Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

And I'm trying to tell you that no matter how you break them apart all that coordination has to happen.

As for EM signals - if I put all those nodes in one place the interall data interchange can be by fibre optics, handwritten notes or voice. None of which generate EM signals.

On the other hand if I put each of those desks in a separate vehicle then all comms are via RF signals. Which creates a very large EM foot print. And makes them all susceptible to jamming.

 

[markppcli]

And I'm trying to tell you that no matter how you break them apart all that coordination has to happen.

As for EM signals - if I put all those nodes in one place the interall data interchange can be by fibre optics, handwritten notes or voice. None of which generate EM signals.

On the other hand if I put each of those desks in a separate vehicle then all comms are via RF signals. Which creates a very large EM foot print. And makes them all susceptible to jamming.

Not really. Because they’re all managing different nets. You end up with a ton of emitters in one place, usually co located with the more power radio suits the Bde has. We’re trying to break them up for a reason.

 

[FJAG]

There's a lot of face-to-face and pointing at screens that happens between the COS/CHOPS/G3 and FSCCO/TACPO/ASCCO when things get kinetic. A lot of the other folks that have migrated their way into command posts can be at the end of a wire.

 

[rmc_wannabe]

Well you said and FSCC which is a specific thing. The giant tent filled with screens we got used to in Afghanistan is sub optimal in an EW environment.

While I realize the difference may not be apparent to quote an old instructor of mine “these words have meanings and they matter.”

We have been trying to break folks if this habit for 20 years. When the Bde HQ takes 4 additional 53 footers to have a full set up, there's a problem.

I think a lot of the Afghan TTPs need to hit the bin and the concept of Bde Main, Bde Fwd, and the Bde Alt need to "small, mobile, austere, wireless"

Not really. Because they’re all managing different nets. You end up with a ton of emitters in one place, usually co located with the more power radio suits the Bde has. We’re trying to break them up for a reason.

This is why I have always fought against the reliance of VHF over long distances. Especially for tasks that are very data intensive. If we had actually developed a solid grasp of UHF SATCOM and directional mircowave (not just HCLOS) , the risk is furthrt mitigated because it's like trying to find a needle in a stack of needles.

Instead, we get to play RRB roulette with multiple voice nets that should be really be minimal with a more reliable data backbone.

But alas, I am given my directives the same as everyone else.

 

[GK .Dundas]

We have been trying to break folks if this habit for 20 years. When the Bde HQ takes 4 additional 53 footers to have a full set up, there's a problem.

I think a lot of the Afghan TTPs need to hit the bin and the concept of Bde Main, Bde Fwd, and the Bde Alt need to "small, mobile, austere, wireless"

This is why I have always fought against the reliance of VHF over long distances. Especially for tasks that are very data intensive. If we had actually developed a solid grasp of UHF SATCOM and directional mircowave (not just HCLOS) , the risk is furthrt mitigated because it's like trying to find a needle in a stack of needles.

Instead, we get to play RRB roulette with multiple voice nets that should be really be minimal with a more reliable data backbone.

But alas, I am given my directives the same as everyone else.

In the 1970s I was told you could if need be run a brigade from a couple of 5/4 tons.....progress?

 

[rmc_wannabe]

In the 1970s I was told you could if need be run a brigade from a couple of 5/4 tons.....progress?

I mean... you still could. Just without a lot of the ISTAR and Joint Fires capabilites we have come to know and love; and a hell of a lot more Mission Command.

IMHO, providing the nodes and networks needed in the modern digital battlespace means higher performing, smaller form factor data comms. That is very quickly on the horizon.

Once you add AD, MLRS, and other automated systems, they're no longer an optional item. The Blitzkrieg of the 21st century is Information/Targeting/Data Sharing. He who closes the OODA loop first, gets rounds on target faster and lives to fight another day.

A couple of dudes coordinating a Bde's worth of effects over VHF with mapboards and log books are no match for automated/integrated data processing.

And it's because of this that the quote in my signature comes to mind when I seeth with rage when Commanders throw the "fuck it, we'll go old school... the computer is more volatile than pen and paper" attitude around in the OPP. Your new mission requirement is ensuring thar system is up and running at 100 percent near 24/7/365, and if it's not, that should be treated with the same crisis reaction as a Bty going combat Ineffective or a Pl worth of LAVs being VOR.

 

[Kirkhill]

So what we need to look for after this kerfuffle in Ukraine is the balance between the enthusiasts of the early days and the mission command system forced on the Ukrainian staff by necessity, and the later data rich war of precision fires and coordinated air defence?

 

[rmc_wannabe]

So what we need to look for after this kerfuffle in Ukraine is the balance between the enthusiasts of the early days and the mission command system forced on the Ukrainian staff by necessity, and the later data rich war of precision fires and coordinated air defence?

Bingo.

This is already being achieved quite brilliantly by the UGF by the use of Adaptive Dispersed Operations in small autonomous forces that are interlinking with higher C4ISR capabilities because of it.

Being able to have Rifleman #2 or Drone Operator #4 take a picture of the target, get PID and coordinates for a strike; all sent via MMS to the FSCC equivalent... you have a dispersed Pl or Coy element gertting Fires on in tens of seconds, vice tens of minutes.

It would be hell to fight that kind of enemy. It's like having a swarm of bees that can all swing a sledgehammer at you.

 

[IKnowNothing]

Bringing the national comparisons here rather than a further derail of the Reserve thread @markppcli @ueo
Mark, don't want to get lost in the weeds of individual vehicle superiority- it goes without saying that barring major design flaws a 28 tonne cannon armed IFV is more desirable than a 14 tonne APC. But what I was driving at wasn't which is better on the micro scale- it was what allocations are feasible, make for better overall army, etc.

To expand, I'm going to focus on the UK comparability, and look at combat arms units rather than vehicle counts, though certain CS items I'll keep to counts. This is not going to account potential differences in overall defense allocations between Army, Navy, Air Force, Regular and Reserve. Our UK GDP multiple is .64, % spend multiple is .60, therefore the controlled for budget expectation is .38


Which translates to
In GDP terms Canada should be expected to field a light 2/3rds the force of the UK, due to budget constraints the CAF shouldn't be expected to do more than a heavy 1/3rd.

UK	UK Actual	UK->CAN GDP Equiv	UK-> CAN Spend Controlled	CAN Actual
Tank Regiment (MBT)	3	2	1	1
Armoured Cavalry Regiment	3	2	1	1 (assume LRSS concentrated)
Light Armoured Cavalry Regiment	3	2	1	1 (pretend TAPV works)
Armoured Inf Bn's (IFV)	6	4	2	6
Mech Inf Bn's (20+ Tonne APC)	3	2	1	0
Light Mech Inf Bn's (7.5 tonne)	6	4	2	0
Light & Para Inf Bn's	14	9	5.3	3
Artillery - SP 155's /Towed 105's/Rocket (pieces)	90/100/50	60/66/34	30/33/17	37 towed 155, 28 towed 105
AD (H SP / L SP/ Stationary)	60/100/24	40/66/16	20/33/8	NA
Attack Helicopters	66	44	22	NA

Other discrepancies- TOW+ M3 CG84 vs Javelin + NLAW, man portable starstreak vs nothing

My first thought is that model holds up surprising well in terms of surface level outputs. RCAC tracks well (Leo serviciability and TAPV lemon issues aside), total number of Inf Bn's not far off, our 9 vs a projected 10, tube artillery #'s are close (albeit with our towed vs their SP 155's.

Biggest differences,
we have the inverse weighting of Armoured/ Mech to Light Mech/Light/Para,
we have no Rocket artillery, GBAD, Attack Helicopters, completely inferior anti-armour capability

To which I raise the question(s)-
to what extent are they linked- do those tradeoffs in acquisition, infrastructure, and operating costs actually line up, or is this all coincidence?
if there is some basis in reality- would you go back and remake the CA with balance/weight of the UK army (with or without some tweaking) to regain those capabilities?

And offer the opinion/ apology- assuming there is any merit at all to those numbers and the tradeoffs, I think that I and others have been overly critical of the CA and it's ability to deliver value. We may be G7, but we're both significantly smaller and significantly underfunded compared to "peers", and when both are accounted for it becomes apparent that shortfalls might be more about internal allocations/decision making than actual raw product.

 

[Spencer100]

And here is that CIC graphic from the RCN's Type 26 that I was looking for. Change the colour of the wooly pullies and it could be an RRCA FSCC

not even built yet and it looks old
Korean KDDX CIC

Japanese future CIC

 

[Kirkhill]

Bingo.

This is already being achieved quite brilliantly by the UGF by the use of Adaptive Dispersed Operations in small autonomous forces that are interlinking with higher C4ISR capabilities because of it.

Being able to have Rifleman #2 or Drone Operator #4 take a picture of the target, get PID and coordinates for a strike; all sent via MMS to the FSCC equivalent... you have a dispersed Pl or Coy element gertting Fires on in tens of seconds, vice tens of minutes.

It would be hell to fight that kind of enemy. It's like having a swarm of bees that can all swing a sledgehammer at you.

Static vs Mobile

1 Would it be reasonable to suggest that the Ukrainian General Staff is working from a fixed location.? Likewise the Regional and Operational commands? The Bakhmut sector?

1a Further would it be reasonable to suggest that those static positions, like power plants, cities, factories and hospitals need to defended? And that that defence, currently, is based on high technology CRAM/GBAD/AirDef systems?

2 In the early days of the Kyiv invasion the Ukrainians breached a dam that resulted in fields being inundated and denied Russians the opportunity to manoeuvre.

2a Concurrently the Ukrainians flooded the zone with independent small units, lightly but effectively armed, that could observe and communicate. Those territorials and special forces advanced like water, taking the paths of least resistance and inundating the fields and villages around the lines of communication denying the Russians the opportunity to manoeuvre

3 Those dispersed small units not only hindered manoeuvre but they functioned as part of the ISR community and the Info Ops community.

3a As part of the ISR community they identified targets and relayed opportunities for Ukrainian manoeuvre

3b As part of the Info Ops community they maintained contact with their natural allies, the residents of Ukraine.



I've heard the analogy before, wrt Vietnam, Afghanistan, Northern Ireland of fish swimming in the sea. The fish are the combatants. The sea is supposedly neutral. But it is possible to make the sea work for you. And that, it seems to me, is the benefit of the Special Forces, the Light Forces and the Territorial Forces. They supply the gameboard, the setting, the battlefield.


Beyond those elements there are the pieces on the board. Those elements that contest with each other for the win. The kinetic elements.
It seems to me that those elements range from Air and Artillery strikes, through small unit raids to brigade groups committed en masse to broad offensives or to rapid counter-strikes. In that sense the Brigade Group is more like a very large and very slow moving artillery round. Best held in reserve and used as an entity to deliver a short, sharp shock and then recovered to reset before doing it again.

And no, this isn't new stuff. This is me thinking aloud and trying to catch up.

 

[KevinB]

Static vs Mobile

1 Would it be reasonable to suggest that the Ukrainian General Staff is working from a fixed location.? Likewise the Regional and Operational commands? The Bakhmut sector?

Defense versus the requirements of an Expeditionary Force.

1a Further would it be reasonable to suggest that those static positions, like power plants, cities, factories and hospitals need to defended? And that that defence, currently, is based on high technology CRAM/GBAD/AirDef systems?

Yes but see my point above. Not significantly relevant for Canada outside NORAD facilities.

2 In the early days of the Kyiv invasion the Ukrainians breached a dam that resulted in fields being inundated and denied Russians the opportunity to manoeuvre.

2a Concurrently the Ukrainians flooded the zone with independent small units, lightly but effectively armed, that could observe and communicate. Those territorials and special forces advanced like water, taking the paths of least resistance and inundating the fields and villages around the lines of communication denying the Russians the opportunity to manoeuvre

3 Those dispersed small units not only hindered manoeuvre but they functioned as part of the ISR community and the Info Ops community.

3a As part of the ISR community they identified targets and relayed opportunities for Ukrainian manoeuvre

3b As part of the Info Ops community they maintained contact with their natural allies, the residents of Ukraine.



I've heard the analogy before, wrt Vietnam, Afghanistan, Northern Ireland of fish swimming in the sea. The fish are the combatants. The sea is supposedly neutral. But it is possible to make the sea work for you. And that, it seems to me, is the benefit of the Special Forces, the Light Forces and the Territorial Forces. They supply the gameboard, the setting, the battlefield.


Beyond those elements there are the pieces on the board. Those elements that contest with each other for the win. The kinetic elements.
It seems to me that those elements range from Air and Artillery strikes, through small unit raids to brigade groups committed en masse to broad offensives or to rapid counter-strikes. In that sense the Brigade Group is more like a very large and very slow moving artillery round. Best held in reserve and used as an entity to deliver a short, sharp shock and then recovered to reset before doing it again.

And no, this isn't new stuff. This is me thinking aloud and trying to catch up.

One of the issues with Ukraine versus more recent NATO countries experiences, is that Ukraine is fighting an incursion into their territory. When you are on home turf you can exploit some aspects of that, more than one can if one is operating in another country.

The SOF/Partisan aspect is similar to how 10th Group was expected to operate if Russia came over the wall. Small teams training partisans also doing their own layback missions.
*pre CANSOF the layback missions we’re also Cdn Infantry tasks

I’m not discounting the ability of SOF or Light Forces in an Expeditionary setting at all, but with the understanding that freedom of maneuvering may be significantly impacted.

 

[Kirkhill]

Defense versus the requirements of an Expeditionary Force.

The Canadian Armed Forces of the Department of National Defence requires an Expeditionary Force. But it's first duty is to defend the nation. No matter how distant and inconsequential the threat to the nation may seem. The Expeditionary Force is a nice to have political piece that buys us the proverbial seat at the table.

Yes but see my point above. Not significantly relevant for Canada outside NORAD facilities.

So therefore Canada's first priority in National Defence should be NORAD compatible assets - Surveillance, Air Defence, GBAD, Rangers, All weather Lt Rapid Response troops.

I would love to see a riverine version of Operation Nanook, annually connecting the Arctic with the interior using shallow draft seaworthy boats in conjunction with helicopters, rangers and light troops.

Eg the MacKenzie from Tuktoyaktuk to Fort McMurray, maybe even Hinton. the Saskatchewan from Churchill to Edmonton, the Red from Churchill to Winnipeg, the St Lawrence from Newfoundland to Thunder Bay and possibly Manitoba. Showing the flag, info ops, sovereignty patrols are all part of winning wars -as the Ukrainians demonstrate.

One of the issues with Ukraine versus more recent NATO countries experiences, is that Ukraine is fighting an incursion into their territory. When you are on home turf you can exploit some aspects of that, more than one can if one is operating in another country.

Agreed. We have the luxury of preparing to prevent such an incursion. We can make the prospect unattractive.

As to the difference between "home" and "away" games: perhaps that needs to be a key consideration when the Canadian Government decides to take on an "away" mission. Will the locals treat us like an "away" team or a "home" team? If we are not being treated like a "home" team do we want to be there.

The SOF/Partisan aspect is similar to how 10th Group was expected to operate if Russia came over the wall. Small teams training partisans also doing their own layback missions.

That skill set, capability, is one that should be maintained at home as well as practiced overseas.

*pre CANSOF the layback missions we’re also Cdn Infantry tasks

I think there is a difference between planned layback missions and making the best of a bad situation after your line has been penetrated, you have been surrounded and now find yourself in the rear of the enemy.

I’m not discounting the ability of SOF or Light Forces in an Expeditionary setting at all, but with the understanding that freedom of maneuvering may be significantly impacted.

Light Forces will only be able to manoeuvre locally around fixed positions. 10km or so at a stretch. 50 or so if they are light motorized.

I anticipate that Light Forces would move strategically to establish operational bases in areas where they are unopposed - either because there is nobody there at all or because the locals want them to be there.

Heavy forces are going to be necessary if there is opposition. No doubt. But - two questions - how many attacks are really feasible and how far from each operating base can you exploit on tracks?

 

[KevinB]

The Canadian Armed Forces of the Department of National Defence requires an Expeditionary Force. But it's first duty is to defend the nation. No matter how distant and inconsequential the threat to the nation may seem. The Expeditionary Force is a nice to have political piece that buys us the proverbial seat at the table.

Any Expeditionary Force, can also be used Domestically...

So therefore Canada's first priority in National Defence should be NORAD compatible assets - Surveillance, Air Defence, GBAD, Rangers, All weather Lt Rapid Response troops.

I think the Rangers would need a major reconstruction before I would consider them anything other than a presence.

I would love to see a riverine version of Operation Nanook, annually connecting the Arctic with the interior using shallow draft seaworthy boats in conjunction with helicopters, rangers and light troops.

No disagreement here.

Eg the MacKenzie from Tuktoyaktuk to Fort McMurray, maybe even Hinton. the Saskatchewan from Churchill to Edmonton, the Red from Churchill to Winnipeg, the St Lawrence from Newfoundland to Thunder Bay and possibly Manitoba. Showing the flag, info ops, sovereignty patrols are all part of winning wars -as the Ukrainians demonstrate.

All what could be done with well equipped Expeditionary Forces...

Agreed. We have the luxury of preparing to prevent such an incursion. We can make the prospect unattractive.

Visit Russia, before Russia visits you...
I would argue that a proactive response is significantly better for Canada using Expeditionary Forces than trying war fighting at home.

As to the difference between "home" and "away" games: perhaps that needs to be a key consideration when the Canadian Government decides to take on an "away" mission. Will the locals treat us like an "away" team or a "home" team? If we are not being treated like a "home" team do we want to be there.

Away missions (if well structured) generally ensure the Home mission doesn't occur.

That skill set, capability, is one that should be maintained at home as well as practiced overseas.

I think it is best not actively working on a home...

I think there is a difference between planned layback missions and making the best of a bad situation after your line has been penetrated, you have been surrounded and now find yourself in the rear of the enemy.

LOL -- we actually used to plan those --

Light Forces will only be able to manoeuvre locally around fixed positions. 10km or so at a stretch. 50 or so if they are light motorized.

I anticipate that Light Forces would move strategically to establish operational bases in areas where they are unopposed - either because there is nobody there at all or because the locals want them to be there.

I think each situation is different, certain areas will require no "home base" either due to terrain, weather, or enemy action.

Heavy forces are going to be necessary if there is opposition. No doubt. But - two questions - how many attacks are really feasible and how far from each operating base can you exploit on tracks?

Why do you need a static operating base?
Maneuver Warfare should need anything static - even at Corps level.

 

[Kirkhill]

Any Expeditionary Force, can also be used Domestically...

Not all expeditionary forces can be used everywhere. I agree that Canada's geography demands a long range deployable force indistinguishable in many respects from an Expeditionary Force. But Abrams, Bradleys and even Strykers are not the preferred platforms for a Domestic Expeditionary Force

I think the Rangers would need a major reconstruction before I would consider them anything other than a presence.

I'm happy enough to leave the Rangers as the presence they are. Observe and report is great.

No disagreement here.

All what could be done with well equipped Expeditionary Forces...

As long as the Expeditionary Force were "appropriately" equipped - CB90s instead of CV90s, BvS10s instead of Leos, Helicopters en masse, and lots of long range arty and good GBAD.

Visit Russia, before Russia visits you...
I would argue that a proactive response is significantly better for Canada using Expeditionary Forces than trying war fighting at home.

Priorities

NORAD - RCAF/GBAD/LRPF/Lt Troops/Rangers/Militia
NATO - RCN/Expeditionary Force

Away missions (if well structured) generally ensure the Home mission doesn't occur.

Until you make a sufficient pest of yourself that somebody decides to slam an couple of aircraft in an office complex.

I think it is best not actively working on a home...

SOF or CADTC - who is best positioned to provide instructors to civilians?

LOL -- we actually used to plan those --

Says a lot about the expectations of the Expeditionary Force.

I think each situation is different, certain areas will require no "home base" either due to terrain, weather, or enemy action.

I agree.

Why do you need a static operating base?
Maneuver Warfare should need anything static - even at Corps level.

Are you trading space for time? If you have no space to trade then static is the call.

And no matter how high you go in the command level there will always be another higher - and that one will be working from home.

Points of embarkation? Points of debarkation? Factories, workshops, hospitals, airfields, railway stations - all of those are going to constrain your ability to trade space and manoeuvre.

 

[FJAG]

The Canadian Armed Forces of the Department of National Defence requires an Expeditionary Force. But it's first duty is to defend the nation. No matter how distant and inconsequential the threat to the nation may seem. The Expeditionary Force is a nice to have political piece that buys us the proverbial seat at the table.

At the risk of starting this debate all over again. Defence of sovereignty does not start at your international boundaries. Collective defence and forward defence and deterrence are every bit as, and frequently more, useful in maintaining peace as domestic defence. And that's leaving aside the political benefits involved.

As @KevinB indicates most forces prepared for expeditionary defence have roles in domestic defence anyway.

 

[Kirkhill]

At the risk of starting this debate all over again. Defence of sovereignty does not start at your international boundaries. Collective defence and forward defence and deterrence are every bit as, and frequently more, useful in maintaining peace as domestic defence. And that's leaving aside the political benefits involved.

As @KevinB indicates most forces prepared for expeditionary defence have roles in domestic defence anyway.

That is the heart of our disagreement.

I am unwilling to entrust the defence of our nation to a single magical rapier.

 

[KevinB]

That is the heart of our disagreement.

I am unwilling to entrust the defence of our nation to a single magical rapier.

I’d suggest that’s what you are doing.

Anything bought for a solely domestic activity is something that could have been a dual role item.

 

[KevinB]

Not all expeditionary forces can be used everywhere. I agree that Canada's geography demands a long range deployable force indistinguishable in many respects from an Expeditionary Force. But Abrams, Bradleys and even Strykers are not the preferred platforms for a Domestic Expeditionary Force



I'm happy enough to leave the Rangers as the presence they are. Observe and report is great.




As long as the Expeditionary Force were "appropriately" equipped - CB90s instead of CV90s, BvS10s instead of Leos, Helicopters en masse, and lots of long range arty and good GBAD.



Priorities

NORAD - RCAF/GBAD/LRPF/Lt Troops/Rangers/Militia
NATO - RCN/Expeditionary Force



Until you make a sufficient pest of yourself that somebody decides to slam an couple of aircraft in an office complex.


SOF or CADTC - who is best positioned to provide instructors to civilians?


Says a lot about the expectations of the Expeditionary Force.


I agree.



Are you trading space for time? If you have no space to trade then static is the call.

And no matter how high you go in the command level there will always be another higher - and that one will be working from home.

Points of embarkation? Points of debarkation? Factories, workshops, hospitals, airfields, railway stations - all of those are going to constrain your ability to trade space and manoeuvre.

Remember I’m American. Moving forward is our MO

 

[Kirkhill]

I’d suggest that’s what you are doing.

Anything bought for a solely domestic activity is something that could have been a dual role item.

You're wrong.

The money spent on a Heavy Brigade could be used otherwise. And our single Heavy Brigade will neither last long nor can it be used widely.

The best that will happen is that it keeps you or the Brits happy, or maybe the Germans.

Meanwhile, maybe we could try our luck in riverine warfare in the islands of the South China seas and Indo-China with the USMC and the Aussies.