I believe FJAG's point is that with 30/70 units you'd have Reg Force Majors & MWO's leading Reserve Captains and WOs/Sergeants.
I was responding in that case to Daftandbarmy’s comment that the reserves can presently do that.
Big fan of RESO. We could do more with it and should expand it into similar programs for ResF NCMs for complex trades and a branch of ResF SnrNCO training including porting it to Community Colleges
If they can field 3 platoons.
Which goes to what I wrote in an earlier post:
Each battalion has two rifle companies that are reserve centric and structured 10/90. The 90 is three rifle platoons of reservists. The 10 is a RegF company core with a RegF Coy Comd and various RegF and ResF HQ personnel. The company is basically trained and equipped as a light infantry company by its RegF leadership.
The two 10/90 companies belong to a 30/70 battalion where the bulk of its leadership, one complete rifle company and much of its support companies are staffed by RegF and are fully equipped. The RegF CO is responsible for the full training of his RegF and two ResF companies.
Neither do I see value in those parade nights. In my kingdom, ResF members receive all their DP1 and 2 training at depot battalions and companies that exist both at a central location and distributed to local armouries and who train both the RegF and ResF to those levels. RegF individual training occurs 1 Sept to 30 Apr and individual ResF training takes place across the summer from 1 May to 31 Aug. Once DP1 trained at a depot, soldiers are "posted" to their units and there receive nothing but collective training.
I am quite aware of how long it took to work up the army, the navy on the other hand sailed ships sometimes with only one person who had actually been to sea.
I was MGen Vernon's ADC during that period. On no less than three occasions, I witnessed Reserve CO's stating that Hon Col's forbid Reserve units from following LFCA direction. It wasn't MGen Vernon's arrogance, it was a complete frustration from how much influence that former members, no longer serving, but affiliated with those units, had ( and in my opinion, still have)I'm not a defender of Reserves 2000.
Their origin comes from a RegF movement in Ontario under MGen Vernon to downsize and amalgamate units and it was done in a way that involved minimal ResF involvement. Tie that to the debacle of the disappearing Bisons and a multitude of other actions which made it clear that reservists were not partners in the process but merely pawns to be shoved around.
Reserves 2000 opposed this and makes it clear that the required solution is to leave the units as the Army's contact with the nation, to raise the numbers to 30,000 and to properly equip the reserves. Vernon's arrogance and divide and conquer approach was the catalyst that mobilized the movement.
As I said, I do not carry any water for Reserves 2000. I think that much of what they did back then, and now, is wrong headed. But the problem is very much a two-sided one with the only common ground between them being keeping the ResF separated from the RegF and under their own leadership. I'll add to that the "train when you feel like it" model of reserve service That leads to a perpetuation of the problem.
Brian Vernon and John (which he styled himself earlier in his career, then switched to Jean) Boyle hated each other. I re-read the MacLeans article, it is correct to my knowledge.As I said, I do not carry any water for Reserves 2000. I think that much of what they did back then, and now, is wrong headed. But the problem is very much a two-sided one with the only common ground between them being keeping the ResF separated from the RegF and under their own leadership. I'll add to that the "train when you feel like it" model of reserve service That leads to a perpetuation of the problem.
There were and still are two issues here. The first is that the Army ResF structure, as originally conceived as a Militia, had two purposes - to make contact with the civilian population across the country in a way that the small permanent force couldn't and the current RegF can't; and to be a core around which mobilization takes place.
The former is still necessary but the later is a model that is less useful because of the complexity of modern war and its much heavier reliance on equipment than that of the old style Militia (where essentially a rifle and a uniform for each soldier was 90% of the kit a battalion needed.)
Vernon's initiatives were presented poorly in a dictatorial fashion and not well received by his audience. There's a great difference between consulting, even extensively consulting, and building consensus. The problem in fact centred around those "LFCA directions" which were, in varying degrees unattainable such as "build and reach warrior combat readiness by year's-end" on ever shrinking budgets.
Vernon had issues in how he approached things which smacked of arrogance. Just as an example look at his interview with Macleans after his retirement.
I recall those days as well, although with more distance than you as the issues were still hammering around in Chief of Reserves Council when I went there a few years later. Reserves 2000 was clearly marked as the enemy (actually more like the Devil's spawn) by those there and while I liked and respected many of my colleagues there, more than a few of them had drunk the RegF Kool-Aid. Rather than working together with Reserves 2000 to leverage their considerable political connections in successive governments, they declared war and butted heads. The result was that politicians declared a pox on both their houses and dodged meaningful reform issues whenever possible. It was such a wasted opportunity.
Vernon may have had good intentions, (I'll give him that) but his ham-fisted way of dealing with things poisoned an already shaky relationship and spread it nation-wide.
And just as an aside, I'll happily admit that there were a number of RegF leaders throughout the years who were very good and did try to advance the system in very meaningful ways. Unfortunately with the rotating desk career structure within the RegF, progress was fleeting and frequently abandoned or reversed to the former status quo.
That's a tad heavy assessment. It's hardly ever direction as much as it is sage advice. Most honouraries are either former COs who've "been there and done that" or other community leaders who have the best interests of the unit and community at heart.
Key point being the ‘unit and community’, not necessarily the CAF or PRes as a whole.That's a tad heavy assessment. It's hardly ever direction as much as it is sage advice. Most honouraries are either former COs who've "been there and done that" or other community leaders who have the best interests of the unit and community at heart.
.
