Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Ostrozac]

I think our Army has a number of psyches or Jungian archetypes. We have the Germany-era CMBG. Much of our structure and way of thought is derived from that. Its our received "good place." We have the rotational Battegroup in the Balkans, which morphed somewhat in the early Afghan days. One deployed Battlegroup that gets replaced every six months. One or maybe two battlegroups worth of "real gear." Then we have the hybrid TFK model with a rotational Bde HQ and a rotational BG plus enablers.

If we want a CMBG to fight conventionally in the Germany construct we have the structure (more or less) but not the equipment. I think the assumption here is that it would be a single pulse and not a rotation. I think we have the structure and equipment for a rotational BG in a UN peacekeeping or even COIN role. For the TFK model we have our muscle memory and some equipment from Kandahar, now ten years since real use.

Perhaps for the conventional fight we need to think along the lines of a well-enabled BG instead of a CMBG.

I am not convinced that a Canadian battle group would be useful, or even wanted, on a high-intensity battlefield. It's my understanding that the Optimized Battle Group project (the OBGYN, for all you old 2RCR types) made it pretty clear that a battle group, on its own, tended to get it's ass kicked in a fight, and that the brigade is the minimum size to provide some depth, combat power, and enablers.

If we go to war, let's say for planning purposes into the next Korean War, what role does a Canadian battle group fill? Our American allies think in terms of brigade combat teams -- if we show up with a battalion, what are we going to be doing besides guarding POWs? Form part of a composite brigade? Those don't seem very impressive, either. The multinational polyglot brigades that NATO is cobbling together in the Baltics are going to be effective as tripwires, but if I were a Russian and I had the choice between fighting against a Polish brigade or a composite brigade composed of soldiers from 15 different countries, all with different languages and equipment, I know who I'd rather kick off against.

As I see it, as an army, we have a choice. If we want to be able to fight, we need to organize and equip our brigades as fighting formations. If we want to be a constabulary force, then being organized around rotational battle groups is fine, and indeed, probably ideal. But if we can't make up our minds, the chances are, at some point in the future, that we will over promise to cabinet and under deliver on the battlefield.

 

[ArmyRick]

Following

 

[IRepoCans]

ALAWS - advanced lightweight anti-armour weapon system. The project meant to bring us something like Javelin, Spike, Bill etc. Manportable antitank missile in the 2km band.

I thought we were looking at the Spikes within the 5-7 km range so we could actually outrange MBTs as dismounts, the newer Javelins also reach out to 5km. Either way, would these merely just be available to the DFS pl or would they find themselves within the rifle coys? Because a brigades worth of LAVs with ATGMs that can readily dismount would indeed be quite useful and a pain in the ass for any armour.

Nothing is more ludicrous than tank hunting with a Carl G and having the LAV or Leopard pretend it didn't see you 2-3 km before it got within range.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I thought we were looking at the Spikes within the 5-7 km range so we could actually outrange MBTs as dismounts, the newer Javelins also reach out to 5km. Either way, would these merely just be available to the DFS pl or would they find themselves within the rifle coys? Because a brigades worth of LAVs with ATGMs that can readily dismount would indeed be quite useful and a pain in the ass for any armour.

Nothing is more ludicrous than tank hunting with a Carl G and having the LAV or Leopard pretend it didn't see you 2-3 km before it got within range.

I am not with the project - people were looking at a variety of systems. Javelin was the archetype that the Staff College went with - assumption of 2.5km range. They key points are manportability and range past 2km (and of course ability to destroy armour). The sad thing is that the Army was identified the problem in the 80s. It is not Eryx with its 600m range!

Don't want to divert this thread into equipment details too much while also accepting that we need to talk about equipment. To be relevant on the conventional battlefield our infantry need anti-tank systems. Tanks are not that AT system. AHs are not that AT system. A LAV company with 4 integral Javelin equivalents, possibly augmented by TOW equivalents, can look after itself against mechanized threats allowing tanks to mass where needed. This was an old lesson reinforced on CDX10.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I am not with the project - people were looking at a variety of systems. Javelin was the archetype that the Staff College went with - assumption of 2.5km range. They key points are manportability and range past 2km (and of course ability to destroy armour). The sad thing is that the Army was identified the problem in the 80s. It is not Eryx with its 600m range!

Don't want to divert this thread into equipment details too much while also accepting that we need to talk about equipment. To be relevant on the conventional battlefield our infantry need anti-tank systems. Tanks are not that AT system. AHs are not that AT system. A LAV company with 4 integral Javelin equivalents, possibly augmented by TOW equivalents, can look after itself against mechanized threats allowing tanks to mass where needed. This was an old lesson reinforced on CDX10.

How about an anti-tank mortar?

Strix mortar round​

Pansarsprängvinggranat m/94 STRIX is a Swedish endphase-guided projectile fired from a 120 mm mortar currently manufactured by Saab Bofors Dynamics.[1]

STRIX is fired like a conventional mortar round. The round contains an infrared imaging sensor that it uses to guide itself onto any tank or armoured fighting vehicle in the vicinity where it lands. The seeker is designed to ignore targets that are already burning.

Launched from any 120 mm mortar, Strix has a normal range of up to 4.5 km. With the addition of a special sustainer motor, however, range can be increased to 7.5 km.

Bofors STRIX - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Kirkhill]

How about an anti-tank mortar?

Strix mortar round​

Pansarsprängvinggranat m/94 STRIX is a Swedish endphase-guided projectile fired from a 120 mm mortar currently manufactured by Saab Bofors Dynamics.[1]

STRIX is fired like a conventional mortar round. The round contains an infrared imaging sensor that it uses to guide itself onto any tank or armoured fighting vehicle in the vicinity where it lands. The seeker is designed to ignore targets that are already burning.

Launched from any 120 mm mortar, Strix has a normal range of up to 4.5 km. With the addition of a special sustainer motor, however, range can be increased to 7.5 km.

Bofors STRIX - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Absolutely, D&B

But first you would have to buy a 120mm mortar. And a 120mm mortar carrier. And Mjolner turrets would have to be verified on LAVs. No? Doubt if that would make it to Force 2025 let alone the eFP Battle Group.

T2B is talking about a pretty modest UOR by limiting himself to 4 ATGM-CLU per coy. There is no reason why for Force 2025 we shouldn't be looking at 3 or 4 per Platoon.

Question to T2B?

What are the sight lines like in Latvia? The images I have seen the country looks more like the Canadian Shield than the Prairies. Pretty close country. Could they exploit the long sight lines? Conversely would there be anything to hinder minimum range engagements with long range missiles?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

While I have been to Latvia and Lithuania, I have not been in the EFP. I have exercised at formation level for both countries with good map data. There are areas of close country and areas that are more open. There are manouevre corridors with line of sight that mechanized forces used in both directions during WW2.

You can take a gander on Google.

 

[Kirkhill]

Thinking about FJAG's 40,000 PY army I took a look back at some stale-dated numbers from 2010-2013.



The RCIC planned on using 5796 PYs to field 9 Bns.
But they only reckoned on having 4182 of them actually available.
They also reckoned on having 1704 other trades to help them field those battalions but reckoned on only 1056 actually being available.

First suggestion - don't plan on having that which you don't have.

To field 9 Bns they have 4182 PYs available. 464-465 PYs per battalion.
Plus 1056 other trade PYs. 117 PYs per battalion.

So, 9 fielded battalions of 582 all ranks, all trades.
5238 of FJAGs 40,000. Call it 13%. Or better, 5238 of his 23,000 Regs - 23%. Can't actually plan on the Reserves being able to provide anything.



The RCAC planned on using 1599 PYs to field 3 Rgts.
But they only reckoned on having 1328 of them actually available.
They also reckoned on having 415 other trades to help them field those battalions but reckoned on only 318 actually being available.

First suggestion repeated - don't plan on having that which you don't have.

To field 3 Rgts they have 1328 PYs available. 443 PYs per regiment.
Plus 316 other trade PYs. 106 PYs regiment.

So, 3 fielded regiments of 549 all ranks, all trades.
1646 of FJAGs 40,000. Call it 4%. Or better, 1646 of his 23,000 Regs - 7%. Again, can't actually plan on the Reserves being able to provide anything.

RCIC and RCAC combined fielding 12 Manoeuvre Units of approximately 450 combat arms with 100 combat support and service support attached or embedded.


Peculiarly enough those manning levels bring us broadly into the levels employed by the Swedes and the Danes and others.


Second Suggestion - Continue with 3x Symmetric Brigades with 3x equal RCAC Regiments and 9x equal RCIC Battalions equally distributed amongst 3 RCIC Regiments.

Third Suggestion - Plan operations around the Brigade Group. The Brigade Group to consist of 1x RCAC Regiment, 2x RCIC Battalions (LAV Mounted), 1x RCIC Battalion of equivalent size and organization (Dismounted), 1x Mixed RCAF Helicopter Squadron (Griffon and Chinook) permanently attached to the Brigade.

Fourth Suggestion - adopt Swedish practices.


Impact of Swedish practice on RCAC

Existing equipment and personnel capable of fielding 3 Regiments each containing 22 MBTs and 38x LAV/IFV. Sufficient personnel available to man 8x 120mm Mortar Carriers and 4x VSHORAD vehicles if acquired. Organized into a Recce Tp, 2x Mortar Tps, 1x VSHORAD Tp, 2x IFV mounted infantry coys equipped for anti-tank warfare and 2x MBT squadrons. The Regiments are adequately resourced with C4I assets and an embedded Log and Maint Sqn - including medics.

This is made possible by:

Permanently splitting an RCAC MBT Sqn into 2x Augmented Half-Squadrons of 11x MBTs each

Reducing the number of LAV/IFVs per platoon from 4 to 3.
Reducing the number of dismounts to 1 Gd Commander plus 3x 6 troopers organized around 3x AT Teams. Total of 19 Dismounts / Pl
The 3x LAV/IFVs are manned by their 2 man crews (Driver and Gunner) and their permanently mounted command team (Pl L, Pl WO, LAV Sgt). Total of 9 vehicle-bound.

Alternate view of the 28 man platoon. 3x 6man AT sections. 1x 6man LAV section. 1x 4man Command det with one person focusing on the ground game, one focusing on the mounted game, one commanding the platoon as a whole and one focusing on the rear link.

The AT sections are equipped with 6x C7 equivalents, 2x C9 equivalents, 1x C6 equivalents, 1x DMR, a CG-84 or an ATGM-CLU issued from battalion, or AT-4s or NLAWs, and a number of AT mines. The precise armament depends on the commanders' appreciation of the task at hand.


Impact on the RCIC

Adopt the 6 man section, 28 man platoon and the arms locker concept.

Issue 3 LAVs per platoon.

Use savings in PYs and LAVs to staff the Mortars and VSHORADs.

RCAC's MBT Sqn (2x Half Squadrons) replaced by a 3rd LAV Company in each of the 6 mounted battalions

The three dismounted battalions, identically equipped and organized as the LAV battalions to be focused on Brigade ops as an Anti-Tank focused QRF deployable in conjunction with the Brigade Helicopter Squadrons.



All troops to be capable of managing lower intensity conflict when appropriately augmented, trained and commanded.

Light troops to be supplied from vehicle park with ULCVs capable of being transported by Griffon.



Short form

Is anybody willing to give up PYs and Vehicles at the sub- and sub-sub-unit levels if it results in more effective and better equipped units operating within a familiar construct?



Stick a needle in my eye, beat me, hurt me, make me cry!

Cheers.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I am not convinced that a Canadian battle group would be useful, or even wanted, on a high-intensity battlefield. It's my understanding that the Optimized Battle Group project (the OBGYN, for all you old 2RCR types) made it pretty clear that a battle group, on its own, tended to get it's ass kicked in a fight, and that the brigade is the minimum size to provide some depth, combat power, and enablers.

If we go to war, let's say for planning purposes into the next Korean War, what role does a Canadian battle group fill? Our American allies think in terms of brigade combat teams -- if we show up with a battalion, what are we going to be doing besides guarding POWs? Form part of a composite brigade? Those don't seem very impressive, either. The multinational polyglot brigades that NATO is cobbling together in the Baltics are going to be effective as tripwires, but if I were a Russian and I had the choice between fighting against a Polish brigade or a composite brigade composed of soldiers from 15 different countries, all with different languages and equipment, I know who I'd rather kick off against.

As I see it, as an army, we have a choice. If we want to be able to fight, we need to organize and equip our brigades as fighting formations. If we want to be a constabulary force, then being organized around rotational battle groups is fine, and indeed, probably ideal. But if we can't make up our minds, the chances are, at some point in the future, that we will over promise to cabinet and under deliver on the battlefield.

I am not suggesting that a BG would attempt to do the same think as a CMBG. A robust BG, though, could indeed work in a Multinational Div (a Div Cav mission set) or a Multinational Brigade. In terms of promises, at least we could fulfill a BG.

The Optimized Battlegroup was also not trying to be a CMBG. I was an OC there - interesting times. Some great stuff, but ultimately the Army seemed to lose interest. Running with that thought, I am not sure if there is appetite for fixed BGs to enable the envisioned ECATs that Close Engagement talks about.

 

[dapaterson]

but ultimately the Army seemed to lose interest.

So, what can the Army do to keep momentum on initiatives like this - to ensure they survive first contact with the enemy the proponent being posted?

 

[daftandbarmy]

So, what can the Army do to keep momentum on initiatives like this - to ensure they survive first contact with the enemy the proponent being posted?

Nothing. It can probably do nothing without national level leadership starting with the political will to lead it.

 

[Kirkhill]

What does political leadership have to do with 40 years of indecision on ATGMs that would actually give the infantry some purpose? Deciding to fill seats rather than keeping mortars? Deciding to spend years debating phantom Corps and Optimum Battle Groups rather than figuring out how to make the best of what is available?

I have no love for the government but you don't get to duck the internal responsibility of DND and particularly the Army.

Your lunch is being eaten by CANSOFCOM. While you moan they are out there experimenting with new vehicles, new weapons, new technologies.

They have actually bought the Spike LR ALAWS that T2B is asking for. Maybe they can loan the eFP half a dozen?

And who decided that new sights and ammo for Carl Gustaf could be continually kicked down the road when everybody in the west has continually upgraded their systems because they are useful, effective and cheap?

 

[CBH99]

Thinking about FJAG's 40,000 PY army I took a look back at some stale-dated numbers from 2010-2013.



The RCIC planned on using 5796 PYs to field 9 Bns.
But they only reckoned on having 4182 of them actually available.
They also reckoned on having 1704 other trades to help them field those battalions but reckoned on only 1056 actually being available.

First suggestion - don't plan on having that which you don't have.

To field 9 Bns they have 4182 PYs available. 464-465 PYs per battalion.
Plus 1056 other trade PYs. 117 PYs per battalion.

So, 9 fielded battalions of 582 all ranks, all trades.
5238 of FJAGs 40,000. Call it 13%. Or better, 5238 of his 23,000 Regs - 23%. Can't actually plan on the Reserves being able to provide anything.



The RCAC planned on using 1599 PYs to field 3 Rgts.
But they only reckoned on having 1328 of them actually available.
They also reckoned on having 415 other trades to help them field those battalions but reckoned on only 318 actually being available.

First suggestion repeated - don't plan on having that which you don't have.

To field 3 Rgts they have 1328 PYs available. 443 PYs per regiment.
Plus 316 other trade PYs. 106 PYs regiment.

So, 3 fielded regiments of 549 all ranks, all trades.
1646 of FJAGs 40,000. Call it 4%. Or better, 1646 of his 23,000 Regs - 7%. Again, can't actually plan on the Reserves being able to provide anything.

RCIC and RCAC combined fielding 12 Manoeuvre Units of approximately 450 combat arms with 100 combat support and service support attached or embedded.


Peculiarly enough those manning levels bring us broadly into the levels employed by the Swedes and the Danes and others.


Second Suggestion - Continue with 3x Symmetric Brigades with 3x equal RCAC Regiments and 9x equal RCIC Battalions equally distributed amongst 3 RCIC Regiments.

Third Suggestion - Plan operations around the Brigade Group. The Brigade Group to consist of 1x RCAC Regiment, 2x RCIC Battalions (LAV Mounted), 1x RCIC Battalion of equivalent size and organization (Dismounted), 1x Mixed RCAF Helicopter Squadron (Griffon and Chinook) permanently attached to the Brigade.

Fourth Suggestion - adopt Swedish practices.


Impact of Swedish practice on RCAC

Existing equipment and personnel capable of fielding 3 Regiments each containing 22 MBTs and 38x LAV/IFV. Sufficient personnel available to man 8x 120mm Mortar Carriers and 4x VSHORAD vehicles if acquired. Organized into a Recce Tp, 2x Mortar Tps, 1x VSHORAD Tp, 2x IFV mounted infantry coys equipped for anti-tank warfare and 2x MBT squadrons. The Regiments are adequately resourced with C4I assets and an embedded Log and Maint Sqn - including medics.

This is made possible by:

Permanently splitting an RCAC MBT Sqn into 2x Augmented Half-Squadrons of 11x MBTs each

Reducing the number of LAV/IFVs per platoon from 4 to 3.
Reducing the number of dismounts to 1 Gd Commander plus 3x 6 troopers organized around 3x AT Teams. Total of 19 Dismounts / Pl
The 3x LAV/IFVs are manned by their 2 man crews (Driver and Gunner) and their permanently mounted command team (Pl L, Pl WO, LAV Sgt). Total of 9 vehicle-bound.

Alternate view of the 28 man platoon. 3x 6man AT sections. 1x 6man LAV section. 1x 4man Command det with one person focusing on the ground game, one focusing on the mounted game, one commanding the platoon as a whole and one focusing on the rear link.

The AT sections are equipped with 6x C7 equivalents, 2x C9 equivalents, 1x C6 equivalents, 1x DMR, a CG-84 or an ATGM-CLU issued from battalion, or AT-4s or NLAWs, and a number of AT mines. The precise armament depends on the commanders' appreciation of the task at hand.


Impact on the RCIC

Adopt the 6 man section, 28 man platoon and the arms locker concept.

Issue 3 LAVs per platoon.

Use savings in PYs and LAVs to staff the Mortars and VSHORADs.

RCAC's MBT Sqn (2x Half Squadrons) replaced by a 3rd LAV Company in each of the 6 mounted battalions

The three dismounted battalions, identically equipped and organized as the LAV battalions to be focused on Brigade ops as an Anti-Tank focused QRF deployable in conjunction with the Brigade Helicopter Squadrons.



All troops to be capable of managing lower intensity conflict when appropriately augmented, trained and commanded.

Light troops to be supplied from vehicle park with ULCVs capable of being transported by Griffon.



Short form

Is anybody willing to give up PYs and Vehicles at the sub- and sub-sub-unit levels if it results in more effective and better equipped units operating within a familiar construct?

I genuinely enjoy your thought experiments on these matters Kirkhill. Whenever I read these proposed alternatives, I always enjoy sitting here with a cup of tea & trying to envision them in my head, in a way that would be workable. I may not post in reply to these often, but I often ponder these types of posts.


That being said, just random thoughts here...

- If the Army wanted to seriously upgrade it's lethality without spending a ton of money, or having any big capital contracts for the public & parliament to delay/ruin... the integration of a good DMR, and ATGM system would be gold. By having a DMR at the section or platoon level, and an ATGM capability in there too, the lethality of our troops would skyrocket, and the government wouldn't have to pay a ton of $$ to make it happen.

- If adopting a 28 person platoon, 3 LAVs won't be enough vehicles. In my world, I would stick with 4 vehicles. (Remember, if one vehicle is damaged, you need some extra room in remaining vehicles for those troops to jump into.) It would also allow you to disperse your troops via more vehicles, and allow more LAV based firepower when engaged. (I realize the focus now is on peer vs. peer, but in Afghanistan, the LAV did most of the killing & doorway creation.)

- Well trained, well equipped troops can always engage in lower intensity conflicts. The same cannot be said for 'lighter' troops equipped with 'light weapons' engaging in higher intensity conflicts. (I know that's already well established, not critiquing what you wrote here.)

 

[Kirkhill]

So, 28 PY Platoons organized around 4 LAVs with 12 PYs to crew the LAVs and 16 PYs for dismounts and a rolling, well-equipped, arms locker.

The equipping of the arms locker is at least as important as the actual distribution of the troops. But just to continue the exercise -

4x Dr
4x Gnr

4x 4 PY Tms organized around AT weapons and MGs - One Tm Ldr designated Section Ldr.

1x PL - mounted
1x P2 - mounted
1x LAV Sgt
1x LAV Cpl

3x Infantry Regiments
6x LAV Battalions
18x LAV Companies
54x LAV Platoons

Plus

3x Armoured Regiments
6x LAV Sqns
18x LAV Tps

Therefore retaining the 4th LAV means 72 LAVs to be found or not to be reallocated.

Would you rather have the 4th LAV in each Platoon? Or 8 LAVs in each wheeled and armoured units carrying 120mm mortars?

I don't know if that specific choice is required but it does kind of go hand-in-glove with the discussion we're having.





Secondary thought that occurred after I finished my rant about "opportunities missed".

In the eighties the government proposed building the Militia 200 Bisons in London and 400 Bv206s at Foremost in Calgary. And then they found they didn't have the money and stuff had to be cancelled.

The decision was made, along with transferring the CF-18 maintenance contract from Manitoba to Quebec, to proceed with building the Ontario Bisons instead of the Alberta Bv206s. And then the Army claimed the Bisons leaving the Militia sucking fumes.

In 2013 the Army was fighting floods in Alberta with Bushmaster cannons.

In an alternate history those floods would have been managed by 41 Bde mounted in locally manufactured and supported Bv206s and Foremost, would be contemplating building more for the DAME project and contemplating competing for world wide markets - Just like GDLS London.


Thought for the day

 

[blacktriangle]

In terms of our peer adversaries, what exactly are we trying to defeat? Something like a Russian BTG?

Shouldn't we answer that question first? In order to make informed choices about how to organize & equip?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

In terms of our peer adversaries, what exactly are we trying to defeat? Something like a Russian BTG?

Shouldn't we answer that question first? In order to make informed choices about how to organize & equip?

As always, it depends, but the frame for conventional conflict would be an adversary with modern equipment in open conflict. It might not be linear, but it is not COIN. We have fairly established force ratios as a guide.

So could a Canadian Battle Group defeat an adversary equipped with modern equipment? So an opponent with tanks, APCs, a variety of indirect fire, a contested airspace, a contested electronic spectrum, somewhat similar night vision etc.

To start small, could one of our Combat Teams or Company Groups defeat a battalion-sized attack on their position? Lets give the opponent a company of T72s (upgraded), three companies of BMP2 equivalents and supporting fires from a Brigade.

Right now, our LAV company could muster three platoons of 25mm and something like four 84mm. Let's say they had two dismounted TOW attached. If the OC can site the Killzone to have engagements inside the 2km range then the LAVs have a chance to defeat the BMPs with direct fire. The T72s will be a big problem, even with 2 TOW. We could attach Leopard 2A6M to the company, but now those tanks are fixed and if the enemy Brigade masses elsewhere we would likely face a penetration.

To me, the answer is that adding at least four Javelin equivalents to the Company allows them to defeat (if not destroy) a battalion-sized force attacking them (assuming again that they have selected an appropriate KZ to keep the engagement band inside the 25mm effective range). The Battlegroup's Leopards can then be used as countermoves, massing their fire while staying as dispersed as possible.

To me, the good news is that Structure we have can incorporate this without new organizations.

Additionally, I think we keep the exact nature of our potential conventional opponent broad as equipment can change.

 

[Kirkhill]

Have we developed contingencies for handling Turkish type UAVs in the region?

Can the Bushmasters contribute to that fight? What type of addition EO/IR gear might be required?

 

[Ostrozac]

Have we developed contingencies for handling Turkish type UAVs in the region?

Can the Bushmasters contribute to that fight? What type of addition EO/IR gear might be required?

The 25mm contributes next to nothing to countering medium altitude UAVs of the type widely employed in the recent Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. Even if it had a proximity fused round, 25mm just isn’t going to reach up to the 15,000 feet altitude band, and trying to search the sky with a turreted optic just isn’t practical. These UAVs even operate above the effective range of many dedicated antiarcraft guns like the ZSU-23–4, which has a radar for target acquisition.

You‘ll probably want a combined antiaircraft gun/missile system like the Pantsir if you want to swat flies at that altitude.

 

[Kirkhill]

The 25mm contributes next to nothing to countering medium altitude UAVs of the type widely employed in the recent Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. Even if it had a proximity fused round, 25mm just isn’t going to reach up to the 15,000 feet altitude band, and trying to search the sky with a turreted optic just isn’t practical. These UAVs even operate above the effective range of many dedicated antiarcraft guns like the ZSU-23–4, which has a radar for target acquisition.

You‘ll probably want a combined antiaircraft gun/missile system like the Pantsir if you want to swat flies at that altitude.

Pretty expensive fly swatter for a horde of pests.

 

[daftandbarmy]

As always, it depends, but the frame for conventional conflict would be an adversary with modern equipment in open conflict. It might not be linear, but it is not COIN. We have fairly established force ratios as a guide.

So could a Canadian Battle Group defeat an adversary equipped with modern equipment? So an opponent with tanks, APCs, a variety of indirect fire, a contested airspace, a contested electronic spectrum, somewhat similar night vision etc.

To start small, could one of our Combat Teams or Company Groups defeat a battalion-sized attack on their position? Lets give the opponent a company of T72s (upgraded), three companies of BMP2 equivalents and supporting fires from a Brigade.

Right now, our LAV company could muster three platoons of 25mm and something like four 84mm. Let's say they had two dismounted TOW attached. If the OC can site the Killzone to have engagements inside the 2km range then the LAVs have a chance to defeat the BMPs with direct fire. The T72s will be a big problem, even with 2 TOW. We could attach Leopard 2A6M to the company, but now those tanks are fixed and if the enemy Brigade masses elsewhere we would likely face a penetration.

To me, the answer is that adding at least four Javelin equivalents to the Company allows them to defeat (if not destroy) a battalion-sized force attacking them (assuming again that they have selected an appropriate KZ to keep the engagement band inside the 25mm effective range). The Battlegroup's Leopards can then be used as countermoves, massing their fire while staying as dispersed as possible.

To me, the good news is that Structure we have can incorporate this without new organizations.

Additionally, I think we keep the exact nature of our potential conventional opponent broad as equipment can change.

How much artillery cover could we offer our Combat Team? I assume a 155mm battery/regiment as required?