Infantry Vehicles

[IKnowNothing]

If the original LAVs were too light then so were the M113s.

As the primary infantry vehicle? Depends on what decade.

 

[markppcli]

Remember that Thousand LAV Army Volume I actually replaced Thousand TLAV Army (M113 APC) which saw the M113 employed both as an armoured ATV and as a Troop Carrier for following along after the Centurions/Leo 1s.

If the original LAVs were too light then so were the M113s. Although other armies added Marders, Bradleys and Warriors to their tool boxes 50 years ago they never stopped using M113s as well.

Well the army that uses Warriors most certainly doesn’t use M113s. The Germans have 37 left, I don’t think it’s really in front line use as an APC anymore.

The French also had to focus on their colonial holdings in Africa, which wheeled AFV do very well. The reality is that we need a lighter wheeled APC for the "light brigade" and a tracked IFV for the "Medium/Heavy brigade". The current model of LAV need to be renamed as the MAV (Medium Armoured Vehicle), because it's sure the hell is no longer light.

Well they never had AMX 10Ps in Africa, the VAB and VBL operated (and still operate) there. Those weren’t part of the VCBI program, rather they’ll be replaced by Griffon and Jaguar, the VCBI is a the IFV of the French armoured force which is not intended for Africa.

In my head canon we have 1CMBG as a heavy brigade, equipped with a full regiment of Leo 2s or M1A2 Abrams tanks and div recce squadron+ equipped with CV90105, CV9030s, CV90RWS Multi BK mortar carriers and some LUVs/Side-by-sides for assault troop and mud recce tasks. three battalions equipped with CV9030s and a couple platoons per battalion CV90RWS Multi BK for internal mortars. For arty I'd pick Archer or Caesar and maybe some MLRS is were feeling bold. I don't know enough about GBAD to comment.

The LAV has reached that trap where it's too heavy to be used in a light brigade and too light to be very useful in a heavy brigade. 4XX can take the medium brigade task and strap whatever shit they want to LAVs, mortars, SPIKE, new guns, whatever they want.

Tldr: I like CV90s

CV90 is the favourite of enthusiasts everywhere. Having sat in one of prefer more head room but I digress. I find the “too heavy” or “too light” arguments to be poor ones in general. I’ll contend it’s too much for a light Bde, but it was never conceived as such and indeed a light Bde would be defined by its lack of a proper APC or IFV. A better argument is its strategic mobility, which is grant is worse that a lighter vehicle but that’s the offset of heavier forces. To light for an armoured Bde I find deeply confusing, is that a statement of masss protection or armament ? In those three the first is absurd, the second wrong, and the third is somewhat correct. LAV 6 is as well armoured as most of its class, and the 25 is still a good penetrator. Where is differs is the HE payload. The best argument against the LAV is the need for tracked mobility.

As the primary infantry vehicle? Depends on what decade.

Careful your about to get a convoluted explanation of why the Grizzly is the original LAV and how that should inform discussion on the LAV 6. There will be pictures, some highlighted quotes, and 2-3 neon green spread sheets.

 

[IKnowNothing]

Careful your about to get a convoluted explanation of why the Grizzly is the original LAV and how that should inform discussion on the LAV 6

Here I was thinking the natural segue would be a comparison of comparisons- the LAV 6 and it's hypothetical suite of variants + Leo 2A4M vs. contemporaries, the M113 + LEO C1 vs. Abrams/Leo 2/Chieftan + Bradley/Marder/Warrior the likely conclusion is that if all the pieces were in place, maintained, and in the right quantities the NATO bde that could be fielded on the LAV 6 would be the best Canadian offering (vehicle wise) relative to peers since the... 60's? I agree that the LAV isn't the problem.

 

[Kirkhill]

@markppcli

You're right

The army that uses Warrior did not use the aluminium M113. It used the Sankey knock-off, the steel FV432, currently in service as the Bulldog.

Service history
Production history
Specifications
Type	Armoured personnel carrier
Place of origin	United Kingdom
In service	1963–present
Manufacturer	GKN Sankey
Mass	15 tons (15.3 t)
Length	5.25 m (17 ft 3 in)
Width	2.55 m (8 ft 4 in)
Height	2.28 m (7 ft 6 in)
Crew	2 + 10 troops
Armour	12.7 mm max
Main armament	7.62 mm L7 General Purpose Machine Gun
Secondary armament	smoke dischargers
Engine	Rolls-Royce K60 multi-fuel 240 hp (180 kW)
Power/weight	15.7 hp/tonne
Suspension	torsion-bar, 5 road wheels
Operational range	580 km (360 mi)
Maximum speed	52 km/h (32 mph

And while the M113 can't be confused with an IFV (although the Dutch and Israelis did) there are still thousands of M113s in service trudging around the battlefield behind the tanks and IFVs, even when they are Abrams and Bradleys.

In the U.S. Army, the M113 series have long been replaced as front-line combat vehicles by the M2 and M3 Bradleys, but large numbers are still used in support roles such as armored ambulance, mortar carrier, engineer vehicle, and command vehicle. The U.S. Army's heavy brigade combat teams are equipped with approximately 6,000 M113s and 4,000 Bradleys.

The M113's versatility spawned a wide variety of adaptations that live on worldwide and in U.S. service. These variants together currently represent about half of U.S. Army armored vehicles. To date, it is estimated that over 80,000 vehicles in the M113 family have been produced and used by over 50 countries worldwide, making it one of the most widely used armored fighting vehicles of all time.[6]

M113 production was terminated in 2007. The Army initiated the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) program to search for a replacement. In 2014, the U.S. Army selected BAE Systems' proposal of a turretless variant of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle to replace over 2,800 M113s in service.[7] Thousands of M113s continue to see combat service in the Israel Defense Forces, although by 2014 the IDF was seeking to gradually replace many of its 6,000 M113s with the Namers,[8] and with the Eitan AFV in 2020.[9]

M113 armored personnel carrier - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

One of the arguments for the Marder back in the day was that the M113 was too light. On the other hand you could do this with an M113 and not with a Marder, which goes to your point about strategic mobility.



Edit - To be honest I could still see the TLAV with Souci tracks as a support vehicle for a light battalion.

 

[FJAG]

Respectfully it’s not what they did at all. They up armoured the Vikings because that’s what 3 Cdo had. While in Afghanistan they proved to be effective and they stayed, frankly because they were already there. While it was deployed, it wa employed alongside other vehicles by the “armour support group” and functioned more in a QRF role. They have since expanded the fleet. At no point were these intended to operate as an IFV. It’s has not, in any way, shape, or form, replaced an APC or IFV. It’s is, as I posted above, a niche vehicle fulfilling a niche role. In this case it’s arctic mobility to the British Military’s arctic force - the Royal Marines. But you knew all this.

I remember reading Ewen Southby-Tailyour's "3 Commando Brigade" re their 2006 tour (following 3 Para's). I was quite surprised actually at how aggressively they used the armoured Vikings of their 1st Armoured Support Troop, both for transporting troops close to their objectives and as direct fire support with their GPMGs.

Viking has been deployed operationally with British Forces in southern Afghanistan,[2] supporting both 3 Cdo Bde and other roulements. The need for the RMASG came about because the Viking was so successful with 3 Cdo Bde on Op Herrick 5 that the incoming forces on Op Herrick 6 requested that the Vikings stay on creating a problem as the Army has no Viking trained drivers. The solution was the RMASG, an expanded unit that could continue to operate the Viking for future roulements, this led to the drivers of the RMASG having one of the highest operational tempos in the forces.[8]

Royal Marines Armoured Support Group - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

See also:

UK Government Web Archive

This Page is [ARCHIVED CONTENT] and shows what the site page http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/royalmarines/units-and-deployments/3-commando-brigade/539-assault-squadron-royal-marines/news/viking-operators-return-from-helmand looked like on 10 Sep 2010 at 16:45:02

webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk

 

[KevinB]

. LAV 6 is as well armoured as most of its class, and the 25 is still a good penetrator.

If Canada had either bought into the APFSDS-DU or had a turret launched ATGM then generally I’d be fine with the M242, as for the majority of DFS roles as a section carrier it does they very well.

Where is differs is the HE payload.

I’d not go that far

The best argument against the LAV is the need for tracked mobility.

Yup.

 

[FJAG]

One of the arguments for the Marder back in the day was that the M113 was too light. On the other hand you could do this with an M113 and not with a Marder, which goes to your point about strategic mobility.

Strangely enough, the Germans didn't give a crap. As long as you could transport a Marder on a railroad flatcar, you were golden.

It's all a matter of perspective. The case for flying task forces of LAVs (or more properly Strykers) on quick reaction force missions never became the "thing" that the military progressives of the turn of the century imagined.

Tracks become a definite advantage when those pristine European roads are covered in craters and tire (even run-flat tire) slicing splinters and bullets and twisted and broken steel wrecks and the rubble of destroyed buildings or the muck of agricultural fields (especially if moving with tanks).

Should you have some LAVs? - sure. Should you build your whole army around them? - nope.

 

[Kirkhill]

Strangely enough, the Germans didn't give a crap. As long as you could transport a Marder on a railroad flatcar, you were golden.

It's all a matter of perspective. The case for flying task forces of LAVs (or more properly Strykers) on quick reaction force missions never became the "thing" that the military progressives of the turn of the century imagined.

Tracks become a definite advantage when those pristine European roads are covered in craters and tire (even run-flat tire) slicing splinters and bullets and twisted and broken steel wrecks and the rubble of destroyed buildings or the muck of agricultural fields (especially if moving with tanks).

Should you have some LAVs? - sure. Should you build your whole army around them? - nope.

The Germans didn't but Hellyer did. The M113 was a go anywhere buggy that could be taken anywhere.

And if the roads didn't hold up how did the rails manage?

 

[OldSolduer]

There has to be a mix of wheel and track. The vehicles themselves should robust and take a crap kicking. They should be easy to maintain, repair and use.
FWIW I think whatever the infantry runs around the battlefield in needs a fairly big cannon on it. I am not the expert on these big cannons and I am sure y'all here that were in Afghanistan can inform an old guy what would be appropriate.

 

[PrairieFella]

There has to be a mix of wheel and track. The vehicles themselves should robust and take a crap kicking. They should be easy to maintain, repair and use.
FWIW I think whatever the infantry runs around the battlefield in needs a fairly big cannon on it. I am not the expert on these big cannons and I am sure y'all here that were in Afghanistan can inform an old guy what would be appropriate.

The conventional wisdom from the armoured folk was the 25mm lacked the huevos for the longer range engagements and the penetration of the rounds that were actually useful against the Taliban were severely lacking against the mud walls. That's where the Leo C2 and later Leo 2 really came into its own. Bear in mind that's all second hand on my part.

 

[OldSolduer]

The conventional wisdom from the armoured folk was the 25mm lacked the huevos for the longer range engagements and the penetration of the anti-personnel rounds was severely lacking against the mud walls. That's where the Leo C2 and later Leo 2 really came into its own. Hear in mind that's all second hand on my part.

I heard the same from people that were there. So the take away I think is Armor Infantry cooperation is required.

 

[PrairieFella]

I heard the same from people that were there. So the take away I think is Armor Infantry cooperation is required.

100%. That's why the attrition of our tank forces to next to nothing is one of the biggest low-key issues of the CA. The infantry need tanks in so many situations but it's easy (and much cheaper) to pretend the RCAF will handle everything the 25mm can't.

 

[markppcli]

The conventional wisdom from the armoured folk was the 25mm lacked the huevos for the longer range engagements and the penetration of the rounds that were actually useful against the Taliban were severely lacking against the mud walls. That's where the Leo C2 and later Leo 2 really came into its own. Bear in mind that's all second hand on my part.

Possible, bearing in mind every LAV I was in in Afghan was loaded straight HE in both bins as I recall that may have had something to do with problems punching holes.

100%. That's why the attrition of our tank forces to next to nothing is one of the biggest low-key issues of the CA. The infantry need tanks in so many situations but it's easy (and much cheaper) to pretend the RCAF will handle everything the 25mm can't.

As a guy who does the RCAF effects for the army kinda business…. That’s not the case at all. At 0 point in any of our doctrine, training, or decision making is that how we indent on solving those problems. If anything our training processes and planning over emphasizes direct fire and maneuver over fires (surface or air).


That being said we 100 percent need at least double the amount of tanks we have.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I see the difference of the light and heavy brigade is there effect on logistics. The lighter wheeled vehicles (if done correctly) have a much smaller footprint and can be transported and supplied much easier. Even your wreckers/ARV's can be smaller. For this effect you give up some protection and firepower. Since Canada's army will be for a very long time a expeditionary army with no firm idea where it will have to fight next, the heavy and light brigade mix makes sense to me. Also training and preparing for a conventional war should be the standard, as it will be easier to adapt to lesser missions than the other way around.

 

[ueo]

Well the army that uses Warriors most certainly doesn’t use M113s. The Germans have 37 left, I don’t think it’s really in front line use as an APC anymore.

Well they never had AMX 10Ps in Africa, the VAB and VBL operated (and still operate) there. Those weren’t part of the VCBI program, rather they’ll be replaced by Griffon and Jaguar, the VCBI is a the IFV of the French armoured force which is not intended for Africa.




CV90 is the favourite of enthusiasts everywhere. Having sat in one of prefer more head room but I digress. I find the “too heavy” or “too light” arguments to be poor ones in general. I’ll contend it’s too much for a light Bde, but it was never conceived as such and indeed a light Bde would be defined by its lack of a proper APC or IFV. A better argument is its strategic mobility, which is grant is worse that a lighter vehicle but that’s the offset of heavier forces. To light for an armoured Bde I find deeply confusing, is that a statement of masss protection or armament ? In those three the first is absurd, the second wrong, and the third is somewhat correct. LAV 6 is as well armoured as most of its class, and the 25 is still a good penetrator. Where is differs is the HE payload. The best argument against the LAV is the need for tracked mobility.igional That was a MOWAG sorta urban assaukt veh,




Careful your about to get a convoluted explanation of why the Grizzly is the original LAV and how that should inform discussion on the LAV 6. There will be pictures, some highlighted quotes, and 2-3 neon green spread sheets.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Article in the CDR says Roshel has delivered over a 1,000 vehicles to Ukraine and can currently make 5 a day. They mention significant changes to the first generation to current and more changes as they learn from the conflict. They are also working on a 8x8.

 

[PrairieFella]

Article in the CDR says Roshel has delivered over a 1,000 vehicles to Ukraine and can currently make 5 a day. They mention significant changes to the first generation to current and more changes as they learn from the conflict. They are also working on a 8x8.

Maybe a future IMV for the CAF under the LUV program. The problem is the program requires a C&R (more likely Light/Motor Cav post-switch) variant that is absolutely vital for the Armd ARes units. The Senator MRAP would be waaay to big for those purposes. Honestly at this point the program should spin off the Armoured Corps requirements into a different program and grab something along the lines of the French Jaguar EBRC or the old British Fox CVR(W).

 

[KevinB]

Maybe a future IMV for the CAF under the LUV program. The problem is the program requires a C&R (more likely Light/Motor Cav post-switch) variant that is absolutely vital for the Armd ARes units. The Senator MRAP would be waaay to big for those purposes. Honestly at this point the program should spin off the Armoured Corps requirements into a different program and grab something along the lines of the French Jaguar EBRC or the old British Fox CVR(W).

Chicken v Egg.

The CA really needs to decide what it’s wants to be when it grows up.

Regardless my thoughts on organizing it, until the CA sorts itself out and how to properly integrate the PRes into the CA as an effective force - no practical decision can be made on vehicles.

 

[dapaterson]

Chicken v Egg.

The CA really needs to decide what it’s wants to be when it grows up.

Regardless my thoughts on organizing it, until the CA sorts itself out and how to properly integrate the PRes into the CA as an effective force - no practical decision can be made on vehicles.

You assume that it wants to grow up

 

[markppcli]

Chicken v Egg.

The CA really needs to decide what it’s wants to be when it grows up.

Regardless my thoughts on organizing it, until the CA sorts itself out and how to properly integrate the PRes into the CA as an effective force - no practical decision can be made on vehicles.

This is where I go when I rant about reserve restructure - names and badges are a side piece. We need the Army to task organize itself, and that has to include its reserve. We do not need to buy a vehicle for the reserves, we need to buy vehicles for that do a job for the army that are manned by the reserves.