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Infantry Vehicles

Kyiv, large. Assault force, small. Not gonna jump on the spontaneous taking up of arms bandwagon as if it bears some relationship to acquiring equipment for the forces.

But can we afford to ignore the impact on the field of battle of motivated citizens - or partizans if you prefer?
 
But can we afford to ignore the impact on the field of battle of motivated citizens - or partizans if you prefer?
Depends on the opponent -- Russia made huge miscalculations in the initial invasion, had they advanced as Maneuver Divisions rather than kids out partying, the results would have been significantly different - and we'd be worried about Poland, Latvia etc. holding.

Partisans, LI, SOF, etc can only do so much, and don't work well if placed directly against Combined Arms Forces that are waging a war with firepower.
 
Depends on the opponent -- Russia made huge miscalculations in the initial invasion, had they advanced as Maneuver Divisions rather than kids out partying, the results would have been significantly different - and we'd be worried about Poland, Latvia etc. holding.

Partisans, LI, SOF, etc can only do so much, and don't work well if placed directly against Combined Arms Forces that are waging a war with firepower.

But the Russians did get it wrong.....

Even professionals make mistakes. And it is much easier to critique the Russians a year after the fact and say "we would have done it so much better".

Taliban Light Infantry chased Russian tanks and helicopters out of Afghanistan. Vietnamese Light Infantry chased the US Army out of Vietnam.

Like cockroaches and nomads time favours the Light Infantry - if you want to win a war and not just a battle.
 
He was talking about reservists mechanics who are mechanics civie side.



This was the point that was being made. We have a very very hard time getting mechanics / trades people to want to do their job as a reservist. It’s not hard to understand that a guy who just did his shift as a heavy duty mechanic doesn’t want to spend his weekend doing the same thing. Even if you love it.


Okay so let’s follow that line. We call for recovery a 1 am because a LAV rolled. Vehicles arrive and because they’re contracted for this stuff they get it righted and tow it to their shop. That’s obstacle one and having off road wreckers is probably a big ask but let’s assume they do have it. Now it’s at the shop, it’s an a vehicle, so who’s securing it / what security does this shop have ? Or do we tow it to an armouries, now we need to retrofit those to have lifts / hoists / tool cribs. I’m not against that but that requires massive investment and changes.

And finally will the reserves be able to actually do the 20-30 training day driver / Gunner courses these vehicles require ?

Insurmountable? Of course not but would require adjustment to certain things. I’m in favour of the RCAC having reserve crewmen units who are located close to major bases and train on existing equipment myself. Facilities are already there and it doesn’t require massive reorganization and legislative changes.
When we were ops tasked we had a trained mechanic on Class B and 5/4 full of tools and parts. He did all the day to day maintenance on the vehicles and whoever was around during the day (Storesmans, RSS staff) helped him with lifting or anything that needed two people. Our vehicle ready rates went up, because they were getting serviced and inspected, with problems resolved before they got worse. Frankly any vehicle intense unit should have a Class B Mechanic on strength and the authority to order/buy parts and fix things. Build up the local Service Battalion to have a shop, overhead crane and Mechanics trained in bigger jobs, that can support the various unit vehicle techs, then it will be like having another 25% vehicles without actually adding any to the fleet.
Currently from what I see, you could not design a more inefficient system, well maybe the RCN can........
 
When we were ops tasked we had a trained mechanic on Class B and 5/4 full of tools and parts. He did all the day to day maintenance on the vehicles and whoever was around during the day (Storesmans, RSS staff) helped him with lifting or anything that needed two people. Our vehicle ready rates went up, because they were getting serviced and inspected, with problems resolved before they got worse. Frankly any vehicle intense unit should have a Class B Mechanic on strength and the authority to order/buy parts and fix things. Build up the local Service Battalion to have a shop, overhead crane and Mechanics trained in bigger jobs, that can support the various unit vehicle techs, then it will be like having another 25% vehicles without actually adding any to the fleet.
Currently from what I see, you could not design a more inefficient system, well maybe the RCN can........

And that's exactly what it would take to keep a Reserve Unit's kit properly operational, which is light-years away from where most units are now.

But 'progress' ;)
 
And that's exactly what it would take to keep a Reserve Unit's kit properly operational, which is light-years away from where most units are now.

But 'progress' ;)
Don't worry they put some ridiculous requirements in, making such things impossible. Operational readiness will take away for the abilty to hold Mess Dinners.
 
But the Russians did get it wrong.....

Even professionals make mistakes. And it is much easier to critique the Russians a year after the fact and say "we would have done it so much better".

Taliban Light Infantry chased Russian tanks and helicopters out of Afghanistan. Vietnamese Light Infantry chased the US Army out of Vietnam.
It was the Mujahideen, Taliban came into the vacuum when the Muj Warlords squabbled afterwards.
But let’s remember the CIA Ground Branch and Stinger missiles also played a part, but in Afghanistan as the west relearned - it’s a mess and you don’t want it anyway.

The Vietnamese war is a case study in winning battles and losing the war due to politics. The NVA wasn’t really light BTW and there were tank battles post US withdrawal.
Like cockroaches and nomads time favours the Light Infantry - if you want to win a war and not just a battle.

No it favors those who will stay the course and continue fighting.
Or those who say F’ it and just burn it all down…
 
And yet the citizens of Kyiv and Sumy..... and the Russians stopped. And retreated.

Taking ground is something else again and it does need large numbers of trained troops - but how much training - a month to create an assault trooper?

What is an “assault trooper.” I’d say an average of 3-6 months is the norm for infantry, less if you don’t bother with much of what gets covered in BMQ.
If both the Russians and Ukrainians are husbanding their tanks and holding them in reserve because of the effectiveness of the anti-armour forces available what does one expect from the tankers? And the Bradleys? Will they carry troops or will they be loaded up with all the 7.62, 25mm and TOWs they can carry to fight from prepared positions?

Are they? Plenty of examples of tanks on the front line everywhere. Although the Russian preference seems to be to leave them in location and fuck off.
And as to the Infantry Fighting Vehicle, Infantry Section Carrier, Armoured Personnel Carrier, Troop Carrier spectrum - don't forget the advent of the Protected Mobility Vehicle

I could start with the Saxon, the Foxhound, Bushmaster, Hawkei, Dingo, ... Wheeled vehicles designed primarily to move troops on highways and hard tracks, under cover from the elements, artillery and bombing attacks. They may be pressed forwards depending if the commander ascertains that fire is effective or not, or in the absence of a better solution. But ideally I would think that in this high end conflict the role of those armoured vehicles is to rapidly move reinforcements from reserve to covered positions on the FEBA or to supply reinforcement for "proper" IFVs and ISCs.

And, when the environment permits, those light vehicles can act as scouts, patrols and light cavalry.
Okay, no disagreement there. What’s your point though in reference to the conversation we’re having ? I’d point out that all of those vehicles are able to fire in self defence. A notable omission in the sentinel.
 
Don't worry they put some ridiculous requirements in, making such things impossible. Operational readiness will take away for the abilty to hold Mess Dinners.
Next they’ll explore the idea of not having three messes and having a computer lab and maintenance bay in an armoury.
 
Next they’ll explore the idea of not having three messes and having a computer lab and maintenance bay in an armoury.
Careful or they burn you at the stake. Problem at my old armoury is there is no way to get the current gun tractors into the building and the parking lot is to small for a bay. They should have expanded when land was cheap, but TBS was more interested in selling the family jewels, than making the collection better.
 
What is an “assault trooper.” I’d say an average of 3-6 months is the norm for infantry, less if you don’t bother with much of what gets covered in BMQ.

The Brits were training the Ukrainians for static defence in a planned course of 2 to 3 weeks. After 5 weeks they are being assigned to manoeuvre forces for unit training back in Ukraine.
Are they? Plenty of examples of tanks on the front line everywhere. Although the Russian preference seems to be to leave them in location and fuck off.

Interesting video on tanks in Bakhmut and the effect of Javelins on the Russian use of tanks.



Okay, no disagreement there. What’s your point though in reference to the conversation we’re having ? I’d point out that all of those vehicles are able to fire in self defence. A notable omission in the sentinel.

I agree that in all of the Protected Mobility Vehicles I would be giving the co-driver an RWS - but the target set would not be other vehicles but, essentially, C-RAM duties, especially against very small drones in the final attack.
 
So see my earlier question about where you sit AFVs while they’re being worked on multi day. Who secured them?
Secure the in their shop.
Have you never seen an MRT? Or an ARV?
Yes I have, Have you ever scene a Oilfield mobile repair shop on wheels. Or a Drilling rigs tool room?
Fucking nope. Besides the fact that they drive different, there’s the off reading, formation driving, maintenance learning, using the DVE, how to operate the other systems. This is clearly not your wheel house, but there is a reason why for Fighting each vehicles we take a long time to teach it.
Why does a Mechanic require to learn all this stuff when we have a shortage of skilled workers. They can fix crap, thats what their job would be.
I mean I fixed Fighter Aircraft, never learned how to fly one, but I fixed them. I ran one or two up under supervision of my Boss also.
In the oil patch Our Top Drive Mechanics never drilled a hole in their lives, but they new how to fix the systems involved. Including all the sensors we would step on and break, the hydraulic system and controls along with the box and boxes with miles of electrical wiring we had on those rigs.
Im not just talking about techs I’m talking about everyone.
Then everyone are not in this discussion about maintaining the equipment,. Running yes but fixing no. I have been part of blackout road moves, seen trucks and armored piled up into one another.
 
Secure the in their shop.

In a civilian shop, who’s securing it at night ? What’s the security state.
Yes I have, Have you ever scene a Oilfield mobile repair shop on wheels. Or a Drilling rigs tool room?

Nope, you asked what off road recovery assets “the army really has anyway” so MRTs and and ARVs which pull vehicles out.
Why does a Mechanic require to learn all this stuff when we have a shortage of skilled workers. They can fix crap, thats what their job would be.
I mean I fixed Fighter Aircraft, never learned how to fly one, but I fixed them. I ran one or two up under supervision of my Boss also.
In the oil patch Our Top Drive Mechanics never drilled a hole in their lives, but they new how to fix the systems involved. Including all the sensors we would step on and break, the hydraulic system and controls along with the box and boxes with miles of electrical wiring we had on those rigs.

I didn’t say mechanic, I said the Driver and Gunner courses. Which the operators would need. Again, 30 days to qualify on either makes it very hard for the reserves to actually operate them.
Then everyone are not in this discussion about maintaining the equipment,. Running yes but fixing no. I have been part of blackout road moves, seen trucks and armored piled up into one another.

Okay? I don’t understand what your getting at here. Partly my fault I meant to say everything, ie the infrastructures. But the rest of that paragraph I don’t get. I’ve also been part of black out road moves and not had that happen; seems like a training issue.
 
In a civilian shop, who’s securing it at night ? What’s the security state.
Ever been to a Finning shop or similar, they have better security then the Military does.
Nope, you asked what off road recovery assets “the army really has anyway” so MRTs and and ARVs which pull vehicles out.
How many do we have and are they based appropriately?
I didn’t say mechanic, I said the Driver and Gunner courses. Which the operators would need. Again, 30 days to qualify on either makes it very hard for the reserves to actually operate them.
If they offered the courses that would be the first step. Then not cancelling the courses would be the next step.
Plus one might be surprised what can be taught using simulators and then confirm with live. F35 fighter simulator comes to mind. We have an amazing company in Canada who can make simulators like no one else.
Okay? I don’t understand what your getting at here. Partly my fault I meant to say everything, ie the infrastructures. But the rest of that paragraph I don’t get. I’ve also been part of black out road moves and not had that happen; seems like a training issue.
My discussion was about maintaining the equipment, which was stated one of the main reasons why Reservists cannot get a more maintenance intense platform. I am strictly addressing the Fixing side of the equations. Everything else can fall into place as needed. Often does.
Out East is an example with 2 RCHA where they identified a short fall in their staffing the guns, put their money where their mouth was and worked with the local unit to get Gunners up to full training, and competency needed to deploy in the various aspects of the Battery. So far has been hugely successful.
Again if you put money into a Reserve Unit, give them the equipment, the dedicated training they will come out and do the job.
Give them cancelled courses, broken or lack of/no equipment, cut their already short training days and you will have a none commitment to the cause.
 
Again if you put money into a Reserve Unit, give them the equipment, the dedicated training they will come out and do the job.
Give them cancelled courses, broken or lack of/no equipment, cut their already short training days and you will have a none commitment to the cause.
The money quote, because the troops see how much the senior command cares by the lack of organization, planing, money and equipment and then they made an educated choice about how to use their valuable time and leave.
 
The money quote, because the troops see how much the senior command cares by the lack of organization, planing, money and equipment and then they made an educated choice about how to use their valuable time and leave.
Then everyone craps on Reservists for their lack of training, lack of motivation and lack GAFF.

I remember doing patrols where we did not use rifles, simple we did not have any. Then when we got rifles, LMGs and GPMGs it changes the dynamics of patrolling through Scottish broom and dense bush much different. Thingys get hung up everywhere.

I also remember when our Ammo count went from lots to a little to it wasn't worth the fuel to drive to the ranges. We could do dry deployments at home.
Grenades what you mean a rock wrapped in paper. we couldn't even afford/ order dummy ones for practice.
The M72s we practiced with came from some ones private collection they bought from the surplus store.

You know what kept most around, curious as to what would be cut next. The beer was cold, the parties were wild and the few good exercises were pretty epic. Continuous fire WP/ HE at night. (showing the British Army a night smoke mission he he) They were pretty close to the impact zone and said that was pretty epic to watch. They wished they had of known we were doing that as they would have coordinated and did a live fire through the impact area. Instead they got to watch a night of fireworks.
 
Ever been to a Finning shop or similar, they have better security then the Military does.

Okay that’s fine but that needs to be assessed, and audited before contracted.

How many do we have and are they based appropriately?

4-6 per Bn / Regt I think? I posted the ACSV numbers before. That’s obviously in addition to the HLVW wreckers. Their internal to units which is good. Now how that would be played out with AFVs across the country is a whole different question of course.

If they offered the courses that would be the first step. Then not cancelling the courses would be the next step.
Plus one might be surprised what can be taught using simulators and then confirm with live. F35 fighter simulator comes to mind. We have an amazing company in Canada who can make simulators like no one else.

That wasn’t really my point. Not a lot of reservists will be able to give up 30 plus days a year just for those courses. We already make heavy use of simulators, in house ICS, for gunners but I think we can agree you need to actually drive to get a sense of the vehicles. Much like flight time is still required in addition to sim time.

Would you, an an example, be able to take 30 days off for a driver course ?

My discussion was about maintaining the equipment, which was stated one of the main reasons why Reservists cannot get a more maintenance intense platform. I am strictly addressing the Fixing side of the equations. Everything else can fall into place as needed. Often does.

“She’ll buff” failing to plan is planning to dial and all that.
Out East is an example with 2 RCHA where they identified a short fall in their staffing the guns, put their money where their mouth was and worked with the local unit to get Gunners up to full training, and competency needed to deploy in the various aspects of the Battery. So far has been hugely successful.

God glad to hear it, how long is the m777 course ?
Again if you put money into a Reserve Unit, give them the equipment, the dedicated training they will come out and do the job.
Give them cancelled courses, broken or lack of/no equipment, cut their already short training days and you will have a none commitment to the cause.
My point isn’t that I don’t think the reserves can fix the vehicles; I’m sure we can do some work around a to get it to work. It’s more that time and training would eat up every training day available to a reserve unit. Probably more if you have to break up the field portions into multiple weekends and account for travel.
 
My point isn’t that I don’t think the reserves can fix the vehicles; I’m sure we can do some work around a to get it to work. It’s more that time and training would eat up every training day available to a reserve unit. Probably more if you have to break up the field portions into multiple weekends and account for travel.
Summer.
Yes your Gunners and Drivers will be HS Students and Crew Commanders probably University Students -- but not a significant difference from the current hierarchy in the PRes correct?

The biggest issue is maintenance - and of course armouries able to store them securely...
 
The CAF's main output should be readiness - equipment that's ready, materiel that's ready, people who are ready.

That in turn suggests a bias in the Army's full time force towards those who generate that readiness - the techs and acquisition and other support personnel... and then a shift for the "pointy end" to less full-time, and more part-time.
 
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