Infantry Vehicles

[markppcli]

Technically the LAV 6.0 used in the "Mech" Battalions is the LAV ISC (Infantry Squad Carrier)...it's not named as an IFV.

Infantry section carrier

 

[GR66]

Infantry section carrier

 

[FJAG]

Swap the MGS Platoon for a C-UAS platoon with SkyRangers? Add UAVs throughout?

Just noticed this. This was the organization from when it was first deployed around 2007 to 2010. Originally the aim was to deploy 34 with each SBCT but this was reduced to just the three battalion's rifle companies for a total of 27. The system was problematic and by 2017 the number of MGS in an SBCT was reduced to 10, all of which formed a single company in the SBCT's cavalry squadron. The rifle companies didn't have any at all after that as it was not replaced by anything. In 2021 it was decided to divest all remaining MGS from the army by 2022/23.

Canada scored a win back in 2006 when it decided not to go ahead with the MGS purchase.

 

[dapaterson]

Just noticed this. This was the organization from when it was first deployed around 2007 to 2010. Originally the aim was to deploy 34 with each SBCT but this was reduced to just the three battalion's rifle companies for a total of 27. The system was problematic and by 2017 the number of MGS in an SBCT was reduced to 10, all of which formed a single company in the SBCT's cavalry squadron. The rifle companies didn't have any at all after that as it was not replaced by anything. In 2021 it was decided to divest all remaining MGS from the army by 2022/23.

Canada scored a win back in 2006 when it decided not to go ahead with the MGS purchase.

To the contrary, going back to MBTs was a symptom of the lack of serious discussion in the Army about its size and therefore how it should be structured. Having marginal capabilities scattered across the Army, in light, medium and heavy, without coherent structures for employment or coherent support, is a perpetuation of the past without a plan for the future.

 

[KevinB]

You are both somewhat right. I’d expand on @dapaterson ’s comment and say going back to MBT’s without also focusing on a tracked IFV and supporting arms systems for those MBT was a collective fail for the CA.

 

[Kirkhill]

Just noticed this. This was the organization from when it was first deployed around 2007 to 2010. Originally the aim was to deploy 34 with each SBCT but this was reduced to just the three battalion's rifle companies for a total of 27. The system was problematic and by 2017 the number of MGS in an SBCT was reduced to 10, all of which formed a single company in the SBCT's cavalry squadron. The rifle companies didn't have any at all after that as it was not replaced by anything. In 2021 it was decided to divest all remaining MGS from the army by 2022/23.

Canada scored a win back in 2006 when it decided not to go ahead with the MGS purchase.

I was focusing on the infantry role of the infantry battalion and the repeated reference to the battalion being a light infantry, or standard or leg infantry battalion that was provided with what would now be classified as a Protected Mobility Vehicle - same class as Bushmasters and MRAPs and Foxhounds - or French Servals and Griffons and German Dingos.

Armoured buses with provision for self-defence.

The mortars and FSTs ride in similar buses and the mortars can be dismounted as well as being fired from the bus.

....

And then the perennial discussion of what is Direct Fire Support, how much is needed and how heavy does it need to be. That subject does not appear to have been resolved - cf MGS/Centauro/Centauro2/Type16-MCV/M10 Booker.

...

My take is that if the weapon is fired from a turret then it should not be in an infantry battalion. If the battalion dismounts it should be able to take all its weapons with it and deploy them from ground mounts.

If the weapon is permanently attached to a vehicle then that vehicle should be part of a non-infantry group that can be attached to the infantry when and if needed.

If the turreted vehicle transports infantry that routinely work with the turreted vehicles then they should be considered as a separate element to the infantry. The mounted troops only go where the vehicles go and always work in conjunction with the full panoply of mounted weapons.

US context: Bradley infantry is armoured infantry and different from mech infantry which was light infantry mounted in M113s or Strykers.

...

 

[Brad Sallows]

To the contrary, going back to MBTs was a symptom of the lack of serious discussion in the Army about its size and therefore how it should be structured. Having marginal capabilities scattered across the Army, in light, medium and heavy, without coherent structures for employment or coherent support, is a perpetuation of the past without a plan for the future.

I gather that at the time something was needed, there was not also time for the usual "plan for the future" process to reach a conclusion.

 

[Kirkhill]

Further to...

Canadian Context -

LAV 6.0 with turreted weapons - RCAC with Dragoons on board.
LAV 6.0 ACSC, or BvS10, or Senator, or ISV, or helicopter or boat - Infantry with back-packable weapons.

 

[FJAG]

To the contrary, going back to MBTs was a symptom of the lack of serious discussion in the Army about its size and therefore how it should be structured. Having marginal capabilities scattered across the Army, in light, medium and heavy, without coherent structures for employment or coherent support, is a perpetuation of the past without a plan for the future.

Going back to the MBT was an operational need that came out of several events. The first was the VCDS cancelling the MGS on the recommendation of Caron before he left the job as CLS in June of 2006. The project was eventually cancelled later that year. Concurrently he recommended the cancellation of the Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle (the replacement of the air defence artillery's Anti-Tank, Anti-Air System (ADATS) with a similar weapon on the LAV III chassis) The cancelling of MGS and MMEV shut down the experimentation of the Direct Fire Support Unit (an ungodly mashing together of the MGS, ADATS and TOW Under Armour in the LdSH) (As an aside there was also a change of government earlier that year which undoubtedly played a role here)

Nearly concurrent with this, but slightly later in August, it became clear in Afghanistan that a large concentration of Taliban were gathering in Zhari/Panjwayi and that the terrain there was problematic. Shortly after his arrival in Kandahar, Leslie asked Lavoie if tanks would help - the result was the almost immediate (by Canadian standards) dispatch of 3/4 of a squadron of the existing Leo C2 and the purchase of redundant Leo 2s from Europe as the C2s were on their last legs. The C2s went operational in Kandahar that same December.

The issue was not so much a "lack of a serious discussion" but the failure of the DFSU concept (which was championed by the lighter armour faction [including Hillier]) and an immediate UOR brought about by operational conditions in Kandahar as the enemy's strategic plans and deployments over the previous two years had been missed by the American and ISAF intelligence agencies.

There had been considerable discussion and debate (even heated debate) as between the MBT and DFSU concepts and the degree of symmetry/asymmetry in the army and armoured corps.

I'm not quite sure what you mean by "Having marginal capabilities scattered across the Army, in light, medium and heavy, without coherent structures for employment or coherent support, is a perpetuation of the past without a plan for the future."

Bosnia and the Decade of Darkness had shown that the army would a) remain underfunded and equipped and b) that it would need to be able to generate battle group sized rotational deployments. As a result the army turned to a modular concept based on aggregating medium-weight battle groups from company-sized modules supported what by then had become the NSE construct. The force was basically light and medium with an designed interim structure to have available some heavy elements (three batteries of M109s and some tanks) as add ons when required. These interim heavier elements were to be replaced, in due course by a medium wheeled SP howitzers and the DFSU (which would combine medium-weight, air-transportable wheeled gun, ATGM and air defence in one unit).

One may not agree with that construct but it was one with a defined end state and a concept adequate for the time. Managed readiness was also instituted at this time to deal with the funding/equipment shortfall issues and the rotational nature of the army's employment on failed-state operations. The fact that MGS proved problematic and MMEV was never given the final nod doesn't negate the idea that there was a vision and honest debate as to the army's future structure. Advancing With Purpose, as set out that 20 year vision, as adjusted with time and circumstances.

I actually am one of those who thinks that the vision (and AWP) at the time was a mistake as it did not provide sufficient asymmetry in the army in not having a heavy enough component and in going symmetrical for rotational readiness (and don't get me started on the reserves). My view is that both the government and CAF leadership focus too much on today's operations and not enough on potential future ones. That said, I'll be the first to admit that the direction the army took at that time was based on financial circumstances, as they existed then, and considerable debate and discussion about what the army needed to be to achieve the government's objectives at the time in the world as it stood before 9/11. IMHO a new vision and appropriate implementation plan is desperately needed.

 

[dapaterson]

I'm not quite sure what you mean by "Having marginal capabilities scattered across the Army, in light, medium and heavy, without coherent structures for employment or coherent support, is a perpetuation of the past without a plan for the future."

Explain Canada's doctrine for heavy, medium and light forces, and how that is translated into structures and equipment.

Explain the rationale for three dispersed airmobile / airborne companies, two located without meaningful air support (Griffons don't count).

Explain how a professional organization changes its mind every three years about what it wants to be based on the whim of the new commander.

 

[FJAG]

When I said "I'm not quite sure what you mean by 'Having marginal capabilities scattered across the Army, in light, medium and heavy, without coherent structures for employment or coherent support, is a perpetuation of the past without a plan for the future,'" I meant that I wasn't sure whether you disagreed with the concept of symmetrical brigades as they are now - i.e. with both medium and light in each (and one with a little bit of heavy) - or with having a heavy component at all. In other words, do you favour abandoning some components or are you arguing for an asymmetric solution.

Explain Canada's doctrine for heavy, medium and light forces, and how that is translated into structures and equipment.

You're asking the wrong guy because as I indicated above I disagree with the system as it is albeit I can understand how it got there. It's an attempt to cater to current and potentially future operations from within the same force. Catering for the future and the present is necessary. It's combining the capabilities in one force which is where I think the failure lies.

You know my view: we need a) an army for today which should be primarily light and medium quick reaction battle groups kept in separate primarily RegF brigades and b) an army for tomorrow which should be primarily heavy, designed to operate as brigades and even a division and kept in separate, primarily ResF division. In other words focus the RegF on today's issues and keep it agile enough to react across an existing threat spectrum that the government wants to react to on short notice. At the same time focus the ResF on a less likely and wider threat spectrum that may or may not occur in the future but for which capabilities need to exist should that threat occur.

Explain the rationale for three dispersed airmobile / airborne companies, two located without meaningful air support (Griffons don't count).

I don't count Griffons either. The explanation is that there is a need for airmobile/airborne forces and they are distributed based on the rotational concept which is centred on the RegF brigades. Accordingly each brigade needs a light element. That's explainable but as I said I don't agree with it. I'd concentrate the RegF light battalions in a single brigade in Petawawa near the bulk of the aviation and air transport resources.

Explain how a professional organization changes its mind every three years about what it wants to be based on the whim of the new commander.

Actually I disagree with you on the organizational change, its frequency and its being based on whims.

I think that the army is still operating under the 20-year old AWP as tweaked from time to time. Policies do need to change to keep up with changing conditions in world situations and government policies and the developments in weapons systems. IMHO we needed to make a major correction in AWP around 2013/4 - we didn't - and still haven't. We're still reactively tweaking.

We don't change every three years - especially to the maturing of weapons systems - because we're not agile enough to do so.

We do make minor tweaks every few years as we change commanders - that's only natural because we do not have an overarching vision to move us beyond AWP (the army failed with 2025 but did institute some valuable tweaks as a result of the effort). I use the term "tweaks" because I think that our army commanders have neither the clout nor funding to do more than tweak. Additionally the CAF procurement and manpower system lacks the agility to do more than tweak. I've been quite surprised at how much difficulty our various army commanders have had in building either a sustainable vision or obtaining the necessary consensus from the government (including DND), their peers, and even their subordinates, to move the goalposts.

Just as an aside on the issue of "coherent support" that you raised earlier. It goes without saying - but I'll say it anyway - that I fully agree with you. Remember that I'm a baby of the Hellyer "event." We could all see that by unifying the three services into one service that the biggest nightmare would come from trying to unite three separate logistics systems, each tuned to supporting their own organization, into a single one that would serve all three efficiently. The question was always how do you structure the new expanded system to ensure that each service still gets the very specialized logistics support that it needs. Additionally it was clear that while jointness was a desirable result that everyone supported, his vision of jointness would simply create an additional bureaucratic layer that would reduce whatever agility the three services had on their own to a snail's pace. IMHO how it was effected was quite muddled. The system that it has become is one that has incorporated many corrections to the initial incoherent "Command" structure that was built in the late 60s/early 70s. It's better than it was but still not good enough.

I just happen to be in the middle of rereading Hellyer's book "Damn the Torpedoes" (which I haven't touched since it came out three decades ago) and it still amazes me as to how much of a genius he was in his own mind.

 

[FJAG]

I've just reread Hellyer's 1964 White Paper on Defence. It's actually a breath of fresh air, brevity and clarity compared to SSE and ONSF.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Explain Canada's doctrine for heavy, medium and light forces, and how that is translated into structures and equipment.

Explain the rationale for three dispersed airmobile / airborne companies, two located without meaningful air support (Griffons don't count).

Explain how a professional organization changes its mind every three years about what it wants to be based on the whim of the new commander.

You left out the rationale for clinging to nine understrength battalions... and then there's the huge, but disconnected and rather less than effective, A Res

 

[PrairieFella]

I gather that at the time something was needed, there was not also time for the usual "plan for the future" process to reach a conclusion.

Ramp ceremonies have that tendency.

 

[FJAG]

Marines, special ops test MRZR vehicles that add power, payload capacity

Polaris developed two new MRZR Alpha variants that support using more payloads in the field: a power export variant, and a heavy payload variant.

www.defensenews.com

 

[PrairieFella]

And instead of something useful like these they bought us stock stark white ranger 1000 to "replace" the GWagons in 3Div armoured reserve. Only have to wait until 2030 for the LUV program so it's all good.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

And instead of something useful like these they bought us stock stark white ranger 1000 to "replace" the GWagons in 3Div armoured reserve. Only have to wait until 2030 for the LUV program so it's all good.

That's because there are no other Canadian made options for the Armoured Reserves.....Roshel enters Chat

 

[PrairieFella]

That's because there are no other Canadian made options for the Armoured Reserves.....Roshel enters Chat

I'd take literally anything with the rate the LUVWs are self-divesting.

 

[OldSolduer]

Infantry section carrier

 

[GK .Dundas]

And a slightly lower silhouette then the TAPV.