Infantry Vehicles

[Fabius]

I guess I am trying to see the "so what?" Doctrine is an agreed-upon set of fundamental principles on how we will fight. Our BG-level doctrine is sound, and we can execute it. Our CMBG-level doctrine is also sound, and it applies in what we are leading overseas (with variations, of course, for the local situation).

I do not see a need to adjust doctrine based on numbers of tanks? Why do you see that? If we had no tanks at all and no scope for allied tanks then we'd need to look at out combat team and battle group doctrine.

We have six LAV battalions that will be cycling through Latvia. This means that each Battalion will deploy once every three years. This includes the Battalion HQ. combat support company and the combat support company. If we surged another LAV Company Canada could field a rather doctrinal Mech Battle Group on its own.

I suspect the difference between you and @GR66 is that he is looking at the Canadian Army as an army at war with all of its units and formations, whereas you are looking at it in terms of a peacetime rotational deployment.

The CA has three tank squadrons and 18 infantry companies. If those infantry companies go to war anytime in the next 5 years as part of Canadian Army formations chances of them being in a square combat team or even a Sqn(-) or half Sqn will be slight.

Our tactical doctrine at the Cbt Tn and BG levels is sound but due to resources it starts collapsing at Bde and has utterly collapsed as a doctrine for how the Canadian Army will fight as an Army at War. Again simply due to resources and structure.

The whole MRP idea of a Bn deploying every three years should also be heavily caveated. The Infantry is right now using personnel from two Bns for almost every Roto to find enough able bodies. The sqns are going to be worse likely, deploying once every 18 months.

 

[Fabius]

If I was suddenly given a bunch of public funds to spend I would likely just buy 100 more LAV 6 and place a BG worth at JMRC Hohenfels for Level 5/6 training and as a surge BG.

The problem with the entire idea of exporting the Canadian Army’s collective training to Europe for L5 and L6 is that we would be further atrophying our ability to mobilize and train the rest of our army inside fortress North America and then deploy them.
As a surge BG that equipment set would be completely disconnected from the rest of the Canadian Army in Latvia.

 

[FJAG]

The whole MRP idea of a Bn deploying every three years should also be heavily caveated. The Infantry is right now using personnel from two Bns for almost every Roto to find enough able bodies. The sqns are going to be worse likely, deploying once every 18 months.

I'm 100% with you on this. It's a habit we picked up in Afghanistan. I'll trump your two battalions scenario with TF 3-07 which was headed by the RHQ of 3 R22eR. The TF's A Coy was formed by A Coy 1 R22eR; B Coy was formed by 2 R22eR's A Coy and C Coy was formed by 3 R22eR's A Coy.

When we look at the current Latvia eFP we have 9 bns with 27 rifle coys (assuming they are reasonably staffed) to draw on to fill a bn HQ, a rifle coy and parts of a CS coy. The artillery only has six 4-gun batteries to draw on to fill a 6-gun battery and the armoured really only has one tank regiment with three sabre sqns to field a 15-tank squadron. Obviously everyone is robbing Peter to pay Paul. This makes for a poor business model but is pretty much what the designers of the system were aiming for at the turn of the century when battle group-sized task forces were designed to be formed from a variety of coy-sized building blocks and JIMP-capable brigades from building block task forces.

Financial pressures and over-tasking were the driving forces behind this transformation. You've probably read the article in the CAJ a few years ago that discusses some of these issues and argues for an asynchronous army and revised MRP. The MRP has already been revised somewhat but asynchronicity, as proposed, still escapes the army. There is a long way to go, however, and there continues to be disagreement as to the right, or even the best, way forward.

The artillery has for quite some time relied heavily on reservists to fill roto positions. It continues to do so now that the deployment has become heavier but support for reserve force integration and training varies widely across the RegF and ARes brigades.

 

[KevinB]

The internet ate a rather long and detailed reply. I’ll be back later to reconstruct it.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

The problem with the entire idea of exporting the Canadian Army’s collective training to Europe for L5 and L6 is that we would be further atrophying our ability to mobilize and train the rest of our army inside fortress North America and then deploy them.
As a surge BG that equipment set would be completely disconnected from the rest of the Canadian Army in Latvia.

We are already exporting our Level 5 Combat Team and Level 6 for the mech units to Europe, and our Level 6 for the Light Battalions is exported to JPMRC/JRTC. Having a hypothetical BG vehicle set in Germany would allow for live fire (Graefenwhor) and fully-instrumented CT in a less-crowded (but admittedly still in demand) training centre than Latvia. I am not sure how this atrophies our ability mobilize and train the rest of our army inside fortress North America? Our deploying elements conduct CT up to and including Level 5 Combined Arms Team near their home garrison locations. If we needed to conduct Level 5 Combat Team and Level 6 in Canada we could still do it. The folks that organize and coordinate the exported CT are still Canadian Army.

The hypothetical equipment in Germany would be disconnected from Latvia. But it would a lot closer to Latvia for a surge than it would be it was in Canada. It would require custodial personnel. Moving from Hohenfels to Riga would be a deliberate move, but at least the staging of the flyover troops on the equipment would be in our (NATO) operational depth.

But this is all in an imaginary world where we get an extra BG set of vehicles.

 

[ArmyRick]

The internet ate a rather long and detailed reply. I’ll be back later to reconstruct it.

The old internet ate my homework excuse? Back in my day we blamed our dogs for that, sonny. Sorry Kev, but thats a F on this assignment.

 

[ArmyRick]

Deleted duplicate post. Internet tried to eat my response.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I suspect the difference between you and @GR66 is that he is looking at the Canadian Army as an army at war with all of its units and formations, whereas you are looking at it in terms of a peacetime rotational deployment.

The CA has three tank squadrons and 18 infantry companies. If those infantry companies go to war anytime in the next 5 years as part of Canadian Army formations chances of them being in a square combat team or even a Sqn(-) or half Sqn will be slight.

Our tactical doctrine at the Cbt Tn and BG levels is sound but due to resources it starts collapsing at Bde and has utterly collapsed as a doctrine for how the Canadian Army will fight as an Army at War. Again simply due to resources and structure.

The whole MRP idea of a Bn deploying every three years should also be heavily caveated. The Infantry is right now using personnel from two Bns for almost every Roto to find enough able bodies. The sqns are going to be worse likely, deploying once every 18 months.

I won't speak for GR66, but I am looking at our doctrine in the context of our operational remits. If we tried to field the entire Canadian Army as-is as a Division today we would have plenty of problems. I was part of a Corps-level exercise with allies a few years ago were we explored that concept, fielding pretty much the entire CA with existing equipment (more or less). I will just say that our commitments (which drive the operational requirements) should be made with within our means. If a higher scale of commitment is required then that should drive more equipment (or troops etc).

Even if we had more tank squadrons I don't think we'd see too many "square" combat teams on operations. It is unlikely that a Battle Group commander (especially a infantry heavy BG with a single squadron) would put the bulk of his combat power under two Majors with one of them in charge. We do it on the Combat Team Commander Course because it makes us happy in that little vacuum and lets us see what a Major can handle in terms of span of control.

It would be great if we had at least three more tank squadrons, trading in three "recce" squadrons to achieve that. Would cutting our existing tank squadrons in half achieve something if we have to deploy more than a BG? Perhaps. That would be something to consider through a doctrinal and professional ethics lens. The same would apply to fielding Leopard 2A4s on operations.

I will say that our LAV battalions are useful without too many attachments for operations other than large scale combat operations. They are also useful for security tasks without too many attachments within a LSCO-context.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I'm 100% with you on this. It's a habit we picked up in Afghanistan. I'll trump your two battalions scenario with TF 3-07 which was headed by the RHQ of 3 R22eR. The TF's A Coy was formed by A Coy 1 R22eR; B Coy was formed by 2 R22eR's A Coy and C Coy was formed by 3 R22eR's A Coy.

When we look at the current Latvia eFP we have 9 bns with 27 rifle coys (assuming they are reasonably staffed) to draw on to fill a bn HQ, a rifle coy and parts of a CS coy. The artillery only has six 4-gun batteries to draw on to fill a 6-gun battery and the armoured really only has one tank regiment with three sabre sqns to field a 15-tank squadron. Obviously everyone is robbing Peter to pay Paul. This makes for a poor business model but is pretty much what the designers of the system were aiming for at the turn of the century when battle group-sized task forces were designed to be formed from a variety of coy-sized building blocks and JIMP-capable brigades from building block task forces.

Financial pressures and over-tasking were the driving forces behind this transformation. You've probably read the article in the CAJ a few years ago that discusses some of these issues and argues for an asynchronous army and revised MRP. The MRP has already been revised somewhat but asynchronicity, as proposed, still escapes the army. There is a long way to go, however, and there continues to be disagreement as to the right, or even the best, way forward.

The artillery has for quite some time relied heavily on reservists to fill roto positions. It continues to do so now that the deployment has become heavier but support for reserve force integration and training varies widely across the RegF and ARes brigades.

It sounds like 'Total Force' is working according to the Master Plan then, eh?

 

[ArmyRick]

It sounds like 'Total Force' is working according to the Master Plan then, eh?

Ahhhhh, the old grand scheme envisioned the year I joined in 1990. Embraced by both the Reg Force and at the time, P Res. Embraced as in literally brawls erupting on exercise between one of my old units, the Lorne Scots and The Canadian Airborne Regiment during Ex On Guard '90.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Ahhhhh, the old grand scheme envisioned the year I joined in 1990. Embraced by both the Reg Force and at the time, P Res. Embraced as in literally brawls erupting on exercise between one of my old units, the Lorne Scots and The Canadian Airborne Regiment during Ex On Guard '90.

Oh God 90.... what a disaster....

I gave the CAF one more chance after that, in '91, then never went back again for another Summer Schlmozzle.

Life is too short to dream about self-harming to get off yet another seriously effed up 2 week exercise

 

[FJAG]

We are already exporting our Level 5 Combat Team and Level 6 for the mech units to Europe, and our Level 6 for the Light Battalions is exported to JPMRC/JRTC. Having a hypothetical BG vehicle set in Germany would allow for live fire (Graefenwhor) and fully-instrumented CT in a less-crowded (but admittedly still in demand) training centre than Latvia. I am not sure how this atrophies our ability mobilize and train the rest of our army inside fortress North America? Our deploying elements conduct CT up to and including Level 5 Combined Arms Team near their home garrison locations. If we needed to conduct Level 5 Combat Team and Level 6 in Canada we could still do it. The folks that organize and coordinate the exported CT are still Canadian Army.

The hypothetical equipment in Germany would be disconnected from Latvia. But it would a lot closer to Latvia for a surge than it would be it was in Canada. It would require custodial personnel. Moving from Hohenfels to Riga would be a deliberate move, but at least the staging of the flyover troops on the equipment would be in our (NATO) operational depth.

But this is all in an imaginary world where we get an extra BG set of vehicles.

How does the new base at Selonia factor into the overcrowding and ability to do Level 5 and 6 training. I'm very much of the view that having a full battle group of equipment there for flyover training and operational use would be a great benefit. The way that the numbers stack up in the eFP, the current tank squadron could be part of that battlegroup while the eFP relies on the multinational tank forces. That would notionally increase the Latvia MNB to four battalions: the eFP BG; the Dane/Swede flyover BG; the Cdn prepositioned mech BG and the Canadian light flyover battalion. A credible force.

As to the effect on Canada, the only new equipment not already earmarked are four coys - two rifle, one CS, one CSS - and a bn HQ. (and potentially an engineer squadron) That leaves Canada down approximately 10% of its infantry equipment which, considering its manning levels, ought to be tolerable. (I'm assuming the eFP's gear came from op stock and the army has the ability to maintain it) The equipment could come from the battalion manning the eFP during a given year and which will have a reduced need considering many of its personnel are deployed anyway.

 

[Fabius]

I am not sure how this atrophies our ability mobilize and train the rest of our army inside fortress North America? Our deploying elements conduct CT up to and including Level 5 Combined Arms Team near their home garrison locations. If we needed to conduct Level 5 Combat Team and Level 6 in Canada we could still do it. The folks that organize and coordinate the exported CT are still Canadian Army.

I think it depends on what we want from our collective training. Of course we can do L6 in Canada at any time but it would be adhoc compared to NTC or JRTC or even CMTC 10 years ago due to the lack of weapons effects simulation and dedicated OPFOR.
A Combat Training Centre requires resources and equipment that can not be spun up quickly, something we are finding out in Latvia.

I will say that the Canadian Army’s CT in large training areas has imparted an operational capability of its sub units and units that is markedly better than European elements that are constrained by very small training areas. It will be interesting to see how that capability develops going forward.

I am looking at our doctrine in the context of our operational remits. If we tried to field the entire Canadian Army as-is as a Division today we would have plenty of problems. I was part of a Corps-level exercise with allies a few years ago were we explored that concept, fielding pretty much the entire CA with existing equipment (more or less). I will just say that our commitments (which drive the operational requirements) should be made with within our means. If a higher scale of commitment is required then that should drive more equipment (or troops etc).

That Corps exercise highlighting our problem’s is interesting in relation to our operational requirements and commitments and is likely a fundamental part of understanding if our doctrine is fit for purpose. For a Canadian Army that sees itself as deploying and fighting only a BG or Bde (-) the resource shortfalls that prevent the entire Army from fighting according to doctrine are not a problem. Especially as you say because the equipment is scaled to a small scale in relation to the total army due to the rotation system.

The issue though is that idea works as long as we can adhere to that limited commitment but it fails if we are forced to go to war with the entire army.
Through the 1990s to the 2010s we had the case where we largely faced only wars of convenience where we had the ability to limit our commitment. With the changing international situation our ability to choose when,where and with how much we commit is declining and our hands may be forced.

If that happens our delta between doctrine and resources is going to potentially be felt very profoundly.

 

[Fabius]

How does the new base at Selonia factor into the overcrowding and ability to do Level 5 and 6 training.

Its not yet operational so it’s affect is still undetermined. It will likely improve it but only to a degree for mech forces, based off what I am tracking it’s mostly swamp.

 

[KevinB]

And yes, @KevinB, since this is the Infantry vehicle thread, I'd pair it with a couple of battalions of LAV 6.0s because a) that's what we got, and b) not every battle is a sweeping assault across a Middle Eastern desert.

Okay Take 2 on this reply. I am mostly going to address that in my attack on @Kirkhill below

One solution was to buy Marders for the Armoured Corps and expand the Assault Troops to create Panzergrenadiers.

And leave the light fight to the Infantry.

Personally I have never been a big fan of the "Assault Troop" concept, as it really is a waste of a Crewman to also teach Infantry role tasks to them as well. I however do believe that there is a difference between Light and Heavy Infantry - and the trade should be split - or at least managed differently than it is done --- we have that issue now here as well with the 11B MOS.

PSOs? Sorry civvy ignorance.

Pease Support Operations; being Somalia and Kosovo for there US Army - where the Heavy Metal of the Armored Bde's was not practical, and the Light Divisions soft skin vehicle too light.
- for which the concept of Medium forces makes a great deal of sense -

Careful - even Light Forces need transport.

IMHO Light Forces need to be vehicle agnostic, and while transport is needed during various stages - not all transport methods are practical for Light Forces.

The Stryker made a good infantry bus.

Yes - and the key to keeping it a good bus is to use it for its abilities (protected mobility, over primarily a road network) for PSO type endeavors. Where it comes off the rails is when you start to use it as an IFV in a Tank/Infantry team.

Putting a turret on the bus has a psychological impact on the users - a negative one.

Well again that depends on what role you are trying to imply it for. The initial RWS mount was designed to give troops protected firepower needed for most PSO type situation with the blend of the M2 and Mk19. It was something that had been noted was missing from the Bison that was really the genesis of the Stryker, as the Bison required a solider to stand exposed to man a pintle mounted MG.

The original HMG RWS made sense and upgrading it to C-UAS mount also makes sense. Equipping 10% of the fleet with a 30-35mm Air Defence turret also makes sense. What doesn't make sense to me is sticking those Dragoon turrets on them with the intention of slogging it out with similarly equipped vehicles.

So this is where the entire line of Medium Force tends to stray. Clearly future PSO's will require C-UAS systems, as it is a fairly easy means of attack - and Johnny Jihad no longer needs to dig in the road side bomb - but can fly it to it's destiny.

When we started to upgrade to the Stryker 2.0 Double V Hull (basically a LAV 6.0 w/o turret) the Stryker was no longer an easily deployed system - and getting up into the space / weight zone of the Bradley - so what does one do then - if Medium "doctrine" fails you just pencil it is for Heavy.
So the US Army when looking at places to put the Stryker Brigades found them seriously outgunned for activities in Europe - and voila the Dragoon was born. The old adage of if all you have is a hammer...
Well we like Hammers, so we just made a screwdriver heavier so it be be banged with.

Disagree. Nothing wrong with the Stryker. Might be a problem with the way some people want to use it. But that would be a problem of doctrine, wouldn't it?

Agreed

However if you have a medium force that WAS designed to fairly easily be transported to help Light Forces, and all of a sudden it can't really do that -- then what?
So then you start to want to add enablers to the fleet -- AD systems, ATGM carriers, Mortar Variants etc
Things a PSO force don't typical need - and tend to take away from your vehicles that do need them.

Honestly there are needs for Light (various types of light), Medium, and Heavy Forces, but trying to make Heavy Forces out of wheeled vehicles isn't a good idea.

Light forces love a nice tank, if they have one and the other guys don't.

In Iraq, the Abrams was generally most dangerous thing on the battle field - to both sides.

Even a troop of light tanks can be a useful addition to Division (-) of light troops engaging other light troops. Or a squadron flown in on a peace keeping mission.

So I don't want to be in a Light unit that is anywhere that a tank can be if I can help it. I want to be be exploiting terrain that vehicles can't go at least can't easily go, so they get hung up and easily picked off. Or I want to be in and out before anyone can bring armor to bear on me.

 

[KevinB]

I won't speak for GR66, but I am looking at our doctrine in the context of our operational remits. If we tried to field the entire Canadian Army as-is as a Division today we would have plenty of problems. I was part of a Corps-level exercise with allies a few years ago were we explored that concept, fielding pretty much the entire CA with existing equipment (more or less). I will just say that our commitments (which drive the operational requirements) should be made with within our means. If a higher scale of commitment is required then that should drive more equipment (or troops etc).

I thought RV92 was the last CA Div Ex?

I will say that our LAV battalions are useful without too many attachments for operations other than large scale combat operations. They are also useful for security tasks without too many attachments within a LSCO-context.

Agreed

My main beef with the CA LAV fleet is that one cannot truly run combined Tank Infantry attacks without a fairly heavy Tracked IFV as the Infantry vehicle, while the LAV 6.0 is quite well protected - especially with add on armor, the off road mobility is deplorable compared to a Leo2 or Abrams MBT, so you will not be a combined breakthrough - or your route will be very predictable to accommodate the LAV's - so your tanks are separate on the objective which generally they don't like as folks poke out of all sorts of small places to shoot blasts things at them, and if the tanks roar over the objective - it can lead to some nasty fights on the objective - as well as the potential for Blue on Blue.

I'm also slightly jaded looking at it from the CAB view point.

 

[Maxman1]

4x4 for 16 in the troops

Sqn Comd
2 IC
BC
And now another one ? Where are they getting these crews from lol

 

[Kirkhill]

Okay Take 2 on this reply. I am mostly going to address that in my attack on @Kirkhill below

En garde, mon ami!

Personally I have never been a big fan of the "Assault Troop" concept, as it really is a waste of a Crewman to also teach Infantry role tasks to them as well. I however do believe that there is a difference between Light and Heavy Infantry - and the trade should be split - or at least managed differently than it is done --- we have that issue now here as well with the 11B MOS.

I agree with you. And I think most of the people I served with and under back in the 80s agreed with you as well. The question, I believe, boiled down to the necessary ratio of Panzers to Panzergrenadiers and what cap badges were to be worn. I was not then, and is not now, impossible to envisage an all RCAC solution for the Heavy Force.

Pease Support Operations; being Somalia and Kosovo for there US Army - where the Heavy Metal of the Armored Bde's was not practical, and the Light Divisions soft skin vehicle too light.
- for which the concept of Medium forces makes a great deal of sense -

Pease porridge hot, pease porridge cold, pease porridge in the pot, nine days old. (Sorry, couldn't resist - wasn't aware that pease required separate support operations).

Beyond the chuckles - again, I agree.

IMHO Light Forces need to be vehicle agnostic, and while transport is needed during various stages - not all transport methods are practical for Light Forces.

And lo and behold it is three in a row. Agreed.

Yes - and the key to keeping it a good bus is to use it for its abilities (protected mobility, over primarily a road network) for PSO type endeavors. Where it comes off the rails is when you start to use it as an IFV in a Tank/Infantry team.

Four. In my view the Stryker makes a much improved Saxon, or BTR. A great buggy for getting troops forwards over roads and the occasional rough patch, or wet patch if amphibious, while protecting them from blasts, shrapnel and the environment.

One of the reasons I have spent so much time arguing fruitlessly that the vehicle should be supplied by the battalion Transport Platoon or a brigade Transport Company is to reduce the dependency of the troops on their transport. They should be able to unplug from their buses and jump aboard boats or helicopters, or even planes.

Well again that depends on what role you are trying to imply it for. The initial RWS mount was designed to give troops protected firepower needed for most PSO type situation with the blend of the M2 and Mk19. It was something that had been noted was missing from the Bison that was really the genesis of the Stryker, as the Bison required a solider to stand exposed to man a pintle mounted MG.

I saw the RWS as the logical progression from the pintle mount MGs of the M113 and the Bison. Its greatest utility, on the M113, was for Air Defence while travelling. It also supplied a response in the event of ambush. The gun was easily dismounted to support dismounted operations while the buses went Zulu.

Things started going cock-eyed when the turret for the Cadillac-Gage Commando Armoured Security Vehicle, now known in Canadian service as the TAPV, was adopted and parked on the Grizzly. On the ASV it made sense as the crew expected to fight lightly armed troops on airfields and in convoys, from the road, while staying mounted. The Grizzly, and the accompanying Cougar tank trainer basically made those troops a road bound security force. And the 45 degree elevation on the turret limited their Air Defence value. We've been trying to get off-road ever since.

So this is where the entire line of Medium Force tends to stray. Clearly future PSO's will require C-UAS systems, as it is a fairly easy means of attack - and Johnny Jihad no longer needs to dig in the road side bomb - but can fly it to it's destiny.

And again

When we started to upgrade to the Stryker 2.0 Double V Hull (basically a LAV 6.0 w/o turret) the Stryker was no longer an easily deployed system - and getting up into the space / weight zone of the Bradley - so what does one do then - if Medium "doctrine" fails you just pencil it is for Heavy.
So the US Army when looking at places to put the Stryker Brigades found them seriously outgunned for activities in Europe - and voila the Dragoon was born. The old adage of if all you have is a hammer...
Well we like Hammers, so we just made a screwdriver heavier so it be be banged with.

Agreed

This is getting monotonous.

However if you have a medium force that WAS designed to fairly easily be transported to help Light Forces, and all of a sudden it can't really do that -- then what?
So then you start to want to add enablers to the fleet -- AD systems, ATGM carriers, Mortar Variants etc
Things a PSO force don't typical need - and tend to take away from your vehicles that do need them.

A better solution would have been to accept there are things that the Stryker fleet can't do and, within the design limits of the vehicle, create the best enablers possible. And adjust TTPs accordingly.

Don't tell me you couldn't afford to do that. Look at the gazillions spent on your MRAP/ASV menagerie only to be parked, sold or donated to the Taliban.

Honestly there are needs for Light (various types of light), Medium, and Heavy Forces, but trying to make Heavy Forces out of wheeled vehicles isn't a good idea.

And again.

In Iraq, the Abrams was generally most dangerous thing on the battle field - to both sides.

So I don't want to be in a Light unit that is anywhere that a tank can be if I can help it. I want to be be exploiting terrain that vehicles can't go at least can't easily go, so they get hung up and easily picked off. Or I want to be in and out before anyone can bring armor to bear on me.

On the other hand even a couple of self-propelled 76mm guns on tracks, and a few 30mm guns, had a significant impact on operations in the Falklands. Some folks would call those light tanks.

Heavy armoured cars (still lighter than what passes for Mediums these days) performed admirably in French and British "Peace Support Operations" for decades.

Greyhound - 7.4 tons and 37mm
Staghound - 17 tons and 37mm
Saladin - 12 tons and 76mm
ERC-90 - 8 tons and 90mm
AMX-10 - 16 tons and 105mm

Light tanks were welcomed by US Marines, Commonwealth and Japanese troops fighting in the jungles - even though the Brits were using bolt action rifles and relied on bayonets, fighting knives, kukris and entrenching tools for back up weapons.

You can call them tanks or not, as you like, or you can call them Direct Fire Support Vehicles, ultimately they are self-propelled guns. They are artillery pieces for infantry support.

Maybe the 105 was too big for a Bison. Maybe a 90 or even a 76 would have been a better fit for the vehicle that would still have enhanced the capabilities of a Stryker/LAV column, even if restricted to roads and wide flanking movements in deserts.

Opération Daguet - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Brad Sallows]

Other than Europe, where might large traditional tank forces really be needed on a scale that would need a large Canadian contribution of tanks? South America? Southern Africa? MENA? Southeast Asia?

If there are none, prepositioning equipment in Europe makes sense. Even if there are some, prepositioning in Europe still makes sense for some regions.

If the point of tracked infantry vehicles is mainly tank-like mobility for tank-like tactical operations, we don't really need tracked infantry vehicles for force contributions in regions without a lot of enemy tank-like formations. Wheeled vehicles (LAVs) ought to be enough.

A throwaway aphorism I believe is "you never have enough infantry". We'd be doing well if we could realistically aim for two triangular divisions of triangular brigades - five infantry brigades and one armoured (two tank battalions). One infantry battalion in tracked carriers. 88 fighting tanks if we went with triangular establishments all the way down. (Obviously this is just a situated BotE estimate on the idea of having equipment for two divisions and a plan to recruit and train a lot of people.)

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I thought RV92 was the last CA Div Ex?


Agreed

My main beef with the CA LAV fleet is that one cannot truly run combined Tank Infantry attacks without a fairly heavy Tracked IFV as the Infantry vehicle, while the LAV 6.0 is quite well protected - especially with add on armor, the off road mobility is deplorable compared to a Leo2 or Abrams MBT, so you will not be a combined breakthrough - or your route will be very predictable to accommodate the LAV's - so your tanks are separate on the objective which generally they don't like as folks poke out of all sorts of small places to shoot blasts things at them, and if the tanks roar over the objective - it can lead to some nasty fights on the objective - as well as the potential for Blue on Blue.

I'm also slightly jaded looking at it from the CAB view point.

We've done many divisional-level CAXs since then. Most formation-level training in most armies is done through CAX. This particular CAX was an allied corps level one where the constraints were to use equipment that existed. Some of the soldier-level stuff doesn't really shine through in a Corps level CAX, but an interesting exercise nonetheless.