Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

I had the chance to ask exactly that question of Leslie when I interviewed him.

He confirmed that there were clear and opposing viewpoints but at the end he was persuaded to the distribute them to each brigade for the reason that it was to be a more heavily protected vehicle for deployments (remember this whole thing got its genesis with the Op MEDUSA situation and the LAV3's low protection factor) and if they were to be operationally deployed then every brigade would need some to train on under the Managed Readiness System.

The regimental mafia and equality amongst brothers is a very heavy influencer but the MRS system really is the trump card when it comes to three symmetrical brigades. One first needs to break out of the MRS, as fashioned, if one wants to make any viable arguments for going asymmetrical.

Curiously a platoon of Leo's and a company of CCVs equals a combat team.

 

[markppcli]

Latvia is now what I would define as a "standing commitment" in the same sense as Stanavforlant". So it seems reasonable to me that it should be met by standing forces. Ie Regs.

Are we so reduced and straitened that the Regular Force can't even sustain two companies on their own from three brigades with nominal strengths of something like 4000 each?

Indeed we might as well just pack it in.

No one said it couldn’t be manned.

 

[Brad Sallows]

What is "true light infantry?"

They're like True Scotsmen. You'd know them if you saw them.

The chief factor f*cking everything up must be the tendency to keep putting off replacing stuff on time, which necessarily creates an increasingly large bulge of capital spending which no federal government wants to digest (although they do like pocketing the savings from putting stuff off).

 

[Kirkhill]

They're like True Scotsmen. You'd know them if you saw them.

And if you have to describe them you've never met them.

The chief factor f*cking everything up must be the tendency to keep putting off replacing stuff on time, which necessarily creates an increasingly large bulge of capital spending which no federal government wants to digest (although they do like pocketing the savings from putting stuff off).

The only way to address that bow wave is to start feeding the system slowly, over time with lots of small contracts. Inefficient and no big political splash, or immediate commercial benefit but it solves the forces problems in the short term and lets it sort out its long term needs on a more leisurely basis.

Anand and Freeland need to tell Industry to take a five year hiatus and let the DND lead with Company and Battalion buys. Industry should be told to keep an eye on what the Forces are buying and figure out how they can contribute in the future. Maybe they will find something like the LAV that they can sell to the Americans and the Saudis.

 

[Infanteer]

He confirmed that there were clear and opposing viewpoints but at the end he was persuaded to the distribute them to each brigade for the reason that it was to be a more heavily protected vehicle for deployments (remember this whole thing got its genesis with the Op MEDUSA situation and the LAV3's low protection factor) and if they were to be operationally deployed then every brigade would need some to train on under the Managed Readiness System.

The regimental mafia and equality amongst brothers is a very heavy influencer but the MRS system really is the trump card when it comes to three symmetrical brigades. One first needs to break out of the MRS, as fashioned, if one wants to make any viable arguments for going asymmetrical.

This was linked to Leslie's crackpot plan that the 9 Infantry Battalions be organized the same. The original plan being considered was 2 LAV Coys and a Light Coy for each Bn, but this was amended to organizing all battalions with the same structure, and giving the LIBs the TAPV.

It was shortsighted thinking that we'd be fighting Afghanistan again, with a need to punch out cookie cutter battalions, that led to this thinking. It never went anywhere as the TAPVs went elsewhere and the CCV died on the vine.

 

[Kirkhill]

Curiously a platoon of Leo's and a company of CCVs equals a combat team.

So here's yet another gameable thought.

2 and 5 CMBGs

2x LAV Bns (build to suit)
2x Heavy Squadrons (1 Troop of Leo2A4Ms and 3 Troops of CV9035s)
2x Recce Squadrons

1 CMBG

2x LAV Bns
1x Type 57 Leo Regiment with 1x Recce Squadron
2x LAV Bns each with a Heavy Company in CV9035s

And pass the entire Light Force and Domestic Quick Response effort over to the Reserves to be solved within the confines of Class A, B and C troops.

The Reserve Force also to supply trainable bodies for the organized Ready Reserve to augment the Regulars.

 

[Good2Golf]

Not the case. The role of an infantry battalion, regardless of its transportation, is the same. An infantry battalion's role is to close with and destroy the enemy, repel the enemy’s assault by fire, and to seize and retain ground. It conducts close engagement tasks in stability operations.



What is "true light infantry?"

@Infanteer I’m crediting* you with a shot of Johnny Walker Blue, every time you say that…redeemable in person (and transferable to whomever you choose to bring with you) the next time you come to Bytown and elect to RV in my LZ. …

* up to a full 750ml bottle

 

[Infanteer]

So here's yet another gameable thought.

We don't have CV-90s.

 

[Kirkhill]

We don't have CV-90s.

I know. I erred by allowing myself to fantasize. Maybe somebody could reopen that discussion? Maybe settle for some of Kevin's Bradleys?

 

[IKnowNothing]

Curiously a platoon of Leo's and a company of CCVs equals a combat team.

Which feeds into tweaking the Canadianized MEU idea Scrap the extra tank formation, add a platoon/troop to each.
That plus embracing the idea of consolidation..

8x Leo (2 troops of 4)
8x LAV LRSS (2x mixed Recce Squadrons)
8x TAPV
36x LAV 6 ISC (3x Inf Coy)

x7 (all 3 armoured regiments, 1st Btn of the Inf) + 1 spare/ deployed/ prepositioned
=
56 Leo's
56 LAV LRSS
56 TAPV
252 LAV ISC


Add 8x LAV CP per quickly converted to carry dismount 81mm mortar teams, to be turreted as soon as can be arranged
2nd Btn of the Inf regiments to LIB with TAPV Recce Squadron and 8 tube mortar platoon
3rd battalion dissolved to ensure that everything is manned and supported
Artillery to Achers to free up PY's to man an M-Shorad battery
UOR Javelins


Consolidate the combat arms down to
6x fully manned and equipped standing combined arms battlegroups, 1x full set of prepositioned/deployable kit
3x LIB

 

[FJAG]

Curiously a platoon of Leo's and a company of CCVs equals a combat team.

Old Army here. Nothing less than a half squadron, ever. And that presupposes that somewhere nearby there is a squadron (-) and a regt with all the ech needed to support the half squadron.

This was linked to Leslie's crackpot plan that the 9 Infantry Battalions be organized the same. The original plan being considered was 2 LAV Coys and a Light Coy for each Bn, but this was amended to organizing all battalions with the same structure, and giving the LIBs the TAPV.

Had never heard of the first plan which IMHO would have been crackpot. Do recall the other. While in Ottawa 2006-9 I had a young crackerjack GGFG sergeant working for me who went RegF officer and was posted to 3 RCR to work on the TAPVization of the battalion. Kept in touch with him for a few years while it slowly crumbled away.

It was shortsighted thinking that we'd be fighting Afghanistan again, with a need to punch out cookie cutter battalions, that led to this thinking. It never went anywhere as the TAPVs went elsewhere and the CCV died on the vine.

When CCV was initiated it wasn't too far fetched because we had no LAV6.0s and were losing LAV3s to IEDs. Afghanistan and failed states were still on the agenda. Trouble was with the rate of procurement the CCV, as the Army saw it, was made mostly redundant with the LAV6.0 upgrade. I don't think that there was ever a robust plan to form a heavy force for true conventional conflict ... at best it was to form a better protected LAV battlegroup plus tanks for weight. At the same time we were toying seriously with MLRS/HIMARS which was and is a bit of a questionable fit for the force structure we had and were, and still are, all too married to.

I've never been a fan of the symmetric army and MRS. Might get back to my days when we had one heavy brigade and one heavyish brigade each with a purpose and two light brigades with purposes of their own. I can't help but thinking that we need to get back to defining the roles we need to prepare for - and in my view with current policies that includes something heavy for Latvia/NATO; something SOF; and something quickish reaction but still mechanized or mechanizable. One can debate the ratios and the armaments but at the end it should spell the end of symmetry and the MRS as it stands now.

 

[KevinB]

My take-away from 184 pages of discussion on this topic is that there are simply too many issues with the current Canadian Army for Force 2025 (or whatever is replacing it) to be any sort of truly transformative restructuring of the Army.

Agreed

We have an Armoured Corps with a worn out fleet of tanks that is too small to support and sustain a true Heavy Brigade and a primary Recce vehicle that current operations in Ukraine are showing may be totally unsuitable for a peer conflict.

Agreed.

Our Infantry Corps is undermanned to fill the 9 x Battalions we have and both the Mechanized and Light Battalions are missing the key enablers which would allow them to survive in a peer conflict (ATGMs, integral DFS, sufficient integral IDF, a SHORAD capability, etc.).

Agreed

The Artillery Regiments are woefully lacking in the number of guns they have in addition to not having a self-propelled platform to at least give them a greater chance of survival in a peer conflict. We have no IDF support beyond the direct support Regiments for the Battalions, no rocket artillery, no loitering munitions, no SHORAD batteries, and no MRAD batteries or C-RAM capabilities to protect our forces or our logistics infrastructure.

Agreed

Logistics support appears to be ad hoc for overseas deployments with the line between expeditionary support capabilities and garrison support capabilities in the Service Battalions being blurred. Overall our logistics support infrastructure may turn out to be very vulnerable in a large scale peer/near-peer conflict. It sound like even peacetime maintenance capabilities are stretched to almost the breaking point.

Agreed

Given all of the above I'm beginning to think that rather than Force 2025/202? being a transformation plan it should rather be a consolidation plan.

Or a Reformation?

The global security situation has changed significantly since Force 2025 was first initiated and there are a lot of lessons to be learned from what is happening in Ukraine. These changes will mean that the Canadian Army has to really take a serious look at what a modern battlefield will really look like from a Canadian perspective and look at what capabilities are missing and if our Doctrine may have to be reviewed/revised in order to be successful and relevant.

Agreed

Perhaps a first step should be to eliminate the 3rd (Light) Battalions from the Infantry Regiments and feed those PYs back into the schools and the Mechanized Battalions.

I don’t think that is a good idea at all.
Light Infantry offer some significant advantages in some terrain that Mechanized Infantry don’t. The opposite is also true.
But I’d collapse a BN of each Regiment if need be - but retain at least 2 BN of Light Infantry - right now I’d say the RCR just do to Pet - and make the RCR the Light Inf (which bothers the crap out of me as a Former PPCLightI guy)
But it is what it is - remaining LAV’s would be held in WX and Valcatraz, some in LTPS and a Coy worth for PRes units to learn on for basic courses (Driver, Gunner, Crew Commander) - due to limited CSS ability the need to put some into Long Term Preservative Storage makes sense to me - or gift them to Ukraine.

Then a focus can be put on re-establishing those support capabilities that we already know are missing in order to make the infantry survivable in a peer conflict (including integral AT, AA and IDF capabilities). At the same time the Armoured Corps can focus on reviewing our Recce doctrine and determining what the Brigade Recce Squadron needs to look like and at the same time concentrating our tanks in a single Regiment.

I’m honestly terribly opposed to the Armored controlling Bde Recce at this point- especially as anyone senior in the RCAC seems to have been fine with some colossally fucked up opinions and acceptance of the suitability of some vehicles and what a Recce asset for a Bde actually is.

Frankly I’d be focusing the tank the CAF does have in one Reg’t and looking to offload a lot of Armor PY’s into Artillery and Infantry units.

The Artillery can focus on bringing in a self-propelled gun system to replace the M777.

Move all the M777 to Pet - have res units train with 2RCHA so one can field at least 3 6 gun Bty and ideally 8 gun battery.

The Combat Engineer Regiments and Service Battalions can take the time to review their own units and ensure that they have the equipment and capabilities required to support a deployed Canadian Brigade Group.

While this consolidation and re-building effort is taking place within the Army the CAF leadership should engage with the Government of Canada to push for a new Defence White Paper to clearly define what kind of forces the Government expects to be able to deploy in this new security environment.

Honestly this is a bit of a cop out. SSE already gave the CAF/DND considerable latitude in force Pre. The Army has squandered their resources for decades and looked at a lot of things with blinders on.

This will then allow the Army to look at the larger questions of how many and what type of Brigades are required for the Reg Force and what expectations there are for the contributions will be required from the Reserves to meet our military commitments. This would define our broader organizational and equipment/training/support requirements.

Honestly my faith in the CA to actual learn is low. As I mentioned above and many times before SSE gave a mandate to prepare for all spectrums of war, and OOW, and no one seemed to play any attention to the idea of a peer/near peer threat

Not nearly as sexy as the other proposals, but I'm guessing that it would provide a much more solid base to build on going forward.

If I was King for a day…
My first Force 2025 reorg would be to strike the 2nd and 3rd Regular Force Infantry BN’s
I’d use the PY’s to man the 1’st BN’s and make the 2nd and 3rd 30/70 Total Force units.
I’d then use the remaining PY to both beef up schools but reintroduce The Black Watch , The Canadian Guards, and create a Canadian Parachute Regiment
Not just to dilute the Capbadge Mafia but also to create a backbone of a Total Force Regular Infantry Corps.

 

[KevinB]

A CMBG is allegedly 7,634 ish AR.
Which seems a tad bloated, and one can’t wonder why they aren’t all filled when you theoretically try to have 3 and a CSS Bde and…

 

[Kirkhill]

Old Army here. Nothing less than a half squadron, ever. And that presupposes that somewhere nearby there is a squadron (-) and a regt with all the ech needed to support the half squadron.

Come on! Can't I get a little give? I keep being told of the need for compromise ... Jeez.

Look the Armoured Corps gets a properly resourced Type 57 regiment on the old pattern.
The infantry gets the basis of some real support for their LAV Battalions.
2 LAV Battalions per Brigade each with 4 tanks - That gives the RCAC a half squadron in each Brigade from which to teach the Infantry how to cooperate and which could be combined with 14 LAVs or CV90s if the fairy dust gets sprinkled nicely, to form a permanent Anti-Tank/DFS Squadron to support, protect and co-operate with the LAV Battalions.

The Type 57 Regiment puts the RCAC in the catbird seat for the lead positions in at least one of the Brigades.

And if somebody wants to compromise with Kevin and I on the Light Battalions as well that would be appreciated. Even if it is just one Lt Battalion and a host of CADTC/SFAB/Cadre Trainers with an bunch of Class A/B Ready Reserve Companies.

 

[Kirkhill]

Which feeds into tweaking the Canadianized MEU idea Scrap the extra tank formation, add a platoon/troop to each.
That plus embracing the idea of consolidation..

8x Leo (2 troops of 4)
8x LAV LRSS (2x mixed Recce Squadrons)
8x TAPV
36x LAV 6 ISC (3x Inf Coy)

x7 (all 3 armoured regiments, 1st Btn of the Inf) + 1 spare/ deployed/ prepositioned
=
56 Leo's
56 LAV LRSS
56 TAPV
252 LAV ISC


Add 8x LAV CP per quickly converted to carry dismount 81mm mortar teams, to be turreted as soon as can be arranged
2nd Btn of the Inf regiments to LIB with TAPV Recce Squadron and 8 tube mortar platoon
3rd battalion dissolved to ensure that everything is manned and supported
Artillery to Achers to free up PY's to man an M-Shorad battery
UOR Javelins


Consolidate the combat arms down to
6x fully manned and equipped standing combined arms battlegroups, 1x full set of prepositioned/deployable kit
3x LIB

The reason I want to keep a central large force of tanks is for training, maintenance and organization. I could cycle Troops from the centre out the Brigades and keep the remote Troops in reasonable running condition. In addition it gives me a formed body which can be used in its entirety, as Squadrons, as Half-Squadrons or as more Detached Troops. Flexibility to react to various situations as the circumstances demand.

The same principle would apply to the Guns, Air Defence and Engineers.

 

[FJAG]

A CMBG is allegedly 7,634 ish AR.
Which seems a tad bloated, and one can’t wonder why they aren’t all filled when you theoretically try to have 3 and a CSS Bde and…

Those numbers might be a tad out. The last authorized establishment that I've seen (and that's admittedly not a war establishment) assigned roughly 4,600 PYs to 1 CMBG to which should be added 300 for 1 Fd Amb and whatever 1 MP platoon works out to these days (say 40 or so).

That figure for the brigade is a tad high because 1 Svc Bn has in excess of 900 positions of which a number are undoubtedly base positions and not field positions.

Compare that to an ABCT at 4,040; an SBCT at 4,680 and an IBCT at 4,560 (inclusive of Bde Med Coy)

I’m honestly terribly opposed to the Armored controlling Bde Recce at this point- especially as anyone senior in the RCAC seems to have been fine with some colossally fucked up opinions and acceptance of the suitability of some vehicles and what a Recce asset for a Bde actually is.

Frankly I’d be focusing the tank the CAF does have in one Reg’t and looking to offload a lot of Armor PY’s into Artillery and Infantry units.

I think the RCAC was very badly screwed up in its early '00s scramble to stay relevant what with scraping tanks and fumbling around with ISTAR units and Direct Fire Units and all that. Living in an infantry centric (nay, dare I say rifle company centric army) was rough for zipperheads and gunners. I think the RCAC recce force could do well if properly focused on a role.

A regiment of tanks makes eminent sense. So does a properly organized bde cavalry regiment for each brigade although "sneak and peak" recce (augmented by drones) and surveillance is well within the RCAC's remit. Other things like an infantry element, anti-armour element and close in indirect fire, attack drone elements could come from other branches. But, why bother. Those latter elements are a "in case of fire, break glass" resource and could easily go to the reserves. IMHO Bde cavalry could mostly be a 30/70 organization.

This may sound strange, but for the same "in case of fire, break glass" reason, I don't think the artillery needs more PYs anyway. They can't afford to lose any but I'm not so sure they need more. Much of the artillery could be served by a 30/70 structure as long as the equipment is there.

Move all the M777 to Pet - have res units train with 2RCHA so one can field at least 3 6 gun Bty and ideally 8 gun battery.

Every brigade needs a RegF artillery regimental HQ; a full RegF FOO battery and one RegF gun battery (or a 70/30 battery). The other two gun batteries and the STA battery could easily be 30/70 organizations. That reduces the PYs but leaves sufficient structure for the RegF to have a career path and build the requisite doctrinal base while filling out the bulk with low cost reservists.

Gun distribution is problematic because the M777 is the wrong gun except for a light air mobile capable force.

Some 155mm guns must be available at each regiment if for no other purpose then training the FOOs to be proficient with the more complex fire missions. With 37 M777s one could easily deploy a four gun battery to each RegF regiment. That leaves 25 to allocate.

So here's the next question. Do we need or want M777s in Latvia? IMHO, no. We should either work under the Latvian artillery battalions or if we want our own we should lease or buy an SP. Enough for a six-gun battery for Latvia and another for Shilo (plus a tech spare or two). I wouldn't give any to the RCAS as all the training for these could take place in Shilo. If we do something like that then 1 RCHA's for M777s could be used for ResF training or go to the other regiments.

Of the 25 M777s left for distribution, eight could go to each of 2 RCHA and 5 RALC to add to their existing four and thus give them three four-gun batteries each. (I'm not a proponent of a four-gun battery but it's sufficient to adequately equip and train two troops per battery able to be augmented by a 5th and 6th gun when needed). With one RegF battery per regiment that leaves two gun batteries to be manned by ResF pers in each region. That leaves 9 guns which are sufficient for tech and RCAS stock.

There are other options. But I think the big issue really is will we keep symmetric brigades? And will we be at any point raising the bar to the point where we abandon SSE and get back to a requirement to deploy a full brigade (of whatever weight and structure). Under the SSE battle group construct, aggregate batteries are viable options. Anything bigger then that and you need a fully functioning regiment.

One more issue. We need loitering munitions batteries even more than we need long range precision rockets (and we do need those too.) I see these as a general support battery within the close support regiment. They could also be part of a general support regiment to be allocated to brigades as needed. We're looking at three separate fights here with each needing specialized resources. The close support fight is what our regiments currently focus on with their gun batteries. In addition there is the counterfire role - that's where long range precision rockets come in. We have the acquisition systems in the LCMR and MRR and but no deep strike capability. We're learning from Ukraine, however, that there is also an effective role for an advanced close combat battle involving what used to be a screen and more and more looks like a guard battle fought by lighter forces with new ground and airborne precision anti-armour systems. Three battles - three systems. (Oh yeah. and air defence - let's not lose sight of that one)

Oh hell! One more issue yet. If we are seriously looking at cavalry regiments, we need one additional FSCC and several additional FOOs per brigade. We can currently service three manoeuvre units per brigade. A properly structure cavalry regiment needs a fourth. In the past we always used the reserve battalion's FSCC and FOOs for the screen/guard until they did a passage of lines but that's getting more risky these days.

 

[KevinB]

Oh hell! One more issue yet. If we are seriously looking at cavalry regiments, we need one additional FSCC and several additional FOOs per brigade. We can currently service three manoeuvre units per brigade. A properly structure cavalry regiment needs a fourth. In the past we always used the reserve battalion's FSCC and FOOs for the screen/guard until they did a passage of lines but that's getting more risky these days.

IMHO the amount of FOO Parties never made sense to me. The old saying a heir and spare comes to mind or 2 is 1, 1 is none.

I’m long stale on the Arty organization, as I’d fled to the PPCLI in 94.
But the old 2 FOO Parties per Bty and a FCCC/BC’s Party only gave you 9 / Regiment which never seemed to me enough to cover a Bde frontage. I was told when the FOO parties got stripped from the gun BTY’s they never upped the number.

 

[FJAG]

IMHO the amount of FOO Parties never made sense to me. The old saying a heir and spare comes to mind or 2 is 1, 1 is none.

I’m long stale on the Arty organization, as I’d fled to the PPCLI in 94.
But the old 2 FOO Parties per Bty and a FCCC/BC’s Party only gave you 9 / Regiment which never seemed to me enough to cover a Bde frontage. I was told when the FOO parties got stripped from the gun BTY’s they never upped the number.

They actually upped them a lot.

The arty used to have a Bty Comd and tech and a few signalers who augmented the bn Mortar pl commanders CP to form the FSCC. By establishment there were two FOO parties with a wartime establishment of three so that each coy could have one. Back in the seventies and eighties we only had two batteries per regiment supporting a brigade with four manoeuvre battalions (three infantry one armoured/recce). We FOOs were very busy in those days as between artillery gun camps and two sets of battalion exercises. By 2000 the regiments were up to three gun batteries each but still a BC and two FOOs each.

The nice thing in those days was that if the BC and FOOs were pulled away from a battalion to DS another unit then the bn still had its mortars, mor pl CP/FSCC and its MFCs to provide fire support (plus linkage through the brigade net to call for arty support)

When the battalions cast aside their mortar platoons things had to change.

Under the CLS's Artillery Transformation Directive of Jul 2005, the artillery was tasked to supply three brigade FSCCs, nine full bn FSCCs and increase its FOO holdings from 18 FOO parties to 27 FOO/JTAC teams. The formation of an STA battery in each regiment was also directed. Since the whole thing was to be PY neutral within the artillery the number of gun detachments were reduced from 54 guns to 24 guns (hence two four-gun batteries per regiment rather than three six-gun batteries). Starting with TF1-07, in Afghanistan, the guns provided a battle group FSCC and 4 FOO/JTAC teams and three two-gun troops (plus STA) per roto for a few rotos. (TF 1-07 had three rifle coys, an armoured sqn and a recce sqn)

The FOO batteries actually came after the directive and as a direct cause of it. The process of cranking out more FOOs started immediately and the new FOO batteries really only started to form in 2007. Basically one BC runs the FOO battery and the other two BCs run the two gun batteries so there was really no change in BC strength. STA does its own thing.

I've said before that its a steep and expensive process to develop a competent FOO/JTAC team. They also have a short time in the job - usually two years - before moving on to other career courses, or regimental or other staff positions. I'm not sure how well it works for the development, career structure and capability of the US FSO and FIST folks since they start with junior people and don't go through the gunline first but nonetheless there is still a world of work to just learn the LAV, LAV turret, LAV OPV systems (or M7 Bradley FSV or M1131 Stryker FSV in the US) and JTACery over and above all the fire control stuff. With no war going on things - like recertifying JTACs - are starting to fall by the wayside. Ammo shortages are going to hurt shooting skills as well (During the 1970s our two battery regiments were each putting about 10,000 rds of 105 mm down range each year. That's certainly not happening anymore. 'course we only had maps and grease pencils so we needed to adjust fire a lot more )

 

[Prairie canuck]

My observations, for what they're worth, are whichever structure that has been discussed here, and there are many, many, many, unfortunately ignores the need to deploy to an isolated Arctic environment for an extended period of time, no matter the season, be supported, and all the while under duress. If any of our allies were to inquire about getting some Arctic warfare training Canada could only refer them to Scandanavia.
There's an understandable focus on Europe, the middle east, Asia, etc. but leaving the backdoor wide open because we're focused on the neighbours across the street or down the block is a head scratcher.
Probable or not Canada needs to be able to quickly deploy a mobile force to fight and win in the Arctic (and not just our own area). Leos, LAVs, TAPVs, etc will not be easily transported to nor will they be mobile once, if ever, they get there. You need "stuff" that can drive across Ellesmere Island. A lack of airfields almost mandates it be something that while in flight can be pushed out the ass end of multiple C17s and/or C130s.
...the defense of Canada... priority #1 right?
Canada should be the "experts" in Arctic warfare and I daresay having the rangers lead 50 snowmobiles around every year on a sovereignty ride that covers maybe 2% of the arctic isn't very convincing. China and Russia certainly won't be intimidated.
AOPS is a start but that's it, a start. It's got as much firepower as a single LAV.....
It's late and I'm rambling....

 

[GR66]

Not the case. The role of an infantry battalion, regardless of its transportation, is the same. An infantry battalion's role is to close with and destroy the enemy, repel the enemy’s assault by fire, and to seize and retain ground. It conducts close engagement tasks in stability operations.



What is "true light infantry?"

You're right, I shouldn't have thrown out an unofficial definition without context.

When I spoke about "true" light infantry I was couching it in terms similar to what Lt Col Gregory Thiele, USMC describes in his book "4th Generation Warfare Handbook" where he refers back to a more historical distinction between "Line" infantry and "Light" infantry.

Light Infantry vs. Line Infantry​

This is a critical part of 4GW, and one in which the two authors focus much of their time. Line infantry refers to conventional infantry tactics. Lt. Col Thiele uses the word “open space” in reference to it. This is basically uniformed conventional infantry forces fighting other uniformed forces with tanks, air support, and massive amounts of logistics in support.

Light infantry takes place on a different battlefield that has more complexity and nuance. These units need to be more “self-reliant” and must have a smaller logistical footprint. Furthermore, the use of violence is more selective and calculated. Also, light infantry uses the ambush more than close air support and artillery.

This is a very crude description of the distinction between "Line" and "Light" infantry by Lt Col Thiele in the writings and podcasts I've heard and obviously there is much more to it than that.

A basic Wikipedia definition of Light Infantry historically (vs the modern interpretation) is:

Historically, light infantry often fought as scouts, raiders, and skirmishers—soldiers who fight in a loose formation ahead of the main army to harass, delay, disrupt supply lines, and generally "soften up" an enemy before the main battle.

and

Today the term "light" denotes, in the United States table of organization and equipment, units lacking heavy weapons and armor or with a reduced vehicle footprint. Light infantry units lack the greater firepower, operational mobility and protection of mechanized or armored units, but possess greater tactical mobility and the ability to execute missions in severely restrictive terrain and in areas where weather makes vehicular mobility difficult.

When Kirkhill (and some others) present organizational structures focusing on Light Infantry it seems to me that they are often clearly leaning toward the more historical (and 4th Gen Warfare) definition of "Light" Infantry vs the more contemporary definition. They are describing small Company-Group sized units capable of independent operation in the field (sometimes behind enemy lines) with an array of integral weapon systems including AA, AT, Sense/Strike, etc. focused on raiding, skirmishing and swarming rather than a traditional Infantry Battalion/IBCT type structure that is designed to "close with and destroy the enemy".

So when I say that the roles of our Mechanized Infantry (or our Light Infantry in a Canadian Light Battalion context) is different than the role of "true" Light Infantry this is the distinction I am referring to. While there may be a role for "true" Light Infantry in the Canadian Army I think it is important to get the "Line" Infantry role sorted first before we head down that path (outside a CSOR context).

When it comes to the question of concentrating our Light Battalions in the RCR vs. simply dropping the 3rd Battalions from all three Brigades I can see the logic in doing that in order to keep a portion of the force more easily deployable in case of a crisis. I'd counter that however by a) questioning whether a risk-adverse Canadian Government is likely to choose to deploy a relatively more vulnerable Light Battalion somewhere over a more protected Mechanized Battalion, and b) are there a great many deployment situations where a Light Battalion can be deployed where a Mechanized Battalion cannot be deployed in a Light role without their LAVs?