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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

Thanks again. For the little its worth I like that lot.
Given the above, in a mobilization scenario would the reserve mech coy's be for sustainment/ replenishment or to round out the deployed Bn's to current doctrinal (3 coy) strength?

And how would you see readiness / roto's to Latvia shaking out with a base 4 rather than a base 6? 2BG has 3 phase intra bde mrp to keep a ready bn, do the 2 mech bde's truncate to 2 phase?
I would see the 2 Bde light Bns rotating a ready Bn group in a three phase program.

1 and 5 would have a mechanized Bg “up” and fully manned for contingency operations. It’s be a three Coy Bn with the 3rd company being a skeleton crew filled by reserve members when it’s that Bns turn. So in practice the two Mechanized Bdes swap annually to provide the ready BG and the relieved Bg begins a reconstitution process until its turn again. The Armoured Sqns will in practice be deployed alongside a given Bn but at grouped to allow a) for better training / administration in garrison and b) to allow them to mass for shock action.

The Reserve Bns can be stood up as required, in my head they are made up of a new program that sees reservists volunteer to be on a higher readiness category that comes with probably some more pay, guarantees of kit and training, and the requirement to show up when called. I’d see it as a “half pay” vs some weekends and Thursdays type deal. Obstacles exist there of course, and we’ll likely see an end to the idea that you wear one cap badge your whole career.
 
Perhaps time to utilize Suffield for our own training? Im sure we can still help out our Brit cousins....
 
Perhaps time to utilize Suffield for our own training? Im sure we can still help out our Brit cousins....
 
Perhaps time to utilize Suffield for our own training? Im sure we can still help out our Brit cousins....
We already do training in Suffield. Frankly I’ve never seen much difference beyond one has trees and the other is Suffield. Kidding aside I don’t know what benefit is held by training in Suffield ?
 
We already do training in Suffield. Frankly I’ve never seen much difference beyond one has trees and the other is Suffield. Kidding aside I don’t know what benefit is held by training in Suffield ?
Larger training area… the Wx template for 25mm is fairly restrictive, and I’m curious how Pet and Valcatraz do for that, as I still have my impact area maps for Pet, and there isn’t a lot of room to do much there live with 25mm

Honestly the CAF needs better trg areas - but there is so much other work that needs to be done, that is a relatively low priority
 
I would see the 2 Bde light Bns rotating a ready Bn group in a three phase program.

1 and 5 would have a mechanized Bg “up” and fully manned for contingency operations. It’s be a three Coy Bn with the 3rd company being a skeleton crew filled by reserve members when it’s that Bns turn. So in practice the two Mechanized Bdes swap annually to provide the ready BG and the relieved Bg begins a reconstitution process until its turn again. The Armoured Sqns will in practice be deployed alongside a given Bn but at grouped to allow a) for better training / administration in garrison and b) to allow them to mass for shock action.

The Reserve Bns can be stood up as required, in my head they are made up of a new program that sees reservists volunteer to be on a higher readiness category that comes with probably some more pay, guarantees of kit and training, and the requirement to show up when called. I’d see it as a “half pay” vs some weekends and Thursdays type deal. Obstacles exist there of course, and we’ll likely see an end to the idea that you wear one cap badge your whole career.

The only way this would work, I think, is if you put the Reservists on Class B/C status. You couldn't operate a system like this with Class A soldiers except during a two week summer training period of some sort.
 
The only way this would work, I think, is if you put the Reservists on Class B/C status. You couldn't operate a system like this with Class A soldiers except during a two week summer training period of some sort.
No I agree and that’s why I said you’d need essentially a new class of service to ensure some kind of dependable return.


Larger training area… the Wx template for 25mm is fairly restrictive, and I’m curious how Pet and Valcatraz do for that, as I still have my impact area maps for Pet, and there isn’t a lot of room to do much there live with 25mm

The PDA is enough for most of our combat team live attacks, I know I’ve done BG live there as well but I’m not sure what the restrictions were (which probably means they were wide enough to be transparent) but I see your point.

Honestly the CAF needs better trg areas - but there is so much other work that needs to be done, that is a relatively low priority

I’d kill for an environment like Smoky Hills for a bombing range. Unfortunately all our training areas in the boreal forest make any kind of maneuver or observation impossible.
 
USMC getting around to focusing on their logistics


“To succeed on tomorrow’s battlefields, we will need a logistics enterprise fully integrated with the broader objectives of [Force Design 2030], capable of supporting multi-domain and distributed operations in contested environments,” it reads. “Currently, our logistical capabilities are under-resourced and do not meet the demands of our future force to succeed on future battlefields.”

The report cites several ongoing challenges: the Corps wants to increasingly rely on stand-in forces, or small units who are always present in contested areas; the service needs to figure out how those forces can be sustained across vast distances and long amounts of time, especially as tensions rise and fall.

New weapons programs aren’t always designed with sustainment in mind, but the service does not have the authority today to fix that through ideas like 3D printing repair parts at the point of need.

And the service has increasingly relied on technical experts in industry to repair advanced avionics and other parts, but the Marines cannot rely on these contractors to be on hand during a conflict; Marines must be able to repair their own platforms while operating forward.

“To achieve resilient logistics networks, we need to view and understand our logistics resources differently than we have in the past. We will need tools to help commanders visualize logistics resources in space and time across the [joint logistics environment]. This will give us the ability to provide sustainment and distribution options based on threat, inventory position, and protection requirements,” the report reads.

To do that, the Marines and the joint force will need to invest in sensors to predict the demand for parts and to ensure a proper understanding of the inventory. Data will drive logistics decisions, and this data will have to be available up and down the chain of command while being protected from hacking by adversaries. The system will also need alternate ways to communicate needs and move goods into theater, in case the system or the supply routes are disrupted.

To get after these issues, three deputy commandants — for Installations and Logistics, Combat Development and Integration, and Information — will “refine requirements for a logistics information technology system” that can allow for conditions-based maintenance and generate readiness data and ownership-cost estimates.



A second objective is to diversify how supplies are moved.

Noting the Marines and the joint force typically move goods by land and by air, the report states “We will advance from a predominately ground-based, manned and crewed, wheeled-vehicle fleet to a mix of crewed and uncrewed, manned and unmanned, air, surface, subsurface, and ground capabilities with variable payloads and ranges that can be owned, leased, or contracted based on the situation.”

This will include some small unmanned systems that could deliver lightweight goods to contested areas, and the drones will be cheap enough that it won’t matter much if some are shot down.
Presumably this means that excess goods will be supplied to contested areas to compensate for those lost when they are shot down.

A combat logistics battalion at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, sent several Marines to get licensed to pilot a variety of types of boats — the thinking being that some islands in the Pacific do not have roads that can support heavy trucks to move goods around, and those goods may need to be moved from one part of the shoreline to another via small boats.

Those Marines took their new skills to Europe, where they were able to use boats for a resupply mission in a real operating environment.
Marines driving boats instead of trucks..... modern marvels.


And this

A third objective calls for the Marines to “improve sustainment.” It notes the Marines today rely on “a linear logistics and supply chain, requiring large warehousing and trans-shipment nodes to break down, consolidate, and repackage shipments for delivery to the end user.”

Though Marine formations are designed to self-sustain for some period of time, they eventually do need to be resupplied; that supply system was long ago designed for efficiency over effectiveness and is now “vulnerable,” the report states.
 
Cyber security issues

 
The only way this would work, I think, is if you put the Reservists on Class B/C status. You couldn't operate a system like this with Class A soldiers except during a two week summer training period of some sort.
You just knew I'd jump on that, didn't you?

Reservists on Class B and C are in effect RegF on a form of continuing, full-time service. That defeats the concept of reservists entirely.

No I agree and that’s why I said you’d need essentially a new class of service to ensure some kind of dependable return.
We're essentially facing two issues. How much initial training is needed to create a proficient soldier? How much recurring training is needed to maintain the proficiency?

Both can be dealt with under the current Reserve Force system. The problem arrives when the recurring training is too much for the avergae civilian reservist to mange and still have a life causing them to quit.

Let's be clear. If there is a capability that can be maintained by a stand-by force with good initial training and minimal recurring training then they can be reservists.

If what you want is a standing full-time battalion of constantly rotating reservists then you might as well stand up the PYs for an extra RegF battalion and just shelve the reservist idea.

Both the RegF and the ResF are valid concepts within their own areas. Our problem is we don't have a good ResF system and we try to push the PY envelopes by employing them as full-timers on an indefinite period.

Thus endeth lesson 593.

🍻
 
They were Bisons and the Calgary Highlanders had them. They lived in our compound with the rest of our unit vehicles.
Then the Cal High was an absolute anomaly, as they were never supposed to have been released to units. In Ontario Bisons were held in Borden, Meaford, and Pet, and by RV 91 most had already been stolen for Reg Bde HQ’s and the rest followed shortly after.
I didn’t get to Calgary till 95, and we closed shop there in 97, and the Cal High lot had nothing then, as even the AVGP’s were stored at Currie then.
 
You just knew I'd jump on that, didn't you?

Reservists on Class B and C are in effect RegF on a form of continuing, full-time service. That defeats the concept of reservists entirely.


We're essentially facing two issues. How much initial training is needed to create a proficient soldier? How much recurring training is needed to maintain the proficiency?

Both can be dealt with under the current Reserve Force system. The problem arrives when the recurring training is too much for the avergae civilian reservist to mange and still have a life causing them to quit.

Let's be clear. If there is a capability that can be maintained by a stand-by force with good initial training and minimal recurring training then they can be reservists.

If what you want is a standing full-time battalion of constantly rotating reservists then you might as well stand up the PYs for an extra RegF battalion and just shelve the reservist idea.

Both the RegF and the ResF are valid concepts within their own areas. Our problem is we don't have a good ResF system and we try to push the PY envelopes by employing them as full-timers on an indefinite period.

Thus endeth lesson 593.

🍻
More and more I'm beginning to think that our Canadian political culture, the geographic dispersion of our population and the location of our Reg Force infrastructure away from our population centers/Reservists makes the US National Guard model a poor one for the Canadian Army Reserves. There are too many obstacles to overcome to try and recreate the system they have here.

I'm also beginning to question whether hybrid units like 70/30 or 30/70 formations are practically achievable as well. Is the limited training time available to Reservists, the distance to suitable training areas and the difficulty of maintaining complex vehicles/equipment too much of an obstacle to creating actual units that can be activated as a deployable entity when required.

I'm wondering if instead an achievable goal for the Army Reserve would be to create a large pool of personnel that are trained at a basic trade level that can be called upon to man units that are stood up as required in a crisis.

The Reg Force would provide the Roto 0 forces and would also be responsible for holding and maintaining an expanded fleet of vehicles/weapons that would be used to equip the expanded force (something like the Korean War Special Force). The Reg Force could also man the HQ elements of the expected expansion units but they would just be "skeleton" formations...HQ only with the personnel to be filled out by activated Reservists only during a crisis. This would maintain a pool of qualified senior leaders for the units.

A system like this would require the Reg Force to expand the number of technical trades personnel to cover the additional maintenance requirements of the larger vehicle fleets (but only a portion of the fleet would have to be in active use by the Reg Force at any time...the rest maintained in high-readiness storage). There should also be increased training capacity built into the system with training depots close to the major population centers in order to expand the Reserve force and train them at basic trade levels.

In a major conflict the Reg Force would deploy as the Roto 0 force. The expanded training infrastructure would take in the activated Reservists and begin their work-up and train them in the more technical skills required for operating the vehicles/weapons they will use (their basic Reserve training could cover the concepts and expose them to the equipment but they wouldn't be expected to maintain ongoing currency during their Class A service). They would then be organized into the new units under the existing Reg Force leadership for Roto 1.

The main difference between this system and the current/proposed systems would be that Class A Reservists would not be expected to be trained identically to their Reg Force counterparts as the time/infrastructure/equipment doesn't exist for them to reliably achieve and maintain ongoing currency with those skills. As a result there would have to be a practical limit to the rank that a Class A Reservist would be able to achieve. Reserve units wouldn't be seen as deployable units/sub-units in themselves, but rather as training pools for partially trained soldiers that can be brought up to speed fairly rapidly in a crisis.

I'm sure there are lots of holes in this idea, but it's just an initial thought on how we could possibly look at the idea of force expansion in a crisis in a different way than we do now.
 
More and more I'm beginning to think that our Canadian political culture, the geographic dispersion of our population and the location of our Reg Force infrastructure away from our population centers/Reservists makes the US National Guard model a poor one for the Canadian Army Reserves. There are too many obstacles to overcome to try and recreate the system they have here.
Actually it would be an easy system to recreate - but it requires legislation, and willingness to make hard decisions and a lot of money.
I'm also beginning to question whether hybrid units like 70/30 or 30/70 formations are practically achievable as well. Is the limited training time available to Reservists, the distance to suitable training areas and the difficulty of maintaining complex vehicles/equipment too much of an obstacle to creating actual units that can be activated as a deployable entity when required.
30/70, and 70/30 should be really easy.
It would require again an honest look at what is needed and where things are practical though.

I'm wondering if instead an achievable goal for the Army Reserve would be to create a large pool of personnel that are trained at a basic trade level that can be called upon to man units that are stood up as required in a crisis.
So basically nothing that could not be done from Ground Zero mobilization anyway?

The Reg Force would provide the Roto 0 forces and would also be responsible for holding and maintaining an expanded fleet of vehicles/weapons that would be used to equip the expanded force (something like the Korean War Special Force). The Reg Force could also man the HQ elements of the expected expansion units but they would just be "skeleton" formations...HQ only with the personnel to be filled out by activated Reservists only during a crisis. This would maintain a pool of qualified senior leaders for the units.
Not seeing the difference other than adding an extra month of training from a Day 0 Mobilization.
A system like this would require the Reg Force to expand the number of technical trades personnel to cover the additional maintenance requirements of the larger vehicle fleets (but only a portion of the fleet would have to be in active use by the Reg Force at any time...the rest maintained in high-readiness storage). There should also be increased training capacity built into the system with training depots close to the major population centers in order to expand the Reserve force and train them at basic trade levels.
The Reg Force doesn’t even have the kit it needs, Nor the personnel.
A scarcely trained PRes won’t get anything, I joined in 1987 and got issued 1951 webbing - that sort of situation is FUBAR.

In a major conflict the Reg Force would deploy as the Roto 0 force. The expanded training infrastructure would take in the activated Reservists and begin their work-up and train them in the more technical skills required for operating the vehicles/weapons they will use (their basic Reserve training could cover the concepts and expose them to the equipment but they wouldn't be expected to maintain ongoing currency during their Class A service). They would then be organized into the new units under the existing Reg Force leadership for Roto 1.

The main difference between this system and the current/proposed systems would be that Class A Reservists would not be expected to be trained identically to their Reg Force counterparts as the time/infrastructure/equipment doesn't exist for them to reliably achieve and maintain ongoing currency with those skills. As a result there would have to be a practical limit to the rank that a Class A Reservist would be able to achieve. Reserve units wouldn't be seen as deployable units/sub-units in themselves, but rather as training pools for partially trained soldiers that can be brought up to speed fairly rapidly in a crisis.

I'm sure there are lots of holes in this idea, but it's just an initial thought on how we could possibly look at the idea of force expansion in a crisis in a different way than we do now.
Canada can’t expand in crisis, it doesn’t have the resources to build equipment for what its current needs are.
The more you look into the situation, the more the situation in Canada is absolutely catastrophic.
 
You just knew I'd jump on that, didn't you?

Reservists on Class B and C are in effect RegF on a form of continuing, full-time service. That defeats the concept of reservists entirely.


We're essentially facing two issues. How much initial training is needed to create a proficient soldier? How much recurring training is needed to maintain the proficiency?

Both can be dealt with under the current Reserve Force system. The problem arrives when the recurring training is too much for the avergae civilian reservist to mange and still have a life causing them to quit.

Let's be clear. If there is a capability that can be maintained by a stand-by force with good initial training and minimal recurring training then they can be reservists.

If what you want is a standing full-time battalion of constantly rotating reservists then you might as well stand up the PYs for an extra RegF battalion and just shelve the reservist idea.

Both the RegF and the ResF are valid concepts within their own areas. Our problem is we don't have a good ResF system and we try to push the PY envelopes by employing them as full-timers on an indefinite period.

Thus endeth lesson 593.

🍻
I want reserve Bns as the Bde depth, I think we need three infantry Bns in a Bde still, that they need to be able to move, and that light Bns serve a purpose outside that. A reserve Bn inside a Bde gives them a role, a job, and makes them matter to the field force. All that being said while I agree with your legal appraisal we need a method of ensuring force generation from that reserve pool for those reserve Bns inside the Bde, and the reserve companies inside a Bn. Otherwise we’re just cutting PYs and praying some one shows up.
 
It took the US Army 30 months to build a new Reg force IBCT from scratch during the GWOT.

How long would the Canadian Army take is a interesting question that the Canadian Army should be fascinated with both in terms of using our reserves as well as right from the street with only a small Reg force core.
 
Then the Cal High was an absolute anomaly, as they were never supposed to have been released to units. In Ontario Bisons were held in Borden, Meaford, and Pet, and by RV 91 most had already been stolen for Reg Bde HQ’s and the rest followed shortly after.
I didn’t get to Calgary till 95, and we closed shop there in 97, and the Cal High lot had nothing then, as even the AVGP’s were stored at Currie then.
Around that time the CAF was playing musical vehicles. In 2VP 1995 we re-rolled into Grizzly from M113 for UNPROFOR, tour cancelled, re-rolled back to tracks, re-rolled again for NATO I/SFOR into Grizzly the fall of 1996 (again). I seem to remember Bisons getting very heavily commandeered by that point. And many reservist attached to us for tour complaining about it.
 
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To be realistic and looking at P Res Infantry. The two different (and achievable) main tasks/goals/get 'er dones are
-Platoon and Company level augmentation for reg f battalions
-Force protection companies for Service battalions and the RCAF airfields/Hel squadrons

IF I was grandmaster emporer of this shitshow, and given a just a little extra change for defence, I would invest it into growing Reg F and P Res infantry. Its kind of the cheapest and quickest option.

For any other sort of serious growth, we need a serious sit down and "lets talk, Canada" (about defence matters not suicide)
 
It took the US Army 30 months to build a new Reg force IBCT from scratch during the GWOT.

How long would the Canadian Army take is a interesting question that the Canadian Army should be fascinated with both in terms of using our reserves as well as right from the street with only a small Reg force core.
We’ll never know now that Force 2025 is dead.

To be realistic and looking at P Res Infantry. The two different (and achievable) main tasks/goals/get 'er dones are
-Platoon and Company level augmentation for reg f battalions
-Force protection companies for Service battalions and the RCAF airfields/Hel squadrons

IF I was grandmaster emporer of this shitshow, and given a just a little extra change for defence, I would invest it into growing Reg F and P Res infantry. Its kind of the cheapest and quickest option.

For any other sort of serious growth, we need a serious sit down and "lets talk, Canada" (about defence matters not suicide)

The problem is we don’t have enough PYs to man our existing Bns and training establishments. Force 2025 for all its flaws was going to see one company per each Bn be a skeleton crew to be filled by reservists as needed. I don’t hate that idea. Use the saved PYs to fill out combat support, and the rifle companies.

I don’t disagree with your security task asssessment either. In my great restructure I’d have a Reserve Bn in each CBG to act as depth / fill all those tasks.
 
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