How to beat the Taliban in Afghanistan / Pakistan (and win the war on terror)

[aesop081]

"I say we nuke the site from orbit. It's the only way to be sure"

 

[Fishbone Jones]

Quote from: Peter Dow on August 18, 2012, 20:45:45

...The bull initially lacks no fighting will to charge at the matedor's cape but the cape is not the bull's real enemy but the bull lacks the strategic vision to understand the true nature of the fight.

Shoulda told this bull. I don't think he believes your hypothesis  :

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BXsYhvnBxIc&feature=related

 

[a_majoor]

All I got was;
Just bomb the bad guys
Pay afghans more money

Can you redo this as a Haiku?

 

[dimsum]

Can you redo this as a Haiku?

All I got was this
Bomb the bad guys now and then
Pay Afghans more cash

 

[Peter Dow]

This thread is like driving on the 401 and slowing down to see an accident in the opposite lanes, horrible and fascinating at the same time.

What's even more horrible to see has been the many avoidable deaths of our troops killed by mines, road-side bombs, improvised explosive devices and ambushes while routinely and recklessly supplying along unsecured roads in Iraq and Afghanistan.

What has been fascinating about this unnecessary carnage has been the blind-eye of our generals to the conventional military approach of securing a supply road by defending a secure perimeter to keep the enemy forces well back from the road at all times and instead of our political leaders demanding that elementary competence from our generals, we have seen a fascinating considerable investment by the Pentagon and the UK MOD to develop more robust armoured vehicles, MRAPs etc - to counter the IED threat to supply roads.

It is fascinating that the military experience of centuries of securing roads has been overlooked as if military academies aren't teaching military basics to our officers any more and instead the war planners have reached for new 21st century technology to try to compensate and work around the grotesque  incompetence of our generals.

I confess that I have been caught up with this fascination for new, better, stronger APCs myself and here, briefly is a couple of my ideas I first published in the weeks after I had published my plan for securing the roads.

There's a tendency to engage in "group think". In other words, everyone in the news has been talking about new MRAPs and no-one has been talking about securing the roads by defending a perimeter the old-fashioned way so I joined in the MRAP debate whereas perhaps I should have continued to bang on to deaf ears about securing the roads like any competent general would do. So in my own way, I "rubber-necked" the IED carnage the way the news did and was not able to get the authorities or military forums to insist on critical thinking to break the group think towards new, bigger and better MRAPs as the answer.

I did my best to get political and military people to focus on what they should know works but what with being banned from some forums and being ridiculed and trolled in other forums there are many out there still in denial about the bizarre failure of our generals to secure our supply roads.

I am sure that a great many members here in this forum will dig their heels in and refuse to consider and to admit to the sheer stupidity of failing to secure supply roads in Iraq and Afghanistan and think that our casaulties to road-side bombs etc are sad but somehow an inevitable consequence of those damn terrorists and in no way the fault of our generals who as "people of significance", or as "senior officials at the Pentagon and MoD" must know what they are doing.

It all reminds me of the absolute trust in the donkey generals of world war 1 who sent vast numbers of brave men to pick their way through barbed-wire of no-man's land while being machine-gunned to death all to no strategic purpose whatsoever.

The generals, be they people of significance, with medals and honours from the monarch, do not always know best. Face this fact and win this war.

The highway idea is really an adaptation of the blockhouse defense the British developed in the Boer War to protect the railways and lines of communications,

Well in every previous war it is hard to imagine competent generals tolerating enemy forces in the rear planting bombs on supply roads though the Nazi generals made that mistake in their campaign against the Soviets.

History Learning Site > World War Two > World War Two and Eastern Europe > Russia
The supply lines of the German army stretched from Germany through Poland and into Russia itself - a huge distance to defend and control. These supply lines were attacked by guerrillas called partisans who did a considerable amount of damage to the German army and caused major shortages.

Well of course Hitler was an interfering commander in chief who imposed his own utterly incompetent military ideas over the objections of his generals some of who were reasonably competent. In many ways, Hitler was the Allies best military asset so useless a commander in chief was he.

Who have been the equivalent fools in our Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns? I know the Queen is a fool but I can't see her ever over-ruling her generals. So are the generals incompetent or are civilian defence ministers refusing to secure roads but offering bigger, better MRAPs instead?

This for me is fascinating. From where springs the font of eternal stupidity?

so as long as an army has 10,000 men to spare this is quite doable in the abstract.

In my opening posts, I suggested numbers of men per mile or per kilometre.

Staff numbers

Reaction captain's office
1 office every 4 depots

161 men

• four depots of forty men (4 x 40 = 160)
• plus the Reaction Captain (160 + 1 = 161)

Mobile reaction depot
1 depot every 2 kilometres (1.25 miles)

40 men

• three eight-hour shifts of thirteen men, (3 x 13 = 39)
• plus the Depot Commander (39 + 1 = 40)

40 men per 2 kilometres = 20 men per kilometre = 32 men per mile

Depot shift
3 shifts per depot

13 men

• four three-man gun teams, ( 4 x 3 = 12)
• plus the Shift Officer (12 + 1 = 13)

Reserves
Approximate numbers of infantry required including reserves.

For a 25% reserve of 5 reserves per kilometre, 8 reserves per mile
Force including reserves is 25 infantry per kilometre, 40 infantry per mile

For a 50% reserve of 10 reserves per kilometre, 16 reserves per mile
Force including reserves is 30 infantry per kilometre, 48 infantry per mile

Support staff
Infantry deployed in the field or on guard somewhere can require numbers of support staff (such as delivery and rubbish collection, engineers of all kinds, trainers, medical, administration, military policing etc.) which I am told can be multiples of the numbers of deployed infantry they support, depending on the support facilities offered, the quality and efficiency of the support organisation.

I believe the support staff requirements for a static guard force are somewhat different to mobile infantry advancing (or retreating) in a conventional war because the guard force's requirements for fuel and ammunition deliveries are less but a guard force may expect more in terms of base facilities - running water, electricity and so on.

I am not recommending figures for support staff because such numbers are more dependent on the infrastructure of the army and nation concerned and are independent of the details of how the infantry are deployed which is my concern here only. Numbers of support staff are to be filled in by NATO-ISAF and the Afghan government and army themselves later.

So for a 25% reserve I am suggesting 25 men per kilometre or 40 men per mile to secure a supply route. That's front-line gunners and their officers. That doesn't include extras like air support or even certain essentials like military policing of the force, or policing for the STOP points where traffic is checked before being allowed onto the secured road.

But anyway at 25 men/km, 40 men/mile with your suggested 10,000 men I could only offer you 400 km or 250 miles of secured road which is not quite enough to join Kabul to Kandahar.

There's a lot more road that needs securing than that but there are a lot more troops available. The Afghan national army is about 200,000 strong I think and so recruiting from that pool to man a NATO-ISAF auxiliary supply route protection force of say 50,000 men could be used to provide the basic security for 2000 km or 1250 miles of road, a much more practical figure for Afghanistan.

Of course, like ERC says, what exactly do we want to do in Afghanistan now that would justify that level of expenditures (or any level of expenditure, for that matter)?

In the global war on terror, it makes sense to fight an offensive war, to seek and destroy enemy bases wherever they are in the world with the prospect of a final victory (eventually), rather than concentrate all expenditure on homeland defence and never have any chance of winning the war while allowing other parts of the world to fall to the enemy, the enemy gains strength through gaining more countries with more resources and more dangerous weapons (Pakistan's nuclear weapons for example) which makes the homeland defence job a whole lot more expensive.

So we were right to invade somewhere and Afghanistan was as good a place as any to start though we ought to be aware that Al Qaeda intended to lure us there because the ground (they thought) favours jihadi infantry forces as they proved in defeating the Soviets and driving them out of Afghanistan (with some help from the West).

But on the subject of expenditure, I must say it is much more efficient war-on-terror spending to switch off pro-jihadi and pro-state-sponsors-of-terrorism satellite TV from a Western-controlled satellite ground station. Knocking out the enemy propaganda our technology is beaming into the middle east is such a low-cost, effective move that it qualifies as a "no brainer" which tells us all we need to know about our current war strategy (the people running it have no brains to speak of).

The other points of my plan do not suggest a total amount of expenditure in Afghanistan but rather suggest how best to spend whatever money is going to be spent.

Some aspects of my plan - bombing Taliban bases from the air, in Afghanistan or Pakistan do not absolutely require a ground presence in Afghanistan though having air bases in Afghanistan gives us more attack options and I should mention more headaches in terms of defending those air bases from Pakistan's nuclear weapons or other WMDs.

From a military perspective, we have essentially moved the war to the south of Afghanistan and the Frontier provinces of Pakistan, leaving the Panjshir valley and other areas formerly controlled by the Norther Alliance relatively clear and peaceful. From a political perspective, there is a sort of functioning national government with very shaky institutions that are plagued by corruption and inefficiency.

A stable Afghanistan is something that should be desired, considering that it is the traditional land route between China, India, Russia and Iran/the Middle East. As a stable polity it can act as a circuit breaker or damper between unstable regions, while as an unstable region it allows the spread of crime, radicalism and instabiklity in general between these various regions.

How to get there is going to be a problem that will plague politicians for at least a generation to come (especially considering there are powerful forces who wish to undo the limited gains that were made and who want a conduit for crime, radicalsim and instability). From a geographic perspective, the nations that surround Afghanistan have the most to gain or lose, so they should be the ones stepping in to provide help and resources. Since several nations have competing agendas, Afghanistan will probably become a pawn in a series of "Great Games" between multiple sets of players.

Political support for the intervention in Afghanistan is fast draining away and I do not think at current casualty rates it can be sustained for a generation. If casualties and costs could be moderated, if our generals were up to the task, if the diplomacy with and/or regime change of neighbouring countries could secure enough supply options, then I would support a long term presence in terms of NATO air bases for forward operations in Asia and training facilities for our local Afghan partners.

We can do this thing but we need to up our game.

 

[MeatheadMick]

Mr. Dow sounds like an incredibly crazy person... but what most intrigues me is that his post count remains 0

 

[aesop081]

but what most intrigues me is that his post count remains 0

Posts made in "Radio Chatter" do not add up in the post count.

 

[MeatheadMick]

Posts made in "Radio Chatter" do not add up in the post count.

Well shit... now this Peter Dow doesn't seem so scary   Just clicking through Posts Since Last Visit... did not see the form >.<

 

[Journeyman]

From where springs the font of eternal stupidity?

Delusions that Nintendo-inspired vehicles, and 'if only Hitler had stationed countless hundreds of thousands of armed guards 15km out from all supply routes between Berlin and Stalingrad,' passes for informed strategic thought.

The sources of those delusions of competence is beyond me.

    :not-again:

 

[Fishbone Jones]

From where springs the font of eternal stupidity?

In the existential search for self realization and the eternal quest for the meaning of one's life, typically, your question is answered by the simple act of delving into the grandiose fantasies produced by one's own moonstruck mind.

 

[GAP]

In the existential search for self realization and the eternal quest for the meaning of one's life, typically, your question is answered by the simple act of delving into the grandiose fantasies produced by one's own moonstruck mind.

oh....dingbatitis......

 

[Franko]

Peter Dow - you have yet again ducked my question and it still stands.

 

[cupper]

oh....dingbatitis......

Otherwise known as Bat Crap Crazy (BCC)

 

[medicineman]

oh....dingbatitis......

Otherwise known as Bat Crap Crazy (BCC)

Or, what I used to get in trouble for using on my Psychiatry rotation: F.I.T.H. - F#$ked In The Head.  It's apparently going to be int he DSM V thanks to me ;D.

MM

 

[uptheglens]

Wibble, kipper, hatstand, my old man's a wheelbarrow.

Dow's probably the biggest troll and mental defective that ARRSE ever attracted.

http://www.arrse.co.uk/search.php?searchid=11622686

But I must admit that he elicited some of the most creative putdowns I've ever read.

 

[dimsum]

Dow's probably the biggest troll and mental defective that ARRSE ever attracted.

http://www.arrse.co.uk/search.php?searchid=11622686

But I must admit that he elicited some of the most creative putdowns I've ever read.

Darn, the link doesn't seem to work for me.

 

[uptheglens]

Darn, the link doesn't seem to work for me.

Here's some direct links to some of the choicer threads he started.

http://www.arrse.co.uk/arrse-hole/164026-traitor-msps-surrender-scotland-queen-elizabeth.html

http://www.arrse.co.uk/arrse-hole/137489-afghanistan-our-army-betrayed-rotten-nato-isaf-uk-us-generals.html

http://www.arrse.co.uk/naafi-bar/155225-peter-dows-again.html

The man clearly has mental issues.

 

[Franko]

http://scot.tk/outfit.htm

Wow....just wow.

Read some of the links provided and Dow's posting style - basically post and run.

Anymore of this and I will lock this thread perminatly as it is trolling.



Oh, just so we are clear - Dow will be banned as well. Consider yourself on the ramp.....




The Army.ca Staff

 

[Ignatius J. Reilly]

Mr. Dow would appear to have far too much free time on his hands.
The same content as his original post in this thread has been posted in a least 5 other sites:

http://www.uspoliticsonline.com/war-peace/73641-how-beat-taliban-afghanistan-pakistan-win-war-terror.html

http://forums.militaryspot.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/3461073/m/9024056228/p/1

http://www.volconvo.com/forums/politics-government/41922-how-beat-taliban-afghanistan-pakistan-win.html

http://armyforums.com/politics/5874-how-beat-taliban-afghanistan-pakistan-win-war-terror.html

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?217234-How-to-beat-the-Taliban-in-Afghanistan-Pakistan-(and-win-the-war-on-terror)

 

[dimsum]

Mr. Dow would appear to have far too much free time on his hands.
The same content as his original post in this thread has been posted in a least 5 other sites:

http://www.uspoliticsonline.com/war-peace/73641-how-beat-taliban-afghanistan-pakistan-win-war-terror.html

http://forums.militaryspot.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/3461073/m/9024056228/p/1

http://www.volconvo.com/forums/politics-government/41922-how-beat-taliban-afghanistan-pakistan-win.html

http://armyforums.com/politics/5874-how-beat-taliban-afghanistan-pakistan-win-war-terror.html

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?217234-How-to-beat-the-Taliban-in-Afghanistan-Pakistan-(and-win-the-war-on-terror)

Well, let's just hope no one else is taking him seriously either.