For the size of Canada, how large should our armed force be?

[aesop081]

Denis, please just go back to whatever it is you do when not on here.......

 

[Dennis Ruhl]

Denis, please just go back to whatever it is you do when not on here.......

Is there an error somewhere?  8 aircraft would be an extremely small squadron in any airforce.  You're right I should be working to pay taxes to support a larger military that has not put more than a brigade in the field or a normal squadron equivalent in hostile air in 64 years.  It's just my opinion, nothing more.

 

[aesop081]

Is there an error somewhere? 

Based on your entire posting history i would say that there is something majorly wrong but i will try to just stick to what you just posted here.

You stated that 16 jets is a small sqn. The article you quoted stated that the individual lead a 16-ship NATO force that included 4 canadian fighters. How you got from this that a Sqn is down to 16 jets , i have no idea. Maybe you should note that a fighter Sqn is typicaly composed of around 12 aircraft.

In what is typical fashion for you, you have taken unrelated numbers and are dishing them out in incorrect ways to support an eroneus argument.

 

[aesop081]

that has not put more than a brigade in the field or a normal squadron equivalent in hostile air in 64 years. 

How quickly you forget that during the 50 years where faced the USSR, Canada deployed forces of significant size in Europe. let us not forget 4 CIBG and later 4 CMBG. let us not forget the fighter squadrons ( yes...plural) that Canada based in England, Germany and France. I assure you that those days were quite hostile.

 

[SupersonicMax]

Sorry Dennis, 416 Sqn also deployed in Irak.  Get your facts straight.

 

[Dennis Ruhl]

You stated that 16 jets is a small sqn. The article you quoted stated that the individual lead a 16-ship NATO force that included 4 canadian fighters. How you got from this that a Sqn is down to 16 jets , i have no idea. Maybe you should note that a fighter Sqn is typicaly composed of around 12 aircraft.

The Kosovo force was 2 squadrons with 16 aircraft which divides out to 8 per squadron.  The particular officer in the article commanded 4 aircraft in a 16 aircraft Canadian force which was part of many hundred aircraft NATO force.

I was unaware that Canadian squadrons only had only 12 planes.  I have never researched the subject, it just seemed low.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usaf/squadron.htm

Until 1992, the Air Force predominantly organized its active fighter aircraft in wings of three squadrons, with 24 combat aircraft in each squadron. However, in 1992, the Air Force Chief of Staff directed that the squadrons be reduced to 18 aircraft. By 1997, most fighter squadrons were reduced to this smaller size, leaving only 54 aircraft in most wings

..................

Subsequently as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) F-15C squadrons were reinstated to 24 primary assigned aircraft (PAA). This was intended to reduce stress on the F-15C squadrons as they dealt with an increasing operations tempo with reduced manning.

Apparently at times Canadian squadrons had 18 or 25 aircraft.

http://www.international.gc.ca/department/history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp?intRefid=10927

13. The Minister of National Defence said that the F-86 aircraft, with which 8 of the 12 squadrons in the Air Division in Europe were equipped, was obsolescent and should be replaced with the least possible delay. When the Supreme Allied Commander Europe had been in Ottawa last month he had recommended that the Air Division should have a strike/ reconnaissance role and had indicated that he would be prepared to accept the re-arming of the F-86 squadrons on the basis of 18 aircraft each instead of the present 25 per squadron now.

 

[Dennis Ruhl]

Sorry Dennis, 416 Sqn also deployed in Irak.  Get your facts straight.

No they didn't.  Part of 416 Squadron did.

 

[SupersonicMax]

Dennis, the 2 squadron did not deploy at the same time, but consecutively in Kosovo (425 first, then 441). 

In Iraq, 416 augmented 439 squadron, making it, really, 2 squadrons deployed at once. 

There are more than 12 jets in a Squadron these days.  Just like you could probably guess, they are not all serviceable all at once.  The maintenance is staggered so that we have a constant number of jets on the line (minus snags), day after day.

While there maybe more than 1 package in the sky, what 16 aircraft means is that the guy was commanding 16 aircraft all going towards a single objective.  You have the strike formation, the escort formation, the SEAD formation, the OCA, sweep, whatever was required.  That added up to 16 aircraft.  Not all aircraft were Canadian (yes, there were Canadians leading american planes in combat, in the recent past)

No they didn't.  Part of 416 Squadron did.

Just like part of 425 and 441 deployed in Kosovo and part of 439 deployed in Iraq.  You rarely deploy a WHOLE unit.

 

[Dennis Ruhl]

How quickly you forget that during the 50 years where faced the USSR, Canada deployed forces of significant size in Europe. let us not forget 4 CIBG and later 4 CMBG. let us not forget the fighter squadrons ( yes...plural) that Canada based in England, Germany and France. I assure you that those days were quite hostile.

Yes we employed as many as 120,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen, not one of whom fired a shot in anger.  The Cold War was definitely a different situation from today.  In those days everyone fully expected to be at war on short notice.

 

[aesop081]

Yes we employed as many as 120,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen, not one of whom fired a shot in anger.  The Cold War was definitely a different situation from today.  In those days everyone fully expected to be at war on short notice.

Yup, yet you claimed that Canada had military forces that had never deployed more than a brigade or a single sqn. You are blatantly wrong. The cold war was a confrontation that consumed resources and , above all, lives.

 

[TCBF]

I was always curious what Canada would do if we were to enter another full scale conflict. How would they mass recruit but still maintain the quality of training our soldiers are getting today and gear issue on a mass scale?

- The 'quality of training' is at present a 'targetted quality of training.'  We are recruiting a wide variance in human talent.  Some of it is obviously short-term hires in a practical sense, in that their social and intellectual qualities do not consist of the stuff we want to make Junior Leaders out of. We better not, anyway.  Sad thing is, it would create some issues if we told them they are of limited use.  it will have to be a self-awareness thing, I am afraid.

 

[George Wallace]

........  I have never researched the subject, it just seemed low.

I might suggest that next time you do research the subject before posting.  As you can see, many of the replies on this topic and others are corrections to your historical inaccuracies.


As for not having fired shots in anger, perhaps that may be true; however many shots have been fired in self defence.  I would like to remind you of the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Cyprus defending themselves with several sever casualties and KIAs in 1974.  This was not one of your "no shots fired in anger" moments for them.

 

[Edward Campbell]

I think we need to bear in mind that Dennis Ruhl represents an important minority of Canadians in that:

• He is highly critical of defence management in Canada; and

• He is interested and minimally informed about the topic.

I say he is part of a minority because the majority amongst our fellow countrymen is:

• Highly critical of defence management in Canada; and

• Totally disinterested and completely uninformed about the topic.

Dennis Ruhl is telling us what most Canadians are telling pollsters and politicians. We should all pay attention and try to remember that the Canadian majority is ignorant and apathetic but it (the Canadian majority)”supports the troops” even as it dislikes the military for its expense.

 

[ArmyRick]

Well said. Mr Campbell.

My take on what we need to determine what we need for a force?

Do an estimate.

Have the generals and admirals sit down and figure out their mission analysis from the Government. This Government has charged the Canadian forces to do what exactly and in what priority?

Next, they take in all the factors and weigh them out
-What are the threats? From most realistic to very unlikely.
-Who is the threat?
-What resources do we have (Manpower, funding, support, industrial capability, etc, etc)
-so on and on (The wizards at the top will have far more info than me)

Next I would say the figure out 3-5 Courses of Action (in this case how and what our military is structured for) It could be based on best case scenario (High budget and lots of man power) down to worst case scenario (Lower budget, lower man power). Between five different secnarios, weigh them agaisnt each other and figure out what we need.

One final word, no sacred cows. No preserving this unit or that because of history, fairness to both cultures, etc, etc.

I am sure that the guys at the top have already done this (Is this how we ended up with Canada Command, exp. command, etc?).

If I were the CDS or the Emperor of Canada, this is how I would go about it.

My 2 cents, with interest equals 3.76485 cents.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Well said. Mr Campbell.

My take on what we need to determine what we need for a force?

Do an estimate.

Have the generals and admirals sit down and figure out their mission analysis from the Government. This Government has charged the Canadian forces to do what exactly and in what priority?

Next, they take in all the factors and weigh them out
-What are the threats? From most realistic to very unlikely.
-Who is the threat?
-What resources do we have (Manpower, funding, support, industrial capability, etc, etc)
-so on and on (The wizards at the top will have far more info than me)

Next I would say the figure out 3-5 Courses of Action (in this case how and what our military is structured for) It could be based on best case scenario (High budget and lots of man power) down to worst case scenario (Lower budget, lower man power). Between five different secnarios, weigh them agaisnt each other and figure out what we need.

One final word, no sacred cows. No preserving this unit or that because of history, fairness to both cultures, etc, etc.

I am sure that the guys at the top have already done this (Is this how we ended up with Canada Command, exp. command, etc?).

If I were the CDS or the Emperor of Canada, this is how I would go about it.

My 2 cents, with interest equals 3.76485 cents.

This is, largely, done - over and over and over again. But it is done in a few secretariats of the Privy Council Office, right across the street from Parliament Hill.

The CDS and the admirals and generals are rarely involved, even though inputs are always sought from DND, usually provide by both the Deputy Minister's (mostly civilian) staff and some military staff, through the DM, himself.

This is part of a constant, ongoing, strategic review that is (or at least was) done with great care, but, especially in a minority situation or during times of financial crisis (e.g. 1993-2000), it is too often ignored by the prime minister and his/her cabinet.

 

[Old Sweat]

My take on what we need to determine what we need for a force?

Do an estimate.

Have the generals and admirals sit down and figure out their mission analysis from the Government. This Government has charged the Canadian forces to do what exactly and in what priority?

Next, they take in all the factors and weigh them out
-What are the threats? From most realistic to very unlikely.
-Who is the threat?
-What resources do we have (Manpower, funding, support, industrial capability, etc, etc)
-so on and on (The wizards at the top will have far more info than me)

Next I would say the figure out 3-5 Courses of Action (in this case how and what our military is structured for) It could be based on best case scenario (High budget and lots of man power) down to worst case scenario (Lower budget, lower man power). Between five different secnarios, weigh them agaisnt each other and figure out what we need.

One final word, no sacred cows. No preserving this unit or that because of history, fairness to both cultures, etc, etc.

I am sure that the guys at the top have already done this (Is this how we ended up with Canada Command, exp. command, etc?).

If I were the CDS or the Emperor of Canada, this is how I would go about it.

My 2 cents, with interest equals 3.76485 cents.

I wish it was that easy. As Edward has noted, there have been no end of strategic reviews, most of whichb result in a statment such as "there is no obvious level of defence spending for Canada." In my opinion, defence spending is a factor of how much can be siphoned off from what really matters to the Canadian people without provoking too much of a backlash.

With a few exceptions - the two world wars and the first twenty years of the Cold War - Canada has not faced a serious threat that could not be countered by deploying an armed mob of hastily-assembled militia and civilians. Neither the Fenians nor the Metis were in the same league as the Jacobites in the case of the UK or the CSA and the tribes on the great plains and the south-west that opposed the US. Even in wartime our planning was based on shipping partly-trained levvies to the UK, where they would complete their training before deploying to the continent. Moreover, besides depending on the might of the British Empire, we also were protected by geography and the Monroe Doctrine. We also propagated the myth that Canadian farmers and shopkeepers had rallied to the colours to repel the Yankee invaders in the War of 1812. Thus, we put our faith in the existence of a large number of poorly-trained and ill-equipped militia regiments. This had the advantage of maximizing pork (the minister, not the military, decided promotions and key appointments) while keeping defence expenditures pitifully low.

The notion that defence comes cheap is engrained in the national consciousness. It will take much, much more than a comprehensive estimate to banish that to the wood shed of history. Besidesit is too easy to rely upon first the British and now the American taxpayer to protect us.

 

[Edward Campbell]

There are, broadly, two sorts of strategic reviews:

1. The permanent, always ongoing one in PCO which I described above; and

2. The seemingly endless series of special reviews that Old Sweat described. Those special reviews are sometimes done in house, by government people with axes to grind, sometimes done by consultants (frequently retired government people with even more axes to grind), and sometimes by "distinguished" outsiders - being from Oxford helps.

Mr. Manley's recent "review" of the Afghanistan Mission, is one example - it was very localized but still strategic. Ditto Jeniffer Welsh's aborted rewrite of Paul Martin aborted White Paper on foreign policy.

 

[PuckChaser]

I personally think if someone has an issue with how the military spends their money, they are more than welcome to walk into the recruiting center, sign up to be an officer, and work at being CDS. Then maybe you can be informed about how things work and effect some change.

 

[observor 69]

My fear......A few years down the road with the deficit still present, federal debt  high from recession stimulus spending and a political reluctance to raise taxes we get a Paul Martin answer.....cut programs, the big one "Defence" comes with little political cost. We have our new toys but few dollars for maintenance or operation, sound familiar?

 

[George Wallace]

My fear......A few years down the road with the deficit still present, federal debt  high from recession stimulus spending and a political reluctance to raise taxes we get a Paul Martin answer.....cut programs, the big one "Defence" comes with little political cost. We have our new toys but few dollars for maintenance or operation, sound familiar?

Quite a discusion for a topic that was started with only a    posted.

I fear, that when the Government pulls us out of Afghanistan, we are left with "NO toys", as many/most/all will be left in theatre.