Haligonian
Sr. Member
- Reaction score
- 382
- Points
- 880
Really liked the second article from the Bn Comd.
This is from the article. The bolding is mine. You can find a map of NTC at this link https://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=3599258. Brigade hill is in the 3200 5000 Grid square (the map is from some game and so the grids are a little weird. The Eastings are four digits while the Northings are only two):
"The knobby, segmented hill dominates the cross-maneuver
corridor that separates the western and eastern portions of the
box. If the BCT did not own Brigade Hill, it could not continue the
attack to the east. Approaching Brigade Hill mounted presents
a dilemma. Just a single well-placed anti-armor system can
systematically destroy a mounted approach. Yet those same
systems are vulnerable to an approach by dismounted forces.
The 1-8 IN dismounted a rifle company and maneuvered it
along the southern wall while the BCT set conditions for a
dismounted attack using artillery suppression and smoke."
Is that really true?
Brigade Hill is not a really large feature in terms of width and depth. Seems to me that a US Arty Bn, particularly if it has attached MLRS, should be able to provide the required suppression for the lead armour to close and then the trailing mech infantry to close the remaining distance, dismount, and start winkling out any ATGMs.
I thought it was interesting to note that this Bn added Stingers to the sections as I mentioned earlier.
In separate threads on here I've discussed re-grouping and the potential advantages of sticking to arm pure sub units vice cbt tms (https://army.ca/forums/threads/129368.0.html). The author hits on this. From the article:
"Fighting pure enabled the battalion to mass tanks and
infantry. We do not generally think about massing infantry,
but most pieces of key terrain on the battlefield require more
than one or two platoons to clear. Therefore, it makes sense
to mass an infantry company (or potentially two or three) to
clear key terrain. It does not make sense in many instances to
mass mechanized teams to perform the same task. We would
do better to employ the tanks as a company in support of the
infantry — as the BCT did when it attacked Razish — and allow
the infantry to perform the heavy lifting of clearing the terrain
systematically."
The Brits Standard Orders Cards show some good examples of how these drills work in terms of a BG on the offense while maintaining pure Companies. Our emphasis on the Cbt Tm, especially the square cbt tm, is a function of our desire to train sub unit commanders in combined arms and to conduct tank-infantry integration. It is, however, not always the best task organization. With so few tanks in the Army we really need to be thinking about how we want to employ them and their mobility really allows for them to rove around the battlefield smashing problems then moving to the next instead of tying them to the slow grind of the infantry battle.
The author's notes on the impacts of having a paucity of infantry are interesting. Historically, its not really surprising. The Wehrmact steadily moved away from armour heavy formations as they realized they needed a better balance of infantry. The Israelis learned the same thing in '76 when ADA shot their planes from the air and Saggers started plinking their tanks at range.
More generally it made me think about the roles of infantry and armour in these types of formations. Surprise and shock are essential ingredients to achieving disproportionate tactical success. Both surprise and shock can happen independent of each other, however, surprise, when exploited, can also lead to shock. While either arm can achieve both it seems like the infantry is particularly suited to achieving surprise and the armour to shock. The infantry can employ their small signature, capability to operate in all weather, and ability to exploit difficult terrain to attack the enemy at unexpected times and places to surprise the enemy. Meanwhile tanks can blast holes and move rapidly to exploit their firepower to present new situations to the enemy, thereby imposing shock. The trick is to identify what situation calls for which effect and how best to have them support each other.
This is from the article. The bolding is mine. You can find a map of NTC at this link https://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=3599258. Brigade hill is in the 3200 5000 Grid square (the map is from some game and so the grids are a little weird. The Eastings are four digits while the Northings are only two):
"The knobby, segmented hill dominates the cross-maneuver
corridor that separates the western and eastern portions of the
box. If the BCT did not own Brigade Hill, it could not continue the
attack to the east. Approaching Brigade Hill mounted presents
a dilemma. Just a single well-placed anti-armor system can
systematically destroy a mounted approach. Yet those same
systems are vulnerable to an approach by dismounted forces.
The 1-8 IN dismounted a rifle company and maneuvered it
along the southern wall while the BCT set conditions for a
dismounted attack using artillery suppression and smoke."
Is that really true?
Brigade Hill is not a really large feature in terms of width and depth. Seems to me that a US Arty Bn, particularly if it has attached MLRS, should be able to provide the required suppression for the lead armour to close and then the trailing mech infantry to close the remaining distance, dismount, and start winkling out any ATGMs.
I thought it was interesting to note that this Bn added Stingers to the sections as I mentioned earlier.
In separate threads on here I've discussed re-grouping and the potential advantages of sticking to arm pure sub units vice cbt tms (https://army.ca/forums/threads/129368.0.html). The author hits on this. From the article:
"Fighting pure enabled the battalion to mass tanks and
infantry. We do not generally think about massing infantry,
but most pieces of key terrain on the battlefield require more
than one or two platoons to clear. Therefore, it makes sense
to mass an infantry company (or potentially two or three) to
clear key terrain. It does not make sense in many instances to
mass mechanized teams to perform the same task. We would
do better to employ the tanks as a company in support of the
infantry — as the BCT did when it attacked Razish — and allow
the infantry to perform the heavy lifting of clearing the terrain
systematically."
The Brits Standard Orders Cards show some good examples of how these drills work in terms of a BG on the offense while maintaining pure Companies. Our emphasis on the Cbt Tm, especially the square cbt tm, is a function of our desire to train sub unit commanders in combined arms and to conduct tank-infantry integration. It is, however, not always the best task organization. With so few tanks in the Army we really need to be thinking about how we want to employ them and their mobility really allows for them to rove around the battlefield smashing problems then moving to the next instead of tying them to the slow grind of the infantry battle.
The author's notes on the impacts of having a paucity of infantry are interesting. Historically, its not really surprising. The Wehrmact steadily moved away from armour heavy formations as they realized they needed a better balance of infantry. The Israelis learned the same thing in '76 when ADA shot their planes from the air and Saggers started plinking their tanks at range.
More generally it made me think about the roles of infantry and armour in these types of formations. Surprise and shock are essential ingredients to achieving disproportionate tactical success. Both surprise and shock can happen independent of each other, however, surprise, when exploited, can also lead to shock. While either arm can achieve both it seems like the infantry is particularly suited to achieving surprise and the armour to shock. The infantry can employ their small signature, capability to operate in all weather, and ability to exploit difficult terrain to attack the enemy at unexpected times and places to surprise the enemy. Meanwhile tanks can blast holes and move rapidly to exploit their firepower to present new situations to the enemy, thereby imposing shock. The trick is to identify what situation calls for which effect and how best to have them support each other.
