Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[quadrapiper]

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.



I really want to ask who thinks that wording makes any sense?
Why bother having the Distro Restriction if it is APR unlimited?

To avoid ambiguity and prevent restrictions being imposed/assumed by lower levels.

 

[dapaterson]

Common look and feel is important in any bureaucratic organization.

Consistency is underrated.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Common look and feel is important in any bureaucratic organization.

Consistency is underrated.

Just wondering: did you actually mean to say 'Synchronized Organization Projection'?

 

[KevinB]

To avoid ambiguity and prevent restrictions being imposed/assumed by lower levels.

How about using less ink and saying None, or just Public Release.

 

[dapaterson]

Repeatability of a function means those involved know their roles, rather than having commanders inserting random changes on every iteration.

Make it easy to do the routine parts of the job, so energy and effort can be committed to the unusual things.

 

[KevinB]

Repeatability of a function means those involved know their roles, rather than having commanders inserting random changes on every iteration.

Make it easy to do the routine parts of the job, so energy and effort can be committed to the unusual things.

Like redefining terminology from other documents.

 

[dapaterson]

That'd be a big "No" from me.

 

[Kirkhill]

The best argument for higher levels of command - span of control​

“The large-scale combat [operations] against a peer threat, the amount of complexity, speed, violence, chaos, leads us to the conclusion that our great brigade combat team commanders are going to be wholly consumed winning the fight they're in,”​

But is span of control a function of boots on the ground or the number of separate combat functions being orchestrated?

​

​

Divisions, Corps to Replace Brigades As Army’s Wartime Formation Of Choice

Brigades that operated largely independently in Iraq and Afghanistan will fight as part of larger units in future conflicts, officials said.

www.defenseone.com

​

​

Divisions, Corps to Replace Brigades As Army’s Wartime Formation Of Choice​

Brigades that operated largely independently in Iraq and Afghanistan will fight as part of larger units in future conflicts, officials said.​

BY CAITLIN M. KENNEY
STAFF REPORTER, DEFENSE ONE
OCTOBER 10, 2022

• ARMY
• UKRAINE

The Army’s brigade combat teams may have been the signature units of recent wars, but service leaders believe future conflicts will be dominated by divisions and even corps, officials said Monday.
“The large-scale combat [operations] against a peer threat, the amount of complexity, speed, violence, chaos, leads us to the conclusion that our great brigade combat team commanders are going to be wholly consumed winning the fight they're in,” said Gen. James Rainey, the new chief of Army Futures Command, at the Association of the United States Army’s conference in Washington, D.C.
Operations during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars were largely planned by brigade combat teams—some 4,000 troops led by a colonel—and executed by their battalions and companies. Rainey said these BCTs were built in a way that had them hold and operate in an area for a year but were not a “maneuver formation.”
The war in Ukraine has shown what the Army could face in a large-scale conflict, said James Greer, an associate professor at the U.S. Army School for Advanced Military Studies, who spoke on a future-of-warfare panel with Rainey. Ukraine has committed the equivalent of two full corps of troops and is fighting across a vast area, about 150 times larger than the Army’s National Training Center in California, Greer said. A single U.S. Army corps can be comprised of two to five divisions with up to 45,000 soldiers, commanded by a lieutenant general.
“So: very large formations, very large spaces, and of course, everyone's familiar with the lethality, the destruction, the consumption of materiel, ammunition, etc., on a scale that we haven't really thought through in a long time,” Greer said.
Focusing the Army on these larger formations will mean they will be able to work closer with the other services as well as allies and partners, Secretary Christine Wormuth in her Monday keynote.


“Our study and analysis of recent conflicts, exercises, simulation, and training, tells us that brigade commanders must focus fully on winning the close fight. To allow frontline leaders to concentrate on the close fight, division and corps commanders will have the responsibility and capability to visualize the larger picture,” Wormuth said. “To ensure they can do this, our theater armies, corps, and divisions will gain the personnel, organizations, and equipment they need to disrupt and defeat peer adversaries on the future battlefield.”
That means bringing artillery, engineers, and intelligence together at the division level, she said.
Rainey said division commanders will be able to provide these capabilities to the brigades when they need it.
The secretary said this focus on larger formations would be part of the Army’s upcoming doctrine on multi-domain operations, Wormuth said.
“To realize this vision and build the Army of 2030, we are transforming our force structure and evolving how we fight. We must do this to prepare for the challenge of large-scale combat operations, strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, and to be ready if deterrence fails,” she said.
Rainey pushed back on any would-be critics who say the Army is “going backwards” by going to a division. “And that is absolutely not the case. First of all, everything we're doing is threat-informed.”
The brigades will also have to get smaller in order to survive and move, he said—but did not say how much smaller or what kind of weapons and gear would have to be shed.
The larger formations will also help keep brigades in the fight longer—for weeks and months—and give them “endurance,” which they are seeing as a requirement from what they are learning about the war in Ukraine, Greer said.

 

[Kirkhill]

The best argument for higher levels of command - span of control​

“The large-scale combat [operations] against a peer threat, the amount of complexity, speed, violence, chaos, leads us to the conclusion that our great brigade combat team commanders are going to be wholly consumed winning the fight they're in,”​

But is span of control a function of boots on the ground or the number of separate combat functions being orchestrated?

​

​

Divisions, Corps to Replace Brigades As Army’s Wartime Formation Of Choice

Brigades that operated largely independently in Iraq and Afghanistan will fight as part of larger units in future conflicts, officials said.

www.defenseone.com

​

​

Divisions, Corps to Replace Brigades As Army’s Wartime Formation Of Choice​

Brigades that operated largely independently in Iraq and Afghanistan will fight as part of larger units in future conflicts, officials said.​

BY CAITLIN M. KENNEY
STAFF REPORTER, DEFENSE ONE
OCTOBER 10, 2022

• ARMY
• UKRAINE

The Army’s brigade combat teams may have been the signature units of recent wars, but service leaders believe future conflicts will be dominated by divisions and even corps, officials said Monday.
“The large-scale combat [operations] against a peer threat, the amount of complexity, speed, violence, chaos, leads us to the conclusion that our great brigade combat team commanders are going to be wholly consumed winning the fight they're in,” said Gen. James Rainey, the new chief of Army Futures Command, at the Association of the United States Army’s conference in Washington, D.C.
Operations during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars were largely planned by brigade combat teams—some 4,000 troops led by a colonel—and executed by their battalions and companies. Rainey said these BCTs were built in a way that had them hold and operate in an area for a year but were not a “maneuver formation.”
The war in Ukraine has shown what the Army could face in a large-scale conflict, said James Greer, an associate professor at the U.S. Army School for Advanced Military Studies, who spoke on a future-of-warfare panel with Rainey. Ukraine has committed the equivalent of two full corps of troops and is fighting across a vast area, about 150 times larger than the Army’s National Training Center in California, Greer said. A single U.S. Army corps can be comprised of two to five divisions with up to 45,000 soldiers, commanded by a lieutenant general.
“So: very large formations, very large spaces, and of course, everyone's familiar with the lethality, the destruction, the consumption of materiel, ammunition, etc., on a scale that we haven't really thought through in a long time,” Greer said.
Focusing the Army on these larger formations will mean they will be able to work closer with the other services as well as allies and partners, Secretary Christine Wormuth in her Monday keynote.


“Our study and analysis of recent conflicts, exercises, simulation, and training, tells us that brigade commanders must focus fully on winning the close fight. To allow frontline leaders to concentrate on the close fight, division and corps commanders will have the responsibility and capability to visualize the larger picture,” Wormuth said. “To ensure they can do this, our theater armies, corps, and divisions will gain the personnel, organizations, and equipment they need to disrupt and defeat peer adversaries on the future battlefield.”
That means bringing artillery, engineers, and intelligence together at the division level, she said.
Rainey said division commanders will be able to provide these capabilities to the brigades when they need it.
The secretary said this focus on larger formations would be part of the Army’s upcoming doctrine on multi-domain operations, Wormuth said.
“To realize this vision and build the Army of 2030, we are transforming our force structure and evolving how we fight. We must do this to prepare for the challenge of large-scale combat operations, strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, and to be ready if deterrence fails,” she said.
Rainey pushed back on any would-be critics who say the Army is “going backwards” by going to a division. “And that is absolutely not the case. First of all, everything we're doing is threat-informed.”
The brigades will also have to get smaller in order to survive and move, he said—but did not say how much smaller or what kind of weapons and gear would have to be shed.
The larger formations will also help keep brigades in the fight longer—for weeks and months—and give them “endurance,” which they are seeing as a requirement from what they are learning about the war in Ukraine, Greer said.

So does that argue for a proper division with 2 or 3 small brigades or 3 large brigade groups that can slot into someone else's division/corps?

Based on this info, and latest perceptions, I could be persuaded of the benefit of a division with a heavy-medium support brigade and 2 small light-medium brigades. Focus on the Ordnance Corps and the enablers.

 

[KevinB]

So does that argue for a proper division with 2 or 3 small brigades or 3 large brigade groups that can slot into someone else's division/corps?

Based on this info, and latest perceptions, I could be persuaded of the benefit of a division with a heavy-medium support brigade and 2 small light-medium brigades. Focus on the Ordnance Corps and the enablers.

I think that until Canada really changes it’s force structure that the only reasonable approach is 3-5 separate robust Brigades that are tailored to link into US/UK Div.

Divisions are ideally homogeneous entities.
Armored or Light
I’m not even sure a rational exists for a Medium Div.

 

[Kirkhill]

I think that until Canada really changes it’s force structure that the only reasonable approach is 3-5 separate robust Brigades that are tailored to link into US/UK Div.

Divisions are ideally homogeneous entities.
Armored or Light
I’m not even sure a rational exists for a Medium Div.

Kevin, as much as you and I find many points of agreement, and as much as I am a fan of Americans, especially the red state ones I have spent a career working with, I cannot bring myself to relegating the CAF to auxiliary spear-chuckers for the US Government.

Canada does have a dysfunctional defence establishment. It has a dysfunctional system of governance. For me though, the solution is not to merge into the US by stealth. The solution is to create functional systems in a sovereign society.

I have no problem with buying yankee kit. Some of it is pretty good and there is lots of it. But I remain unconvinced that Heavy Forces are a priority requirement for Canadian defence needs. Are they a diplomatic necessity? That is a separate question. They serve good relations with our neighbour and provide a useful international diplomatic tool. But are they more useful than the supporting enablers necessary to field a useful division. I don't believe so.

Should some heavy tools be part of the package of enablers? Absolutely. But, counter to North German Plain orthodoxy, I am entirely convinced that the future will look kindly on dispersed small units with penny-packets of heavy gear when appropriate.

And as for the relevance of the LAV..... If Hummers can be found to be useful, if BTRs can be found to be useful, then LAVs have their place. Even if they are just carriers for ATGM, MANPAD and 81mm mortar teams.



Definition - Medium-Heavy - Mix of 2 or 3 LAV battalions and a Tank Regiment
Definition - Medium-Light - Mix of 2 Light battalions and a LAV Regiment
Definition - Divisional Troops and Enablers - TBD.


Edit: Besides I think the yanks would be happier if we first committed to the integrated anti-missile defence and established the continental defence force we have been promising since 1947.

 

[FJAG]

I think that the debate about whether we are going back to Cold War divisions and corps or not are a red herring.

To start with we never really lost the concept of divisions or corps in the first place. The terminology changed a bit with the use of the term "task force" but essentially, divisional and corps headquarters continued to function during the GWOT albeit in slightly modified forms.

The real point of contention is the brigade structure.

Cold War brigades were designed and intended to function within a tightly deployed division so that supporting CS and CSS elements such as artillery, engineers, reconnaissance and sustainment could be centrally controlled and shifted to support efforts that were concentrated on one or two of the three or more manoeuvre brigades of the division.

The turn of the century reorganization of the US Army, like ours, assumed that large scale combat like last seen in Iraq 1 would not occur again (I really could never understand how that conclusion was justified). The assumption was that combat would be widely distributed and divisions would not have the ability to properly control CS and CSS over distance. It was done with the assumption that it would be much more likely that brigades in the future ought to be large enough force to deploy as an independent force. Accordingly the divisional support elements were broken up amongst the various brigades to form self sufficient BCTs which mirrored the brigade groups that Canada had already had for decades. Divisional headquarters still remained but, notwithstanding that the classical arty, engineer, recce and sustainment elements were still there, the ability to gather them together into single entities had atrophied.

The structure worked reasonably well during Iraq 2 and Afghanistan.

Quite frankly, it doesn't matter that much as to whether you have brigades and CS and CSS centralized at division or BCTs with decentralized CS and CSS. What matters in a peacetime army is whether you have the ability to change from one model to the other rapidly when the need arises. A centralized division should have the ability to spin off a manoeuvre brigade as a BCT when needed for independent operations. A decentralized division ought to have the staff structure to rapidly absorb the decentralized CS and CSS when required to deploy as a concentrated formation. My own preference is for the former it just strikes me as easier to organize, train and exercise. It also mentally prepares the force for large scale operations which the BCT model doesn't do well.

So. As to the debate between @KevinB and @Kirkhill my view is quite simply that we should have a deployable division which has the ability to spin off brigades and Cs and CSS elements as required.

I say this because I think we do need the mindset and the ability to deploy a division if circumstances require it. It's always easier to deploy something smaller than the whole rather than to build something bigger that you don't already have. A division is not necessarily a bigger force then you already have. We already have the manoeuvre brigades, artillery, engineer and recce regiments, sustainment units, signals unit and much of the needed for a division. It's just scattered around and not organized as an entity. Yes, there are capability deficiencies that need to be worked on and a proper sustainment system that needs to be organized, but the manpower and basic elements are already there.

It would be extremely short sighted if we did not organize and train in a way that would allow us to plug a battalion, brigade or even a division into a US or UK force. Yes, there are NATO multinational corps and divisions but the most likely ones we would operate with use US/UK staff structures anyway. Our biggest challenge is to tie our logistics system into a multinational structure. Let's get back to the two, simple overriding factors, though. We share a continent with the US and will probably never deploy on a major operation where the US is not a dominant player. The principle of "Keep It Simple, Stupid" makes it abundantly clear that we should be organized and equipped to operate as seamlessly as possible with a higher US HQ. Unfortunately our nationalistic bravado makes us reject in the heart that which our brain tells us is logical.

There is nothing whatsoever to prevent us having a doctrine that organizes and equips us to be part of a bilateral US/CA force but also have one of tactics and procedures to enable us to operate in the dispersed penny packet system @Kirkhill envisions. Light forces are ideal for that. So are medium forces to an extent. As I said before, its easier to decentralize than to recentralize (if that's a word).

 

[KevinB]

@FJAG and @Kirkhill I’d be tickled pink if the CAF would reorganize and be able to field a DIV or 2.
However I don’t see the will collectively.

Harken back to the ratio of tooth to tail.
You have ~22k Reg Army and ~17 PRes.
Even at a 1:2 ratio (significantly greater than any of the credible western armies) that leaves you with 11k Cbt Force troops.

The fact that the CAF logistics and support systems are so thin already has me doubting that one could actually support 2 Bde’s at this point in time on a continuing basis.

 

[GR66]

@FJAG and @Kirkhill I’d be tickled pink if the CAF would reorganize and be able to field a DIV or 2.
However I don’t see the will collectively.

Harken back to the ratio of tooth to tail.
You have ~22k Reg Army and ~17 PRes.
Even at a 1:2 ratio (significantly greater than any of the credible western armies) that leaves you with 11k Cbt Force troops.

The fact that the CAF logistics and support systems are so thin already has me doubting that one could actually support 2 Bde’s at this point in time on a continuing basis.

That's the dilemma for anyone trying to figure out how to organize the Army isn't it? Do you believe the Army will remain roughly the size it is now with roughly the same challenges (but hopefully with some new equipment), or do you think the situation will change enough that serious efforts will be made to correct the many issues underlying the force and expansion is possible?

If you're a "glass half full" type then it makes sense to begin putting in place the changes to build toward a deployable (and sustainable) Division even if we don't yet have all of the pieces required to make it a reality today.

If on the other hand you're a "glass half empty" type then maybe it instead makes sense to see how to best reorganize our existing assets in order to make the most effective use of them.

Unfortunately, successive Governments barely seem to realize we even have a glass or what they heck to do with it.

 

[Kirkhill]

@FJAG and @Kirkhill I’d be tickled pink if the CAF would reorganize and be able to field a DIV or 2.
However I don’t see the will collectively.

Harken back to the ratio of tooth to tail.
You have ~22k Reg Army and ~17 PRes.
Even at a 1:2 ratio (significantly greater than any of the credible western armies) that leaves you with 11k Cbt Force troops.

The fact that the CAF logistics and support systems are so thin already has me doubting that one could actually support 2 Bde’s at this point in time on a continuing basis.

Not disagreeing at all. Except to say that change is necessary.

My difference with @Furniture and @FJAG is that I don't expect to see more bodies in the ranks any time soon.

On the other hand I see 550 LAV 6.0s in the system, 66 LAV LRSS in the pipeline for 2023 and 350 LAV ACSV in the pipeline for 2024.

I would start from there and assign 3 crew members to each of the 966 vehicles (2888 troops) and then figure out what you can do with them.

We have 3200 trucks in the 7 to 10 tonne range - 3200 drivers (can't afford assistant drivers - don't have them and can't recruit them).

So just to man our LAVs and MSVS fleet we need 6000 bodies.

We have a few tanks - 100 including MBTs, ARVs and AEVs so allow for another 400 bodies.

We also have Engineers but they need new bridges, bulldozers and front end loaders, and some Bobcats, to be useful.

Signallers need radios and radio relay systems.

We have to exploit what we have, and not worry about the things we don't have.

If all we have is a highly mobile light cavalry force then let us embrace that. And ditch all the other pretensions.

 

[FJAG]

@FJAG and @Kirkhill I’d be tickled pink if the CAF would reorganize and be able to field a DIV or 2.
However I don’t see the will collectively.

Harken back to the ratio of tooth to tail.
You have ~22k Reg Army and ~17 PRes.
Even at a 1:2 ratio (significantly greater than any of the credible western armies) that leaves you with 11k Cbt Force troops.

The fact that the CAF logistics and support systems are so thin already has me doubting that one could actually support 2 Bde’s at this point in time on a continuing basis.

I like those odds. Based on three existing manoeuvre brigades of 4,000 each (12,000 total) that leaves 27,000. Dedicate 7,000 to administrative overhead and core training establishments and you have 20,000 left over. That's enough for a divisional headquarters and 5 to 6 other brigades.

There's also the fact that the ARes is established at some 30,000 but only paid to roughly 16-18,000 leaving some room for adjustment if one cut back on the RegF and exchanged the PYs for ARes at a 1:3 to 1:6 ratio.

I'm waiting to see how the new US divisional structure works out numbers wise by the time is all said and done but let's look at a heavy division as an example.

1. Two ABCTs are 4,040 each and an SBCT is 4,680 for a total of 12,760.
2. The division adds a headquarters but the artillery brigade comes out of the hides of the manoeuvre brigades and is basically a wash.
3. The Aviation brigade is also a wash because it comes out of the RCAF.
4. That leaves the headquarters itself, a two battalion Sustainment Brigade and a Protection Brigade which are well within the 5-6 brigades available.

That leaves up to 2 to 4 brigades over and above the division requirements.

One thing to remember in the overall structure is that there is no need to cater for a corps support structure - that will have to come from a multinational organization although it would not be unreasonable to suppose that we will need a national theatre sustainment element as part of that (let's say one brigade equivalent)

Let's be real though. The crux of whatever argument is the phrase "at this point in time".

Can we currently support two deployed brigades on a continuing basis? If we're talking two fully staffed and deployed brigades each on a six month rotational basis then the answer is no; of course not.

Can we staff and deploy two brigades? Yes we can, assuming we can cure the obvious equipment deficiencies. The problem is duration and rotation. It's a one shot affair.

Can we staff and deploy one brigade? Yes we can, for a short duration and maybe even a rotation or two.

We certainly can't staff and deploy three brigades or a division out of the way that we are currently configured even if it wasn't for more than a one time deployment. There are just too many capability shortfalls starting with the lack of a trained and equipped deployable divisional headquarters much less the logistics system needed to support that size of a force.

For me that's the fundamental need for a "Force 20xx" program. The numbers say we should be able to deploy and sustain more. From within the present manpower envelope authorized by the government, we should be able to deploy and sustain one rotational brigade indefinitely or do a one time deployment of a full division (which can't be rotated but could be sustained for losses).

I keep saying: If the Canadian Army were to receive a report card from a high school teacher it would read "Not performing up to his potential".

We need to be aspirational. Honestly, we can be aspirational while remaining realistic with a little bit of vision and an willingness for reform.

 

[Kirkhill]

11th Airborne Division

12,000 troops

2 IBCT

2 Cavalry Squadrons
2 Engineer Battalions
5 Infantry Battalions

1 Atk Recce Avn Battalion
2 Artillery Regiments

2 Support Battalions
1 Sustainment Battalion
1 GS Avn Battalion

Army re-activates historic airborne unit, reaffirms commitment to Arctic Strategy

FORT WAINWRIGHT, Alaska – Several hundred Soldiers gathered in formation within the Alaskan Interior on a bright June morning to take part in the activa...

www.army.mil

 

[KevinB]

@FJAG any actual increase to TacHel needs to come at the expense of Army PY’s, as the RCAF won’t alter it themselves.


@Kirkhill the 11th isn’t fully filled out yet.
It’s still missing an Inf Bde.

The 82nd is a better example of an Airborne Div.
- this is a 2021 chart, I have not found a more updated one.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Canada sent a Para company and elements of an ARCG to JPMRC Alaska in March 2022 to train with 11th Airborne Division as part of their Brigade validation and will be doing so again in March 2023.

 

[KevinB]

Canada sent a Para company and elements of an ARCG to JPMRC Alaska in March 2022 to train with 11th Airborne Division as part of their Brigade validation and will be doing so again in March 2023.

Would be nice if it was actually at least a Para Bn.
Conventional Force deployment of a Para Coy is pretty pointless (I’d argue a Bde is the minimum capability but…)