Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[FJAG]

I agree with much that you say. I just want to point out the following:

If everyone is legally required to show up you have everyone there to train. We can’t demand people always show up to everything on the current system, its too much to demand as a part time gig. Getting a month off to do it is much more attainable.

There is already a mechanism to order people to attend training in the NDA and QR&O.

NDA 33.(2) The reserve force, all units and other elements thereof and all officers and non-commissioned members thereof

(a) may be ordered to train for such periods as are prescribed in regulations made by the Governor in Council; and
(b) may be called out on service to perform any lawful duty other than training at such times and in such manner as by regulations or otherwise are prescribed by the Governor in Council.

QR&O 9.04(2) Subject to any limitations prescribed by the Chief of the Defence Staff, a member of the Primary Reserve may be ordered to train each year on Class "B" Reserve Service prescribed under subparagraph (1)(b) of article 9.07 (Class "B" Reserve Service) for a period not exceeding 15 days and on Class "A" Reserve Service (see article 9.06 - Class "A" Reserve Service), for a period not exceeding 60 days.

The problem is that this provision is not used because people do not wish to go through the system of civilian courts to charge an individual with failure to attend training. This is a conceptual issue which could be overcome with a little internal fortitude or minor amendments to the NDA s 60(1)(c)

treat them the same as the Regs, its a legal requirement, you face AWOL if you don’t.

see above.

 

[Eaglelord17]

I agree with much that you say. I just want to point out the following:



There is already a mechanism to order people to attend training in the NDA and QR&O.





The problem is that this provision is not used because people do not wish to go through the system of civilian courts to charge an individual with failure to attend training. This is a conceptual issue which could be overcome with a little internal fortitude or minor amendments to the NDA s 60(1)(c)


see above.

Your missing the important part, the ability to guarantee the soldier the time off from their employer.

If someone was to invoke that regulation without having something to protect the soldiers civilian career, they will not show up. Not only that, if you tried to charge those soldiers for not showing up as their civilian career comes first, they will all release.

If you want to kill the Reserves that is the quickest way to do it. Lots of dedicated soldiers would leave and I wouldn’t blame a single one of them.

 

[childs56]

I agree with much that you say. I just want to point out the following:



There is already a mechanism to order people to attend training in the NDA and QR&O.





The problem is that this provision is not used because people do not wish to go through the system of civilian courts to charge an individual with failure to attend training. This is a conceptual issue which could be overcome with a little internal fortitude or minor amendments to the NDA s 60(1)(c)


see above.

Unless you provide job protection to a Reservist charging them for not parading under the QR&O 90.04(2) is not going to be effective.


What is your interpretation of the following?
Exception in case of reserve force

33(3) Nothing in subsection (2) shall be deemed to impose liability to serve as prescribed therein, without his consent, on an officer or non-commissioned member of the reserve force who is, by virtue of the terms of his enrolment, liable to perform duty on active service only.

 

[Kirkhill]

What Value Does Land Power Offer An Island Nation?

Defence blog focusing on 21st century analysis of Cold War defence, security and continuity of government problems.

thinpinstripedline.blogspot.com

Brits having many of the same debates as we are about the role of an expeditionary Army and the Reserves.

An old debate perhaps?

Do you need infantry to defend the guns in garrison?
Fusiliers to defend them on the road?
Dragoons to suppress rebellious subjects?
Marines to project power overseas?
Light Bobs to find the enemy and contain them for the heavies?
Rifles to do the same job at range?
Are the Dragoons Foot on Horses or Horse on Foot?
Does the Horse need its own Guns?
How much armour plate is enough?
Is any armour plate required given the rise of the rifle?

And what to do with radios and airplanes?

 

[Blackadder1916]

Unless you provide job protection to a Reservist charging them for not parading under the QR&O 90.04(2) is not going to be effective.


What is your interpretation of the following?
Exception in case of reserve force

33(3) Nothing in subsection (2) shall be deemed to impose liability to serve as prescribed therein, without his consent, on an officer or non-commissioned member of the reserve force who is, by virtue of the terms of his enrolment, liable to perform duty on active service only.

33(3) refers to members in the Supplementary Reserve. QR&O 2.034 refers

b. the Supplementary Reserve, which consists of officers and non-commissioned members who, except when on active service, are not required to perform military or any other form of duty or training;

 

[Kirkhill]

There is no question that equipment is essential. It takes time to acquire that. There's no reason, however, that you can't start the rebuilding process with what we have and then add the equipment as it goes along.

The US Congressional Budget Office has a website that lets you see how much the direct and indirect costs of a given military element is. These are in annual operating costs and do not include capital equipment purchases. Note the figures are large because they also include the proportional overhead costs.

Read in three columns: Type of BCT; Active Army BCT cost; ARNG BCT cost

ABCT $3.5 billion $1.0 billion

SBCT $3.4 billion $0.9 billion

IBCT $3.2 billion $0.9 billion

In short, it cost a bit less than one third to maintain an equipped ARNG BCT than an active one.

From GR66's posting above...

This challenge is tacitly acknowledged in the CGS speech, which recognises the problem of trying to get a career and training model in place which is time bound and cannot do the courses that the Regular force does. How do you use a mass reserve in an era when you are not going to mobilise quickly for transition to war, and where it may be faster and easier to recruit from scratch than it is to try to mobilise and upskill units? Defining a role for the citizen soldier is also hard – is it to keep the Army in the public eye, conduct MACA, train to augment on various operations or something else?

There is doubtless much valuable work the Reserve can, and should, do. It is a link between the public and the armed forces in a way that the Regular Army is not. It can provide people of immense skill in their real lives to support the nation when required in a variety of ways. But is it still a body who can provide reinforcements when required to serve their nation, or is it time to look again at this? The other question that hasn’t been really explained is the scale and ambition with which the Army Reserve should operate. Is it an organisation that exists to provide singletons or is it one that will send formed units?

The ‘whole force’ concept appears to have been seen officially now as something of a failure. You cannot rely on a volunteer reserve, where the clue is in the title, to always be available to put their lives on hold to support military operations. But if you can’t use the Reserve, then what point is there in having it? Is a better use for the Reserve for it to function as the ‘reconstitution Army’ – a force that exists so that in the event of the regulars being deployed and taking casualties to a high level, the Reserve can be mobilised and turned into the follow-on force? This model closely mirrors the TA of 1914-15 whose members held the line after the evisceration of the BEF in the early part of WW1. Is this a more accurate use of the Reserve, to use as a force only to be deployed, in the main, when things have gone very badly wrong for the Army? It may concentrate decision makers minds to know that the Army they send to war is a ‘one use only’ force and that the AR is all that will be left if it goes wrong.

But that bit in purple circles back to this earlier statement:

it may be faster and easier to recruit from scratch than it is to try to mobilise and upskill units

And the article's conclusion is paramount for all expeditionary armies.

Making the case for the Army requires being able to explain why the UK needs to send troops abroad to fight, and if needs be die, in large numbers. What is the benefit to our national interest of being able to do this. Politicians are increasingly averse to long term and bloody commitments that yield little but cost treasure and blood. Trying to steer a path that retains the Army’s ability to act as the national conventional deterrent through its force structure while also being able to sensibly predict the future and find causes worth fighting for is going to be challenging. There is unlikely to be much call for wars of conquest, so defining the value that land power brings to an island nation will be key here.

 

[Kirkhill]

What Value Does Land Power Offer An Island Nation?

Defence blog focusing on 21st century analysis of Cold War defence, security and continuity of government problems.

thinpinstripedline.blogspot.com

Brits having many of the same debates as we are about the role of an expeditionary Army and the Reserves.

I think we can all agree, fundamentally, on a few things when it comes to reshaping the army reserve:

1. Its structure is at best not optimized for organizational efficiency, and at worst directly detracts from the reserves mission (see below). It needs to be rebuilt into usable units that hold enough mass (read people) to make Bn sized groupings sensible.

2. 3 hour parade nights are not a good use of time and money. A full weekend is a) better time for money b) allows for far more actual time for training and c) is less administrative work.

3. The idea of “the regs” and “the reserves” as separate organizations vs simply as administrative statuses of personnel creates a deeply unproductive culture of distrust and disinterest. Any more forward should better integrate the two to make good use of all soldiers and to start breaking apart this culture.

* note: the mission of the reserves needs to be addressed. A coherent, directive, mission task to each unit and then build a structure that is made to meet that task.

If I combine Mark's observations with the article supplied by GR66 and focus on the bits I highlighted above, in particular -

it may be faster and easier to recruit from scratch than it is to try to mobilise and upskill units

is it still a body who can provide reinforcements when required?

is it an organisation that exists to provide singletons or is it one that will send formed units?

and the one, single, declarative

It is a link between the public and the armed forces

Is it worthwhile training the reserves in complex skills that ultimately may have to be trained out of them before they can be retrained with the necessary skills of the moment? Compound that with wondering if they are ever good enough to start with and how long their learned skills survive on the shelf.

Or is there value in simply having an engaged and fit body of like-minded citizens expressing willingness to support the army and the government of the day as they attempt to protect their fellow citizens?

And if so how do you keep those enthusiasts engaged? At minimal cost of course.

Is it enough to teach them basic skills that are common and will endure over time? And what are those basic skills? And how much effort is required from both instructors and students to efficiently transfer those skills and retain them?

My sense is that basic knowledge is an understanding of the military organization and its needs. Basic skills, again in my opinion, include creating and holding a sight picture and squeezing a trigger, communicating clearly both directly and by electronic means, driving in a military manner in a variety of environments, basic first aid, living rough, and increasingly operating as "two soldiers and a coffee pot manning screens and joysticks". And, above all else, operating as a team and supplying mutual support.

 

[GR66]

Obviously beyond the question of how the Reserves are best integrated into a "Total Force" is the question of the structure of that force.

We need to be careful that we don't take the wrong lessons from the war in Ukraine. The temptation is to look at that conflict and figure out ways we can do it better than the Ukrainians and Russians are doing it. The reality however is that we want to avoid that type of attritional war all together.

To my mind the real lesson to take from the war is the importance of gaining and maintaining air superiority. Achieve that and the whole way the war is fought changes. Tube artillery which has been a key factor in Ukraine suddenly becomes extremely vulnerable (self propelled or not) if you lose air superiority. Once the enemy's artillery is off the table then massing for maneuver again becomes an option. Meanwhile the enemy's ability to reposition forces to face a threat is challenged.

For sure there are many basic capabilities that the CA needs to seriously beef up (including tube artillery, SHORAD, ATGMs, Armour, etc.), but maybe a very serious focus should be put on those capabilities (CAF wide) that help to gain, maintain and sustain air superiority which will enable our land forces to achieve massed maneuver like more F-35's, HIMARS w/ATACMS & PSM, EW, MRAD and LRAD, C-UAS, Cruise Missiles (air, sea and land launched), Attack Helicopters, etc.

 

[FJAG]

Your missing the important part, the ability to guarantee the soldier the time off from their employer.

Unless you provide job protection to a Reservist charging them for not parading under the QR&O 90.04(2) is not going to be effective.

There is nothing to prevent a system whereby people are ordered to parade but can seek exemptions on a case by case basis from their CO.

But the point is well taken. And I've said this myself many times: Our job protection legislation is entirely inadequate.

33(3) refers to members in the Supplementary Reserve. QR&O 2.034 refers

Exactly.

 

[KevinB]

If I combine Mark's observations with the article supplied by GR66 and focus on the bits I highlighted above, in particular -




and the one, single, declarative


Is it worthwhile training the reserves in complex skills that ultimately may have to be trained out of them before they can be retrained with the necessary skills of the moment? Compound that with wondering if they are ever good enough to start with and how long their learned skills survive on the shelf.

It depends
Yes I put the clown face intentionally, because the answer while true was not helpful.

I would suggest a properly equipped and trained force is easier to mobilize than build from scratch (that’s kind of a no brainer)

The CA’s current PRes system is best probably dousing in a jellied diesel and gasoline and throwing a match on however from a Mobilization stand point.

One fatal flaw a lot of people are making when looking at Ukraine’s mobilization, is the available resources and equipment.
Ukraine has the ability to mobilize due to the support of countries that aren’t directly involved.

Had Canada needed to mobilize like that for something, it should be abundantly clear that it would be as a result of a worldwide crisis and there wouldn’t be any donor nations providing equipment and training.

Or is there value in simply having an engaged and fit body of like-minded citizens expressing willingness to support the army and the government of the day as they attempt to protect their fellow citizens?

And if so how do you keep those enthusiasts engaged? At minimal cost of course.

Depends if you just want expendable infantry like Russia, or if you want a capable force.

Is it enough to teach them basic skills that are common and will endure over time? And what are those basic skills? And how much effort is required from both instructors and students to efficiently transfer those skills and retain them?

What do you consider basic skills.
Personally I don’t believe there is enough training days for the PRes to maintain basic skills

My sense is that basic knowledge is an understanding of the military organization and its needs. Basic skills, again in my opinion, include creating and holding a sight picture and squeezing a trigger,

I’ll state without a shadow of a doubt that the CAF’s small arms program is not a very good system to prepare soldier for combat.
Very few militaries are good at this aspect either - but skill fade is real, and one qualification a month is not sufficient let alone once a year.

communicating clearly both directly and by electronic means,

Ah comms, something that few folks really understand the importance or issues with.
A improperly used radio is more of a liability than most understand.

driving in a military manner in a variety of environments,

This day and age one needs to be able to drive and nav under NODs. It’s a very perishable skill as well, and that’s simply after daylight driving in combat conditions is mastered.

basic first aid,

Honestly most First Aid courses are about as good as “He’s Dead Jim” coming from Dr McCoy in StarTrek. TCCC courses are the bare min and a good class for one of those is a 2 week event that has a live fire Ex as part of the final exam. If I was King everyone in the military would be exposed to live tissue as well, as it really sucks when your first need for TCCC is also your first major exposure to human trauma.

living rough, and increasingly operating as "two soldiers and a coffee pot manning screens and joysticks". And, above all else, operating as a team and supplying mutual support.

When I started doodling about what one could or couldn’t fit into an Immediate Mobilization course - and the time I would want with troops before I considered them fit for deployment, I don’t see a lot of room for gaps inside 60days - and that assumes a well trained cadre and supporting infrastructure.

When looking at maintenance of a capability, I’d use 4 days a month (2 x 2 day weekends) for 10 months of the year for 40days to upkeep individual skills and low level group skills, and 21 days during a summer to work on refining individual skills and collective training.

All of that requires a PRes to be fully equipped and supported.

Failure to do so, just leaves the PRes to having no real point.

 

[Kirkhill]

It depends
Yes I put the clown face intentionally, because the answer while true was not helpful.

I would suggest a properly equipped and trained force is easier to mobilize than build from scratch (that’s kind of a no brainer)

The CA’s current PRes system is best probably dousing in a jellied diesel and gasoline and throwing a match on however from a Mobilization stand point.

One fatal flaw a lot of people are making when looking at Ukraine’s mobilization, is the available resources and equipment.
Ukraine has the ability to mobilize due to the support of countries that aren’t directly involved.

Had Canada needed to mobilize like that for something, it should be abundantly clear that it would be as a result of a worldwide crisis and there wouldn’t be any donor nations providing equipment and training.




Depends if you just want expendable infantry like Russia, or if you want a capable force.

What do you consider basic skills.
Personally I don’t believe there is enough training days for the PRes to maintain basic skills

I’ll state without a shadow of a doubt that the CAF’s small arms program is not a very good system to prepare soldier for combat.
Very few militaries are good at this aspect either - but skill fade is real, and one qualification a month is not sufficient let alone once a year.

Ah comms, something that few folks really understand the importance or issues with.
A improperly used radio is more of a liability than most understand.


This day and age one needs to be able to drive and nav under NODs. It’s a very perishable skill as well, and that’s simply after daylight driving in combat conditions is mastered.



Honestly most First Aid courses are about as good as “He’s Dead Jim” coming from Dr McCoy in StarTrek. TCCC courses are the bare min and a good class for one of those is a 2 week event that has a live fire Ex as part of the final exam. If I was King everyone in the military would be exposed to live tissue as well, as it really sucks when your first need for TCCC is also your first major exposure to human trauma.


When I started doodling about what one could or couldn’t fit into an Immediate Mobilization course - and the time I would want with troops before I considered them fit for deployment, I don’t see a lot of room for gaps inside 60days - and that assumes a well trained cadre and supporting infrastructure.

When looking at maintenance of a capability, I’d use 4 days a month (2 x 2 day weekends) for 10 months of the year for 40days to upkeep individual skills and low level group skills, and 21 days during a summer to work on refining individual skills and collective training.

All of that requires a PRes to be fully equipped and supported.

Failure to do so, just leaves the PRes to having no real point.

So what you are saying is that all skill sets are so complex that they need to be constantly rehearsed snd practiced.

And you want civilians to dedicate themselves to that level.

And at the end of the day the skill sets they have learned may not be appropriate to the battle they face so they will have to be re-equipped untrained and retrained.

And most of them will be old fat and slovenly in any case...


Happy Canada Day

 

[KevinB]

So what you are saying is that all skill sets are so complex that they need to be constantly rehearsed snd practiced.

And you want civilians to dedicate themselves to that level.

I did provide a schedule for that sort of maintenance that isn’t unreasonable for a Reservist.

And at the end of the day the skill sets they have learned may not be appropriate to the battle they face so they will have to be re-equipped untrained and retrained.

I would not go so far to say that.
But unless Canada opts for a mix of formations (Heavy, Med, Light) then yes.
To goal of a blended force is to have the ability to bring the appropriate force structures to bear.

And most of them will be old fat and slovenly in any case...

PT standards need improvement across the board.

Happy Canada Day

Same

 

[FJAG]

I think what I've set out below still applies to Canada's situation.

When you think about it, the current structure of our ResF what with all its battalions and LCols is to facilitate Stage 4 mobilization which the Canadian Army has given up on a long time ago. We tend to think and work only within the Stage 1 system.

I've always been of the view what the Army should be aiming for is an efficient way of creating Stage 3 mobilization. This is where I think things like 30/70 units have a role in that, if properly formed and trained (and for @KevinB - properly equipped) you can rapidly double the size of our Army by virtue of the existing authorized ResF strength.

Stage 3 needs a structure with equipment and trained people. It's a no brainer that we should have this.

I think Stage4 is elusive. It contemplates a plan for enabling industry to turn out equipment, the nation to supply new recruits and the Army to build it into a cohesive force. This idea withered on the vine in the 1960s "Forces in being" concept but quite frankly its still an essential capability that a country, any country should have. All it needs is a plan and a methodology for implementing the plan.

The Monitoring Committee stressed in its 1998 Interim Report that the "absence of a plan creates uncertainty for the Reserves. The Reserves are, by virtue of Government policy, the basis for national mobilization, or stage 4: in practice, however, the Department has paid attention to their augmentation role almost exclusively … and fails to mention the Militia’s primary role: to be the basis of national mobilization."(19) This vagueness with respect to the national mobilization role of the reserves continues and, furthermore, their specific role in the other stages of mobilization continues to be ill-defined. Responding to the Department’s insistence that it cannot plan force structures until operational situations and other factors are known, the Monitoring Committee suggests that the Department "identify likely ‘situations’ and … devise methods, processes and, most importantly, force structures, to respond to them."(20) This would include a clear role for the reserves at all stages.

The following descriptions of the four stages of mobilization are taken primarily from the 1994 Defence White Paper:(21)


1. Force Generation

The first stage of a response to any crisis of emergency is force generation which includes all measures needed to prepare elements of the Canadian Forces to undertake, sustain and support new operational tasks. These functions will be undertaken within the existing resource framework of the Canadian Forces and will include the training and preparation of volunteer reservists, often on an individual basis, to augment the Regular Force.


2. Force Enhancement

In the second stage of mobilization, force enhancement, the operational capabilities of the existing forces are improved through the allocation of more resources. Such action will be undertaken without permanent change in the structure or roles of the Canadian Forces, although the formation of temporary units or specialist elements may prove necessary. This level of mobilization would be similar to action taken in response to the 1990 situation in the Persian Gulf and all current peacekeeping commitments. Once again, the Reserve Force is expected to provide personnel, predominantly on an individual basis, to augment Regular Force units.


3. Force Expansion

The third stage, force expansion, involves the enlargement of the Canadian Forces - and perhaps selected elements of the Department of National Defence - to meet a major crisis or emergency. It would likely involve permanent changes in the roles, structure and taskings of the Canadian Forces and could call for the formation of new units, the enhancement of existing facilities and the procurement of additional equipment. This stage would include structural and role changes similar to those undergone by all elements of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence in 1950-1952 when Canada provided armed forces to the United Nations multinational force in Korea and to the then newly formed NATO in Europe. In stage 3, selective activation of reservists individually and in units would be effected by call-up under the terms of an order in council.


4. National Mobilization

Finally, while a major global war is highly unlikely at this time, it remains prudent to have "no-cost" plans ready for total national mobilization. This fourth stage could touch all aspects of Canadian society - including reserves, as well as civilians without military training - and would only come into effect with the proclamation by the Governor-in-Council of a war emergency under the Emergencies Act. The SCRR reported that, "surprisingly, there is no detailed plan in existence for a stage 4 national mobilization."(22)​

 

[childs56]

33(3) refers to members in the Supplementary Reserve. QR&O 2.034 refers

But it doesn't specifaclly state that. In 15(3). The definition of Reserve force does not differentiate between them.

 

[dapaterson]

But it doesn't specifaclly state that. In 15(3). The definition of Reserve force does not differentiate between them.

Laws and the related regulations, and subordinate policy must be read and understood together.

Or you can randomly post on the internet and reveal your own personal abject stupidity. Your call.

 

[Blackadder1916]

But it doesn't specifaclly state that. In 15(3). The definition of Reserve force does not differentiate between them.

For that you must look to NDA 12(2)

Minister’s power to make regulations

(2) Subject to section 13 and any regulations made by the Governor in Council, the Minister may make regulations for the organization, training, discipline, efficiency, administration and good government of the Canadian Forces and generally for carrying the purposes and provisions of this Act into effect.

Then you look at QR&Os (waiting for the title to be changed to KR&Os) - QRs are the regulations.

1.24 – REGULATIONS AND ORDERS – GENERAL
(1) The effective date of a regulation or order imposing an obligation or duty cannot be retroactive.
(2) In QR&O,
(a) immediately following every regulation
(i) made by the Governor in Council, there shall be printed in parentheses the letter “G”,
(ii) made by the Treasury Board, there shall be printed in parentheses the letter “T”,
(iii) made by the Minister, there shall be printed in parentheses the letter “M”; and
(b) following every note, quotation, statement of the offence, specimen charge, italicized reference within parentheses or order issued by the Chief of the Defence Staff, there must be printed in parentheses the letter “C”.

(G);[P.C. 2022-0268 effective 20 June 2022 – (2) (b)];

And the notation for QR&O 2.034 - (M) [2 June 2009 - (c)]

 

[childs56]

Laws and the related regulations, and subordinate policy must be read and understood together.

Or you can randomly post on the internet and reveal your own personal abject stupidity. Your call.

When you read the various points I showed then all it states is Reserve force. It does not differentiate between supp reserves.
Now you go ahead and force a Reservist to work the x amount of days. Have their employer possibly loose a client and or work short causing other issues.
Now have that employer tell their employee you choose either your 15 days a year mandatory training or your job here. See how well that works out.
Or go out on a limb and interpret further that the company looses a significant amount of money due to the 15 day service with the reserves and they sue the goverment. Bet their Lawyer interprets the wording similar to how I do.

Call me names but I bet the Reserves loose more then employers.
12(1)might be more appropriate. What ever.

 

[childs56]

Laws and the related regulations, and subordinate policy must be read and understood together.

Or you can randomly post on the internet and reveal your own personal abject stupidity. Your call.

When did subordinate policy and regulations supersede laws?

 

[FJAG]

When did subordinate policy and regulations supersede laws?

They don't. You have a fundamental misunderstanding about how legislation works. Legislation rarely covers everything. It covers the key concepts and then empowers various individuals and agencies to fill in the blanks in ever reducing layers. First you have regulations made under the legislation and then directives or orders or policies etc where the legislation and the regulations permit. It is only

Key to what we're talking about is that the reserve force is created as a component of the CAF by the NDA s 15(2) and (3).

Next, under the powers that the NDA grants to the Minister, he has divided the ResF into four sub-components under QR&O 2.034 - namely the primary reserve, the supplementary reserve, the COATS and the Rangers. That's absolutely within the powers granted to the Minister by the legislation. See @Blackadder1916 explanation above. He's bang on as to how it functions.

The key part of 2.034 b. reads:

b. the Supplementary Reserve, which consists of officers and non-commissioned members who, except when on active service, are not required to perform military or any other form of duty or training;

The NDA itself in s 33(3) states:

(3) Nothing in subsection (2) shall be deemed to impose liability to serve as prescribed therein, without his consent, on an officer or non-commissioned member of the reserve force who is, by virtue of the terms of his enrolment, liable to perform duty on active service only.

So, by virtue of QR&O 2.034 b, members of the supplementary reserve are provided terms of service which makes them subject to the provisions of NDA 33(3) and thereby makes them solely liable to being placed on Active Service unless they volunteer for other types of service or duties.

 

[markppcli]

They don't. You have a fundamental misunderstanding about how legislation works. Legislation rarely covers everything. It covers the key concepts and then empowers various individuals and agencies to fill in the blanks in ever reducing layers. First you have regulations made under the legislation and then directives or orders or policies etc where the legislation and the regulations permit. It is only

Key to what we're talking about is that the reserve force is created as a component of the CAF by the NDA s 15(2) and (3).

Next, under the powers that the NDA grants to the Minister, he has divided the ResF into four sub-components under QR&O 2.034 - namely the primary reserve, the supplementary reserve, the COATS and the Rangers. That's absolutely within the powers granted to the Minister by the legislation. See @Blackadder1916 explanation above. He's bang on as to how it functions.

The key part of 2.034 b. reads:



The NDA itself in s 33(3) states:



So, by virtue of QR&O 2.034 b, members of the supplementary reserve are provided terms of service which makes them subject to the provisions of NDA 33(3) and thereby makes them solely liable to being placed on Active Service unless they volunteer for other types of service or duties.

Get out of here with you legal expertise and deep understanding of the legislation and policies pertaining to the army reserve gathered as the highest legal officer in that organization. We want uneducated takes based on scumming of laws.