Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[daftandbarmy]

It looks like the BTR-4 is a good piece of kit, kind of like a LAV 6 but with an unmanned, remote control turret.

I don't know how we can justify producing an unarmed APC after what we're seeing happen in this war.

Meet The BTR-4: Watch Ukraine’s “Bucephalus” Blast Russian Armored Vehicles​

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has produced thousands of images and videos of armored vehicles getting ambushed, destroyed, and abandoned. But there has been relatively little imagery of combat between fighting vehicles.

One notable exception is a recording that surfaced on March 14, taken inside a Ukrainian eight-wheeled BTR-4E infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) skittering frenetically in the streets of Mariupol, a besieged coastal port surrounded by Russian forces.

The recording shows the video feed from the BM-7 Parus (“Sail”) weapons turret on top of the vehicle. The gunner remotely controlling the turret is faintly reflected on the monitor.

As indicated on the top left corner of the monitor, the BTR-4’s turret is turned 90 degrees to one side, allowing the vehicle to quickly roll forward and engage adversaries across side streets, then scoot away to escape retaliation.

In the first recorded engagement, the gunner spots a hostile T-72B3 main battle tank a short distance away that could swat the Ukrainian troop carrier like a fly with its 125-millimeter gun.

While the driver hastily rolls away, the gunner has time to rake the unsuspecting T-72’s side armor with 30-millimeter shells, causing small explosions—possibly detonating explosive-reactive armor bricks girding the behemoth.

In the second engagement, the Ukrainian crew ‘peak’ around another intersection and discover a more suitable adversary just around the corner: a BMP-series fighting vehicle (or the BRM-reconnaissance subvariant), its gun turret slewed aside, the feet of disembarked infantry visible beneath its hull.

Being first to spot and shoot is the best predictor of victory in an armored battle. And that’s exactly what happens—before the BMP crew can react, the Ukrainian gunner rotates the turret and pummels the vehicle with cannon fire, causing glowing metal fragments to spray in the air and equipment to fly off.

After overcorrecting the aim downwards, a shot finally slams through the vehicle’s front hull, causing it to erupt in flames. The BTR-4 then rolls back out of the line of fire.

Ukraine’s troubled warhorse

This engagement marks a triumph for a truly Ukrainian armored vehicle that has ridden an especially bumpy path over the years.

In the mid-2000s, Ukraine’s arms industry saw an opportunity to sell wheeled infantry fighting vehicles that were more heavily armed and advanced than Russian Soviet-era BTRs then available—but cheaper than Western ones.

It had already developed two evolutions of the Soviet eight-wheeled BTR-80 APC: the BTR-94 armed with a 23-millimeter gun (50 exported to Jordan/Iraq), and the 30-millimeter armed BTR-3, hundreds of which were sold to Myanmar, Nigeria, Thailand, and the UAE.

But these inherited BTR-80’s configuration with the engine situated in the rear, meaning onboard infantry had to awkwardly disembark from a side hatch, rather than more safely from the rear, shielded by the vehicle’s bulk.

For the BTR-4, dubbed the Bucephalus after Alexander the Great’s fierce black warhorse, the Kharkiv Morozov Engineering Design Bureau sought to move past the Soviet design paradigm by situating the engine between the crew (who could exit from slanted side doors at the front) and the infantry, who could now exit via doors to the rear. This also made it easier to install varied modular systems in the hull.

Indeed, the Bucephalus could mount a variety of weapons turrets, but the only operational configuration uses the remote-control BM-7 Parus turret, which doesn’t take up space inside the hull, leaving room for 7-8 embarked infantry.

The BM-7 sports a 30-millimeter autocannon, a KT 7.62-millimeter machinegun, and six 81-millimeter smoke grenade dischargers. The cannon (akin to Russian 2A72) is effective out to 1.24 miles, and can penetrate just over 1” of armor at 1 kilometer: adequate to threaten other Soviet-era IFVs and APCs, less so heavier IFVs like the M2 Bradley.

Meet the BTR-4: Watch Ukraine’s “Bucephalus” Blast Russian Armored Vehicles

Ukraine’s BTR-4E will play an important role not only in defending Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Mariupol, but by transporting infantry as well.

www.19fortyfive.com

 

[WLSC]

How, exactly?

By having the leadership mind set on the job and focussing on op’s, training etc instead of dealing with toxic work atmosphere. Here something that comes from wayyyyyy back when:

 

[Kirkhill]

I'll focus on these points. It isn't. It will be. More importantly there will be more development to build anti-ATGM systems. These can be anything for better and more effective armour to cause premature detonation to active defense systems to whatever. If you are already building a five to eight million dollar vehicle it makes sense to throw a few more bucks at it to protect it.

Apparently the Trophy system adds 900,000 to a 4,500,000 Merkava. So that means that adding Trophy to 5 tanks means you can't afford to buy the 6th one. It all tends to reduce the number of 120mm guns available at the front of the column. And it makes the tanks harder to keep on line and to repair and replace.

I still claim advantage defence.

Let me get back to attack basics 101. What you are seeing here is a great miscalculation of the effects of terrain. Because of the condition of the ground there is very limited manoeuvre going on other than defined roads where ambushes are likely.

My read is similar.

Operation Market Garden - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

10 days to advance 100 km on elevated roads in flat, swampy ground dotted with farms, hamlets, villages and towns, broken by bridges and culverts and with a carpet of an Airborne Corps of 42,000 to prepare the way.

The difference now is that the anti-tank weaponry is more numerous and more effective.

Combined arms isn't just tanks and HIFV/HAPCs moving down roads.

Agreed

It includes artillery, recce (ground and air), and your own anti-armour and AD. All of these work in concert to create as much of a protective envelope around the attacking force as possible.

Accepted

Recce finds and fixes the enemy's defence positions.

Except than now Recce has to look for two people with a Javelin in the tall grass 4 km away.

Artillery neutralizes those

Except that Artillery now has to suppress 4 km in front of the lead elements and 4 km to either side of the elevated road down the entire length of the column and 4 km to its rear. Requiring more shells and more time and more trucks and more guns. All of which are more vulnerable to two women with a Javelin or an NLAW that could be anywhere from 20m away, in a shed, a hole in the ground or behind a bush to 4000 m.

You're going to need more ground pounders advancing at 1-4 km/h over an 4 km frontage to sweep that ground and keep it clear. Your guns and ammo dumps are also going to need more security. As will your ammo trucks - and you will need to allow for more wastage due to undelivered cargo.

while the attack elements manoeuvre into close contact where they can overrun and overwhelm the opposition.

And that will take more time allowing the defenders more time to improve their defences, thicken their overhead cover and stock up on NLAWs and Javelins.

All those unarmoured tank hunting teams you place in the woods should be cut to shreds by artillery while the heavy elements close.

See comments above on the impact of suppressing a wider area.

Of course there will be losses because that's the nature of war. You can't properly prepare for everything.

Agreed

BUT. Without heavy forces you simply cannot attack well in most situations.

Despite your caveats I disagree. If need be effective attacks can be launched with clubs and rocks.

Where tanks are being blown up now, light infantry advancing would be destroyed by artillery - and even more importantly, mortars - and machine guns.

Agreed.

Any supporting light vehicles will be destroyed by very light anti armour weapons including heavy machine guns.

Agreed

Just as importantly you can't do sweeping manoeuvres to bypass kill zones and attack and roll up weak points before they can reform.

Disagreed.

You can sweep out of contact in a light vehicle just as well as, if not better than, in a heavy vehicle. Or you can sweep out of contact in a helicopter. And use ground to get within 2 to 4 km of the enemy.

And, on the gruesome subject of losses, infantry are easier to replace than tanks. And, again, with longer ranged, more accurate, more effective weapons available to the infantry they can be dispersed over a wider area. Again necessitating more artillery to effectively suppress the area.

And we need to remember the defenders will likely have artillery. And while the defender can be more dispersed the attacker still has to concentrate making an easier target.

The key to any modern war is a robust command and control system working within a doctrine of true combined arms warfare of all its various components working in harmony. Leave out or misuse any one component and you will take many more casualties than you need to regardless of whether your force is light, medium or heavy. One needs a balanced force.

Absolutely

The issue is how each is being used.

We agree

In it's day, the M113 adequately fulfilled its role which was to bring infantry through artillery fire to a dismount area from which they could fight dismounted. It was never designed to be a fighting or fire support vehicle. It's machine gun was a defensive tool. It's only purpose was to stop artillery shell splinters.

The difference is that I think we have pursued the IFV to its logical evolutionary conclusion, just as pavis, mantlet and cuirasse all reached theirs.
I believe that the M113s still in American, Italian and Spanish inventory, and Stormers and Scimitars and Strikers and Scorpions also all have value. As does the Bison.

The Germans touted the Leo 1 over the Challenger on the basis that it traded Protection for Mobility. I am saying that they were right. That it is more important to be able to get a 120mm gun to the fight than it is to be able to protect the gun in the fight.



Italy hedges its bets by making and deploying both.

We used AVGPs as a training vehicle for light mechanized warfare but understood quite well that, if required, we would deploy with them - although not Europe. 4 CMBG and CAST were M113 equipped. Again, they stop shell splinters and (maybe) rifle fire but certainly not an HMG.

Stipulated. But they got the infantry to the fight, allowed them to debus out of contact in a concealed position so that they didn't have to advance to contact after a 40 mile, 24 hour hike like their WW1 forebears.

To be honest we did use them to train in combined arms operations with Cougars. I can't say for sure if this was a legitimate training scenario (if so then what would we use for the real thing - Centurions/Leo1s and M113s?) or just a misuse of the capability.

Every time I saw a Boat with the doors opening I saw troops storming Dieppe, Juno or Kwajalein. In all those amphibious scenarios there was no option than to dismount on the objective (although even that is debatable). In land warfare I don't think it is too much to ask a well rested, well fed and refreshed infanteer dismounting from a nice comfortable AVGP or Griffon to hike 5 km in Fighting Order to reach a Form Up Point.

In any event just about anything that can stop a shell splinter is a valuable infantry transport vehicle so long as you do not take it into close contact with the enemy.

Agreed

Strykers are exactly that. Battlefield taxis with a limited defensive capability.

Yep.

LAVIIIs upped the anti by adding a turret which provided greater firepower but reduced the number of dismounts. IMHO it was bad compromise.

Agreed

The Stryker battalion concept of having a 105mm DFS vehicle in the company was a better solution as it could stand off a good distance. Better yet was the integral 120mm mortar under armour support that every Stryker company had.

Agreed and Agreed

It was a balanced system which, when further supported by artillery, scouts and air operated as a balanced dismounted infantry force.

Agreed again.

In contrast Canadian infantry had little artillery, few to no mortars, no stand off direct fire support but did have a honking 25mm which suckered the infantry battle taxis ever closer into the fight. It was doable in Afghanistan against very light infantry but even there they were vulnerable in a more conventional fight like Medusa. Afterwards the enemy changed tactics.

Agreed.

My long winded point here is regardless of what you buy, if you misuse it from its intended purpose and without its intended suite of supporting actors, it will blow up.

Absolutely and that is true of everything from PBI to MBT.

Canada's biggest error was in thinking that artillery in very small numbers using precision guided munitions complemented by drones using the same are the answer.

Agreed.

Hitting single targets is great, but when you are up against a dismounted company with a selection of ATGMs then you need to blanket a large area (and frequently multiple outposts) with suppressive artillery and mortar fire so that they can't use those neat little weapons while your tanks and infantry close with great violence onto the objective as the final splinters are still falling.

I think we disagree on the area that needs blanketing and the logistic effort necessary to sustain that blanket. It is not good enough to sweep the area. It has to be kept swept. And all those guns, shells, trucks and ammo dumps are vulnerable to a lucky shot from two kids 800 m away.

Their armour needs to be strong to protect them from the rain of the enemy's final protective artillery fire which will be raining down on them and whatever direct fire they manage to get off.

You may be protected from FPF but buttoned up, in the absence of infantry who, even if they are with you in HIFVs, are also buttoned up, you are vulnerable from 800 m to NLAWs in foxholes fired from enclosed spaces while protected from your own offensive fires.

They are moving to the point where the ATGMs will do to the Tanks what Maxims did on the First Day of the Somme.

Machine guns didn't stop the infantry fight but it changed it. ATGMs are not stopping the armoured fight but they are changing it.

I'm not going to try to interpret the final lessons of Ukraine. It's far to early for that. I will say that IMHO we will need to be very careful in the tactical lessons because I think much of what we are seeing here is the result of bad pre-operation intelligence; bad timing vis a vis the condition of the ground and how that would limit operations; and a flawed operational plan that grossly misapprehended the opponent's will and ability to resist. I'll add into that a suspicion that poorly maintained equipment, poorly trained and motivated troops, a crappy logistics system and flawed combined arms tactics also played a role but I'll let others pontificate on that in due course.

Agreed.

I actually agree with you on that. Bisons have a valid purpose as I alluded to with respect to my earlier comments about the initial Stryker. I think LAVs and Boxers are Bisons with pretensions of being more than what they are. ACSVs on the other hand I think are very useful, even for a heavy force in that they provide adequate protection for elements that are in passing contact with the enemy. One can argue about how much armour is enough but what bothers me is the loss of dismounts in exchange for a turreted weapons system that draws the vehicle too far forward.

I could see a rifle company with three platoons of large capacity battle taxis to maximize dismounts supported by a weapons platoon using mortars under armour and some form of direct fire support vehicle (more anti bunker/materiel than anti-armour; anti-armour can come from hand held weapons liberally distributed around the company). That's your multi-purpose force. BUT. There needs to be a heavy force as well. Whether that's a combined arms battalion within a mechanized general purpose brigade or, better yet an armoured brigade in a mechanized division depends on the scale you want to look at. Just make sure both of them are adequately supported by cavalry, artillery, a plethora of things that fly and spy and bomb, and CSS. Effectively in defence the heavy element acts as a guard and subsequently reserve and counter attack force while the general purpose elements form your main defensive line. In the attack the heavy force is the spearpoint and the other two the follow-up consolidation force.

I don't disagree with the need for the Heavy Force. I just think that they are more likely to be reserved in the rear for the counter strike, advancing, or defending, behind a light, widely dispersed force eating away at the enemy and creating the opportunity for that counter attack to be as effective as possible.

But I am still not convinced of the value of a HIFV. LAV6s, Pumas, CV90s, Bradleys will probably suffice to protect the occupants from that rain of Artillery FPFs you were concerned about. But HIFV or LAV6 or Bison. The infantry will still be advancing on their feet, in the open, making whatever use they can of the terrain. Dodging shot and shell.

 

[Kirkhill]

It looks like the BTR-4 is a good piece of kit, kind of like a LAV 6 but with an unmanned, remote control turret.

I don't know how we can justify producing an unarmed APC after what we're seeing happen in this war.

Meet The BTR-4: Watch Ukraine’s “Bucephalus” Blast Russian Armored Vehicles​

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has produced thousands of images and videos of armored vehicles getting ambushed, destroyed, and abandoned. But there has been relatively little imagery of combat between fighting vehicles.

One notable exception is a recording that surfaced on March 14, taken inside a Ukrainian eight-wheeled BTR-4E infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) skittering frenetically in the streets of Mariupol, a besieged coastal port surrounded by Russian forces.

The recording shows the video feed from the BM-7 Parus (“Sail”) weapons turret on top of the vehicle. The gunner remotely controlling the turret is faintly reflected on the monitor.

As indicated on the top left corner of the monitor, the BTR-4’s turret is turned 90 degrees to one side, allowing the vehicle to quickly roll forward and engage adversaries across side streets, then scoot away to escape retaliation.

In the first recorded engagement, the gunner spots a hostile T-72B3 main battle tank a short distance away that could swat the Ukrainian troop carrier like a fly with its 125-millimeter gun.

While the driver hastily rolls away, the gunner has time to rake the unsuspecting T-72’s side armor with 30-millimeter shells, causing small explosions—possibly detonating explosive-reactive armor bricks girding the behemoth.

In the second engagement, the Ukrainian crew ‘peak’ around another intersection and discover a more suitable adversary just around the corner: a BMP-series fighting vehicle (or the BRM-reconnaissance subvariant), its gun turret slewed aside, the feet of disembarked infantry visible beneath its hull.

Being first to spot and shoot is the best predictor of victory in an armored battle. And that’s exactly what happens—before the BMP crew can react, the Ukrainian gunner rotates the turret and pummels the vehicle with cannon fire, causing glowing metal fragments to spray in the air and equipment to fly off.

After overcorrecting the aim downwards, a shot finally slams through the vehicle’s front hull, causing it to erupt in flames. The BTR-4 then rolls back out of the line of fire.

Ukraine’s troubled warhorse

This engagement marks a triumph for a truly Ukrainian armored vehicle that has ridden an especially bumpy path over the years.

In the mid-2000s, Ukraine’s arms industry saw an opportunity to sell wheeled infantry fighting vehicles that were more heavily armed and advanced than Russian Soviet-era BTRs then available—but cheaper than Western ones.

It had already developed two evolutions of the Soviet eight-wheeled BTR-80 APC: the BTR-94 armed with a 23-millimeter gun (50 exported to Jordan/Iraq), and the 30-millimeter armed BTR-3, hundreds of which were sold to Myanmar, Nigeria, Thailand, and the UAE.

But these inherited BTR-80’s configuration with the engine situated in the rear, meaning onboard infantry had to awkwardly disembark from a side hatch, rather than more safely from the rear, shielded by the vehicle’s bulk.

For the BTR-4, dubbed the Bucephalus after Alexander the Great’s fierce black warhorse, the Kharkiv Morozov Engineering Design Bureau sought to move past the Soviet design paradigm by situating the engine between the crew (who could exit from slanted side doors at the front) and the infantry, who could now exit via doors to the rear. This also made it easier to install varied modular systems in the hull.

Indeed, the Bucephalus could mount a variety of weapons turrets, but the only operational configuration uses the remote-control BM-7 Parus turret, which doesn’t take up space inside the hull, leaving room for 7-8 embarked infantry.

The BM-7 sports a 30-millimeter autocannon, a KT 7.62-millimeter machinegun, and six 81-millimeter smoke grenade dischargers. The cannon (akin to Russian 2A72) is effective out to 1.24 miles, and can penetrate just over 1” of armor at 1 kilometer: adequate to threaten other Soviet-era IFVs and APCs, less so heavier IFVs like the M2 Bradley.

Meet the BTR-4: Watch Ukraine’s “Bucephalus” Blast Russian Armored Vehicles

Ukraine’s BTR-4E will play an important role not only in defending Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Mariupol, but by transporting infantry as well.

www.19fortyfive.com

But does the vehicle with the 30mm cannon need to be carrying a section of troops in the rear while it is "skittering" around streets?

Or would a Scimitar (with a Bushmaster) get the same job done without putting a section of infantry at risk? And the Scimitar would make a smaller target.

The infantry could be in the area in a Stormer, or Bison.

 

[IKnowNothing]

But does the vehicle with the 30mm cannon need to be carrying a section of troops in the rear while it is "skittering" around streets?

Or would a Scimitar (with a Bushmaster) get the same job done without putting a section of infantry at risk? And the Scimitar would make a smaller target.

The infantry could be in the area in a Stormer, or Bison.

Stormer with with RT60 (the 40mm and a pair of spikes) for "skittering"
Stormer with an RS4 for the full 8 man section's in the area
Stormer with HMV
Stormer with a Nemo turret

 

[Brad Sallows]

By having the leadership mind set on the job and focussing on op’s, training etc instead of dealing with toxic work atmosphere. Here something that comes from wayyyyyy back when:

Sure. But "diversity" is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for that.

 

[WLSC]

Sure. But "diversity" is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for that.

Forget the « quotas ». Diversity is link with inclusiveness, that’s it. The way it’s coming out is not totally what it’s all about. Read the pic I’ve put above. It’s a modern, cloud shoveler version of what that pic says, that’s it.

 

[Brad Sallows]

If it's about something else, the people in charge should stop burping up bullsh!t talking points, then, and be specific about what it really does that is useful.

 

[KevinB]

Right now our enemies don’t have items like NLAW, Javelin or Spike - so NATO tanks are still fairly immune \ and have time to perfect a active Anti Missile system.

 

[MilEME09]

I am hoping it's safe to sat the CAF assumption of no new funding for F2025 is now out the window. There are a number of projects being discussed that if they were fast tracked (and some would be simple sole sourcing) could get us upto speed very quickly with addition kit needed including AA, more AT, motor carriers, etc...

 

[dapaterson]

Industry capacity is a concern, along with availability of raw materials.

And any ramp up needs infra investment and divestment, and people to manage the projects... There's no "Easy!" button.

 

[KevinB]

Good WP tube BNVD’s
Suppressors for individual weapons, and belt feds
MFAL (multi function aiming laser - I’m predisposed to the BE Meyers MAWL-DA)
For everyone

 

[WLSC]

If it's about something else, the people in charge should stop burping up bullsh!t talking points, then, and be specific about what it really does that is useful.

L0 and L1 are saying it. As soon it’s out the door, it’s like everything else, it’s distorted.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Surely people that highly placed have figured out that paeans to "diversity" are meaningless, and that meaningless babble does nothing to reassure people that the babblers have things in hand?

 

[WLSC]

Surely people that highly placed have figured out that paeans to "diversity" are meaningless, and that meaningless babble does nothing to reassure people that the babblers have things in hand?

We are sooooo good in comms/talking points… They know it’s badly, really badly sell.

 

[WLSC]

Surely people that highly placed have figured out that paeans to "diversity" are meaningless, and that meaningless babble does nothing to reassure people that the babblers have things in hand?

The point is there’s a reshuffle of all these word IOT make everything digestible so we stop changing everything for buss word and the taste of the day. We are not the only one is this boat it’s just that everything seems/are stopping for that. It should be simple thing like respect everyone, be fair, be just etc so we can do our job.

 

[IKnowNothing]

So lets say the government -in conjunction with the CDS- comes out tomorrow with the requirement (and funding) for
All 3 armoured regiments to be fully tracked, two 14 tank squadrons, two 14 veh of cav or mech infantry
All the Lav battions to have organic mortars and AT
Artillery to have self propelled guns
Artillery to stand up a battery of GBAD per CMBG
a 4th full CMBG set of kit to the above standards to be prepositioned in Europe

What are the avenues to do so and how fast could it be done, ex.
How long for GDLS to crank out the AT and Mortar Lav hulls and ISC's for two more battalions?
Will anyone sell us surplus equipment with all of Europe rearming (and if so, what?)
If not, how long would procurement of stuff off the production line take? (assuming UOR issued within the month)
Could we meet the maintenance and logistics requirements to field that, and if not, how long to add that capability?
How long to integrate these capabilities and train to a deployable level?

Thanks

 

[markppcli]

But does the vehicle with the 30mm cannon need to be carrying a section of troops in the rear while it is "skittering" around streets?

Or would a Scimitar (with a Bushmaster) get the same job done without putting a section of infantry at risk? And the Scimitar would make a smaller target.

The infantry could be in the area in a Stormer, or Bison.

1. No but it’s sure nice that it can when needed.
2. Yes, but it’s sure nice that the infantry is there to secure and clear that build up area around it (something about at teams?)
3. Could be but then we’re talking about just more “stuff.”

 

[markppcli]

What are the avenues to do so and how fast could it be done, ex.
How long for GDLS to crank out the AT and Mortar Lav hulls and ISC's for two more battalions?
Will anyone sell us surplus equipment with all of Europe rearming (and if so, what?)
If not, how long would procurement of stuff off the production line take? (assuming UOR issued within the month)
Could we meet the maintenance and logistics requirements to field that, and if not, how long to add that capability?
How long to integrate these capabilities and train to a deployable level?

Thanks

It’s take multiple years unless we decide to rapidly transition the ACSVs to mortar and atgm carriers. A single fleet would mitigate the maintenance cost but the real problem there is actually keeping maintainers around, that’s a separate issue.

Training will take time; we’re 4 year in to the return of TOW and I just saw an AAR point from an ex in Ft Polk referencing the need to have a 79A in the Bn CP. We have the play books but have forgotten how to play the sport.

A note on the mortar carriers: under armour is obviously ideal, but the option to tow heavy mortars behind a protected carrier also exists and still allows for rapid redeployment. The Slovenians had a really good set up for theirs, the trailers even had slots for ready rounds.

 

[Kirkhill]

1. No but it’s sure nice that it can when needed.
2. Yes, but it’s sure nice that the infantry is there to secure and clear that build up area around it (something about at teams?)
3. Could be but then we’re talking about just more “stuff.”

I speak from the perspective of a guy with claustrophobic tendencies that prefers to see what's going on around him rather than being locked in a filing cabinet in case he comes in handy some day.

I get the need for the infantry to be there to assist with the team work, but frankly I would rather be on my feet than in a can. And if I am hit then I won't be taking half-a-dozen or so of my buddies with me. You'll still have five team mates to work with. And as big as I am these days, I still make a smaller target than a LAV.

So, if you are giving me a lift into town, let me out before you start getting into a discussion with the locals. It'll probably do us both more good.

I still think you would be better off with me getting a lift in an armoured truck and getting out while you get something smaller, and more manoeuverable than a LAV to tackle the locals.