR?

Or are you talking about a SOCD (Statement of Operational Capability Deficiency)
Definitely proceeded by UOR. I have numerous documents from the SS(EPA) on but not anything before that. I'd just be guessing as to the precise opening documentation.

🍻
 
Definitely proceeded by UOR. I have numerous documents from the SS(EPA) on but not anything before that. I'd just be guessing as to the precise opening documentation.

🍻
I think I'm (or we) are mixing process'. Perhaps across elements. SOCD are what the navy uses to point out equipment deficiencies for something that doesn't already exist.

Example: Gulf War 1 the RCN didn't have a mine detection sonar. SOCD was used to identify that deficiency and a Temp Engineering Change was generated to fix the problem. A mine sonar (actually a good fish finding sonar that essentially does the same thing) was bought and installed.

Not to be confused with an SOTD (training deficiency) or a UCR (unsatisfactory condition report on a piece of equipment that exists but doesn't do the job its supposed to correctly in some way).

Urgent Operational Requirement seems like another layer of lableing that gets SOCD's moved to the top of the pile to be dealt with outside of normal procurement process' in Ottawa. Thing is a Temp Eng Change can be paid for at a lower level (unit or formation) if necessary. A UOR I think goes all the way up.

(I'm sure this is facinating for all the Logistical Types out there but I wanted to demonstrate how smart I was... its how engineers show dominance.. I'll be quiet now... lol)
 
I think I'm (or we) are mixing process'. Perhaps across elements. SOCD are what the navy uses to point out equipment deficiencies for something that doesn't already exist.

Example: Gulf War 1 the RCN didn't have a mine detection sonar. SOCD was used to identify that deficiency and a Temp Engineering Change was generated to fix the problem. A mine sonar (actually a good fish finding sonar that essentially does the same thing) was bought and installed.

Not to be confused with an SOTD (training deficiency) or a UCR (unsatisfactory condition report on a piece of equipment that exists but doesn't do the job its supposed to correctly in some way).
In your example a SOCD was used to identify the deficiency, and the sonars were likely purchased by UOR (Urgent Operation Requirement), meaning the purchase bypassed the normal procurement process.
 
In your example a SOCD was used to identify the deficiency, and the sonars were likely purchased by UOR (Urgent Operation Requirement), meaning the purchase bypassed the normal procurement process.
UORs are prioritized, but do not necessarily bypass normal procurement processes - they are accelerated, usually creating delays for other items seeking ng approvals.

They are simplified largely through not requiring life cycle support considerations.
 
UORs are prioritized, but do not necessarily bypass normal procurement processes - they are accelerated, usually creating delays for other items seeking ng approvals.

They are simplified largely through not requiring life cycle support considerations.
Stuff like this is why this site is great.

I figured I wasn't 100% right, and now I know more than I did 10 min ago.
 
I direct your attention to LGen (Ret'd) Masionneuve's article in the National Post. He outlines the current state of the CAF. Key extracts from the article:

“Strong, Secure, Engaged” defence policy released under then-defence minister Harjit Sajjan. Perfunctory public consultations closed at the end of April, and work is now proceeding at the defence department to draft the policy update. The new policy could provide the impetus for Canada to increase its share of defence expenditures to GDP closer to the agreed two per cent floor and explain how this would be accomplished.

The defence policy update could first, as a priority, provide a strategy for the CAF to increase recruiting through a declaration by the prime minister that a “whole-of-government” approach will be used. Without it, the bleeding will continue. Whole-of-government was a strategy used in international missions to synchronize all departments towards one goal; it could be used in the current crisis of personnel in the CAF.

Secondly, the defence policy update should consider how to streamline the CAF’s myriad of procurement projects. Low-hanging-fruit should be acquired quickly if immediate implementation is possible. Again, a whole-of-government approach would be needed remove any roadblocks and gate-keepers.

Third, cultural changes in the CAF should be rolled into regular processes and leadership initiatives and to remove the temporary organizations used to perform cavity searches and skeleton searches into any potential future leaders.

Fourth, operationalization of the reserves should be prioritized — with budgets protected and increased numbers of personnel. The reserves should remain our insurance policy for times of crisis, but also remain a way for Canadians to connect with their armed forces.

Many other actions that need to be undertaken could be stated in the defence policy update: quicker NORAD modernization (with greater involvement of First Nations), permanent basing in our northern territories, purchasing and deploying submarines for under-ice patrols, digital modernization, equipping our CAF to implement government strategy (for example, more ships to implement the Indo-Pacific strategy) and so on.

All these initiatives need to be supported by a truly robust public affairs plan, whose aim should be to re-confirm the need for service to country and to explain why security and sovereignty should come before any other priority. Without security and sovereignty, no other social programs are possible. Celebrating service to country in the armed forces can only help our recruiting efforts; maybe the complacency of Canadians can be shaken.
 
Until we change the procurement thresholds ($25k to PSPC, minor cap and major cap lines), we'll never fix procurement and therefore waste even more money pretending we're moving to 2% of GDP. We're trying to buy 2023 era items with 1965 procurement policies.
 
Back
Top