Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[markppcli]

For a modern coin situation? We absolutely need a drone counter measure, that is becoming a standard part of the insurgent playbook in the way that IEDs did in the mid 2000s. That can be VSHORAD, it can be jammers, hell it can be a group of highly trained Canadian Geese for all I care, but we do need it.

 

[FJAG]

Trust me, I have read SSE. Worked at Div and CMBG level. Was happy to see the CMBG included in SSE, but I also see things as they are and not how I wish they were to be.

I've been on this thread much too much today, T2B.

And I don't want to be too repetitive but I think that when we accept things the way that they are when we know that they are terribly wrong then we have stopped serving our country and are just working for a paycheck (and I know that's not fair to those who are in positions who can't effect change - I'm concentrating on the level of leadership that can and should).

Far too many people at the centre of the CAF are willing to settle for what it is. They take minute steps to fine tune a system that is patently broken rather than looking at the truth of the matter which is that we devote as much money and effort to administrative overhead as to combat capabilities and that a radical change is needed to reset the system.

Honestly, T2B (and you too DAP - you denizen of the country's biggest self-licking ice cream cone ), if the CAF were a civilian corporation, the board of directors, CEO, COO and CFO would have been fired long ago together with most of middle management and 50% of the administrative side of the workforce (excluding the maintenance side). I constantly marvel at the annual Departmental Performance Report results, as much for the meaningless performance indicators selected as for the meaningless statistics reported. DND has made an art form of finding success in the banal and avoiding the hard questions.

We need bold vision and a plan. We need to see how things should be and work towards that and damn the naysayers.

 

[GR66]

While I 100% agree that we need to step up and create an Army that can realistically fight the high-end fight I think it's also important to not abandon all of the things that we've learned from our experiences in Afghanistan.

I think there are several things I think it's important to keep in mind while we make the shift to "great power competition". Firstly, I personally have my doubts that Maneuver Warfare in a potential war against Russia will play out like some people think it will. Due to the nuclear umbrella under which Russia and Western Europe are protected along with the generally smaller armies that exist now in comparison to the Cold War I don't think we are likely to see the Operation Barbarosa/Bagration style offensives that some people seem to imagine. Personally I think we are much more likely to see more limited (geographically) operations where Russia (or other peer/near-peer opponents) sees the opportunity to seize some important territory quickly (like Crimea) in hopes that the West won't have the will to try and "undo" what has been done.

While there may be an element of geographical maneuver in the initial assault, the counter will more likely require positional/attritional warfare against an enemy entrenching to maintain their gains. That doesn't mean that "maneuverism" is dead...you can still strike an enemy's weaknesses, undermine their morale and exploit their vulnerabilities in an urban context,...but some people seem to equate maneuver with highly mobile warfare with deep penetrating attacks. I have my doubts if that will actually be the case.

The other thing to keep in mind is that in our last bout of great power competition, there wasn't actually any full-scale war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact but there were lots of proxy wars, insurgencies and small scale wars as the powers competed for resources, influence and advantage over each other. I fully expect a very similar situation going forward but this time with two rival powers in Russia and China. I think we will be much more likely to be engaged in these kinds of conflicts going forward than in full-scale war with either Russia or China.

That doesn't mean we don't need to seriously upgrade our forces to be able to face high-intensity peer/near-peer conflict because Russia and China will likely equip their proxies with various high-tech weapons, but it does mean that we should also be prepared to continue to face the same types of conflicts as we've faced in Afghanistan, Syria, the Balkans, Korea, etc. in the past.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I've been on this thread much too much today, T2B.

And I don't want to be too repetitive but I think that when we accept things the way that they are when we know that they are terribly wrong then we have stopped serving our country and are just working for a paycheck (and I know that's not fair to those who are in positions who can't effect change - I'm concentrating on the level of leadership that can and should).

Far too many people at the centre of the CAF are willing to settle for what it is. They take minute steps to fine tune a system that is patently broken rather than looking at the truth of the matter which is that we devote as much money and effort to administrative overhead as to combat capabilities and that a radical change is needed to reset the system.

Honestly, T2B (and you too DAP - you denizen of the country's biggest self-licking ice cream cone ), if the CAF were a civilian corporation, the board of directors, CEO, COO and CFO would have been fired long ago together with most of middle management and 50% of the administrative side of the workforce (excluding the maintenance side). I constantly marvel at the annual Departmental Performance Report results, as much for the meaningless performance indicators selected as for the meaningless statistics reported. DND has made an art form of finding success in the banal and avoiding the hard questions.

We need bold vision and a plan. We need to see how things should be and work towards that and damn the naysayers.

The good news is that we are not a civilian corporation. Please don't presume to lecture me on service.

 

[FJAG]

The good news is that we are not a civilian corporation. Please don't presume to lecture me on service.

PM inbound

 

[Infanteer]

Looking at a COIN scenario, what do we need? I think the army that we have now is the result of our Kandahar experience. Some things have been put aside and others added on, but at the end of the day I think we would recognize the situation and would know roughly what to do. Acknowledging that we would would need to know some rust off, is there a structure or capability that we are missing?

That depends. Our conception of "COIN requirements" would be far different if Canada had deployed to RC East instead of RC South.

 

[Infanteer]

And I don't want to be too repetitive but I think that when we accept things the way that they are when we know that they are terribly wrong then we have stopped serving our country and are just working for a paycheck (and I know that's not fair to those who are in positions who can't effect change - I'm concentrating on the level of leadership that can and should).

You assume a General or Admiral is a level of leadership that can affect change. What happens when the Minister, or Treasury Board, or PCO says no? Is that "settling for what is and collecting a paycheck" or is that "working within the boundaries the civilians have laid out for you?"

To add, Force 2025 and CAMS were sold as "in house" projects, so don't expect the massive resourcing and recapitalization that your proposal has to be viable COA in a discussion on Force 2025.

 

[MilEME09]

You assume a General or Admiral is a level of leadership that can affect change. What happens when the Minister, or Treasury Board, or PCO says no? Is that "settling for what is and collecting a paycheck" or is that "working within the boundaries the civilians have laid out for you?"

To add, Force 2025 and CAMS were sold as "in house" projects, so don't expect the massive resourcing and recapitalization that your proposal has to be viable COA in a discussion on Force 2025.

In fact F2025 assumes funding won't change so everything must be done within existing framework

 

[FJAG]

You assume a General or Admiral is a level of leadership that can affect change. What happens when the Minister, or Treasury Board, or PCO says no? Is that "settling for what is and collecting a paycheck" or is that "working within the boundaries the civilians have laid out for you?"

To add, Force 2025 and CAMS were sold as "in house" projects, so don't expect the massive resourcing and recapitalization that your proposal has to be viable COA in a discussion on Force 2025.

I actually used to assume that individuals at that level could affect change, at least within what ought to be their sphere of authority. I have found out more recently just how high up the chain internal and external friction to progress operates.

And yes, I do believe that when the TB or MND or PCO interferes with the right path or directs something which is wrong and will cost people their lives then working within those boundaries is "settling". There used to be a time when generals and admirals resigned in order to voice their opposition in public to bad policies. When is the last time we saw that happen?

The trouble is that while there is much external friction to progress, entirely too much of that friction comes from within in the struggle for resources and turf protection. I've long been a believer in Belzile's statement from 2005

... Another way of putting this is that no planning is being done for a major war.

This is shortsighted in the extreme. A military that thinks in terms of turning itself into a great host in a crisis is very different from one that is small, thinks small, and plans for very little.

The Canadian Forces needs a plan.[1]

---

[1] J.L. Granatstein and LGen (retd) Charles Belzile, The Special Commission on Restructuring the Reserves, 1995: Ten Years Later Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, Calgary, 2005 p. 12
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.n...cturing_The_Reserves_-_English.pdf?1413661138

This is why my biggest criticism in this thread is that we have the numbers (if not the full equipment) to man a division plus but we think and plan at the battle group level with LEGO plug and play parts. I've seen a number of the plans for the Army from 1997 onward but they have not strike me as plans to move forward, merely as plans to get by.

I've seen snippets of Force 2025 and CAMS and am actually, for once, optimistic that within the resource limitations in place, it will create some positive change but there is still doubt in my mind as to what the targets are for 2030: is there a plan to think big? Are we even capable of big, bold plans anymore?

Honestly, I'm getting weary myself about my constant cynicism. Being retired gives me the ability to voice my criticism (in public like here). What I find discouraging though is that what I see (and many others have seen) as self-evident fundamental flaws and potential solutions does not seem to find acceptance by those within the system. The enduring failure to improve and utilize the reserve force is just one of those. I'm just not sure whether that's because of the boiling frog syndrome, or institutional restraint in voicing opposition to leadership.

Look. I'm not attempting to disparage either you or T2B. I respect both of you and your opinions entirely too much to do that. And I know that each of you is working to improve the system from within wherever you can. I honestly hope to see more positive indicators as Force 2025 and CAMS moves forward.

I think I've yapped too much in this thread already so, because I tend to be repeating myself, I'll move more into a listening watch for a while.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

That depends. Our conception of "COIN requirements" would be far different if Canada had deployed to RC East instead of RC South.

True that. Perhaps Light infantry and mortars would have featured more prominently.

 

[Infanteer]

True that. Perhaps Light infantry and mortars would have featured more prominently.

Let's admit it - we jumped at the opportunity to put our jungian heart (the medium-heavy BG of the Staff College's dream) in Kandahar as it could roam around the arid valleys and riverbeds looking for a fight. This may not have been appropriate after the Taliban figured out how the game worked in 2006.

 

[Weinie]

Let's admit it - we jumped at the opportunity to put our jungian heart (the medium-heavy BG of the Staff College's dream) in Kandahar as it could roam around the arid valleys and riverbeds looking for a fight. This may not have been appropriate after the Taliban figured out how the game worked in 2006.

Ok, but hindsight is 20/20. There were many more factors in play then just Staff Colleges dreams at that time. There was no sense of real urgency, as the Taliban were still seen as a spent, albeit resurging in some sectors, force. The US had switched their focus to Iraq. Canada dithered long past the point of decision where Kandahar was basically the only AO left. The decision by Canada to not support the U.S. in Iraq certainly figured into the diplomatic calculus ITO the level of support we would offer in Afghanistan, which was seen as a "just" conflict. There was no psychic counterpart of instinct here, rather the instinctual feeling was that we had badly underestimated the degree of hard feelings that the U.S. would direct towards us in not supporting Iraq. We attempted to minimize those recriminations.

My .02

 

[dapaterson]

The CAF never took Afghanistan seriously.

Compare over the years of our engagement: The number of students sent on multi-year Korean language training to prepare them for diplomatic postings or staff college in Korea, and the number of students sent on year long or multi-year Dari and Pashto language training.

Inertia is a hell of a drug.

 

[Infanteer]

Ok, but hindsight is 20/20. There were many more factors in play then just Staff Colleges dreams at that time. There was no sense of real urgency, as the Taliban were still seen as a spent, albeit resurging in some sectors, force. The US had switched their focus to Iraq. Canada dithered long past the point of decision where Kandahar was basically the only AO left. The decision by Canada to not support the U.S. in Iraq certainly figured into the diplomatic calculus ITO the level of support we would offer in Afghanistan, which was seen as a "just" conflict. There was no psychic counterpart of instinct here, rather the instinctual feeling was that we had badly underestimated the degree of hard feelings that the U.S. would direct towards us in not supporting Iraq. We attempted to minimize those recriminations.

That's not what I'm referring to. It's more in response to the Army's hammer in search of a nail, and how we try to fit a structure into a conflict that it may not be appropriate for. We "uparmoured" in Afghanistan in response to the Taliban trying to seize and hold parts of Kandahar province in 2006. A conventional response to a conventional threat. However, by the time our battlegroup was augmented for full up square combat team attacks, the Taliban already realized their strategic approach wasn't going to work and switched gameplans. And yet we kept driving around, looking for the next Medusa.

This is all well documented in much of the operational analysis on the campaign from 2007-2011.

Despite sitting in PD sessions about "winning hearts and minds" before hand, we'd rotate heavy BGs over to Afghanistan, armour up like Robocop, and scramble a half dozen 70 ton tanks around the province in reaction to the war of the flea. The outcome was an enemy who wouldn't mass (because he learned and adapted), a bunch of wrecked infrastructure (which doesn't handle 70 ton armoured vehicles), and locals who were waiting for us to leave.

 

[MilEME09]

The CAF never took Afghanistan seriously.

Compare over the years of our engagement: The number of students sent on multi-year Korean language training to prepare them for diplomatic postings or staff college in Korea, and the number of students sent on year long or multi-year Dari and Pashto language training.

Inertia is a hell of a drug.

I think you might be off the mark personally, I think the CAF took it seriously, I do not think the GoC did, otherwise they would of committed more, and interfered less.

 

[Infanteer]

The CAF never took Afghanistan seriously.

Compare over the years of our engagement: The number of students sent on multi-year Korean language training to prepare them for diplomatic postings or staff college in Korea, and the number of students sent on year long or multi-year Dari and Pashto language training.

Inertia is a hell of a drug.

That is a mischaracterization and is patently untrue. The CAF took Afghanistan very seriously. It just didn't see the ROI on having year-long language courses for relatively obscure Iranian dialects to use during a 6-month rotation. There is merit to this logic, and one has to wonder if there would be any additional value in the Western soldier being able to directly converse with an Afghan to hear him say "Hey Canadian, you are leaving in 2011?!?"

 

[GR66]

My gut tells me that FJAG is right that within the existing manning and budget we should be able to field a much more effective Army.

I'm going to throw out one possible model to achieve this that would allow us to be effective in the types of conflict I believe we're most likely to end up fighting as well as being significantly more capable than we currently are in a peer/near-peer conflict.

My assumptions are that the Army is not going to increase in size, the Reg Force will remain primarily a LAV-based force and there will be limited equipment buying opportunities beyond projects that are already in the works.

PY's and money would be saved by reducing the number of Divisions from five to three and the number of Brigade Groups from 13 to 8. These PYs would be put into filling out the Combat Support positions within the Reg Force Regiments and cost savings used to expand the budgets of existing equipment purchase programs (as identified in the Advancing with Purpose document).

Armoured Regiments:

• The three existing Armoured Regiments would be symmetrically organized as LAV-based regiments with some of the AT/DFS support lost from the removal of the tanks from the regiments replaced equipping a portion of the LAVS with RWS-mounted ATGM's under the "Anti-Tank Guided Missile"/"LAV Specialist Variant Enhancement" programs. Ideally I'd also like to see the addition of some Direct Fire Support vehicles to the regiments (120mm Centuro II turret?) but that may have to wait for a future program.
• The tanks, which are to be modernized under the "Tank Life Extension" program would be grouped together in a new all tank Regiment as part of 1 Mechanized Brigade in Edmonton. This would centralize maintenance and support in one location. Individual tank squadrons could be attached to each of the LAV-based Armoured Recce Regiments as required or in the case of a major conflict the Regiment could deploy as a whole. The PYs for this new Tank Regiment would come from the re-roleing of 3PPCLI. This transition would take several years and would aim to be completed by the time the tank modernization program is completed in 2027.

Ground-Based Air Defence:
- A new GBAD Regiment to be stood up as part of the "Ground Based Air Defence" program with a LAV-based SHORAD vehicle. Ideally (for sake of commonality of parts/munitions and interoperability) I'd like to see us use the same RWS as the US Army IM-SHORAD system with dual-Hellfire and quad-Stinger missile launchers. This same RWS could also be fitted with the same dual-Hellfire and a single Javelin or single/dual TOW missile launcher for our ATGM LAVs to provide commonality of equipment. The personnel for this new GBAD Regiment would come from the re-roleing of 3 R22R. This transition would take place over the several years required for the new GBAD system to be selected and rolled out. Not all of the 3-R22R PYs would be required for this new Regiment so the extra PYs would roll back into the Reg Force Infantry Battalions to fill out their CS elements.

Artillery:
- Replace the M777's in the Regular Force Artillery Regiments with a Self-propelled Howitzer under the "Indirect Fire Modernization" program. For commonality and interoperability it would likely be best if we went with the same wheeled 155mm howitzer system that gets selected for the US Army's Stryker Brigades. As noted previously the wheeled howitzers require less personnel to operate than the towed M777's so some of the artillery PY's saved could be shifted to support Reserve artillery TA functions. The M777s removed from Reg Force service would be moved to the Reserves.

Infantry:

• PY's left over from the re-roleing of the 3rd Battalions of the PPCLI and R22R would go into filling slots in the remaining 6 x LAV infantry battalions - in particular the Combat Support roles, including the addition of 120mm mortars to the CS Companies. Ideally we would procure turreted 120mm mortar vehicles but if required could at least have LAV-mounted 120mm mortars with 81mm dismounts like in the US Army Stryker Brigades. This could be covered under a combination of the "Indirect Fire Modernization" and "LAV Specialist Variant Enhancement" projects. The "Anti-Tank Guided Missile" program could also cover ATGM equipped LAVs for the CS Companies.
• The 3rd Battalion of the RCR in Gagetown would become the 1st Battalion of the Canadian Light Reaction Regiment. This would be a re-envisioning of Light Battalions away from simply being light infantry to smaller, mobile companies capable if independent action and much more easily deployable by air when an immediate response is required.
• The 560 troops currently allotted to a light battalion under Force 2013 could be used to fully man a slightly reduced size Battalion HQ (80 pers) and Admin Company (80 pers) which would leave enough PY's for 8 x fully manned 50 pers Companies. This is where the Army could innovate and experiment with various light company constructs to develop small company groups capable of rapid deployment to a crisis zone with light vehicles providing a potentially wide variety of capabilities (JTAC's, ATGM teams, Pioneers, UAV's, Light Recce, Counter UAV, EW, Loitering Munitions, etc.). Being a fully manned battalion should mean that there should be at least 2 or 3 of these Company-Groups at high readiness at any time in order to provide the Army the capability to rapidly respond to a developing crisis.

Reserves:

• If Reserve units are "right sized" to be organized as Companies/Squadrons/Batteries instead of "Regiments" and grouped together, you could have three symmetrical Infantry Brigade Groups, each with an Armoured Recce Regiment, a 12-gun M777 Artillery Regiment, a Combat Engineer Regiment, a Signals Regiment and a Service Battalion.
• In case of full mobilization this would theoretically allow deployment of a full Division of light infantry with supporting elements.
• In a more realistic scenario these Companies could be used to generate platoon-sized units to either provide dismounted infantry reinforcements for combat losses to the Reg Force battalions, or alternately group together to provide a 3rd Light Infantry Battalion (complete with Combat Support elements) to each of the Mechanized Brigade Groups.

• In addition to these three Infantry Brigade Groups you would be left with 8 x Company-sized infantry units in each of Ontario and Atlantic Canada to make a 2nd and 3rd Battalion to round out the 1st Battalion of the new Canadian Light Response Regiment (former 3 RCR) along with a Combat Support Battalion consisting of one Artillery Battery, Combat Engineer Squadron, Signals Squadron and Service Company.
• These two Reserve Light Response Battalions could be a source of straight light-infantry to round our more specialized troops in the Reg Force Battalion, or could eventually expand to include their own specialist units/equipment once the doctrine is developed to put new technologies in place.

- Finally, there would be two Reserve Artillery Batteries available in each of the Reserve Brigade Groups that could be equipped with HIMARS once the "Long-Range Precision Fires" project comes online.


I'm sure that people will be able to point out numerous issues with a plan like this, but I think it shows that with some willingness to be creative and break some rice bowls the Canadian Army and Reserves could be much more effective within the constraints of our current manning and existing equipment plans.

 

[Infanteer]

PY's and money would be saved by reducing the number of Divisions from five to three and the number of Brigade Groups from 13 to 8. These PYs would be put into filling out the Combat Support positions within the Reg Force Regiments and cost savings used to expand the budgets of existing equipment purchase programs (as identified in the Advancing with Purpose document).

The Army only has 4 Divisions (1st Cdn Div belongs to CJOC). If you cut one division HQ and 5 CBG HQs, you will save 143 PYs.

If we're drawing up armies on napkins, here is a rough approximation of your Reg Force PY pool:

Field Force: (CMBGs and CCSB): 15,180
Support to ARes (CBG, CRPGs, and RSS staff): 900
Army and Div HQs: 730
Training System: 2,640
Base Support: 2,200
Bands: 70

 

[Brad Sallows]

8 x fully manned 50 pers Companies

What is the advantage of 8x50 over 3x133? Larger span of control to keep the CO exercised?

 

[McG]

That is a mischaracterization and is patently untrue. The CAF took Afghanistan very seriously. It just didn't see the ROI on having year-long language courses for relatively obscure Iranian dialects to use during a 6-month rotation. There is merit to this logic, and one has to wonder if there would be any additional value in the Western soldier being able to directly converse with an Afghan to hear him say "Hey Canadian, you are leaving in 2011?!?"

The US did this language training, but it was a four year commitment for the selected officers (and it may only have been officers). They did 12 months language training , 12 months in theatre, 12 months in a US based staff job supporting the theatre, and then a second 12 months back in theatre. I don't know how much value it returned form them.

Regardless, I don't think we can point to our experience in Afghanistan and say that we know how to COIN. Maybe it can be said that we never lost tactically, but we certainly never achieved the strategic goals aside from being seen to contribute to a US priority.