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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

If AT is best used in mass, then penny packeting it out to the platoon level seems folly where it would overburden the rifle coy's with little overall impact to the battlespace. Even a few Javlin's wouldn't allow you to hold against aggressive armour any more than without. For the recce elements that they would be good against, the LAV 25mm would suffice to deal with those as well as the 84.

I believe that you are still confusing logistics and command & control. Just because the section carries a weapons system does not mean that the section commands that system. In a leg battalion loads are distributed across the backs of the troops. They are then aggregated at dropoffs for the use of the relevant systems. 81mm bombs and MG Link for example. LIkewise for the ATGMs. The ATGMs fire can be massed (in a broadside) even if the sections are dispersed. In fact ideally you want to establish a kill zone that concentrates the targets at a distance from the launchers while the launchers are separated.

The fires will be concentrated. The firing posts will be distributed.

The army doesn't work from a battleship where everybody is concentrated in one target. It presents multiple targets and concentrates its effects on the target. Instead of a single battleship the better naval analogy would be a flotilla of gunboats swarming a battleship.
 
Surely if whatever ATGMs we might have are long range (ie. not Eryx), they all belong at the battalion level (not company) to be properly controlled and employed. (Still "local protection", obviously.)
 
I can't disagree with much there (aside from getting free arty support because - everyone knows we should have arty).

I agree with Tank Destroyer doctrine.

I think that that doctrine is not about the platform and the projector so much as the ammunition. We have standalone munitions, 84mm munitions, 105, 120, 127, 152 and 155 caliber munitions all of which can launch a variety of warheads. Even the Javelin and TOW has a separate bunker busting round. And we haven't touched the stuff that is circling over head.

We are talking about maintaining separate AT specialist units. We might as well be talking about maintaining two Javelin platoons. One for the AT role and one for the Bunker Busting role. Or separating 105 batteries into High Angle and Low Angle batteries.

Whatever organization that transpires it needs to be sufficiently flexible to switch, at notice, from one target set to another, from one battlefield to another.
 
Surely if whatever ATGMs we might have are long range (ie. not Eryx), they all belong at the battalion level (not company) to be properly controlled and employed. (Still "local protection", obviously.)

I agree in principle but what happens when the Defended Localities are more widely distributed than they were in 1982? Do we post the ATGMs in the gaps, have them roving, or give them safe harbour in the defensive perimeter and rely on sighting them like 5 km machine guns (ie interlocking arcs and mutual coverage of fronts).?

The CO sets the plan but does he retain tactical control? He might. But then again circumstances might suggest distributed control to him.
 
Would the light battalions, assuming there's any use in them at all, make more sense as a single regiment, rather than bolted on to primarily LAV units?
 
Would the light battalions, assuming there's any use in them at all, make more sense as a single regiment, rather than bolted on to primarily LAV units?

For me, yes even if it were only a two battalion independent regiment with only internal support.

But, I'm the guy that would treat the LAV battalions as Light Cavalry and reduce the vehicle load from a crew and a section to a crew (3 man) and a fire team/wpns det.

I would also be eliminating that Direct Fire elements of the Combat Support Company (including the AT and MG elements) but beefing up the Recce platoon into a fourth company. An ACSV company could lift logistics or a leg infantry group.

If anybody was asking.

But Canada has a LAV army.
 
Weapons can be sited by the CO (should he feel so inclined to micromanage) and still belong to companies and platoons.

To me, something like a Javelin should belong to the company. A company should be able to defend itself against an attack that includes enemy tanks. Placing four Javelin equivalents in the company provides a framework over which other systems can be imposed, especially when you factor in twelve or so 25mm cannons. Any tanks we have can then be concentrated as required instead of being used to protect the infantry.

I think it would make sense, in a European context, to have a Javelin-style system in each company (one with each platoon and one with a Coy wpns det) with a battalion level TOW platoon.

As a complete historical aside, the US Tank Destroyer doctrine from the Second World War is an example of what can happen when you overthink doctrine out of contact with the enemy.
 
Slight off tangent, but given the state if CSS in the CAF it doesn't matter the make up of our regiments when we can't even sustain them long term in a combat environment. We barely sustained a battlegroup in Afghanistan, anything larger would of broke us. Our whole supply and logistics chain needs to be torn down and re built.
 
How long would it take us to find a light infantry doctrine if 2 CBG (or 2 CIB) in Petawawa were attached to the 10th Mtn in Fort Drum?

After all we already send Deputy Armored Corps commanders to Texas.

Repeat the 1st SSF experiment on larger scale.
 
I believe that you are still confusing logistics and command & control. Just because the section carries a weapons system does not mean that the section commands that system. In a leg battalion loads are distributed across the backs of the troops. They are then aggregated at dropoffs for the use of the relevant systems. 81mm bombs and MG Link for example. LIkewise for the ATGMs. The ATGMs fire can be massed (in a broadside) even if the sections are dispersed. In fact ideally you want to establish a kill zone that concentrates the targets at a distance from the launchers while the launchers are separated.

The fires will be concentrated. The firing posts will be distributed.

The army doesn't work from a battleship where everybody is concentrated in one target. It presents multiple targets and concentrates its effects on the target. Instead of a single battleship the better naval analogy would be a flotilla of gunboats swarming a battleship.
Not confusing anything. I'm well aware of how the separate elements work together in the combat team and how the army can direct its fire. It doesn't change the fact that four Javelins in a Coy are going to have a limited effect. Congrats, the entire Javelin inventory of the company was used to mobility kill a single tank thanks to smoke and an active protection system. In order to properly control and set up AT capability for an Infantry Bn, you need a dedicated AT coy/platoon for the CO to set up on the proper terrain with the proper sightlines.

Like @TangoTwoBravo stated that a battalion-level AT capability would be valuable.

There was a reason we had TUA that were developed before those LAV's were cannibalized to make the LAV RWS.
 
Not going to throw my own thoughts in here. I've done that before. But I just wanted to point out that the US Army has differing organizations and doctrine for each of their ABCTs, SBCTs, and IBCTs.

Its only the IBCT that has weapons companies at the rifle battalion. That's not to say that there aren't scouts or mortars in the all three types of rifle battalions. Each them in fact has a headquarters company which contains both the command and control elements as well as medical, scout and four mortar dets (I sometimes wonder if we really need a combat support company or if this organization just provides a spare major and MWO to replace casualties :giggle: ). But the light IBCT infantry battalion has weapons entities. Each IBCT rifle company has a 60 mm mortar det. Each IBCT Rifle platoon has a weapons squad which can man any two of two MMGs or two Javelins. The IBCT infantry battalion's weapons company has four platoons and can field a mix and match of systems. Each platoon of four vehicles has two fitted for ITAS TOW and, in addition, there are 2 x .50 HMGs; 2x Mk 19 40mm grenade launchers and two Javelin systems. So as far as anti-armour systems are concerned, the IBCT infantry battalion can field 8 x TOW and 8 Javelin within the weapons company and another 18 Javelins from its nine rifle platoon weapons squads. (that's if they go all out on Atk weapons rather than MGs) On top of that my understanding is that the scout vehicles in the six cavalry platoons and three battalion scout platoons also carry Javelins for roughly another 50.

The ABCT on the other hand has it's primary anti-armour capability in its six tank companies for roughly a hundred tanks and the TOW launchers mounted on the Bradleys of its four rifle companies and three cavalry troops - that's a minimum of 95 TOW launchers. And yes, there are Javelins spread around the brigade as well but no specific weapons companies.

The SBCT is organized differently again. It has no tanks nor battalion weapons companies. The rifle companies used to have the MGS 105 mm Stryker but these are all gone (except for a dozen relegated to the weapons company of the brigade's cavalry squadron which also has 10 TOW Strykers). Rifle companies each have a two mortar Strykers in addition to the battalions four tubes. Javelins proliferate at the rifle squad and scout squad levels to my understanding. The situation is changing somewhat more. Currently the plan is to upgrade half of the rifle squads' Strykers with 30 mm gun systems while the remaining half are to get CROWS-J (Common Remotely Operated Weapons Station-Javelin (roughly 80 to the brigade)

I think what is clear from the above is that there are differing ways of meeting the challenge of engaging armour. In some ways these differences come from the essential functions that the brigade is to perform, in others its based on legacy equipment (for example the Bradleys TOWs have been around long before the Stryker was a thing or the Javelin existed). I believe in more centralized anti-armour forces, the Americans disagree and have the advantage of lots of cash to proliferate them everywhere.

One common point is that brigade anti-armour platoons or companies are no longer there in any of these brigades. On the other hand, the brigade's cavalry elements all have very robust anti-armour capabilities.

The critical point for any discussion is to understand the role of the formation within which the weapon is to be used and how it will be employed. Is the formation basically a heavy, fast moving hard striking force that fights more mobile than statics; is it a lightly armed formation that once dug in to defend has little mobility available to it; or is it one with lightly armoured somewhat mobile elements that does have some protected mobility available but basically fights dismounted like the light one. The mix of weapon systems may-and probably will-vary with that even if we call the basic unit "the infantry battalion". Those battalions might very well vary. Even the cavalry elements vary because of the primary vehicles contained within each type of brigade.

The other thing is things change over time. Stryker brigades didn't become the thing people thought they would be back in 2000. Their deployability never became as rapid as people hoped. Rather than battle taxis they've been uparmoured, and are now getting fighting stations.

So far all the changes vis-a-vis anti-armour has been of the direct fire type, but my guess is that will change with the next iteration of the US Army as greater use is made of autonomous vehicles and armed UAVs.

Unfortunately we continue to lag in this field and very badly indeed. The fact that the meanest light infantry brigade in the US Army can bring several hundreds of ATGMs to the fight while we bring ? ought to be a sharp rap to the back of our collective heads (and I won't even mention artillery or AD)

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I agree in principle but what happens when the Defended Localities are more widely distributed than they were in 1982?

Someone considers the doctrine, and having considered the doctrine, makes a plan suitable to the circumstances. Anti-armour plans originate from higher rather than lower, so I suppose it makes more sense for the stuff to be held higher.

In the "2025" context, I'd be surprised if the government committed more than a unit to any particular place in the next few years and a bit worried if the government committed to a conflict with a likely anti-armour threat needing more than "local protection". I suppose for now it still makes sense to have battalion anti-armour platoons, and I see a point to not over-burdening rifle companies with ever-increasing quantities and weights of support weapons and munitions.
 
Someone considers the doctrine, and having considered the doctrine, makes a plan suitable to the circumstances. Anti-armour plans originate from higher rather than lower, so I suppose it makes more sense for the stuff to be held higher.

In the "2025" context, I'd be surprised if the government committed more than a unit to any particular place in the next few years and a bit worried if the government committed to a conflict with a likely anti-armour threat needing more than "local protection". I suppose for now it still makes sense to have battalion anti-armour platoons, and I see a point to not over-burdening rifle companies with ever-increasing quantities and weights of support weapons and munitions.

In my (fairly limited) experience, the overburdening of Infantry occurs where commanders are risk averse/ unimaginitive/ indecisive and/or where logistics/ staff planning support is poor, all of which contributes to a poor team and lack of trust hence 'we'd better carry it or we'll never see it when we need it.'
 
Someone considers the doctrine, and having considered the doctrine, makes a plan suitable to the circumstances. Anti-armour plans originate from higher rather than lower, so I suppose it makes more sense for the stuff to be held higher.

In the "2025" context, I'd be surprised if the government committed more than a unit to any particular place in the next few years and a bit worried if the government committed to a conflict with a likely anti-armour threat needing more than "local protection". I suppose for now it still makes sense to have battalion anti-armour platoons, and I see a point to not over-burdening rifle companies with ever-increasing quantities and weights of support weapons and munitions.

So I had this thought. Let's say we've sent a LAV company off the do peacekeeping somewhere in Africa and some local tinpot rebel or insurgent manages to get a half dozen old T54s or T55s or T62s mobile and sets up a little tank ambush ...

I guess runaway becomes our option right up until they follow us to the UN FOB.

I know, I know, Far fetched. But then there's this:

30congo01-600.jpg




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Probably, if you ever watch a Bde exercise take place the hoops we jump through to find a job for them can be fairly .... inventive.
Running further down that option, would it be worth looking at significant differentiation from the mechanized norm?

Get into (and my ignorance will show here...) mountain and other vehicle-unfriendly terrain, recce, ATV/snowmachine, snow in general, unopposed parachuting (if that's of value), etc. and whatever other not-LAV work might be relevant.

If playing the "does what it says on the tin" game is worth it, let that be the PPCLI's new existence.
 
So I had this thought. Let's say we've sent a LAV company off the do peacekeeping somewhere in Africa and some local tinpot rebel or insurgent manages to get a half dozen old T54s or T55s or T62s mobile and sets up a little tank ambush ...

I guess runaway becomes our option right up until they follow us to the UN FOB.

I know, I know, Far fetched. But then there's this:

30congo01-600.jpg






🍻
Lucky for us older model T-55s can be penetrated from the from by a M72, I'd place a bet that a 25mm sabot round would kill it from the rear.
 
OK...a bit of a swerve here, but the comment on the video at the 25 minute mark about the German political fixation on the big, heavy TDs like the Jagdtiger vs. the lighter, more mobile TDs that the German Army wanted got me thinking.

Are modern MBT's like the Abrams and Leopard the modern equivalents of the Jagdtiger? As the speaker describes it "a stupidly impressive vehicle but also a stupid vehicle".

As we all know, costing of military equipment is like reading tea leaves and there are very few apples to apples comparisons available. However, this website (Ancile) suggests the cost of a Leopard 2A7+ is around 8.5 million euros each (approx. $10 million USD). Meanwhile Wikipedia says that Italy purchased 10 x Centauro II vehicles (basically a LAV-type hull with a 120mm gun turret) for $186 million USD (Freccia IFV - Wikipedia). That means that you could purchase approximately 5 x LAV-based 120mm gun vehicles for the price of a single Leopard 2A7+.

If you look at Lanchester's laws of attrition from the video (at the 19 minute mark) you can see how mass of fires has a major impact on the outcome of an engagement between opposing forces. Does this suggest we should rethink some of the arguments made against a LAV-based mobile gun system in an anti-tank role?
 
Lanchester's laws have a number of assumptions behind them, the first of which is "all things being equal". But we know that all things are NOT equal. Accuracy, armour, active protection, terrain, mobility are all factors that need to be considered in a situation.

Yes, quantity has its own quality, but quality matters quite a bit. Centauro can't fire on the move, it can't survive a hit from a return 120mm whereas an MBT may very well survive a 120mm hit. It likely can't get the rate of fire of an MBT and it can be destroyed by artillery much more easy.

And of course there is the crew protection aspect. We want a tank to protect the crew. The crew are more expensive than the tank itself and can be used to crew another tank. A tank is just money and industrial output.
 
Running further down that option, would it be worth looking at significant differentiation from the mechanized norm?

Get into (and my ignorance will show here...) mountain and other vehicle-unfriendly terrain, recce, ATV/snowmachine, snow in general, unopposed parachuting (if that's of value), etc. and whatever other not-LAV work might be relevant.

If playing the "does what it says on the tin" game is worth it, let that be the PPCLI's new existence.
You mean like having mountain and parachute companies? They already do. THe problem being those numbers aren't really worhtwhile for maintaining specializations of that nature.
 
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