Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[dapaterson]

Years ago I was involved in discussion about the infamous "soldiers in our streets", and looking at what the full time personnel cadre would have to look like - basically a platoon or so of full timers.

The CBT Arms solution was basically a platoon ready to go out the door.

The model I suggested was CSS heavy - the veh techs, ACISS, veh techs needed to ensure equipment and materiel readiness, plus a small (3-4 pers) recce element.

That's the challenge in a restructure of the Army: there will be a need to acknowledge that the support cadre needs to be primarily full time, with the pointy end being shifted more to part time.

The impacts on occupations and indirectly on senior leadership will unfortunately undermine any change efforts - gotta protect the Ops Gen bias in leadership selection...

 

[daftandbarmy]

Years ago I was involved in discussion about the infamous "soldiers in our streets", and looking at what the full time personnel cadre would have to look like - basically a platoon or so of full timers.

The CBT Arms solution was basically a platoon ready to go out the door.

The model I suggested was CSS heavy - the veh techs, ACISS, veh techs needed to ensure equipment and materiel readiness, plus a small (3-4 pers) recce element.

That's the challenge in a restructure of the Army: there will be a need to acknowledge that the support cadre needs to be primarily full time, with the pointy end being shifted more to part time.

The impacts on occupations and indirectly on senior leadership will unfortunately undermine any change efforts - gotta protect the Ops Gen bias in leadership selection...

90% of the reasons we get called out in the first place is related to issues a Svc Bn (and Med Teams) are equipped and trained to deal with, so that makes sense. I'd add in an Engr element, of course, for the usual 'mobility' tasks they're good at, as well as water obstacle crossing and water purification etc.

As a Cbt Arms guy, I would have been happy for my troops to jump on the back of their (professionally driven) trucks to go do whatever...

 

[dapaterson]

Hence my "Recce Det of two engineers and two CBT Arms any".

 

[daftandbarmy]

Hence my "Recce Det of two engineers and two CBT Arms any".

The biggest issue might be leadership, of course, regardless of which ARes arm/service leads the way.

You can make up for alot of quality issues in the Reserves but, if the CO is junk (which happens about 50-70% of the time it seems), it will all likely be a bigger disaster than the one you're trying to fix.

 

[FJAG]

That's the challenge in a restructure of the Army: there will be a need to acknowledge that the support cadre needs to be primarily full time, with the pointy end being shifted more to part time.

That is so bloody obvious its almost unbelievable that anything else can be sold to the civilian leadership.

I've been saying for years that artillery, because it rarely needs to deploy (leaving aside 4 CMBG but including Latvia), needs to have just enough full timers to ensure that the vital career flow to create sufficient regimental level staff and NCOs and highly complex skill sets such as BCs, FOOs, JTACs and their staff is maintained. The vast bulk of the gunline and STA can be reservists.

 

[KevinB]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1640482688099565568

 

[markppcli]

That is so bloody obvious its almost unbelievable that anything else can be sold to the civilian leadership.

I've been saying for years that artillery, because it rarely needs to deploy (leaving aside 4 CMBG but including Latvia), needs to have just enough full timers to ensure that the vital career flow to create sufficient regimental level staff and NCOs and highly complex skill sets such as BCs, FOOs, JTACs and their staff is maintained. The vast bulk of the gunline and STA can be reservists.

One troop of full time guns 2 troops part time? To keep that gun line knowledge train ?

 

[FJAG]

One troop of full time guns 2 troops part time? To keep that gun line knowledge train ?

I think that the biggest factor in balancing RegF and ResF in hybrid arty units, which are essentially wartime units that you do not need every day in peacetime, is the fact that you need an adequate base upon which you can build the experienced, full-time officers and senior NCOs that you need to lead both elements. You also need a breadth of skills to keep active from gun line to STA to AD and higher level staff duties with a reasonable career flow.

Some of that can come from the reserves (I was quite surprised in my interviews as to how many RegF officers and NCOs got their start in the Militia before transferring) but most need to flow through a RegF structure to get the necessary experience to supplement their training.

I think a system where you have a RegF led unit, which has one 100/0 subunit and two part time 10/90 sub-units, is probably adequate to provide the base to develop the leadership needed for a) the unit itself, b) the training establishments, and c) formation-level SME leadership and staff.

I've been playing around with my napkin force and have reduced the number of arty brigades from 2 to 1 because we will probably never deploy more than one arty bde HQ in a worst case divisional deployment (and yes I see that as an objective to plan for) - so there is no need for more than 1 arty bde HQ. OTOH I'm not reducing the number of artillery units below one per CS regt per manoeuvre brigade (ie 5), an AD Regt, and two GS regiments (one gun, one rocket) - for a total of eight units plus a 30/70 Svc Bn. That's a large bde but considering it's all 30/70 it means it uses no more RegF PYs than the current 4 RegF regiments (around 1,500-2,000).

 

[Kirkhill]

I think that the biggest factor in balancing RegF and ResF in hybrid arty units, which are essentially wartime units that you do not need every day in peacetime, is the fact that you need an adequate base upon which you can build the experienced, full-time officers and senior NCOs that you need to lead both elements. You also need a breadth of skills to keep active from gun line to STA to AD and higher level staff duties with a reasonable career flow.

Some of that can come from the reserves (I was quite surprised in my interviews as to how many RegF officers and NCOs got their start in the Militia before transferring) but most need to flow through a RegF structure to get the necessary experience to supplement their training.

I think a system where you have a RegF led unit, which has one 100/0 subunit and two part time 10/90 sub-units, is probably adequate to provide the base to develop the leadership needed for a) the unit itself, b) the training establishments, and c) formation-level SME leadership and staff.

I've been playing around with my napkin force and have reduced the number of arty brigades from 2 to 1 because we will probably never deploy more than one arty bde HQ in a worst case divisional deployment (and yes I see that as an objective to plan for) - so there is no need for more than 1 arty bde HQ. OTOH I'm not reducing the number of artillery units below one per CS regt per manoeuvre brigade (ie 5), an AD Regt, and two GS regiments (one gun, one rocket) - for a total of eight units plus a 30/70 Svc Bn. That's a large bde but considering it's all 30/70 it means it uses no more RegF PYs than the current 4 RegF regiments (around 1,500-2,000).

How much of the Arty training has to be field training? It seems to me that a significant portion of the effort has to be managed by HMIs in any event.

Looking at the videos where the Brits are training the Ukes on the Chally's with simulators, and combining that with the developments in FDCs for AD and STA management I have to wonder about the relative proportions of field and simulator time required.

Is a bigger question "how much CSS field training is required?"

 

[KevinB]

How much of the Arty training has to be field training? It seems to me that a significant portion of the effort has to be managed by HMIs in any event.

Certain things can’t be simulated well.

Looking at the videos where the Brits are training the Ukes on the Chally's with simulators, and combining that with the developments in FDCs for AD and STA management I have to wonder about the relative proportions of field and simulator time required.

Certain things can be simulated well, but there is still no 100% replacement for live training.

Is a bigger question "how much CSS field training is required?"

More than I’d think is done currently, and the CAF doesn’t have a spectacular array of high end simulators either.

 

[daftandbarmy]

How much of the Arty training has to be field training? It seems to me that a significant portion of the effort has to be managed by HMIs in any event.

Looking at the videos where the Brits are training the Ukes on the Chally's with simulators, and combining that with the developments in FDCs for AD and STA management I have to wonder about the relative proportions of field and simulator time required.

Is a bigger question "how much CSS field training is required?"

We are famously awful at securing enough, fully functional simulators of various types, especially with respect to training the Reserves.

Apart from that, great idea!

 

[Halifax Tar]

Is a bigger question "how much CSS field training is required?"

I asked a very senior person my CBG how a recent exercise went. He said it was great, awesome training value. I then asked what did the Svc Bn do ?

"Oh I dunno they went off and planned there own stuff."

This person is command level.

We have to get out of the mind frame that kill houses and live fire lanes are the end all be all of ARes exercises and relearn and reestablish our sustainment.

 

[Rifleman62]

Briefed a visiting LFWA Comd, in front of the Inf CO, how did the exercise go. The Svc Bn specifically teamed up with the Inf for this FTX to practice both.

Along the lines of: No Inf CP with all those ramifications, No Ech, CQ issuing ammo direct to each soldier (CSM watched), same with IMP's, etc, etc. No concept of Echs. Inf just wanted to play silly bugger.

Inf CO not happy. He was on short list for CBG Comd until he literally stepped on his dick.

 

[Kirkhill]

Certain things can’t be simulated well.


Certain things can be simulated well, but there is still no 100% replacement for live training.

More than I’d think is done currently, and the CAF doesn’t have a spectacular array of high end simulators either.

We are famously awful at securing enough, fully functional simulators of various types, especially with respect to training the Reserves.

Apart from that, great idea!

Canada is famously unable to procure much of anything - Virtual or IRL.

So, in these flights of fancy that preserve my sanity I prefer to wonder how things might work if the military world caught up to the civilian world of two decades ago.

I reiterate a thought

This is the IRL FDC for a NASAMS system.

I suggest that that station will not look significantly different if it is controlling SAMS and AAA or SSMs and SPHs, or UAVs or F35s, or if it is found in a CSC, the back of a P8 or inside an AFV of some sort.

The sensors fitted will change. The effectors will change. The info on the screens will change. But a whole bunch of what the commander and operator are doing will be common regardless of the target set.

And aside from flipping the red guard off the live switches many of the activities can be predicated on canned games or multi-player games.

How many of the guns and missiles and radars will actually have "operators" in the WW2 sense?

I asked a very senior person my CBG how a recent exercise went. He said it was great, awesome training value. I then asked what did the Svc Bn do ?

"Oh I dunno they went off and planned there own stuff."

This person is command level.

We have to get out of the mind frame that kill houses and live fire lanes are the end all be all of ARes exercises and relearn and reestablish our sustainment.

This is the area where we need to be a lot better.

Delivering guns, launchers and sensors to the field.
Delivering ammunition to the guns and launchers in the field
Delivering spares and techs to the guns, launchers and sensors in the field.

 

[quadrapiper]

We have to get out of the mind frame that kill houses and live fire lanes are the end all be all of ARes exercises and relearn and reestablish our sustainment.

"Train to excite" showing its face?

Though if you've joined the Reserves to do Service Battalion things, providing rewarding opportunities to do/train for those things would be a retention builder.

 

[Halifax Tar]

"Train to excite" showing its face?

Though if you've joined the Reserves to do Service Battalion things, providing rewarding opportunities to do/train for those things would be a retention builder.

No debate. I know what we do is not exciting. But its a pillar of operations and needs to be honed.

 

[Rifleman62]

Lots of things a PRes Svc Bn can do. Scrooged as much ammo that was not expended at year end and go on a range shoot. Incl Link of both calibers if you can believe that. 40mm, 9mm. Everyone fires the pistol twice a year as no other unit bothered to draw 9mm. How many young Cdns get to fire a pistol? D Div RCMP ran a cbt pistol crse. Ran convoy ambush drills, local defence. Actually changed MLVW/LSVW tires in the field. Junior Offrs ran a CP. Lots of exciting opportunities. Change of Comd Pde, all ranks carried rifles.

Nice to have an ex PPCLI Sgt on str!.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Here's a good vision!

 

[Kirkhill]

"Train to excite" showing its face?

Though if you've joined the Reserves to do Service Battalion things, providing rewarding opportunities to do/train for those things would be a retention builder.

Here's a thought - every Ares unit gets a Tpt Pl that, along with the CSM and QM gets regularly exercised with its parent Service Battalion.

Give them trucks, armoured vehicles and boats to play with. Cheap ones. But real ones.

 

[Kirkhill]

Courtesy of Battle Order as of 3 days ago-

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3 DAYS AGO AT 9:37 AM

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Update to US Army 2030 Pen+Heavy Divisions

New graphic of the current TRADOC proposal Armor Division (Reinforced), which was originally the Pen etration Division back when Army 2030 was Waypoint 2028. [Also just added the regular Armor Division]. Aside from integrating the changes between proposals, this is a much improved graphic with more accurate symbology that drills down into certain subunits we know about. There are more detailed breakdowns of the Cav Troops (which were talked about by the 1st Cav Div Commander at the Maneuver Warfighter Conference last year), the Air Defense Battalion (which was talked about by the Fires Center of Excellence Commander), and Divisional Sustainment Brigades.


Here's a good article on divisional sustainment for 2030:

Sustainment 2030: New Armor Division Plan Impacts Sustainment Force Structure

One specific unit whose purpose was clarified in 2022 was the "Cross Domain Troop" under the Division Cavalry Squadron. I initially speculated it might be a long-range surveillance troop, because they used the surveillance icon, but it's actually more likely a multi-sensor surveillance unit with a whole Tactical UAS platoon (aviation MOS). The 1st Cav Div commander mentioned drone swarms and other tech being trialed in this unit before being sent on to the rest of the division.

The Protection Brigade also (mainly due to my unfamiliarity with them in 2021) looks more clearly like a current Maneuver Enhancement Brigade that's either organic to or maybe permanently aligned to the division (MEBs are doctrinally meant to be attached to divisions/corps, while the Protection Brigades will I guess be permanently coordinating rear area security/maneuver support units).

Changes to the proposal since late 2021, which is what my original graphics represent (or at least new info we know of):

1. Brigade Engineer Battalion in the ABCTs has been removed, but the brigades retain their Signal Company.

2. The Engineer Brigade gains 2 construction companies and 1 route clearance company

3. No longer a Robotic Combat Vehicle (RCV) Company under the BCT. Rather, a RCV platoon under the Brigade's Cav Troop (I think we knew this in early 2022)

4. The original proposal graphic had a really weird Divisional Sustainment Brigade and the newer ones (the ones sent to me are dated Dec 2022) are more detailed and seem more logical.

I don't have access to the DSB linked above.