Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Infanteer]

So, are you saying a company from a Canadian Army light battalion can't work as "Company-Group sized units capable of independent operation in the field (sometimes behind enemy lines) with an array of integral weapon systems including AA, AT, Sense/Strike, etc. focused on raiding, skirmishing and swarming?"

How is "raiding, skirmishing and swarming" not engaging the enemy in close combat to destroy him?

 

[FJAG]

So, are you saying a company from a Canadian Army light battalion can't work as "Company-Group sized units capable of independent operation in the field (sometimes behind enemy lines) with an array of integral weapon systems including AA, AT, Sense/Strike, etc. focused on raiding, skirmishing and swarming?"

How is "raiding, skirmishing and swarming" not engaging the enemy in close combat to destroy him?

Just a quick question - because I don't know the answer - what is the vehicle establishment of our light battalions right now? Not the whole thing but just roughly what is in use at the rifle company level.

 

[Infanteer]

There are B Vehicles in the echelon, but that's it.

 

[GR66]

So, are you saying a company from a Canadian Army light battalion can't work as "Company-Group sized units capable of independent operation in the field (sometimes behind enemy lines) with an array of integral weapon systems including AA, AT, Sense/Strike, etc. focused on raiding, skirmishing and swarming?"

How is "raiding, skirmishing and swarming" not engaging the enemy in close combat to destroy him?

I'm not saying that they are not capable of doing that but unless I'm reading his intent completely wrong, my understanding is that the Light forces that Kirkhill is proposing as the basis for the infantry would be intended and organized specifically for that type of role as their primary focus as opposed to a traditional Infantry Battalion/Brigade structure capable of splitting of Combat Teams, etc.

And if LAV infantry is the most likely type of unit that the Canadian Government is likely to deploy (even if only to have the vehicles available for protected mobility while the infantry primarily operates dismounted) then why would you choose to have a full 1/3 of your infantry force NOT habitually trained on that platform?

If this issue is rather that we don't have enough LAVs available to support 6 x LAV Battalions then that is another story, but I can't say that I recall that argument being made.

 

[KevinB]

FWIW small team work is SOF territory. Light Infantry isn’t SOF, but generally Infantry who don’t use heavy vehicles and are generally for us on certain niche employment.
Rapid Deployment
Air Assault
Airborne
Mountain
Arctic

You don’t setup units to fight isolated battles, but your equip your forces so they are effective as possible at the lowest levels that doesn’t adversely affect their mobility.

Headed to Hockey more to follow.

 

[KevinB]

I'm not saying that they are not capable of doing that but unless I'm reading his intent completely wrong, my understanding is that the Light forces that Kirkhill is proposing as the basis for the infantry would be intended and organized specifically for that type of role as their primary focus as opposed to a traditional Infantry Battalion/Brigade structure capable of splitting of Combat Teams, etc.

And if LAV infantry is the most likely type of unit that the Canadian Government is likely to deploy (even if only to have the vehicles available for protected mobility while the infantry primarily operates dismounted) then why would you choose to have a full 1/3 of your infantry force NOT habitually trained on that platform?

If this issue is rather that we don't have enough LAVs available to support 6 x LAV Battalions then that is another story, but I can't say that I recall that argument being made.

Keeping LAV crews trained…
There is only so many training hours and dollars available.

 

[Kirkhill]

Just a quick question - because I don't know the answer - what is the vehicle establishment of our light battalions right now? Not the whole thing but just roughly what is in use at the rifle company level.

Just a quick question for you.

Why does it matter?

The whole point of a Light Battalion, a term I use solely to differentiate it from the various forms of infantry defined by their mounts, is that it is not dependent on its vehicles.

@GR66

I prefer the USMC construct that holds the Infantry's transport as non-organic. Their Infantry is organized into administrative Regiments of 3 tactical battalions of 3 tactical companies of 3 tactical platoons of 3 tactical squads of 3 tactical teams. Each level has its own Command and Support Elements, all the way down to the squad.

The Battalion is configured to fight as an integral part of a combined arms Marine Air Ground Task Force or a Marine Expeditionary Brigade or a Marine Expeditionary Unit. Everything that the Battalion doesn't own, but can be provided by the Corps, is deployed with the Battalion on long term engagements where the entire combined force lives and trains and deploys together.

The Battalion can be fielded as a cohesive full battalion, or split into independent companies, or platoons, or squads. They can concentrate and fight as a closed fist on the "conventional" battlefield as they did in Gulf War I. Or they can disperse and fight as splayed fingers on the ADO battlefield. They can fight on the shoreline, in the arctic, in the jungles, or on the European battlefield. They possess weapons to handle enemy personnel, vehicles, AFVs, helicopters and aerial threats. They can be deployed by ship, boat, amphibs, tracks, wheels and helicopters. They can be strategically deployed by air (not parachute - just an aircraft landing on any suitable runway anywhere in the world).

And all battalions do all these things - with a basic TO&E and a basic doctrine and training time to permit switching from one specialized role to the next.

Most battalions have their fields of excellence and are customarily deployed in that role but every battalion can switch roles and move from arctic to jungle, from MAGTF to MEU(SOC) to ACP and be expected to perform adequately even if they don't have the luxury of training time.

All battalions are expected to supply "Company-Group sized units capable of independent operation in the field ... with an array of integral weapon systems including AA, AT, Sense/Strike, etc. focused on raiding, skirmishing and swarming?"

The "Behind Enemy Lines" stuff is truly the realm of the Special Forces - even if their tactics and kit are the same as their siblings on the other side of the "Enemy Lines". That is not a field I would recommend for any Canadian unit outside of CANSOFCOM.


So why do I keep harping on about "Light" Infantry Companies?

In truth I would be happier to refer to them as Infantry as generations have known the term and the USMC still uses the term. They are "Her Majesty's Odd Job Men". And that applies to all Infantry regardless of how they get to work.

In truth I would be happier referring to Battalions than Companies as the central organizing principle but our system is so FUBAR between Army and The Rest, Zipperheads and Grunts, Armies of the West and East, Regs and Molitia, Capbadges and Colonels galore .... etc. etc. etc., that I have given up long ago at being able to create workable battalions outside of the Reg Force given the challenge the Reg Force seems to have creating workable battalions for themselves. And here I do not just refer to the RCIC. The RCAC and the RRCA are just as FUBAR.


I focus on the Company as that is the largest unit that I have seen on parade on a Molitia Parade Square - 100 to 200 troops.
The Molitia has been able to produce adequate Captains and Warrant Officers.
The Company can train as a combined arms entity if organized on the USMC structure with integral Weapons Platoons and Weapons Squads and well equipped squads and teams.
The Company can train with elements of other Corps to create a combined arms Combat Team.
The Company can be easily plugged into an existing Battalion Structure. Edit: A Battalion can have 2 to 5, 6 at a stretch, Companies working under a central command. (Actually pre WW1 battalions had 10 Companies under command). The 12 manoeuver "Battalions" of the RCIC and the RCAC, and the 4 regular regiments of artillery should be prepared to work with 2 to 6 subunits depending on availability and regardless or parent capbadge.
The Company can be deployed as an independent entity on a brigade or divisional tasking.
The Company is the minimal max-flex organization to which we can aspire.
Should it be 50 troops or 250 troops in size? I don't care. I am more concerned about the range of weaponry, competencies and command.


As Infanteer rightly points out, regardless of horse they ride, an Infanteer is an Infanteer. They close with and destroy. Sometimes they wait for the enemy to come to them. Sometimes they take the fight to the enemy.

 

[Infanteer]

I'm not saying that they are not capable of doing that but unless I'm reading his intent completely wrong, my understanding is that the Light forces that Kirkhill is proposing as the basis for the infantry would be intended and organized specifically for that type of role as their primary focus as opposed to a traditional Infantry Battalion/Brigade structure capable of splitting of Combat Teams, etc.

The problem with the idea of "real light infantry" as is pitched by the 4GW light infantry jaeger crowd is that it is mythical. It creates a false dichotomy of "mech vs light" infantry that doesn't really exist, but suited the conceptual narrative of the crowd that was pushing that junk theory.

The reality is that infantry forces, regardless of their platform, are all beholden to the same tactical and administrative realities as any other regular, conventional force is. Any infantry unit can and will disperse and concentrate for tactical and administrative purposes. But having a force employment concept set permanently to "dispersed" is not in line with the flexibility that an infantry unit provides on the battlefield.

Fighting tactically dispersed is one approach, but I find it is often overhyped. First off, this sort of operating framework makes forces dreadfully exposed, especially to a mechanized foe, due to lack of mutual support. I remember a collective exercise where a Light Infantry Company was used as a "long range raiding company." Following insertion, it was quickly detected, converged upon, and destroyed. Extraction for a force on foot is difficult when the pursuit is on, and the lines of communication often conceived for these forces are usually vulnerable to any enemy with a modicum of area denial capability. Call this the "Chindit effect."

The other fact is that concentration of force is a central tenet of modern system land combat for a reason - to achieve decisive results, and to seize and hold ground, a force has to come together to create overwhelming combat power at the critical point. This is why a Light Infantry Battalion has a robust combat support company - that advantage would be squandered if it operated in a manner that prevented this additional weight.

Any good infantry unit disperses to avoid being vulnerable, and concentrates to achieve decision. The thinking that this is some sort of tactical deficiency or outmoded way of fighting is why the 4GW theorists are just shoveling clouds.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Historically, light infantry often fought as scouts, raiders, and skirmishers

Maybe a very long time ago. Historically, going quite far back, anyone on foot scouting and raiding would have been at high risk of being butchered by the enemy's light cavalry. Skirmishing in front of the line of battle was just a minor part of what was primarily a "line infantry" battle.

Scouting, raiding, anything else requiring extensive movement, is a job for mounted forces.

Light infantry is just dismounted infantry.

 

[GR66]

The problem with the idea of "real light infantry" as is pitched by the 4GW light infantry jaeger crowd is that it is mythical. It creates a false dichotomy of "mech vs light" infantry that doesn't really exist, but suited the conceptual narrative of the crowd that was pushing that junk theory.

The reality is that infantry forces, regardless of their platform, are all beholden to the same tactical and administrative realities as any other regular, conventional force is. Any infantry unit can and will disperse and concentrate for tactical and administrative purposes. But having a force employment concept set permanently to "dispersed" is not in line with the flexibility that an infantry unit provides on the battlefield.

Fighting tactically dispersed is one approach, but I find it is often overhyped. First off, this sort of operating framework makes forces dreadfully exposed, especially to a mechanized foe, due to lack of mutual support. I remember a collective exercise where a Light Infantry Company was used as a "long range raiding company." Following insertion, it was quickly detected, converged upon, and destroyed. Extraction for a force on foot is difficult when the pursuit is on, and the lines of communication often conceived for these forces are usually vulnerable to any enemy with a modicum of area denial capability. Call this the "Chindit effect."

The other fact is that concentration of force is a central tenet of modern system land combat for a reason - to achieve decisive results, and to seize and hold ground, a force has to come together to create overwhelming combat power at the critical point. This is why a Light Infantry Battalion has a robust combat support company - that advantage would be squandered if it operated in a manner that prevented this additional weight.

Any good infantry unit disperses to avoid being vulnerable, and concentrates to achieve decision. The thinking that this is some sort of tactical deficiency or outmoded way of fighting is why the 4GW theorists are just shoveling clouds.

I guess we're in agreement then. No SOF-lite like specialized infantry constructs and there is no real substantial difference between Mechanized Infantry and Light Infantry other than how they get to the battle.

The question then is if we are reducing the number of Infantry Battalions from nine to six should we have 6 x LAV Battalions or 4 x LAV Battaltions and 2 x Light Battalions.

Since you agree that the only real difference between the two is that one drives to the battle and the other walks, then wouldn't it give us more flexibility to have 6 x LAV Battalions, any one of which can also deploy dismounted if required? Deploying the Light Battalions with LAVs on the other hand involves vehicle crewing skills that they are not regularly trained on.

 

[McG]

The question then is if we are reducing the number of Infantry Battalions from nine to six should we have 6 x LAV Battalions or 4 x LAV Battaltions and 2 x Light Battalions

My understanding is CA walked back that plan. 9 battalions will stay.

 

[KevinB]

.

Light infantry is just dismounted infantry.

It shouldn’t be.

Infantry are dismounted fighters by nature.

Mechanized Infantry general go in tracks or wheeled APC/IFV to battle

Motorized Infantry use trucks - though this has been co-opted to also explain wheeled APC/IFV Forces.

Light Infantry isn’t supposed to be just Infantry without mechanization/Motors.

Light Infantry can have light vehicles for mobility - or helicopters for Air Assault etc.

Canada has just neglected Light Infantry for years many have forget it’s role - and those who championed LI eventually got pissed off with the refusal to admit that and went SOF and/or got out.


There are only so many training hours available - you can’t have a Mech Force that is equally good at Light as a dedicated light force that has equal opportunities - simply due to PCF cycles, etc. the isn’t time or money to be stellar at both.

Unless you ignore the niche roles for Light Infantry as Canada has done…

 

[Infanteer]

Since you agree that the only real difference between the two is that one drives to the battle and the other walks, then wouldn't it give us more flexibility to have 6 x LAV Battalions, any one of which can also deploy dismounted if required?

It isn't that simple. What I argued is that their role is the same.

There are differences between the two; largely related to knowledge and skills in planning and sustainment. As well, their different strengths and weaknesses mean that missions may be different. Finally, the Infantry does not operate in a vacuum - there are the other arms and services that fight and sustain the battle. Their ability to support specific missions may mean a degree of specialization or focused training.

These means they are not necessarily inter-changeable for specific missions without some degree of reorientation.

 

[Kirkhill]

It isn't that simple. What I argued is that their role is the same.

There are differences between the two; largely related to knowledge and skills in planning and sustainment. As well, their different strengths and weaknesses mean that missions may be different. Finally, the Infantry does not operate in a vacuum - there are the other arms and services that fight and sustain the battle. Their ability to support specific missions may mean a degree of specialization or focused training.

These means they are not necessarily inter-changeable for specific missions without some degree of reorientation.

Would you accept that "What" the Mech and Light Infantry do is the same.

"How" they do it is different.

Both types build competence and excellence within their own particular limitations.

 

[Fabius]

The problem is that with the RCIC period.

Problem: The Bn’s are hollow and have no personnel stability meaning no expertise developed or ownership of anything. RCIC solution fight tooth and nail to maintain all 9 Bns and the schools as is.

Problem: Reserve infantry aren’t organized or equipped to do much above provide dismount rifleman (STAR not withstanding). RCIC solution fight tooth and nail against anything that takes away from 9 reg Bns.

Problem: Light forces. Our 3 Bns are neither IBCT Bns, nor IBCT (Air Assault) Bns, nor IBCT (Airborne) because the problem isn’t with infantry Rifleman who close with and destroy things it’s with the entire combined arms and joint fight to include the Bde level CSS and CS that is absent that makes our 3 Bns unfit for purpose. RCIC solution - tell a 3 Bn CO to come up with a force employment concept for his unit.

I am sorry but we are doing this to ourselves.

 

[MilEME09]

From what I have been reading, Ukraine has caused some serious recalculation among the CAF and NATO leadership and F2025 is being changed on the fly to reflect the new reality.

 

[Infanteer]

The problem is that with the RCIC period.

Problem: The Bn’s are hollow and have no personnel stability meaning no expertise developed or ownership of anything. RCIC solution fight tooth and nail to maintain all 9 Bns and the schools as is.

Problem: Reserve infantry aren’t organized or equipped to do much above provide dismount rifleman (STAR not withstanding). RCIC solution fight tooth and nail against anything that takes away from 9 reg Bns.

Problem: Light forces. Our 3 Bns are neither IBCT Bns, nor IBCT (Air Assault) Bns, nor IBCT (Airborne) because the problem isn’t with infantry Rifleman who close with and destroy things it’s with the entire combined arms and joint fight to include the Bde level CSS and CS that is absent that makes our 3 Bns unfit for purpose. RCIC solution - tell a 3 Bn CO to come up with a force employment concept for his unit.

I am sorry but we are doing this to ourselves.

I think you are confusing "RCIC" and "Canadian Army" in a lot of things here.

 

[McG]

IBCT

The infantry brigade combat team is American. Instead of coming across as a rational analysis of Canadian requirements, is appears as fetishing US ORBATS when you keep throwing that terminology around where it is not needed.

 

[Infanteer]

Would you accept that "What" the Mech and Light Infantry do is the same.

"How" they do it is different.

Both types build competence and excellence within their own particular limitations.

"What" is the same. This is defined by the infantry battalion's role - close with and destroy the enemy, repel the enemy’s assault by fire, and to seize and retain ground. It conducts close engagement tasks in stability operations.

"How" is the same as well - application of combined arms tactics in offensive, defensive, and stability tasks.

"Where" can be different, based on mission, or it could be the same, depending on mission. "Where" will impact the method under which "how" occurs. "Why" and "When" could also introduce a different context, based on the mission, that affects "method." So "method" is your difference - a subordinate factor of "How." This may sound like splitting hairs, but I think the nuance is important, and helps conceptually avoid the false dichotomy.

And method is where you build the competence and excellence within limitations.

 

[MilEME09]

Womder how the new Army commander will factor in, from CAF facebook

Congratulations to LGen Jocelyn Paul’s appointment as the next Commander of the Canadian Army. LGen Paul is a member of the Huron-Wendat First Nation and will be the first Indigenous person to be appointed to lead Canada’s army. LGen Paul began his military career as a Reserve Infantry Officer before joining the Regular Force and is currently serving as NATO’s Deputy Commander Allied Joint Force Command Naples. A change of command between current acting commander MGen Michel-Henri St-Louis and LGen Paul will occur in the summer.

Congratulations on this achievement Sir, we look forward to serving under your command.