Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[IKnowNothing]

Maybe its been covered, but whats the plan with all these ACSV? Distrubted to who?

Not sure if this is what you're looking for but stated intent is to replace TLAV and Bison. Breakdown from Wiki
Configurations consist of
41 Troop Cargo Vehicle (TCV),
49 Ambulance,
97 Command Post Vehicle,
19 Engineer Vehicle,
18 Electronic Warfare Vehicle,
54 Maintenance Recovery Vehicle,
70 Mobile Repair Team,
13 Fitter/Cargo Vehicle.

 

[ArmyRick]

Not sure if this is what you're looking for but stated intent is to replace TLAV and Bison. Breakdown from Wiki
Configurations consist of
41 Troop Cargo Vehicle (TCV),
49 Ambulance,
97 Command Post Vehicle,
19 Engineer Vehicle,
18 Electronic Warfare Vehicle,
54 Maintenance Recovery Vehicle,
70 Mobile Repair Team,
13 Fitter/Cargo Vehicle.

It is

 

[McG]

Maybe its been covered, but whats the plan with all these ACSV? Distrubted to who?

It is pretty close to a 1 for 1 platform replacement based on 2019 distribution of TLAV, MTVL, and Bison variants. There was some flexibility for branches and divisions to go with one fewer TCV to gain one additional CP or fitter, but basically you can expect to see ACSV appear in the exact same place and role as the vehicles it is replacing.

 

[ArmyRick]

It is pretty close to a 1 for 1 platform replacement based on 2019 distribution of TLAV, MTVL, and Bison variants. There was some flexibility for branches and divisions to go with one fewer TCV to gain one additional CP or fitter, but basically you can expect to see ACSV appear in the exact same place and role as the vehicles it is replacing.

Thanks for the info.

 

[IKnowNothing]

Firstly, thanks to all of you for tolerating my curiosity and intrusion for the last year.

Secondly, more amateur musing- skip if disinterested, anything that's not self evident is probably out to lunch.

This is all conjecture on my part, but it seems like if one closes the door on the more ambitious/audacious ideas (reserve reform) and accepts certain norms (MRP/rule of 3) as sacrosanct, that -even if faced with the opportunity for major re-capitalization and capability gap filling to execute whatever chosen path extremely well, and no under enrollment crisis- the army is faced with a very binary path forward, it must choose between deployable symmetrical medium weight brigades or full spectrum asymmetrical deployable battle groups.

Under the former, you have (theoretically) intra Army MRP delivering deployment ready LAV Bdes*, sustainable at scale, with best in class cavalry regiments, wheeled SP guns and AD.
*respondents choice on 2 LAV Bn + LIB that can draw MRAP's when needed or 3 LAV Bn that might have to deploy leg for QRF needs

Under the latter, you have (theoretically) intra Bde/Regiment MRP delivering (simultaneously) deployment ready tracked mech Bn+tank squadron BG, LAV mech bn + LAV Cav squadron BG, LIB + Light cav squadron BG (all with appropriate weight artillery battery and AD).


Assuming I haven't missed the boat entirely regarding the form/limitations of the MRP process, which do you choose?

 

[daftandbarmy]

This is all conjecture on my part, but it seems like if one closes the door on the more ambitious/audacious ideas (reserve reform) and accepts certain norms (MRP/rule of 3) as sacrosanct, that -even if faced with the opportunity for major re-capitalization and capability gap filling to execute whatever chosen path extremely well, and no under enrollment crisis- the army is faced with a very binary path forward, it must choose between deployable symmetrical medium weight brigades or full spectrum asymmetrical deployable battle groups.

If 'Reserve Reform' classifies as an ambitious/audacious idea in Canada then you have convinced me that we are doomed

 

[IKnowNothing]

If 'Reserve Reform' classifies as an ambitious/audacious idea in Canada then you have convinced me that we are doomed

Gatekeepers paradox: The fastest way to introduce an unwanted and inevitable tangent is to try and explicitly rule it out via assumption.

I just want arguments for/against armoured and light battlegroups vs. medium bdes as the best use of 3 Reg force formations man

 

[daftandbarmy]

Gatekeepers paradox: The fastest way to introduce an unwanted and inevitable tangent is to try and explicitly rule it out via assumption.

I just want arguments for/against armoured and light battlegroups vs. medium bdes as the best use of 3 Reg force formations man

My 'back of the fag packet' estimate is that we have about $200M and 18-20k personnel locked up in the Reserve Force in Canada.

Sort that lot out and it might give you your bells and whistles

 

[FJAG]

Firstly, thanks to all of you for tolerating my curiosity and intrusion for the last year.

Secondly, more amateur musing- skip if disinterested, anything that's not self evident is probably out to lunch.

This is all conjecture on my part, but it seems like if one closes the door on the more ambitious/audacious ideas (reserve reform) and accepts certain norms (MRP/rule of 3) as sacrosanct, that -even if faced with the opportunity for major re-capitalization and capability gap filling to execute whatever chosen path extremely well, and no under enrollment crisis- the army is faced with a very binary path forward, it must choose between deployable symmetrical medium weight brigades or full spectrum asymmetrical deployable battle groups.

Under the former, you have (theoretically) intra Army MRP delivering deployment ready LAV Bdes*, sustainable at scale, with best in class cavalry regiments, wheeled SP guns and AD.
*respondents choice on 2 LAV Bn + LIB that can draw MRAP's when needed or 3 LAV Bn that might have to deploy leg for QRF needs

Under the latter, you have (theoretically) intra Bde/Regiment MRP delivering (simultaneously) deployment ready tracked mech Bn+tank squadron BG, LAV mech bn + LAV Cav squadron BG, LIB + Light cav squadron BG (all with appropriate weight artillery battery and AD).


Assuming I haven't missed the boat entirely regarding the form/limitations of the MRP process, which do you choose?

Let me start by saying that I'm an opponent to the MRP process as it ensures that at any given time 2/3 of your army is managed into being "unready". But I'll leave that aside for the point of argument.

I think your analysis is that there are two options: 1) symmetrical medium weight brigades that once every three years generates a brigade or 2) asymmetrical brigades each of which every year generates a battle group (one each of light, medium or heavy across the army).

I'll also leave aside the comment that the symmetrical brigade generates "world class cavalry regiments, wheeled SP guns and AD" as we have none of those.

My thought is that we aren't generating brigades at all and haven't for almost thirty years. We are training brigade headquarters and battlegroups and associated support arms but not generating brigades. We are, at best, generating battle groups and task force headquarters that are spin-offs of brigade headquarters. That is not dependant on whether we are organized as symmetrical or asymmetrical brigades.

What the MRP does is train one brigade a year in one big brigade exercise. We used to do that as part of our annual training cycle. Every brigade would train through an annual training cycle from platoon level training to a brigade exercise by early summer. Then during the decade of darkness we stopped doing any brigade training or exercising at all. Early this century we went to the MRP and the rotational brigade training event every third year.

IMHO the MRP has little to do with an output-by-symmetry/asymmetry option but everything to do with resource availability. We need to a brigade training event but can only afford to do it for one big brigade event per year.

In my opinion we would be better served by three asymmetrical brigades: one with 3 light battalions; one heavy with 3 combined arms battalions; and one mech with 3 mech battalions. This has little do to with readiness but everything to do with having brigades that hold a particular equipment set specific to their role and can train together in the particular requirements of such a brigade and can concentrate on one predominant mission set.

Each would conduct an annual training cycle ending in a small bde exercise at their home base - we give CMTC a pink slip and reduce it to a roving standards and evaluation team.

Each brigade assigns one battalion as the core of the designated ready force for the year. Effectively that is the battlegroup that will deploy or be designated to deploy.

We rarely deploy a standard ORBAT battlegroup. Even during Afghanistan task forces and battle groups were ad hoc'd. In large part this is because we usually needed to gather resources from multiple units within the brigade. As an example TF 3-07 had one rifle company from each of the three R22eR battalions. Currently our only standing deployment is a partial battle group assigned to Latvia. We have other deployments as well, but again, these are ad hoc'd organizations.

Remember too that brigades have no command role over a deployed force. CJOC has that responsibility. A brigade headquarters may be tasked to form a task force headquarters but that operates separately from the brigade that stays at home as a force generator. SSE has no tasks for a full-up brigade. The largest force it contemplates are task forces of 1,500 - essentially a battle group plus a command and support element.

We need to rethink CMTC, the MRP and whether our symmetric brigade structure is optimal. After that we really need to address those ambitious and audacious issues that the Army has ignored for seventy years.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Let me start by saying that I'm an opponent to the MRP process as it ensures that at any given time 2/3 of your army is managed into being "unready". But I'll leave that aside for the point of argument.

I think that is the main problem.

It's like the Army is being run by an overly 'work to rule' focused Union Executive

 

[IKnowNothing]

Reorganized a bit for commonality of thought

Premise:

I think your analysis is that there are two options: 1) symmetrical medium weight brigades that once every three years generates a brigade or 2) asymmetrical brigades each of which every year generates a battle group (one each of light, medium or heavy across the army).

I'll also leave aside the comment that the symmetrical brigade generates "world class cavalry regiments, wheeled SP guns and AD" as we have none of those.

Bold- yes that's what I'm proposing

Other- bad explanation on my part, both options are predicated on the Army having "the opportunity for major re-capitalization and capability gap filling to execute whatever chosen path extremely well." Either chosen path comes with a shopping spree.

In my opinion we would be better served by three asymmetrical brigades: one with 3 light battalions; one heavy with 3 combined arms battalions; and one mech with 3 mech battalions. This has little do to with readiness but everything to do with having brigades that hold a particular equipment set specific to their role and can train together in the particular requirements of such a brigade and can concentrate on one predominant mission set.

Each would conduct an annual training cycle ending in a small bde exercise at their home base - we give CMTC a pink slip and reduce it to a roving standards and evaluation team.

Each brigade assigns one battalion as the core of the designated ready force for the year. Effectively that is the battlegroup that will deploy or be designated to deploy.

Under that scenario, could we deploy and sustain a full Bn+ BG from each of the three bde's simultaneously? 2? etc.

Remember too that brigades have no command role over a deployed force. CJOC has that responsibility. A brigade headquarters may be tasked to form a task force headquarters but that operates separately from the brigade that stays at home as a force generator. SSE has no tasks for a full-up brigade. The largest force it contemplates are task forces of 1,500 - essentially a battle group plus a command and support element.

My thought is that we aren't generating brigades at all and haven't for almost thirty years. We are training brigade headquarters and battlegroups and associated support arms but not generating brigades. We are, at best, generating battle groups and task force headquarters that are spin-offs of brigade headquarters. That is not dependant on whether we are organized as symmetrical or asymmetrical brigades.

Changing that is core to the premise. All through the thread and others there is lamentation that we should be able to field whole Bdes. Option A would be to commit to doing that, but at the cost of the heavy capability. If SSE rules the day and there is no Bde intent or aspirations asymmetrical seems like a very easy choice in the scenario.

We need to rethink CMTC, the MRP and whether our symmetric brigade structure is optimal. After that we really need to address those ambitious and audacious issues that the Army has ignored for seventy years.

It would be game changer.
But this ignorant civilian is trying to colour within the lines. I'm not qualified to comment reinventing everything, and the more time I spend on here the more I know I don't know. The whole thought process was catalyzed by the 2018 article in the Leo thread. Is the army better served by an RCAC with annual output of one each Tank, LRSS, and TAPV squadrons, or an RCAC with the annual output of full LAV cavalry regiment ( Spitballing- 3 squadrons, each with 3x 6 car troops (4 LAV DFV (35mm and twin ATGM) plus 2 LAV Recce) and a 2 vehicle mortar section with HQ). To answer that you must first answer - is the country better served with an army with an annual output of one each Heavy, Medium, and Light Battlegroups or with an annual output of 1 Medium Brigade? The aforementioned lines suggest that either should be attainable, but not both. Hence the ask. Either way, (again ignorant civilian) it seems like a major issue is the failure on the part of senior leadership and government to choose and commit. We should be able to do either exceedingly well, but it seems like we're trying to balance both and accomplishing neither.

 

[Brad Sallows]

There's always a bigger fish; the only foolproof "adequate protection" is not to get hit, which means finding and interfering with shooters. By all means pick a protection level that covers a lot of threats, but don't go stingy on indirect fires. Historical ratios of artillery (including AD) to manoeuvre might be too small.

If wheels can't keep up with tanks in any reasonably foreseeable assault, there's no conclusion other than admitting that foregoing infantry on tracks is ignoring the problem and limiting the employment of tanks. It should be possible to concede that and write aspirational plans/doctrines while working within the envelope of what we have for now.

 

[FJAG]

Reorganized a bit for commonality of thought

Premise:

Bold- yes that's what I'm proposing

Other- bad explanation on my part, both options are predicated on the Army having "the opportunity for major re-capitalization and capability gap filling to execute whatever chosen path extremely well." Either chosen path comes with a shopping spree.

I think one needs two phases (at least) Phase 1 - organize what you have but with a plan for Phase 2 - to be able to expand into desired capabilities not currently available

Under that scenario, could we deploy and sustain a full Bn+ BG from each of the three bde's simultaneously? 2? etc.

The outcome end numbers are the same. One ready brigade with three battle groups or three brigades with one battle group each. In each case if you want a fourth battlegroup you'll have to dig for it elsewhere. I would think that if you return to an annual training cycle rather than a three year one then the ability to generate that 4th bn/BG is easier. IMHO resources are the limiter. Assuming the resources are unchanged, then under the symmetric 3 year MRP you end up with a super brigade every year while with the asymmetric annual system you end up with three adequate brigades every year. My preference is for more of the adequate side. Creating "super" brigades is IMHO an issue of risk aversion.

Changing that is core to the premise. All through the thread and others there is lamentation that we should be able to field whole Bdes. Option A would be to commit to doing that, but at the cost of the heavy capability. If SSE rules the day and there is no Bde intent or aspirations asymmetrical seems like a very easy choice in the scenario.

I'm not sure that A loses the heavy option. It just makes it more difficult to create a good one. There is a difference in deploying a full brigade and training within a brigade environment. he difference is mostly logistical. In order to train a deployable BG it needs to be trained in how to operate within a brigade environment. In deploying task forces we also need to have command teams that can function as brigade command teams (usually in a multinational environment. So while there is no specific call to deploy a brigade in SSE, there are clearly indicators to deploy multiple BGs simultaneously and at least some above BG level Task Force headquarters. If one reads SSE literally one could be required to deploy up to 6,500 personnel at the same time (sustaining 4,000 of them and the remainder time limited 6-9 months). There is nothing to limit that all of these eggs might not be thrown into the same basket and might not all come from the Army (realistically they won't but we're talking extremes here)

All that said, what we're looking at is building blocks. Regardless of whether you use option A or B, you build units and BGs with subunits and you build brigades from units/BGs. Where they come from and what type they are isn't as important as whether they are tailored for the specific mission. Regardless of the option we still have the same basic raw material source, 6 mech bns, 3 light bns, 1 armoured and 2 recce regiments, 3 two-battery artillery regiment, 3 engr regts, 3 svc bns and 3 brigade headquarters. How we mix and match those and train them to work together can work within either framework.

It would be game changer.
But this ignorant civilian is trying to colour within the lines. I'm not qualified to comment reinventing everything, and the more time I spend on here the more I know I don't know. The whole thought process was catalyzed by the 2018 article in the Leo thread. Is the army better served by an RCAC with annual output of one each Tank, LRSS, and TAPV squadrons, or an RCAC with the annual output of full LAV cavalry regiment ( Spitballing- 3 squadrons, each with 3x 6 car troops (4 LAV DFV (35mm and twin ATGM) plus 2 LAV Recce) and a 2 vehicle mortar section with HQ). To answer that you must first answer - is the country better served with an army with an annual output of one each Heavy, Medium, and Light Battlegroups or with an annual output of 1 Medium Brigade? The aforementioned lines suggest that either should be attainable, but not both. Hence the ask. Either way, (again ignorant civilian) it seems like a major issue is the failure on the part of senior leadership and government to choose and commit. We should be able to do either exceedingly well, but it seems like we're trying to balance both and accomplishing neither.

Actually its not so much a failure to choose and commit. Advancing with Purpose back in around 2002 was a deliberate choice. It started with a symmetric Army. We were Asymmetric during the Cold War with 4 CMBG being the heavy component , 1 and 5 being the medium and 2 (as the Special Service Force) being the light. We became symmetric after 4 CMBG was dropped from the establishment and the SSF returned to a bde status. Concurrently Bosnia made the BG the deployable entity and resource limitations made bde level training a near impossibility.

AwP aim was to take that existing symmetric structure and created a training cycle that could operate within the resource limitations to churn out a cycle of BGs that could be deployed and sustained in Bosnia-type operations in other than war (OOTW). AwP as initially envisioned maintained a reduced heavy component (Leopard C2 tanks and M109 SP howitzers) in a low state of readiness to supplement a medium brigade, if required. Basically it created three medium brigades but with the heavy component to be held in one of them (1 CMBG). Essentially we bought enough LAVs for six battalions (the story of how the three light battalions came to be is for another time - lets just say resources for the time being)

Another aim of AwP was to bring back regular bde level training cycles but again resource limitations put the whole thing into the three-year MRP cycle (coupled with whole fleet management of the equipment) which evolved just in time for use in Afghanistan and has been more or less with us ever since.

So choices were made and at the time there were reasons behind them. There were other choices made along the way - particulalry in 2004/5 when the choice was made to throw the heavy low-readiness component under the bus, and in 2011-13 when the air defence component went the same way (and a host of other ones like all but abandoning ATGMs). Those are harder to justify but - resource limitations and (IMHO) limited vision played a large role.

To get to the specifics, regardless of the option chosen, you can still deploy a brigade. The only difference is whether it comes wholly from within one brigade or is a composite of units from several brigades. There are competing risks and benefits but neither is the wrong answer; its just a choice of what concept that you prefer. My own one goes asymmetric.

 

[Kirkhill]

While we are considering punting on Force 2025....

This from the head of the Air Mobility Command - a logistics organization that is used to working in the rear but may be called, in the next two years to work under fire.

"Maximize the use of the force and the tools we currently have and extract full value from things that currently exist."
"Close the gaps: C2, navigation, manoeuvre under attack, and tempo."
"Go faster!"
"If you are comfortable in your approach to training then you are not taking enough risk."

"All AMC aligned personnel with weapons qualifications will fire a clip into a 7-meter target with the full understanding that unrepentant lethality matters most. Aim for the head."

Get your wills in order. (Editor)

"KC-135 units will coordinate to provide a conceptual means of air-delivering 100 off-the-shelf size and type UAVs from a single aircraft"

Air Mobility Command Boss Predicts War With China In 2025 In Dire Memo

A USAF memo calls for aggressive efforts to prepare for a major fight with China, including orders to 'aim for the head' in firearms training.

www.thedrive.com

A pitter-patter memo if ever there was one.

 

[Kirkhill]

Germany getting off the pot?

Promising to supply 3 divisions (30,000 people total - 1 mech div (not armoured?) by 2027 and two others by 2031 - at NTM).

Priorities

• personal kit - to include NVGs (universal issue?)
• tanks - upgrade to 2A7 and keep them in service to 2045 or longer (doesn't suggest an anticipation of high wastage)

- Boxer - 133 Heavy Weapons Carriers

The Bundeswehr announced in June 2020 that it would replace the Wiesel weapon carrier with a Kampfboxer mission module bringing the combination of a 30 mm cannon and Spike-LR anti-tank guided missile from the Puma infantry fighting vehicle to the wheeled platform.[41] The heavy weapon carrier will be the fifth version of the Boxer in service with the German Army and current planning calls for training to begin on the new heavy weapon carrier in 2025, with the first three infantry battalions to be equipped with the system by 2027. No contract is currently in place.

Boxer (armoured fighting vehicle) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

- Fuchs - replacement in whole or in part by the Finnish Patria 6x6

Finland, Latvia To Jointly Procure 360 Land Vehicles; Estonia, Sweden Could Join - Breaking Defense

The agreement includes an order from Latvia for the delivery of 200 APC variant vehicles and another 160 for Finland.

breakingdefense.com

- Arty - the German Army’s PzH 2000 155mm Self-Propelled Howitzer (SPH) will be in service for “maybe” another 15 to 20 years, but a need for a supporting wheeled capability has been identified. “It could be based on the Boxer platform

Spurred by Russia, Germany rolls out 3-year plan to fully equip all armed forces personnel​

Funding for the items like protective gear and NVGs will be provided from the government’s €100 billon special arms fund, a seismic uplift in defense spending aimed at ending decades of peacetime underfunding and acquiring new military equipment at pace to deter Russian aggression.​

By TIM MARTINon January 27, 2023 at 11:22 AM

German armed forces 1st Lt. Tim Jantzen aims a training weapon inside the 227th Air Support Operations Squadron’s new Air National Guard Advanced JTAC Training System at the 177th Fighter Wing of the New Jersey Air National Guard in Egg Harbor Township, N.J. on Feb. 26, 2016. (U.S. Air National Guard photo by Master Sgt. Andrew J. Moseley/Released)
IAV 2022 — Germany is embarking on a rapidly accelerated procurement process to equip “each and every” solider from its armed forces with personnel equipment like protective gear, night vision goggles, and rucksacks inside the next three years, according to a German defense official.
The process could have taken nearly double that time, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine added real-world urgency to the task. Funding for the items will be provided from the government’s €100 billion ($107 billion USD) special arms fund, a seismic uplift in defense spending aimed at ending decades of peacetime underfunding and acquiring new military equipment at pace to deter Russian aggression.
The personnel equipment decision was revealed by the official this week at the International Armoured Vehicles conference in London, prior to Berlin announcing, after much controversy and delay, that it had finally agreed to send 14 Leopard 2A6 main battle tanks to Ukraine. Berlin’s Leopard decision was soon followed by the Biden administration approving the supply of M1 Abrams main battle tanks. The tanks offer Kyiv additional firepower to counter a new Russian offensive.
RELATED: UK reveals capture of Russian equipment, instructs industry to develop new countermeasures
For the German military, “we have plans to procure equipment that would have taken us until around 2028 or 2029 but finally everybody will get it [sooner],” said the official, who is not being identified in line with conference rules. “We are talking about protective gear, helmets, night vision goggles, rucksacks, stuff like that. We shifted it forward, with the aim to equip each and every soldier in the German armed forces in the next three years.”

A spokesperson for the German army was not immediately available for comment.
The official said Germany also plans on moving forward with a capability sustainment effort to have all Leopard tanks upgraded to the 2A7 configuration.

“This will include digitizing the turrets and is one of the important things we have to do so we can use the tanks in whatever battle management system is developed in the meantime,” said the official.
The vehicles are expected to stay in service until around 2045 “or maybe a bit beyond that” and then make way for the Franco-German Main Ground Combat System (MGCS), which will also replace the French Leclerc main battle tank.
Among a range of other German Army procurements, the official noted that contract negotiations are underway for 133 Boxer heavy weapon carrier (HWC) armored vehicles, which will see deliveries start in 2025 and run through to 2030. He explained that mechanized infantry battalions will receive 150 new vehicles which could also be configured to the Boxer HWC standard or an alternative platform.
“This is something we want to decide and contract on as soon as we can, so that deliveries can start somewhere in the vicinity of 2028” he said of the latter procurement.


“Our overall idea is to create a homogeneous brigade on wheels that incorporate all assets that have a large degree of operational autonomy and are able to be integrated into the joint force. The core of that will be the boxer fleet,” he added.
Additionally, deliberations continue over the future of the FUCHS (fox) armored personnel carrier, with Berlin being “highly interested” in the Patria 6×6 vehicle after signing a letter of intent (LOI) to join the Finnish-led Common Armored Vehicle System (CAVS) program in June 2022.
“One of the options is Patria, maybe not for all the foxes that we have in service and need replaced but some of them,” added the official.
The decision to partner with Finland fits in with Germany’s “military off the shelf, where it makes sense” procurement approach, said the official.
“We could certainly develop something like that [CAVS] with our national industry, but it would cost us somewhere between seven to nine years before something could be fielded.”
For indirect fire support medium range artillery, the German Army’s PzH 2000 155mm Self-Propelled Howitzer (SPH) will be in service for “maybe” another 15 to 20 years, but a need for a supporting wheeled capability has been identified.
“It could be based on the Boxer platform, which is more or less the preferred option for the time being because it’s almost ready or more than a prototype,” said the official. “The earlier we can contract, the better [because] at the latest we want to field in 2029.”
Elsewhere, Germany has agreed to provide NATO with a first operational land division in 2025 to support the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), while long-term targets of providing a modern mechanized division by 2027 and a further two divisions, to the alliance by 2031, both remain.
“We are talking about 30,000 army personnel as opposed to 6,000 [to support the new land division plan],” noted the official. “These are units that will have to go into battle, with what they have at their disposal, on a permanent basis.”

Spurred by Russia, Germany rolls out 3-year plan to fully equip all armed forces personnel - Breaking Defense

Funding for the items like protective gear and NVGs will be provided from the government’s €100 billon special arms fund, a seismic uplift in defense spending aimed at ending decades of peacetime underfunding and acquiring new military equipment at pace to deter Russian aggression.

breakingdefense.com

 

[Kirkhill]

Germany's Third Line Vehicle? (Kirkhill designations).

Line 1 - Puma - 43 Tonnes AUW Tracked
Line 2 - Boxer - 41 Tonnes AUW Wheeled
Line 3 - Patria - 24 Tonnes AUW Wheeled
Line 4 - Dingo - 12 Tonnes AUW Wheeled
Line 4 - Wiesel - 5 Tonnes AUW Tracked


Patria 6x6 being considered by Germany, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia and Finland (already in service)

A 15.5 tonne STANAG level 2 truck with an 8.5 tonne payload that permits raising the armour level to STANAG level 4

Apparently it drives like a truck and so it is very easy to train on.

Technical specifications




Dimensions
Length 7,5m
Height over hull 2,5m
Width 2,9m
Max. payload 8 500 kg
Max. combat weight 24000 kg

Performance
Max. speed >100 km/h
Climbing capacity 60%
Side slope 30%
Obstacle 0,6m
Trench crossing 1,2 m
Swimming (optional)
Fording 1,5m
Operating distance >700 km

Protection
Modular ballistic and mine protection according to customers' requirements. STANAG level 2,
optional level 4. Readiness for future protection technologies as well as future soldier equipment.

LED-light technology
High performance, maintenance free LED light technology.




Engine
Power output 294kW
Torque output 1870 Nm
Engine type 5 inline
Transmission
Automatic 7 + 2 gears

Driveline
Driven axles All wheel drive
Brakes Pneumatically controlled hydraulic disc brakes with ABS.
CTIS Optional

Suspension
Suspension type Fully independent suspension
with double wishbones on every axle.
Spring type Coil springs with hydraulic shock absorbers.
Optional hydropneumatic spring elements.
Steering
Steering type Hydraulically assisted steering with mechanical linkage for 1st and 2nd axle.

 

[daftandbarmy]

While we are considering punting on Force 2025....

This from the head of the Air Mobility Command - a logistics organization that is used to working in the rear but may be called, in the next two years to work under fire.

"Maximize the use of the force and the tools we currently have and extract full value from things that currently exist."
"Close the gaps: C2, navigation, manoeuvre under attack, and tempo."
"Go faster!"
"If you are comfortable in your approach to training then you are not taking enough risk."

"All AMC aligned personnel with weapons qualifications will fire a clip into a 7-meter target with the full understanding that unrepentant lethality matters most. Aim for the head."

Get your wills in order. (Editor)

"KC-135 units will coordinate to provide a conceptual means of air-delivering 100 off-the-shelf size and type UAVs from a single aircraft"

Air Mobility Command Boss Predicts War With China In 2025 In Dire Memo

A USAF memo calls for aggressive efforts to prepare for a major fight with China, including orders to 'aim for the head' in firearms training.

www.thedrive.com

A pitter-patter memo if ever there was one.

It sounds like someone at a senior rank level finally read Patton's 'War as I knew it' and got inspired.

And what's a 'clip'? Regardless, if you fire it at someone's head you'll probably miss

 

[Kirkhill]

It sounds like someone at a senior rank level finally read Patton's 'War as I knew it' and got inspired.

And what's a 'clip'? Regardless, if you fire it at someone's head you'll probably miss

Conversely if you fire at someone's centre of mass you'll probably hit a ceramic plate.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Conversely if you fire at someone's centre of mass you'll probably hit a ceramic plate.

'Five in the thigh and he's gonna die.'

 

[FJAG]

Germany getting off the pot?

Promising to supply 3 divisions (30,000 people total - 1 mech div (not armoured?) by 2027 and two others by 2031 - at NTM).

I'm not sure how new this is or whether its just some fine tuning of their "Division 2027 - Corps 2031" plan that's been around for a few years.

Here's a 2019 article on the subject. I'll pore over the recent stuff to see if there is a significant change. (Not to worry - despite the title, the article is in English)

Deutsche Heer - Ausblick auf die Division 2027

Als dem Kern der Landstreitkräfte und als Träger von Landoperationen gilt es für das Heer, diese ambitionierten Ziele in einen plausiblen Fähigkeitsaufwuchs zu übersetzen. Dabei sind die Weichen zum Aufwuchs der VJTF-Brigade bereits gestellt – hier sind wir 2019 bereits im Jahr der Umsetzung.

esut.de

Edited to add: Okay. I've read it now and there's nothing new to see here folks. Move on. Move on.