Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Ostrozac]

How many PYs are expended working the Army Ball and staffing the associated honours and awards each year?

The Army Ball at least has an achievable objective — to raise the profile of the Army at the expense of the other L1s. Hence why the RCAF has retaliated with the Air Force Ball, in a seemingly never ending arms race of inter-command posturing.

I do wonder how many Hilton reward points you get from booking a ballroom. I’m sure the RCAF know.

 

[Good2Golf]

The Army knows for sure.

Not sure the Air Force has handed out any OMMs yet…

 

[MilEME09]

If reconstitution is such an important task right now, as it should be. One would hope a lot more is on the chopping block while we reorganize. One of the major objectives of F2025 is to move more PYs to the schools to increase our through put by no longer having boom and bust cycles of avaliable personal. By making the schools always fully manned the other units will eventually equal out as we start getting bodies through courses.

 

[GR66]

So here's a possible Force 2025 structure that takes into account some of the points raised by various members on here.

1. There are too many headquarters
2. The Reg Force units are under staffed
3. The Reg Force is stuck in the fuzzy middle...not heavy enough for a peer fight and too heavy for rapid deployment
4. We are missing several key enablers to make us a combat effective force
5. There are too may Reserve units for the number of Reservists we have
6. The Reserves are under equipped (unequipped?) to fulfill any type of useful combat role
7. Our logistics system has difficulty supporting deployed forces of any significant size.

This proposed force structure attempts to solve some of these problems (or at least start us on the path of solving these problems) by taking the following steps.

• Maintaining 3 x Divisional HQ. This is both for administrative purposes due to the geographical distribution of our forces in peacetime, but also to maintain the core ability to command a deployed Division as the long term aspirational goal.
• Eliminating the Brigade Level HQs for the Reserves and bringing the units under the command umbrella of the Reg Force Brigades. The manpower savings can be fed back into the combat units & schools.
• Concentrating our heavier forces (1 x Tank Regiment, 3 x Mechanized Infantry Battalions and an Artillery Regiment equipped with an SP 155mm Howitzer) in 1 Brigade to concentrate on a conventional, European-style peer conflict and our light forces (using air-transportable vehicles and M777s in the Artillery Regiment) in 2 Brigade to concentrate on a potential dispersed, Pacific-style peer conflict.
• 5 Brigade would transform into a Fire Support Brigade type of structure supplying the other two Brigades with the types of combat support roles that the CF is currently missing.
  • 12 RBC would be a Recce Regiment combining both surveillance vehicles and expanding to include UAVs launching vehicles to provide Brigade-level recce assets.
  • 1 R22eR would stay as a Mechanized Infantry Battalion in order to provide security for the FS Brigade and/or a 4th Mechanized Battalion for 1 Brigade for strategic depth.
  • 2 R22eR would convert to an Anti-Tank Battalion. They could start with dismounted TOW/Carl-G teams mounted in standard LAV6.0's until a dedicated ATGM vehicle solution is procured. A good potential option is replacing the LAV turrets with the same RWiP used on the US Army's Stryker IM-SHORAD which can mount various combinations of AT missiles (TOW, Javelin, Hellfire, etc.)
  • 3 R22eR would convert to a SHORAD Battalion. Ideally I'd have their LAV turrets replaced with the same RWS as the Stryker IM-SHORAD to maintain commonality with our major ally. In the short term we could purchase some Stinger Missiles and establish an interim capability with dismounted AD missiles teams mounted in LAV 6.0's.
  • 5 RALC would become our long-range precision fires unit with the purchase of HIMARS for the Regiment.
  • The AT and SHORAD Battalions should require less manpower than an Infantry Battalion so the PY's saved could be fed back into the combat units & schools.
• There are enough Reserve Units in each Divisional area that they could be amalgamated into force generators for 2 x Combined Arms Light Battle Groups per Reg Force Brigade (plus a single additional Battle Group for the Canadian Combat Support Brigade).
  • Each Battle Group would have a mixed Reg Force/Reserve Command Element as well as the following additional units:
    • 2-3 Reserve Armoured Regiments per Battle Group to force generate an Armoured Squadron
    • 5-6 Reserve Infantry Regiments to force generate 2 x Infantry Companies and a Combat Support Company
    • 2 x Reserve Artillery Regiments/Ind. Batteries (with minor exceptions) to force generate an Artillery Battery
    • 1 x Reserve Combat Engineer Regiment to force generate an Engineer Platoon
    • 1 x Reserve Signal Regiment to force generate a Signal Platoon
    • 1 x Reserve Service Battalion for force generate a Forward Support Company
  • This structure would provide an attainable mobilization goal for Reserve units to force generate sub-sub units in order to field a Reserve Battle Group as part of a Reg Force Brigade...or provide the same sub-sub units as augmentees to a Reg Force deployment.
  • This also leaves enough Reserve Regiments to provide mobilization augmentation to Reg Force Units:
    • 2-4 Reserve Infantry Regiments to provide a 4th Rifle Company to the Reg Force Light Infantry Battalions
    • 2 x Reserve Armoured Regiments to man a 4th (Reserve) Tank Squadron for Lord Strathcona's Horse
    • 1 x Reserve Signal Regiment to augment the Signal Squadrons of each Reg Force Brigade HQ
    • 2-3 Reserve Artillery Regiments/Ind. Batteries to man a 3rd Battery for each of the Reg Force Howitzer Regiments
    • 1 x Reserve Combat Engineer Regiment to augment each Reg Force Combat Engineer Regiment
    • 1 x Reserve Service Battalion to augment each Reg Force Service Battalion

Once this basic structure is in place it can be used to expand the capabilities of both the Reg Force and the Reserves.

• If the Reg Force Mechanized Battalions ever get a proper IFV then the 1 Brigade/5 Brigade Reserve units could take over the LAV 6.0's
• The 1 Brigade Reserve Artillery Regiments could take on the same SP 155mm Howitzer as 1 RCHA.
• Each 2 Brigade Artillery Battery could be equipped with 6 x M777's (5 x Batteries = 30 guns total) which is totally doable with our existing stocks.
• Alternately the Reserve Battle Groups could specialize for specific roles (Arctic Warfare, Mountain Warfare, Airborne/Air Mobile, AT, SHORAD, etc.)
• Eventually, if the Reserve Force transformation works well and the units can reliably force generate combat effective Battle Groups, then with some expansion (and proper equipment) those Battle Groups could transform into a 2nd (Reserve) Brigade within each Division.

 

[daftandbarmy]

So here's a possible Force 2025 structure that takes into account some of the points raised by various members on here.

1. There are too many headquarters
2. The Reg Force units are under staffed
3. The Reg Force is stuck in the fuzzy middle...not heavy enough for a peer fight and too heavy for rapid deployment
4. We are missing several key enablers to make us a combat effective force
5. There are too may Reserve units for the number of Reservists we have
6. The Reserves are under equipped (unequipped?) to fulfill any type of useful combat role
7. Our logistics system has difficulty supporting deployed forces of any significant size.

This proposed force structure attempts to solve some of these problems (or at least start us on the path of solving these problems) by taking the following steps.

• Maintaining 3 x Divisional HQ. This is both for administrative purposes due to the geographical distribution of our forces in peacetime, but also to maintain the core ability to command a deployed Division as the long term aspirational goal.
• Eliminating the Brigade Level HQs for the Reserves and bringing the units under the command umbrella of the Reg Force Brigades. The manpower savings can be fed back into the combat units & schools.
• Concentrating our heavier forces (1 x Tank Regiment, 3 x Mechanized Infantry Battalions and an Artillery Regiment equipped with an SP 155mm Howitzer) in 1 Brigade to concentrate on a conventional, European-style peer conflict and our light forces (using air-transportable vehicles and M777s in the Artillery Regiment) in 2 Brigade to concentrate on a potential dispersed, Pacific-style peer conflict.
• 5 Brigade would transform into a Fire Support Brigade type of structure supplying the other two Brigades with the types of combat support roles that the CF is currently missing.
  • 12 RBC would be a Recce Regiment combining both surveillance vehicles and expanding to include UAVs launching vehicles to provide Brigade-level recce assets.
  • 1 R22eR would stay as a Mechanized Infantry Battalion in order to provide security for the FS Brigade and/or a 4th Mechanized Battalion for 1 Brigade for strategic depth.
  • 2 R22eR would convert to an Anti-Tank Battalion. They could start with dismounted TOW/Carl-G teams mounted in standard LAV6.0's until a dedicated ATGM vehicle solution is procured. A good potential option is replacing the LAV turrets with the same RWiP used on the US Army's Stryker IM-SHORAD which can mount various combinations of AT missiles (TOW, Javelin, Hellfire, etc.)
  • 3 R22eR would convert to a SHORAD Battalion. Ideally I'd have their LAV turrets replaced with the same RWS as the Stryker IM-SHORAD to maintain commonality with our major ally. In the short term we could purchase some Stinger Missiles and establish an interim capability with dismounted AD missiles teams mounted in LAV 6.0's.
  • 5 RALC would become our long-range precision fires unit with the purchase of HIMARS for the Regiment.
  • The AT and SHORAD Battalions should require less manpower than an Infantry Battalion so the PY's saved could be fed back into the combat units & schools.
• There are enough Reserve Units in each Divisional area that they could be amalgamated into force generators for 2 x Combined Arms Light Battle Groups per Reg Force Brigade (plus a single additional Battle Group for the Canadian Combat Support Brigade).
  • Each Battle Group would have a mixed Reg Force/Reserve Command Element as well as the following additional units:
    • 2-3 Reserve Armoured Regiments per Battle Group to force generate an Armoured Squadron
    • 5-6 Reserve Infantry Regiments to force generate 2 x Infantry Companies and a Combat Support Company
    • 2 x Reserve Artillery Regiments/Ind. Batteries (with minor exceptions) to force generate an Artillery Battery
    • 1 x Reserve Combat Engineer Regiment to force generate an Engineer Platoon
    • 1 x Reserve Signal Regiment to force generate a Signal Platoon
    • 1 x Reserve Service Battalion for force generate a Forward Support Company
  • This structure would provide an attainable mobilization goal for Reserve units to force generate sub-sub units in order to field a Reserve Battle Group as part of a Reg Force Brigade...or provide the same sub-sub units as augmentees to a Reg Force deployment.
  • This also leaves enough Reserve Regiments to provide mobilization augmentation to Reg Force Units:
    • 2-4 Reserve Infantry Regiments to provide a 4th Rifle Company to the Reg Force Light Infantry Battalions
    • 2 x Reserve Armoured Regiments to man a 4th (Reserve) Tank Squadron for Lord Strathcona's Horse
    • 1 x Reserve Signal Regiment to augment the Signal Squadrons of each Reg Force Brigade HQ
    • 2-3 Reserve Artillery Regiments/Ind. Batteries to man a 3rd Battery for each of the Reg Force Howitzer Regiments
    • 1 x Reserve Combat Engineer Regiment to augment each Reg Force Combat Engineer Regiment
    • 1 x Reserve Service Battalion to augment each Reg Force Service Battalion

Once this basic structure is in place it can be used to expand the capabilities of both the Reg Force and the Reserves.

• If the Reg Force Mechanized Battalions ever get a proper IFV then the 1 Brigade/5 Brigade Reserve units could take over the LAV 6.0's
• The 1 Brigade Reserve Artillery Regiments could take on the same SP 155mm Howitzer as 1 RCHA.
• Each 2 Brigade Artillery Battery could be equipped with 6 x M777's (5 x Batteries = 30 guns total) which is totally doable with our existing stocks.
• Alternately the Reserve Battle Groups could specialize for specific roles (Arctic Warfare, Mountain Warfare, Airborne/Air Mobile, AT, SHORAD, etc.)
• Eventually, if the Reserve Force transformation works well and the units can reliably force generate combat effective Battle Groups, then with some expansion (and proper equipment) those Battle Groups could transform into a 2nd (Reserve) Brigade within each Division.

View attachment 68517

I vacillate, in case you haven't noticed, between 'the Reserves can be relied upon as a supply chain of qualified troops for the Reg F' to 'you are out of your friggin' mind'.

Just looking at my old unit, from year to year, readiness levels swing wildly from good to awful, all mainly based on who is available to fill what positions.

Things could be looking really good and then, after a couple of retirements and a couple of other people stop showing up for whatever reason, you could be back in rebuilding mode. Seriously, if 4 - 6 key leads (at whatever level) disappear, you could go right back to square 1. If you are also unlucky enough to have a lousy CO/RSM etc, which is highly likley more than 50% of the time, adverse impacts are astronomically worse as people vote with their feet.

It's a very fragile and unreliable way to run a combat capability, no matter how many full timers you post in.

All that to say .... IMHO anyone who builds an org chart relying on The 43rd Underground Blloon Regiment to reliably provide a Pl/Tp/Coy/Sqn etc, given the current terms of service and leadership quality control, for Class A reservists is making a big mistake.

 

[Ostrozac]

So here's a possible Force 2025 structure that takes into account some of the points raised by various members on here.

Putting the administration of reserve units under the regular force brigade headquarters completely removes the ability of that headquarters and it’s commander to deploy to the field as a fighting headquarters. It would instead become purely administrative, keeping track of the needs and admin of dozens of reserve units in addition to the 8 regular units already assigned. Unless you give it a huge nondeployable brigade (rear) element — but that’s just confusing.

I can remember when all of the brigade headquarters were direct reports to Mobile Command HQ in St Hubert, I’d bring back that model, keep the reserve brigade HQs for now and disband all 4 of of the division HQs in the army. Those middleman headquarters, full of staff officers, are an expensive manpower burden, and don’t seem to give much value added to the Army.

 

[MilEME09]

Part of the problem with the reserves and their BTS, atleast to me is, on paper you can say we are trained to XYZ standard but are we really? I've seen it before where the bare minimum is planned and executed to get a check in a box. Is there an organization I'm the CAF that preforms spot checks on units to ensure the training is actually being carried out correct? Sort of like standards does for the conduct of courses? If not, while I loath new organizations, perhaps something like that is needed for the reserves to make sure troops are trained to an acceptable level.

I also agree reserves CBG hqs need to go, the purpose they serve would likely be better served if there was a reserve cell at the div level to coordinate all reserve activities.

 

[FJAG]

So here's a possible Force 2025 structure that takes into account some of the points raised by various members on here.

Just having a quick look at this one, I see a lot of positives here. In a lot of ways this structure (at least within the brigades) mimics the Brits' Army 2020 Refine. I'm not sure how well their having reserve "feeder" battalions within RegF brigades works out in practice but it would seem they liked it enough so that they have stayed with the concept for 3 UK Div for Future Soldier.

Two off the top comments is that the Div HQs are superfluous. Yes there needs to be an admin wing to look after numerous issues such as fixed facilities and personnel management that will allow the brigade to be free to concentrate on its warfighting role, but I think that can be an organization that is subordinate to the brigade or alternatively subordinate to Army HQ and with overarching authority over all of Canada. An intermediate HQ between 3 brigades and Army HQ is not necessary.

At the risk of incurring KevinB's ire, I believe you need additional brigade HQs. They need to be RegF and deployable. Three is too few if any of them are sent on actual deployments to manage expeditionary deployments. Even at nine month rotations, that pace can't be kept up without degrading the rest of the brigade through lack of leadership. The Army is large enough to justify a "few" more than 3 manoeuvre brigade HQs

I vacillate, in case you haven't noticed, between 'the Reserves can be relied upon as a supply chain of qualified troops for the Reg F' to 'you are out of your friggin' mind'.

The "you are out of your friggin' mind" aspect only applies if the Army continues on with its seventy year old program to not address the elephant in the room. Anyone who maintains the current reserve system is "out of their friggin' mind" and should be fired out of hand as either CDS or CLS. How well a transformed reserve system would work depends very much on the degree to which the transformation goes. "Fine tuning" will not work.

I also agree reserves CBG hqs need to go, the purpose they serve would likely be better served if there was a reserve cell at the div level to coordinate all reserve activities.

Yes. "Reserve CBGs" need to go but see my comment above about needing a few more deployable brigade headquarters.

I can remember when all of the brigade headquarters were direct reports to Mobile Command HQ in St Hubert, I’d bring back that model, keep the reserve brigade HQs for now and disband all 4 of of the division HQs in the army. Those middleman headquarters, full of staff officers, are an expensive manpower burden, and don’t seem to give much value added to the Army.

I agree that all brigades should report direct to the Army HQ. I agree that the Div HQ need to disappear with the exception that CJOC should have the capability to deploy a div level HQ using its own staff and CFJSR resources. I think the sooner that we reduce the CBGs to maybe 3 or 4 but with deployable RegF staff the better.

 

[Infanteer]

• Maintaining 3 x Divisional HQ. This is both for administrative purposes due to the geographical distribution of our forces in peacetime, but also to maintain the core ability to command a deployed Division as the long term aspirational goal.

Your organization has created a span of control fiasco in both ways. Why would you want a HQ to command a single brigade? What would it do, aside from be a mailbox. Conversely, your brigades have too much, and would be neutered by the span of control they are responsible for.

I agree that all brigades should report direct to the Army HQ.

This fundamentally misses the point of what Army HQ is supposed to be doing, and would only inhibit its ability to see farther then the end of its nose.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Things could be looking really good and then, after a couple of retirements and a couple of other people stop showing up for whatever reason, you could be back in rebuilding mode.

Amen. Sudden budget cut from on high or necessitated by one unit wildly overspending leads to a couple of months of cancelled training. People go on a roto, come home, apply for CT or to work with a federal agency. Wildly variable leadership. People posted in who don't play well with others. People finish undergrad degrees and move to different cities to continue education or start work. Get stiffed one year on recruiting or entry-level courses. Etc.

Units aren't large enough to easily tolerate disruptions or provide a feed of consistently competent and ethical leaders all the way to the top of the over-promotion chain.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Go back to district HQs. Stop calling the Res F formations "brigades" and eliminate the temptation to mimic brigades in structure and purpose and aspirations of the people therein. Redesign the district HQs for exactly what they need to do: Res F, and maybe some assistance prep. Downstream from that, deduce what the next level above district HQs should be other than "divisions".

 

[MilEME09]

Go back to district HQs. Stop calling the Res F formations "brigades" and eliminate the temptation to mimic brigades in structure and purpose and aspirations of the people therein. Redesign the district HQs for exactly what they need to do: Res F, and maybe some assistance prep. Downstream from that, deduce what the next level above district HQs should be other than "divisions".

I'd renaming something really solving the problem? We don't need to change the names of anything, we need to actually be realistic eith what we have. I feel like NDHQ is becoming like the Germany armys command bunker in Berlin in 1945, commanding fictional formations that are no where near what they actually are.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'd renaming something really solving the problem? We don't need to change the names of anything, we need to actually be realistic eith what we have. I feel like NDHQ is becoming like the Germany armys command bunker in Berlin in 1945, commanding fictional formations that are no where near what they actually are.

And that problem is made worse with mythical brigades commanded by Colonels (acting, unpaid Brigadiers). Brad is right. The Reserves are not going to generate Brigades in peacetime or in war. At least not the Brigades that are being talked about here. And I have no idea what the future Brigade will look like either.

They are regional administrations. The head of HR should be retasked as a proper military office - Adjutant-General - and the districts and regions reassigned to their direct command.

Primary responsibility - maintaining a supply of trained troops and ensuring they know the individual capabilities and availability of those under their command.

 

[Kirkhill]

Adjutant-General to the Forces - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[daftandbarmy]

And that problem is made worse with mythical brigades commanded by Colonels (acting, unpaid Brigadiers). Brad is right. The Reserves are not going to generate Brigades in peacetime or in war. At least not the Brigades that are being talked about here. And I have no idea what the future Brigade will look like either.

They are regional administrations. The head of HR should be retasked as a proper military office - Adjutant-General - and the districts and regions reassigned to their direct command.

Primary responsibility - maintaining a supply of trained troops and ensuring they know the individual capabilities and availability of those under their command.

But what about the career aspirations of retired Reg F Captains who join the militia so they can become a Junior General?

 

[Kirkhill]

But what about the career aspirations of retired Reg F Captains who join the militia so they can become a Junior General?

There is more money as a pundit. And probably more free drinks in the mess.

B. H. Liddell Hart - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[FJAG]

This fundamentally misses the point of what Army HQ is supposed to be doing, and would only inhibit its ability to see farther then the end of its nose.

I don't see that as an issue. The Army HQ already has many functions including force development; requirement definition and fulfillment; training; infrastructure management; personnel management and several others. I fail to see what added value an administrative intermediate "divisional" headquarters brings to the table beyond creating regional stovepipes. There clearly are "regional" requirements but these could be handled in other ways (such as an adjunct of the four RegF brigades or an added or expanded element of the Army HQ itself.) Army HQ should be able to separate its forward leaning activities from the management of its current ones.

I know that a headquarters, once created, will find numerous ways of justifying its existence but doesn't mean it should continue indefinitely. The fact of the matter is that there hasn't always been an intermediate level headquarters between the brigades and the Army HQ. Prior to the area Land Force HQs in 1991 RegF brigades reported directly to Mobile Command which also managed the Army's infrastructure directly. Militia units reported through district to area HQs but their role was limited.

IMHO the 1991 reorganization was a "shuffle of the deck chairs on the Titanic" scenario while the 2013 reshuffle to Div HQs was a "lipstick" exercise. These brought a veneer of integration of RegF and ResF elements to the table but without any concrete changes.

I don't know how much smaller the Army is today from when Force Mobile Command and Mobile Command existed but the CF RegF shrank from over 120,000 just before unification to 88,000 in 1989 to an authorized strength of 71,500 today. Why we need ever more nondeployable headquarters and people in nondeployable headquarters as the size of the military declines escapes me.

I'm sure there are reasons for the divisional headquarters but I see it hard to justify them to a reasonable, disinterested third party considering the circumstances of the CF as a whole.

 

[Brad Sallows]

I'd renaming something really solving the problem?

It changes the perception of what the "something" should be. We had areas when I joined, and districts at some earlier time. A question is, why the name change to "brigade" if it wasn't meant to mean something? But I do remember how enthusiastically some of the officer crowd talked about being a "brigade" and training as a "brigade" and exercising as a "brigade". Ask some of the people who attended how well the "brigade" performed during the 1990 summer concentration in Wainwright.

 

[FJAG]

It changes the perception of what the "something" should be. We had areas when I joined, and districts at some earlier time. A question is, why the name change to "brigade" if it wasn't meant to mean something? But I do remember how enthusiastically some of the officer crowd talked about being a "brigade" and training as a "brigade" and exercising as a "brigade". Ask some of the people who attended how well the "brigade" performed during the 1990 summer concentration in Wainwright.

So we shouldn't bring up the four divisions?

 

[MilEME09]

It changes the perception of what the "something" should be. We had areas when I joined, and districts at some earlier time. A question is, why the name change to "brigade" if it wasn't meant to mean something? But I do remember how enthusiastically some of the officer crowd talked about being a "brigade" and training as a "brigade" and exercising as a "brigade". Ask some of the people who attended how well the "brigade" performed during the 1990 summer concentration in Wainwright.

Then really we should just call reserve brigade's administrative groups (since battle group implies they deploy into combat), reduce all units to company's in actuality since they are in paper any way. Only 1 LCol per admin group, every other unit is commanded by a captain or major.