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an earth mover!! wow !! great tech, rather than the FN CShovel, or FN Cpick........
PZM-2 vs HMEV
The difference - the attachments and the distribution of the equipment -
an earth mover!! wow !! great tech, rather than the FN CShovel, or FN Cpick........
As opposed to, for example, having some viable numbers of suitable artillery...
Or enough tanks for each Bde, or a viable armoured recce platform, or air defence, or modernized soldier equipment, or ATGMs, or a plan for the TAPV.As opposed to, for example, having some viable numbers of suitable artillery...
I agree they are not going anywhere, but I still like to see a tracked fleet of APC/IFV to work with the tanks, with the intent of having a "Heavy Brigade" and "Light Brigade" built around the LAV chassis. We will always be an expeditionary force with no control of where we will be asked to go next.Unfortunately it came down to money. The LAV 6 purchase was an upgrade to the LAV 3 that we were able to get through because upgrades are easier than new procurement (the CCV project), and once that was approved the justification for CCV in an era of harsh budget cuts was made more difficult.
Mobility is an interesting topic; because it’s more of a series of trade offs that perhaps is being suggested. While on one hand tracks offer improved cross country mobility, that is offset by on road speed and some operational mobility. For what it’s worth I don’t find the LAV 6 to struggle that much in areas like Wainwright and suffield in comparison to say TLAVs. @KevinB is correct in the power to weight ratio, retuned engine gets a bit more go, but the felt effect is more profound in getting up hills than off road. For me anyways. What I actually miss about the LAV 3 is the barrel depression. I suppose one could argue that there’s serious benefits to road mobility if we have to ship LAVs to Europe in order to get them to the front.
There’s heavy criticism of it here, but that’s to be expected on a forum talking about change. Frankly were it me, and I was addressing the issues of the CAF replacing the LAV 6 fleet would be far far down my list.
I don’t think the juice to squeeze ratio there is worthwhile. The advantages in mobility from a tracked IFV, I think that’s a touch overplayed here, are off set by logistics and training complexities from mixed fleets.I agree they are not going anywhere, but I still like to see a tracked fleet of APC/IFV to work with the tanks, with the intent of having a "Heavy Brigade" and "Light Brigade" built around the LAV chassis. We will always be an expeditionary force with no control of where we will be asked to go next.
love it. way faster than digging in by hand...
PZM-2 vs HMEV
The difference - the attachments and the distribution of the equipment -
watched the West Deutchers dig in a company using similar kit, while 3 RCR worked pick and shovel in 81. blew my mind we couldn't do better coming from a resource digging country.....love it. way faster than digging in by hand...
Yes, but think of the character those poor Germans missed out on developing.watched the West Deutchers dig in a company using similar kit, while 3 RCR worked pick and shovel in 81. blew my mind we couldn't do better coming from a resource digging country.....
I'm not deeply into armour standards. My general understanding is Stanag 4569 Level 4 is sufficient to defeat 14.5mm while Stanag Level 5 protects to 25mm and 6 to 30mm. Generally speaking there are quite a few APCs out there that operate with 25 and 30mm armament. It's them I think one should protect against.It’s easy to say “needs to be better protected” okay against what threat and what level of protection ?
It was an idea that was acceptable as at the time our brigades in Canada were supposed to be light and air portable for a variety of roles and we also had to train people for combined arms tactics because we were constantly rotating people through to 4 CMBG.
The Leo 1 Tank Trainer -
Which was actually deployed in numbers and overlapped both the Leo 1 and the Coyote.
I'm one of those guys who feels that Rumsfeld's reality is simply: RealityWe talk about the what ifs but we are staring "what if" in the face. We are closer to dealing with Rumsfeld's reality.
Not me. I think we need a real IFV. And we shouldn't be wishy washy and leave the SOR open for both wheeled and tracked like we did for the CCV - we need to say tracks are mandatory.What can we do with what we have?
If everybody is satisfied that the LAV6.0 can operate as a Bradley/Warrior/Marder/CV90 substitute, much less a Narmer, then I will shut up. But, with very few exceptions I am not hearing that from the discussions on this board or in the CAF literature.
That's my view as well.And before we start swapping old kit for new kit we need to be buying new kit to fill the gaps that the old kit doesn't cover.
Is the interior designed for 9 Koreans, etc, or for Europeans/Australians?....the K21 with its tracks and 9 dismounts.
An argument for the wheeled Infantry Carrier Vehicle (Stryker) in the High Intensity Conflict
This Is What Stryker Armored Vehicles Could Bring To The Fight In Ukraine
Strykers, even with their known limitations, could provide Ukraine with a host of desperately needed capabilities, especially when combined with other forces.www.thedrive.com
Getting Strykers would be a “win” for Ukraine, said Duplessis, who retired as a colonel in 2021 and oversaw live fire training for those vehicles at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California.
“I would be hesitant to make a one-to-one comparison with Ukraine,” Duplessis told The War Zone on Wednesday, “But the Stryker was made to bridge the gap between light forces and really heavy ones in a high-intensity conflict like you see in Ukraine. The Stryker would provide mobility and protection from the kind of threats faced by Ukrainian forces just as it did for our formations in Iraq.”
How Strykers Could Help Ukraine
While it is still unknown what variant or variants of Stryker the U.S. might provide Ukraine, any would represent a big upgrade for the country from the fleet of more than 1,300 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) or Humvees, 300 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers and 527 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs) the U.S. has already provided, said Duplessis, the retired Stryker officer.
“It's quieter than a tank and you can get a Stryker in areas that you probably could not get a tank or a Bradley into, especially in urban areas,” he told The War Zone. Earlier this month, President Joe Biden authorized the transfer of 50 M2A2-ODS Bradley Fighting Vehicles to Ukraine.
The Stryker also provides safer mobility, with better communications and situational awareness systems, than either of those three previously U.S.-supplied vehicles, Duplessis said.
“You can use all the digital systems. You can use your optics to fire the 50 cal or MK 19 from the protection of being inside the vehicle. You can't do that in the M113 or the MRAP or the HUMVEE. You can only match that with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle or the Abrams tank.”
Detractors, said Duplessis, point out Stryker’s limitations.
“‘It can't fight a tank,’ they say. ‘It doesn't have the firepower of a tank. It doesn't have the protection of the Bradley.’ But you have to look at what role the Stryker plays.”
The Stryker, he said, “was produced and centered around the infantry squad. It is designed to deliver an infantry squad a kilometer or terrain feature away from an objective.”
It “allows mobility in ugly, restricted environments like a city. It allows for the protection of the infantry and at the end of the day, it allows you to put a squad of infantry in a vehicle or dismount with its leaders and organic equipment and weapons.”
The M1126 Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV), one of nearly two-dozen versions, is the “foundation of the Stryker formation,” said Duplessis.
Other variants, such as the Commander’s Vehicle (CV), Mortar Carrier Vehicle (MCV), Engineer Squad Vehicle (ESV) and Medical Evacuation Vehicle (MEV) “enable the formation's infantry” in several way
They provide command and control; organic fire support from the MCV's 120mm mortars - which can range nearly 4.5 miles; mobility support; and medical evacuation, he said.
“In this last role, the MEV provides a better protected medical evacuation vehicle than the U.S.-provided M113.” Such a role is critical in the fight Ukraine is facing against Russia, where artillery is arguably the biggest threat on the battlefield. The Stryker's speed, maneuverability, and protection from indirect fire could be a huge asset for Ukrainian troops.
The Mobile Gun System (MGS) variant, with its 105mm cannon and the Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) variant, armed with Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles, “both have the capability to destroy Russian tanks,” said Duplessis.
But there are things that the Stryker can’t do, he said.
While it allows troops to maneuver in a rapid manner, it's best used as part of a larger effort.
“I probably would not recommend employing a Stryker Brigade alone in an urban environment, but as ... part of a combined arms effort with armor. With anti-armor systems like Javelins. With snipers. With mortars.”
The same holds true for the tank-killing variants.
“This is best done when employed as part of a combined arms formation as opposed to a stand-alone capability. Neither system matches the capability of the Abrams main battle tank.
One of the biggest lessons Duplessis said he learned about the Stryker from his time at the National Training Center is the importance of knowing what it was designed for and tailoring missions around that.
“I can't emphasize this enough,” he said. The Stryker “is designed to maneuver coherent infantry squads and provide protection, communications, situational awareness, and then a support-by-fire platform with a 50-caliber or Mk-19.”
The units that did “extremely well” at NTC were those that “recognized the limitations of it, and really used it to move forces to a position of advantage out of contact with the enemy, and then make contact on their terms. It's not to get the Stryker in these decisive engagements ahead of the armor forces.”
The biggest challenge may not be maintaining the vehicle itself, but the digital systems on the vehicle said Duplessis. There are also parts of the weapons station that frequently broke.
“The digital components and the remote weapon station would be more of a challenge for somebody who's never operated the system,” he said.
Is this article unreliable/ based on a poor translation or could we be set for some pretty big announcements and actual movement this year?
Future Armoured Vehicles Survivability 2022: Canada seeks equipment in light of Ukraine conflict
Canada is seeking equipment for its forces in Latvia and to replace arms supplied to Ukraine, Director Armament Sustainment Program Management in the Canadian Department...www.janes.com
He expected a contract award in 2023 but said the procurement could last seven years, compared with 10–15 years for the replacement of the LAV III with the LAV 6.0.
LAV 700Is this article unreliable/ based on a poor translation or could we be set for some pretty big announcements and actual movement this year?
Future Armoured Vehicles Survivability 2022: Canada seeks equipment in light of Ukraine conflict
Canada is seeking equipment for its forces in Latvia and to replace arms supplied to Ukraine, Director Armament Sustainment Program Management in the Canadian Department...www.janes.com
Still 5 years short of the 6.0 projected life though...That 7 year timeline does conform to Force 2030 ... FWIW.
Do UOR's get listed announced before they're implemented? There's projects on the books for ATGM and GBAD (albeit with unsatisfactory timelines). Nothing for LAV other than the ongoing ACSV procurement. Surprise urgency on those two files plus some LAV variant gap filling?LAV 700
Maybe its been covered, but whats the plan with all these ACSV? Distrubted to who?Still 5 years short of the 6.0 projected life though...
Do UOR's get listed announced before they're implemented? There's projects on the books for ATGM and GBAD (albeit with unsatisfactory timelines). Nothing for LAV other than the ongoing ACSV procurement. Surprise urgency on those two files plus some LAV variant gap filling?