Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[The Bread Guy]

Some interesting thoughts on revitalization and the role of reserves:

This just out via the CDFAI site:

Canada’s Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper
DAVID PRATT
In this Research Paper,  David Pratt, Senior Vice-President of Public Affairs for GCI and a Senior Research Fellow with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, examines the current state of the Reserves. Pratt stipulates that the historic role of the Reserves, for Mobilization, has no relevance in the current strategic environment. Instead, their current roles of augmentation and providing a footprint in the community, should be the focus. Additionally, Reserves may be able to play new roles, such as combating the threats associated with cyber-security.

Full report (4.2MB PDF) downloadable here, shorter version attached.

 

[Haggis]

Two years ago I took on the role of CSM of the Disaster Response Company in 38 CBG during the ice jams on the Red River. It was quite the experience gathering reservists from all over Saskatchewan, Manitoba and NW Ontario and blending them into a cohesive structured unit.
My thoughts? Domestic operations, particularly Aid to the Civil Power in the local area.

Last year I was RSM of a Total Force 350 member IRU for the G8/G20 Op CADENCE, which we built from the ground up from 18 P Res units, elements of 70 Comm Gp and 2 Svc Bn.  I share your pain!  Surprisingly, during the pre-deployment phase the overwhelming majority of my DAG REDs came from the Regular Force.

 

[dapaterson]

Last year I was RSM of a Total Force 350 member IRU for the G8/G20 Op CADENCE, which we built from the ground up from 18 P Res units, elements of 70 Comm Gp and 2 Svc Bn.  I share your pain!  Surprisingly, during the pre-deployment phase the overwhelming majority of my DAG REDs came from the Regular Force.

Was it the first, second or third BFT that did them in?

 

[ArmyRick]

I have seen a few reg f soldier who haven't done a BFT, are not on category but manage to linger on in their respective jobs for way too long. They manage to get their "protection" from friends and old boys. Yes, I have seen the same with PRes pers as well. That whole business of soldiers wasting the CF time is on both sides of the fence.

Part of improving recruiting and keeping the CF on track should maybe include a honest sweep across the entire spectrum of those that do not belong in the CF anymore.

 

[Haggis]

Was it the first, second or third BFT that did them in?

PM inbound.

 

[daftandbarmy]

This just out via the CDFAI site:Full report (4.2MB PDF) downloadable here, shorter version attached.

I just skimmed it but I'm shocked: no apparent emphasis on TDBGs. 

What would the Tories say about that I wonder?

 

[McG]

Jack is a smart guy. Sometimes however he damages the case he is trying to make by inflammatory language and/or dubious claims. I do wonder what is the aim of the exercise and if it takes into account the present security climate? If he is proposing a reserve force of 45,000, what will this do to the regular force? What about the equipment and accomodation bill?

Hopefully the report will soon be available online for examination.

I haven't read it yet, but it is available at http://www.opencanada.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/SSWG-Paper-Jack-English-September-2011.pdf.

And to cut to the chase:

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Immediately bring part-time Class A Militia strength up to the 18,500 target that was supposed to have been met in March 2006.
2. Reaffirm the Militia role sanctioned by the Minister and promulgated by the CDS in 2002.
3.      Aim to increase total Class A strength to 45,000 with clearly defined home defence roles within a skeletonized Militia structure that would serve as a framework for further army expansion.
4.   Produce a “no cost” mobilization plan with a war establishment order of battle structure for expanding a skeletonized Militia in emergency. Unit manning and equipment in this planned structure would be restricted by position and item in peacetime.
5.      Restrict Class B service for Militia support only, with all reservists filling regular positions being paid at Class C rates out of the regular budget.
6. Establish a separate Militia pay envelope and ensure it is used for Militia pay only.
7.      Give priority to deploying formed Militia sub-units – and eventually units – for overseas operations and establish a time-efficient through-put training system to accomplish this objective.

Detailed discussion of these points should probably take place here: Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

I agree with recommendation 5.  There is too much Cl B (including Cl B/A) being used to grow regular force units & HQs without direct support to the reserves.  The only Cl B outside of reserve units & HQs should be individual positions that primarily support the reserves or that represent the reserve force in HQs on matters uniquely affecting the reserves.  Of course, while many HQ positions will be clearly fall one way or another, there will be many HQ positions that are a little grey as to whether the incumbent represent the reserve force in HQs on matters uniquely affecting the reserves.

... and this would also mean that annuitants would not be able to fill such representative positions outside reserve units or HQs.  Coming from the Reg F, they would not be qualified to represent the reserve force on matters uniquely affecting the reserves.

 

[dapaterson]

If Reg F units and formations require temporary incremental Reserve support, I have no heartache with that.  However, "temporary" needs to be enforced; no more endless extensions to temporary programs.

What I object to is the current failing of the accounting system, where such expenditures are not immediately captured in a way to permit them to be reported.  "Reserve Pay" should not be an amorphous blob where anyone paid as a Reservist has their salary expense attributed to the cost of the Reserves.  It would take no great effort to create better accounting methods - take your pick of General Ledger accounts or funds - to clearly differentiate between, say, a full-time reservist conducting admininstration for a Reserve unit and a full-time Reservist marking time in office of the Associate Deputy Minister for Basket Weaving (Natural Fibres) in NDHQ.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Associate Deputy Minister for Basket Weaving (Natural Fibres) in NDHQ.

Oh! I met him at a conference once.  Nice guy!  >

 

[GAP]

Oh! I met him at a conference once.  Nice guy!  >

Good baskets?

 

[dapaterson]

Good baskets?

Your statement assumes that quality of output is measured and assessed in NDHQ.


Silly rabbit.

 

[GAP]

gulp......sorry

 

[Fishbone Jones]

Out of curiosity sir, what were the big lessons learned that came out of that without or TBG for force generation? I know how it all got perceived at our level as one of the Sect Comds, but we never really heard how things went higher up, and how it might affect the next time we do something like that. I get the impression that a similar force generation concept (and TBG structure) looks set to be exercised for Ft Knox... Will there be noticeable changes at the level of individual units, or of Pl/Coy once we glom together?

It won't matter ,whatever you did previous. The attempt to reinvent the wheel and expend maximum time and effort trying to sort the mess on the ground is the hallmark of any combined op\ ex involving the Reserve. It will all come together on the last two days, only to fall to pieces again for the redeployment home.

 

[dapaterson]

Hot off the press, the CDS vision for the Primary Reserve:

CANFORGEN 172/11 CDS 025/11 211449Z SEP 11
CDS P RES VISION
UNCLASSIFIED



THE PURPOSE OF THIS CANFORGEN IS TO CONVEY MY VISION FOR THE PRIMARY RESERVES (P RES)


MANY TRANSFORMATIONAL AND RATIONALIZATION ACTIVITIES ARE UNDERWAY IN DND AND THE CF. AS WE TRANSITION OUR STRATEGIC COMMITMENTS AND FOCUS ON THE NEXT CHALLENGES OF TRANSFORMATION AND THE CANADA FIRST DEFENCE STRATEGY, IT REMAINS CLEAR THAT A ROBUST AND WELL TRAINED PART-TIME P RES WILL REMAIN KEY TO THE ABILITY OF THE CF TO MEET THE SECURITY AND DEFENCE NEEDS OF THE FUTURE.


MY VISION FOR THE PRIMARY RESERVE IS A FORCE THAT CONSISTS OF PREDOMINATELY PART-TIME PROFESSIONAL CF MEMBERS, LOCATED THROUGHOUT CANADA, READY WITH REASONABLE NOTICE TO CONDUCT OR CONTRIBUTE TO DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS TO SAFEGUARD THE DEFENCE AND SECURITY OF CANADA. THIS FORCE IS FULLY INTEGRATED INTO THE CF CHAIN OF COMMAND.


RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO OPERATIONS AND CONNECTIONS WITH CANADIANS ARE CRITICAL TO THE NATION AND TO THE ENVIRONMENTS AND COMMUNITIES IN WHICH THEY SERVE AND WE MUST ENSURE THAT WE ATTRACT, DEVELOP, SUPPORT AND RETAIN A READY, CAPABLE, MOTIVATED AND RELEVANT P RES FORCE AS BOTH A STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL RESOURCE FOR CANADA AND THE CF WELL INTO THE FUTURE.


WORK FORCE REQUIREMENTS ARE BEING REVIEWED ACROSS THE DEFENCE TEAM TO DETERMINE THE FORCE STRUCTURE NEEDED TO MEET OUR OPERATIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENTS. AS PART OF THIS REVIEW, ESTABLISHED FULL-TIME P RES POSITIONS WILL BE ALIGNED TO THE PRIORITIES OF: RESERVE FORCE GENERATION, SUPPORT TO CF OPERATIONS, RESERVE PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AND SUPPORT TO THE CF INSTITUTION. THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE SIGNIFICANT OPPORTUNITIES FOR P PRES TO SERVE IN CURRENT AND FUTURE CF OPERATIONS


TO SUPPORT MY VISION, I WILL COMMUNICATE MORE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE IN THE FUTURE OUTLINING THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT, POLICY, MANAGEMENT, AND EMPLOYMENT PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE P RES. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DEVELOP RELEVANT AND SUSTAINABLE MISSIONS AND TASKS WHICH REFLECT THE RESERVE CULTURE IN WHICH THE MAJORITY OF PRES MEMBERS SERVE PART-TIME AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE CF. AS A PRIORITY, I WILL STRIVE TO ALIGN PROGRAMS AND BENEFITS SO THAT THEY EFFECTIVELY SUPPORT ALL CF MEMBERS.


SIGNED BY GEN W.J. NATYNCZYK, CDS

 

[Bin-Rat]

Reserves' growth deliberately stifled: Report
Article Link


OTTAWA - Canada's military establishment has routinely defied ministerial orders to boost the reserve force since the 1990s, according to a new report.

Written by senior military scholar Jack English for the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, The Role of the Militia in Today's Canadian Forces paints a disturbing picture.

In it, English outlines a "wretched saga" of "sandbagging, obstruction, futile wheel-spinning, and endlessly wasted staff effort" to keep reserve numbers low because the part-time force is viewed as a lesser priority than full-time personnel.

"Nothing of substance has really been done over the past decade to grow militia numbers as promised," English writes.

Today, there are about 16,000 reservists, or citizen-soldiers, which is similar to the figures a decade ago despite the fact that successive defence ministers from both the previous Liberal and current Conservative governments have issued orders to the Canadian Forces to increase its size.

The full-time force is 65,000.

When asked what the current defence minister thought of English's report, a spokesman for Peter MacKay said the Conservatives have been working to restore the government's relationship with the country's military brass.

"After a decade of darkness under a Liberal government, this government has developed a strong relationship of trust with the military that has helped us achieve common goals," wrote Jay Paxton in an e-mail Wednesday. "Our government is committed to implementing the best policies to ensure that the Canadian Forces are able to do the difficult jobs we ask of them."

Paxton would not say what MacKay thought of the report, which indicates he, too, has been ignored. In December 2009, reserve pay budgets were cut dramatically and the funds relocated to other priorities. Many reservists, English writes, were told they would receive no work or pay for months.

While MacKay ordered the department to put in place policies to avoid similar turmoil from happening in the future, "as late as 23 February 2011, the vice chief reported that he was still 'working' on the problem, possibly in anticipation of the May 2011 federal election producing another minister.

"The matter of compliance still remains open," English adds.

The NDP's defence critic Jack Harris said it's no secret reservists have been complaining for years that they don't have adequate resources to increase the militia's size.

If the report's allegations are true, that successive defence ministers have been ignored by the military establishment when it comes to orders to increase the size of the reserves, "then we've got a problem.

"One of the themes of our critique of this government is that there ought to be strong civilian control over the military and we don't have that here. There are pieces missing in the puzzle, and if this is going on, then it's obviously evidence that there's something clearly wrong. If the minister's policies and the policies of the government aren't being followed through in the military then we've got a problem."


By Bryn Weese, Parliamentary Bureau
bryn.weese@sunmedia.ca
Last Updated: September 21, 2011 6:42pm

 

[GAP]

Christie Blatchford: Bureaucracy calls shots on reservists
Article Link
Christie Blatchford  Sep 24, 2011

That Canada’s reserve army routinely gets the shaft comes as news to no one, least of all the country’s long-suffering reservists.

As one reserve officer I know says, “In the civilian world, we would be the third shift at the Ford plant … or the casual part-time force that has no union, no guarantees, no benefits and no representation.

“We’re almost like discretionary spending.”

Still, the report, which was released this week by the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and the Canadian International Council, is nonetheless startling.

Written by distinguished military scholar and veteran Dr. Jack English, it shows how the bureaucracy in Ottawa — an incestuous nest of regular army bosses with turf to protect and intractable civil servants — has consistently ignored or thwarted government directives to increase the size of the reserves.

What’s more, either those defence ministers whose pledges came to nought had the collective attention span of gnats, or they failed to grow a set of nuts sufficient to demand their instructions be followed, or they were simply shifted within Cabinet and the new fellow came in.

Any way you look at it, Dr. English says, the bureaucracy is calling the shots.

In the result, despite pledges to grow the reserves, the militia part-time head count remains still at about 16,500, or, as Dr. English wryly notes, about the size of National Defence Headquarters, or NDHQ as it’s called.

By the way, just getting the damn numbers out of NDHQ is a trick.

David Pratt, the former Liberal MP who wrote another report on Canada’s citizen soldiers for the CDFAI this spring — he takes a different approach, but certainly shares the view that the reserves have been neglected — first asked the Library of Parliament for an accurate count of reservists.

The library approached the Canadian Forces, which in turn essentially said it could go back only three years and couldn’t come up with a proper count.

In referring to this explanation in his report, Dr. English scornfully labels it “typical Byzantine, prevaricating gobbledygook.”

Virtually everyone who has studied the Canadian army, and their number is legion, agrees on a couple of things: The bureaucracy is obscenely bloated, far out of proportion for the size of the army; the citizen soldier, who until called up to full-time service costs only about 20% of the regular one, is a bargain for the taxpayer; the militia is more diverse, ethnically and otherwise, than the regular army.
More on link

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Ms Blatchford (along with many others) is making this a reserve vs reg force battle, when, in my judgement, it is not.  No line unit is in particularly good shape right now.  We seem to have the command and control piece of both DND and the CF screwed up right now and that is sucking up an inordinate amount of resources that could be allocated elsewhere.

 

[PuckChaser]

Last year I was RSM of a Total Force 350 member IRU for the G8/G20 Op CADENCE, which we built from the ground up from 18 P Res units, elements of 70 Comm Gp and 2 Svc Bn.  I share your pain!  Surprisingly, during the pre-deployment phase the overwhelming majority of my DAG REDs came from the Regular Force.

I didn't think we had that many Reds for IRU, I can only think of 1 from HQ+Sigs Platoon.

 

[McG]

Some thoughts from another thread: 

... Today few people see more than a limited mobilization and perhaps the creation of a special force, although the fleshing out of the regulars with individual augmentation is a more realistic proposition.

... but how do we compel individuals sub-units of various militia units to report for duty without a compulsary call up? The chances of any Canadian government being willing to pay the political price for resorting to compulsion in any situation sort of Armageddon is slim to say the least. The hard-eyed bean counters who scrutinize budget items would shoot holes in the plan in a heartbeat.

...The future of the reserve gunners is very much in doubt and while I wish it was not so, but I do not see an easy solution! 

At the risk that you're doing this just to push my buttons I feel a need to respond.

A reserve force that no one is prepared to use compulsorily is a waste of money. The military is a force of last resort and to rely on them to come voluntarily when needed is a suicidal policy.

If this is truly a 'political' issue then its time to get over the conscription crisis - that was so last century.

My belief is that politicians here don't even have an understanding what the existing powers are. We have the legislation in place although I admit we are woefully behind in job protection legislation, financial hardship benefits, wounded warrior support etc.

The problem in my mind remains within both NDHQ and the CF who are stuck within a particular military model mindset.

The US has consistently used reserve call ups to increase their force size when necessary. One can argue about how effective Nat Guard units and formations may be but they continue to form a significant role on deployed operations without the US government having paid any political price.

In the UK right now the government is increasing the Territorial Army strength from 15,000 to 30,000 while cutting the regular army by 20,000 because they understand the massive cost savings involved. They know there will be challenges not the least of which is from within the regular force leadership. Their govt is not going to pay a political price for this because the public appreciates that cost cutting measures are necessary.

I see our military leadership's timid approach to the role and utilization of reserves in the same way that the US conventional military leadership addressed the use of special forces in the 80s and 90s. It took a politician - Rumsfeld - to finally get them off the dime.

Don't sell our political leadership short on a per forma basis. If given reasonable and viable options they will most probably go the right way. At present we give them no real options and as a result we get what appear to be arbitrary budget cuts.

…

FJAG, you are so far off the mark I don't even know where to begin
The problem with equipping the reserves was not stymied by any kind of political mindset against them, but in the growing complexity of the systems themselves. The availability of reservists to become trained on these systems is limited, except for those deploying with Reg F units, who can get it during work up training to high readiness. Even then there are limits. Nevertheless, in the past decade, the CF has relied actually more and more on the Reserves for sustaining deployed forces. Artillery units have gained quite a bit of capability over the past  decade, but no PY growth, and indirectly there was a reduction in capability with the elimination of mortar capability in infantry Bn's. All of which resulted in the Artillery in particular leaning on its Reserve units. This pattern was certainly seen during recent Ops when reservists were making up to 30% of any Artillery unit deploying. The pattern is one based on FG individuals (and the CF does need this depth) and not unit mobilization.

There will still be a need for P Res Arty units for some time, IMO, and there are many good people in these units, but the question is how much do you give them to train with before the skill level is simply not achievable because the limited training time available. The greatest gap right now, between P Res and Reg F units, is in their respective comm's systems. Reg F Artillery units are going more to networked fire control systems, and the reserves remain in the old fashioned voice system. Trying to close this gap can only be done with an increase of training time, and I would argue they're already having trouble now with availability without increasing the complexity of the system.

So the main need is to have viable P res force that can FG individuals, with as minimal training required as possible before they are deployed. The requirement to equip them with a fleet that is not necessarily deployable is a pattern we can see already with acquisition of the MilCOT fleet of vehicles. Even so, the remote possibility does exist that such a fleet could be deployed (certainly true of the Lg1). The basic intent, near as I've ever seen, is to provide P Res units with a training fleet that is less expensive to operate than the system used for full spectrum Ops, but in certain situations could be used on Ops.

…

Having "reserve only" capabilities seems to be part of the CF anyway, one can look at PRes armour or the RCN's use of reservists to man the Kingston class ships to see this in practice. The question of how you can reliably "force generate" units and sub units from the Reserve is a good question, although experience in former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan seems to indicate there are plenty of willing people, so perhaps the answer may lie in "tweaking" existing rules and legislation rather than suggesting compulsion.

In one thread a poster had a realistic plan for raising units and subunits out of reservists by offering a long term Class C contract (the details escape me, but I think the idea was 6 months workup, one year deployed and six months post deployment). If this measure was taken, then each year a "deployment battery" would be formed, volunteers enrolled and the process started. At the same time, a "deployment battery" that was raised two years ago would finish post deployment, turn in the cleaned and repaired kit and everyone would disperse back to their respective regiments.

Combining this with some sort of kit with a small PY and O&M footprint and I think you have a winner. My personal suggestion would be the 120mm mortar given the ability to cover long ranges, provide heavy weight of fire (and terminal effects using smart rounds) towed behind a military utility vehicle in the HMMVW class, or alternatively a BV 206 type vehicle to provide maximum ability to move cross country (the Artillery would then also have a secondary ability to provide mobility in disaster relief and DOMOPS scenarios quite apart from their ability to provide firepower). Using systems that can be deployed and fired by 3 or 4 man crews would keep the footprint small, although there might have to be a larger maintainence troop/battery to keep the systems going, so PY's may be a wash.

Sorry Petard but don't your observations prove my point?

Since Korea, we have stood up a large and expensive regular army/artillery which never went to war until Afghanistan. Even during the first Gulf war we did not send artillery to participate. Our will to commit conventional combat forces was and remains low yet we, as taxpayers, we pay a significant amount to still maintain an arguably large branch which sees, and is predicted to see, only minor operational commitment.

In Afghanistan many branches had large reserve components and they all had long work up sessions before deployment. In my mind that is very much part of the new model of operational deployment and it leaves room to take reservists with fundamental skills to the level needed for operations.

I don't believe in reserve unit mobilization. That's capability hasn't existed since the early 1960s.

I'll go further. In my mind there should be no reserve 'units'. Units are regiments and while we use the term for our reserve organizations they are in fact frequently undermanned and over ranked batteries.

What I see are reserve battery gun lines headed by a regular force captain and a cadre of regular force personnel for maintenance and key leadership positions. (No BC, no FOOS, no FSCC - leave those with the reg f) These batteries would come under the command of the existing regular force regiments and are to be administered and trained by them and plug into their overall establishment and operational role.

Why keep Reserve LCols and Majs many of the Capts, CWOs and MWOs in reserve units that rarely exceed a hundred all ranks. How many of them went to Afghanistan? Not enough to justify a career structure. Not to denigrate them but they are frequently in civilian employment that makes deployment difficult and their skill levels aren't up to the tasks they would need to do in combat. Get rid of these ranks and you can fund another twenty or thirty gunners per battery.

My reg v res model has always been to identify those jobs that you don't need day-to-day and build a viable reserve system around them. Reservists should have only a very minor career path. They should be doers. If they want a 'career' in the military they should component transfer. Young reserve gunners do not join with the aim of being the RSM. They join to fire the guns and get their hands on cool gear. Give them that and give them good leadership and their skill levels will blossom.

I don't for a minute believe there is any equipment we have which is too complex for reservists as a group to use. Its all a matter of the right training and exercise model. If comms systems are really that complex now then leave those as a reg f job.

My approach is one based on redoing the model from scratch based on what so far is an operational deployment model that rarely exceeds a battle group and that always has time for work-up training. If we do need a true quick reaction force as part of our defence mandate then that can be pure regular force. My guess is that it will never exceed a BG either so the one battery gun line per ref f regiment is more than adequate for that need - in fact with that model you could QRF a whole three gun regiment if needed.

…

 

[Infanteer]

FJAG has made some interesting statements.  However, if I recall correctly, the U.S. experience with its integrated reserve model, especially those concerned with service support, did not fare too well during the Iraq and Afghan conflicts.

From my understanding, the Commonwealth tradition in mobilization is that:

1.  Most of the reservists are cashiered right away as too old and unfit for wartime service;

2.  Most of the regulars are cashiered soon after first contact as stale and unfit for the demands of war; and

3.  The organization that comes out of this is a force of very young officers and NCOs who are wartime volunteers led at the higher levels by those few regulars and reservists who had the natural talent to survive the cut.