The problem with Federal job protection legislation is that there will be major push back from the business community so long as regular peacetime deployments are requiring significant Reserve augmentation. When you have a 70/30 force structure that means that companies are will have to back fill Reservists on a regular basis...making them less willing to hire Reservists who could be pulled away at any time.
It depends very much of how you construct the reserve system. If we use the moronic construct that the ARes is today then yes you will not only have pushback but problems. There are very different ways of doing it. A system that loads most of the training up front while recruits are students looking for full summer employment will get you trained people before they are someone else's employees. If after that you make the training very limited and predictable - say one weekend per month for ten months and a two week period in the summer on fixed dates then the burden on employers (and the reservists family) is not that onerous. The important thing is that the reserve system has to find a balance as between the individual, his employer and his family and the military's needs.
Operational duties are something else. In peace-time all such service, whether domestic or expeditionary could be voluntary as it is now. You would only "mobilize" in extreme cases. You can also build in incentives for employers of mobilized reservists.
In short the right system, with the right communications/education/incentive system will not be onerous.
Internal Army policy changes however that streamline the recruiting process and reduce the amount of time spent on administrative-type training and devoting more time to practical military training (i.e. treating Reservists more like "Militia" than Reg Force solders serving Part-Time) would likely help attendance, retention and recruiting.
Internal policy changes are within the military's control and are essential. Equally so is a force structure that puts whatever administrative burden is still necessary on full-time people is critical. Both in recruiting and training we need to ensure that every valuable minute that a reservist, his family and employer gives the military is used to the utmost and not wasted. The Army currently treats too many people as if their time doesn't matter. That needs to stop.
The problem with integrating Reserve forces directly into "Heavy" units is, as is often pointed out on these forums, the issue of access to equipment and training areas, technical support/maintenance of the kit and the ability to maintain skills currency with a limited amount of training days. I believe it would take quite a large chunk of money and effort to create the infrastructure required to make such a system workable and based on previous (admittedly half-hearted) efforts there is the real possibility that the system would still result in Reservists that require significant work-up to be deployable. And would this work-up period be significantly shorter than the work-up for a "less integrated" type of Reservist? Would the cost of the system be worth the difference in work-up training delta between the two?
Again, start with job hungry students. Train them locally on all the stuff that doesn't need heavy equipment and then take them to the equipment for their training on that. During the winter 10 weekends do training on things that can be done locally (small arms, dismounted tactics etc) and then take them to the equipment for their summer refresher exercises. I don't want to sound dismissive, but six out of the nine folks in a LAV do not need to be drivers or gunners. If you have one or two spares in the back that can drive and operate the weapon, so much the better. Ans I bet that while they are young students most of them would be happy to take driver and gunner courses during their summer breaks. You'll have enough trained folks.
Additionally, does increasing the cost of running the Reserve system realistically reduce the likelihood of the Army being able to purchase the additional equipment required to supply an expanded Total Force? I'd argue that the overall pool of money available is still going to be limited and increased overall structural cost will almost certainly result in reduced equipment procurement.
I look at this from a two phased point of view. Regardless we need to know what we want the Army to be. Assuming that we are going to be equipment neutral and stay with what we have then it absolutely vital that we integrate RegF units (with the current equipment) with ResF personnel so that the one set of equipment can be used to train both - let's say one RegF company and two ARes companies. That's phase 1 and can be done with the existing support personnel and maintenance system (although I would very much want to bump up the maintenance folks regardless) Phase 2 comes into play once we have established a core of solid ARes folks that can augment RegF units with minimal extra training. Phase 2 allows the choice of building a larger force by adding in equipment which will allow the "mobilization" of a bigger and more varied force than we have now. That obviously means that politically we want a bigger force worth spending the capital on. In short Phase 1 is use what we have but make it better. Phase 2 is grow the force if we want to do that.
The key point for politicians is that a true, part-time and trained ARes force is cheaper to run day-to-day than a full-time one. Roughly 1/6th to 1/3rd the cost of full-timers. Pay envelopes are a big part of the budget. If that can be credibly reduced (or switched to equipment procurement) it becomes a no-brainer for politicians while being looked at as a poison pill for our RegF leadership. This is why I keep drumming on heavy and esoteric forces, like artillery and tanks, as perfect for reserves because they are a force that does not need to be there day-to-day but only in an emergency. Light forces which can rapidly deploy and do a wide variety of tasks and have very special skills, on the other hand, you need to fill with full-timers.
This is why you need to fire all Class Bs or, at the very least account and pay for them against RegF full-time salaries. The ResF is by definition Class A once they complete their initial training.
Going back to my basic original assertion that major equipment is more difficult and takes longer to acquire than trained personnel and based on my belief that the Army will not be provided the money required for both increased ongoing structural costs AND increased equipment purchases, then to my mind the logical choice is to spend any available money up front on additonal equipment and then train the required personnel when required.
Cynical? Yes. But unfortunately likely also realistic.
The very first step is to define what you want your army to be capable of doing. Once you set those parameters you can define what risk you are prepared to accept in having a portion of that force part-time. That then moves on to a risk mitigation assessment of what training and equipment is needed to a) form the force and b) sustain the force and c) employ the force. We need to look less at will a LAV fit through an armoury door and more at when and where will we need to use a LAV some day and what can we do to get it there at the least all-in system cost. When life-cycle cost is factored into an "extreme circumstance" usage construct then ResF manning has to be seriously considered. When the life-cycle cost is for a capability that needs to be there ready to go at all times then ResF manning becomes a only limited possibility and the probable conclusion is it needs to be a full-time manning.
Let me add in one final comment on maintainers. The Army has royally screwed the logistics system over the years. Canada has bought ever more complex equipment and has kept the logistics system to support that on a shoe string. Do reservists have a role in fixing that. I think yes they do but not to look after equipment on a part-time basis. I'm a big fan of community colleges and apprentice ship programs for technical trades. If I were king, here's what I would do with ResF maintainers.
1. on recruiting run them through a recruit and basic Army field craft course during their first summer.
2. the first winter pay their tuition at a community college to take a basic mechanics course while they do one weekend per month to earn a bit of cash, keep tied to the military and improve some general military skills.
3. the second summer run them through a 3-4 month DP1 conversion course that builds on what they learned in community college, applies it to basic military wheeled vehicles and gives them summer's full of pay.
4. the second winter pay their tuition for an advanced diesel mechanics program while they do one weekend a month to keep their general military skills up and keep them connected with their unit;
5. the third summer run them through a 3-4 month DP2 conversion course that builds on what they learned at community college and applies it to heavy military vehicles and again gives them a summer's full of pay.
6. the third winter put them on a one year Class B contract to work as apprentice mechanics at various base workshops in their local region to maintain existing equipment under supervision so as to gain experience, earn money, create a resume of value on the civilian market, and to provide a labour force to repair vehicles needing servicing.
7. keep them on a two to three year ResF obligatory service contract with a ResF unit on a one weekend a month two weeks a year basis so as to be able to surge trained and experienced mechanics in an emergency. Thereafter offer them a bonus for further service contracts with obligatory service.
There are numerous trades we can do that with from cooks to health care professionals. It's an easy sell to politicians because not only do we build a strong part time force that can be surged in an emergency but we also provide opportunities for young people to learn a civilian transferable trade. The point is that one needs to see the value in creating a pool of stand-by folks for emergencies rather than ones to fluff out the already bloated full-time administrative structure that seems to be the military's raison d'etre for reservists.