Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[FJAG]

Sorry.  You cannot absolve reserve leadership from any responsibility for the state of the reserve force.  The regular force has not fought to retain or restore platoon-regiments for the glory of local fiefdoms.

I would also have to partially agree with Ostrozac.  You cannot claim the PRes is cheaper (even man-for-man) while choosing to exclude the costs of infrastructure and the organizational structures.  That being said, I don't know that the reserves do become more expensive when those overhead costs are included.  I have neither done the math nor even seen the data.

Reserve leadership generally ends at the lieutenant colonel level with a smattering of colonels and the odd brigadier. It speaks very poorly of the RegF senior CF leadership if good ideas can be stymied by lower ranking officers and the odd politically connected civilian/retired hack. I sat on the Chief of Reserves and Cadets Council for over half a decade and failed to see anything other than reactive survival activities there as well. We certainly didn't generate any far reaching reform programs but mostly because we were sure that anything we brought forward would be shot down in flames.

I think the reality is that the RegF senior CF hasn't had a viable idea or plan for the reserves since the 1950s and has failed to garner any by-in from the reserves for any forward steps that would help and improve the overall force structure. In large part they are in the trenches fighting to protect the existing RegF PYs and budgets without any appetite to even consider whether a few thousand of those could be used to create a larger more efficient total force (and yes that would include legislative changes; a willingness to compulsorily mobilize and deploy reserve individuals, subunits etc; proper equipping, etc etc)

Sorry MCG. The RegF 2, 3 and 4 stars can't off load their responsibility to construct and lead a comprehensive effective total force by blaming a bunch of part timers sitting in the local armouries, who (while they might like their mess dinners and regimental kit) are doing their best (as they know it) to keep things moving along in a system that is daily becoming less and less defensible.

I am not sure there is any sort of attainable solution that will fix the force structure, especially as the political will, knowledge base and interest in expending political capital on an issue without a meaningful level of support is non-existent. Without political support at the highest level and the same from the public service, and that means money and lots of it, we are probably doomed to go through periodic bursts of wheel spinning that results in things like total force and 10/90 units and the like. And that goes for the regular force as well as the reserves and in all three services.

So what do we do? Maybe we making the best of a bad situation and maybe we can't expect more from a system that is designed to be not so good, but not all that bad. I suspect we have what the government and the public will accept and pay for because it is relatively cheap and doesn't get in serious trouble too often.

I don't think that we would see much political opposition to a plan to that would expand the total deployable force if it came with a zero budget increase. Back door political interference could be minimized if the plan is a good one and built with reserve buy in.

The very fact that we don't get into trouble very often is exactly why we could trade of RegF PYs for a larger deployable reserve/RegF force.

Back to what I said before; if the RegF objective is to squeeze every possible RegF PY out of the existing budget, and if  the proposition is that in order to build up the reserves we need more funds, then we are dealing with a nonstarter.

:cheers:

 

[Kirkhill]

A bit of editing if you don't mind Old Sweat.

I am not sure there is (are) (m)any sort of attainable solution(s) that will fix the force structure.  especially as (But) the political will, knowledge base and interest in expending political capital on an issue without a meaningful level of support is non-existent. Without political support at the highest level and the same from the public service, and that means money and lots of it, we are probably doomed to go through periodic bursts of wheel spinning that results in things like total force and 10/90 units and the like. And that goes for the regular force as well as the reserves and in all three services.

So what do we do? Maybe we making the best of a bad situation and maybe we can't expect more from a system that is designed to be not so good, but not all that bad. I suspect we have what the government and the public will accept and pay for because it is relatively cheap and doesn't get in serious trouble too often.

There are lots of effective models out there (both within NATO and ABCANZUS as well as elsewhere).  It is indeed the lack of political will that allows the uniformed force to swan around playing with buttons and bows.  If there were a discerned need then I can't imagine that somebody wouldn't grip the situation and get everybody numbered off.

 

[Kirkhill]

Reserve leadership generally ends at the lieutenant colonel level with a smattering of colonels and the odd brigadier. It speaks very poorly of the RegF senior CF leadership if good ideas can be stymied by lower ranking officers and the odd politically connected civilian/retired hack. I sat on the Chief of Reserves and Cadets Council for over half a decade and failed to see anything other than reactive survival activities there as well. We certainly didn't generate any far reaching reform programs but mostly because we were sure that anything we brought forward would be shot down in flames.

I think the reality is that the RegF senior CF hasn't had a viable idea or plan for the reserves since the 1950s and has failed to garner any by-in from the reserves for any forward steps that would help and improve the overall force structure. In large part they are in the trenches fighting to protect the existing RegF PYs and budgets without any appetite to even consider whether a few thousand of those could be used to create a larger more efficient total force (and yes that would include legislative changes; a willingness to compulsorily mobilize and deploy reserve individuals, subunits etc; proper equipping, etc etc)

Sorry MCG. The RegF 2, 3 and 4 stars can't off load their responsibility to construct and lead a comprehensive effective total force by blaming a bunch of part timers sitting in the local armouries, who (while they might like their mess dinners and regimental kit) are doing their best (as they know it) to keep things moving along in a system that is daily becoming less and less defensible.

I don't think that we would see much political opposition to a plan to that would expand the total deployable force if it came with a zero budget increase. Back door political interference could be minimized if the plan is a good one and built with reserve buy in.

The very fact that we don't get into trouble very often is exactly why we could trade of RegF PYs for a larger deployable reserve/RegF force.

Back to what I said before; if the RegF objective is to squeeze every possible RegF PY out of the existing budget, and if  the proposition is that in order to build up the reserves we need more funds, then we are dealing with a nonstarter.

:cheers:

FJAG

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/caf-community-pay/reg-force-ncm-class-c-rates.page
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/caf-community-pay/reg-force-class-c-officer-rates.page

From that it appears to me that a month of an increment 7 Major ($9404) will buy 6 months of an Officer Cadet Basic ($1567) or 3.5 months of a Private increment 1 ($2806).  If you allowed 3 months per annum to train a "reservist"  then one Major less would result in pay for 24 Officer Cadets a year (3x 1567 = 4701)  or 13 Privates (8418).  I understand there are something like 5000 Majors running around loose in a force of 60,000 or so.

I have offered before the notion of putting the troops on retainer for a period of 5 to 7 years with a stipend of $5000 to $10000 per annum, make three months training mandatory in the first year, maybe two, then have a reduced training obligation for the rest of their term (2 to 4 weeks and weekends).  And put the onus on the troop to organize their life so that they can show up or have their stipend clawed back from their bank accounts by the Canada Revenue Agency.

 

[daftandbarmy]

FJAG

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/caf-community-pay/reg-force-ncm-class-c-rates.page
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/caf-community-pay/reg-force-class-c-officer-rates.page

From that it appears to me that a month of an increment 7 Major ($9404) will buy 6 months of an Officer Cadet Basic ($1567) or 3.5 months of a Private increment 1 ($2806).  If you allowed 3 months per annum to train a "reservist"  then one Major less would result in pay for 24 Officer Cadets a year (3x 1567 = 4701)  or 13 Privates (8418).  I understand there are something like 5000 Majors running around loose in a force of 60,000 or so.

I have offered before the notion of putting the troops on retainer for a period of 5 to 7 years with a stipend of $5000 to $10000 per annum, make three months training mandatory in the first year, maybe two, then have a reduced training obligation for the rest of their term (2 to 4 weeks and weekends).  And put the onus on the troop to organize their life so that they can show up or have their stipend clawed back from their bank accounts by the Canada Revenue Agency.

We have the ability to control much of our own destinies within our reserve Bdes, so, we do it to ourselves too, of course.

 

[FJAG]

FJAG

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/caf-community-pay/reg-force-ncm-class-c-rates.page
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/caf-community-pay/reg-force-class-c-officer-rates.page

From that it appears to me that a month of an increment 7 Major ($9404) will buy 6 months of an Officer Cadet Basic ($1567) or 3.5 months of a Private increment 1 ($2806).  If you allowed 3 months per annum to train a "reservist"  then one Major less would result in pay for 24 Officer Cadets a year (3x 1567 = 4701)  or 13 Privates (8418).  I understand there are something like 5000 Majors running around loose in a force of 60,000 or so.

I have offered before the notion of putting the troops on retainer for a period of 5 to 7 years with a stipend of $5000 to $10000 per annum, make three months training mandatory in the first year, maybe two, then have a reduced training obligation for the rest of their term (2 to 4 weeks and weekends).  And put the onus on the troop to organize their life so that they can show up or have their stipend clawed back from their bank accounts by the Canada Revenue Agency.

I've been violently in agreement with this notion for quite some time.  ;D

Even within the current army reserve organization there is an authorized strength of some 18,000 which to me represents 3 to 4 bdes with maybe twenty-five bn sized units (rather than 10 bdes with 143 units) The savings in excess reserve force cols, lcols, maj, CWOs and MWOs would easily fund a bn or two of extra jnr ncos and jnr officers. (no, I haven't done the actual math. My name isn't Sheldon. ;D)

The old concept of having a high percentage of leadership to tail ratio was designed at a time where units had slow mobilization times where the tail could be recruited and trained by the existing leadership before deployment. Those days, like the Reg F is fond of saying, are long gone and won;t come back. To be truly deployable RegF and ResF units need to be fully manned and trained with an overage percentage for annual attrition.

The three month training at the beginning makes too much sense and is what the NG uses to ensure that a soldier coming from basic training is immediately useable by the unit. Note to that in the US the basic training for a NG soldier and an active duty soldier is the same but substantially shorter than for Canadians. (e.g. Inf has a Basic Combat Training phase of ten weeks and an Advanced Individual Training phase of five weeks all of which turns out a basic trade trained infantryman).

There are numerous things the reserves could do themselves to make things better but the real issue is that the total force should consist of complimentary elements which are mutually supporting (I've always believed that the RegF should be infantry and tech maintainer heavy and armour and arty poor while the reserves provide the vast majority of the armour, artillery and support trades that are only needed on deployment on the basic principle that the RegF be those elements that need to go on a moments notice while the ResF should be those that aren't needed every day of the year and can take a little extra time to be deployed.

:cheers:

 

[daftandbarmy]

I've been violently in agreement with this notion for quite some time.  ;D

Even within the current army reserve organization there is an authorized strength of some 18,000 which to me represents 3 to 4 bdes with maybe twenty-five bn sized units (rather than 10 bdes with 143 units) The savings in excess reserve force cols, lcols, maj, CWOs and MWOs would easily fund a bn or two of extra jnr ncos and jnr officers. (no, I haven't done the actual math. My name isn't Sheldon. ;D)

The old concept of having a high percentage of leadership to tail ratio was designed at a time where units had slow mobilization times where the tail could be recruited and trained by the existing leadership before deployment. Those days, like the Reg F is fond of saying, are long gone and won;t come back. To be truly deployable RegF and ResF units need to be fully manned and trained with an overage percentage for annual attrition.

The three month training at the beginning makes too much sense and is what the NG uses to ensure that a soldier coming from basic training is immediately useable by the unit. Note to that in the US the basic training for a NG soldier and an active duty soldier is the same but substantially shorter than for Canadians. (e.g. Inf has a Basic Combat Training phase of ten weeks and an Advanced Individual Training phase of five weeks all of which turns out a basic trade trained infantryman).

There are numerous things the reserves could do themselves to make things better but the real issue is that the total force should consist of complimentary elements which are mutually supporting (I've always believed that the RegF should be infantry and tech maintainer heavy and armour and arty poor while the reserves provide the vast majority of the armour, artillery and support trades that are only needed on deployment on the basic principle that the RegF be those elements that need to go on a moments notice while the ResF should be those that aren't needed every day of the year and can take a little extra time to be deployed.

:cheers:

Lots of kids take a 'gap year' between high school and college.

Why don't we enlist them for a year, at age 17/18, train them up full time, then assign them to reserve units for Class A commitments at age 18/19 until they've graduated university? They could save a ton of money for their education in that first year, get all their military qualifications done, build up a great resume, as well as avail themselves of the various educational subsidies etc we now have available afterwards.

This could be a 'thing' across the country and would benefit both the reserves and the Reg F (as some would no doubt want to join the full timers after their year's stint).

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

If in doubt (ie - the absence of a current, coherent Defence White Paper), return to first principles.  A fleet optimized for constabulary duties cannot establish command of the seas.  We may as well paint Coast Guard hulls grey and task the RCN to focus on NavRes and Sea Cadets across the prairies.

I agree, which is why I put in the part about NATO interoperability. Things like ASW and being able to work with the USN, who actually maintain control of the seas, will serve us well. Canada can't hope to have enough of a navy to protect the coasts by ourselves, so alliances are the only real strategy

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

You know, I often hear it mentioned that reserve forces are significantly cheaper than regular forces, but I've never seen any hard numbers to back that up, particularly when you factor in infrastructure. When I was on RSS duty I was briefly involved in the project that was looking at the future of reserve armouries in the city I was posted to, and what numbers I saw implied that both the cost of continuing to operate the ancient facilities and the cost of new replacement faculties were astronomical -- and all that cost is required to support relatively few part-time soldiers. Don't get me wrong, infrastructure for regulars is also expensive, but with units of 400-500 soldiers you can get some economy of scale for a building -- but my reserve unit was less than 100 all ranks.

I wonder what the actual cost breakdown is for a reserve unit -- between salary for the part-time soldiers, salary for the full-time support staff, training, equipment and infrastructure. And how that compares to the breakdown for a regular unit.

Reserve units are cheaper in a sheer pay vs pay sort of way, but the opportunity costs of maintaining reserves are too high. What you get with a larger regular force and smaller reserve force is a readily deployable and well trained unit that can be deployed in a timely manner. No offence to the reserves, but reserves don't provide full units, well trained units, or readily deployable units. So the opportunity costs of enlarging them far outweighs whatever monetary costs we may save.

IMHO, reserves should be for 1 for 1 augmentation of the regular force or specialized capabilities that are better trained in the civilian world (doctors, dentists, etc)

 

[Journeyman]

I agree, which is why I put in the part about NATO interoperability. Things like ASW and being able to work with the USN, who actually maintain control of the seas, will serve us well. Canada can't hope to have enough of a navy to protect the coasts by ourselves, so alliances are the only real strategy

Sorry, I based my response on what you actually posted:  "The Canadian navy should, IMHO, focus on drug/smuggling interdiction and inter-operability with the USN and NATO."

Interoperability does not mean alliances; it refers to STANAGS and the like -- ensuring that our comms, refueling fixtures, etc, etc are....well, interoperable.  Subsequently throwing things in, "like ASW," is not the purview of a drug interdiction fleet, but requires an actual war-fighting Navy.

For some of us, correct terminology usage is an important thing.  Again, sorry.

I suspect that you'll want the last word, so have at 'er


...then maybe this can return to being an Army Reserve thread.

 

[Rifleman62]

What you get with a larger regular force and smaller reserve force is a readily deployable and well trained unit that can be deployed in a timely manner. No offence to the reserves, but reserves don't provide full units, well trained units, or readily deployable units.

Well tell me how the reserves themselves can change that without funding, equipment, nor a willingness to change the current status quo.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

Well tell me how the reserves themselves can change that without funding, equipment, nor a willingness to change the current status quo.

They can't, but I'm arguing that they don't have to. We could get away with far less units covering far less areas of interest to achieve the same results. I'd see it more in line with the US reserve system where they have specific tasks with a few combat arms reserve units in the vicinity of regular force units to augment them.

There is no military requirement for the sheer bulk of reserve units and the money could be better spent in the regular force.

 

[Remius]

the money could be better spent in the regular force.

:rofl:

edit:  I'll quantify that emoticon with the statement that the CAF as a whole needs to figure out how to best spend its money effectively.  I doubt the money could be better spent as it can't even spend what it currently has effectively. 

 

[Kirkhill]

There is no military requirement for the sheer bulk of reserve units and the money could be better spent in the regular force.

If by Regular Force you mean the RCN, the RCAF, Special Ops, Logistics, Comms and ISR then I might agree with you.  But strangely none of those are army.  And I don't see anybody, beyond the army itself, rushing to put large numbers of Canadian boots on foreign soil.

Here we are talking about the Army and how the Army organizes itself.  And while there is no rush to deploy the requirement is to have bodies in waiting "come the day".  I personally would like to see a large pool of prepared raw material from which to draw and which can be converted into useful force with notice, which can also provide a domestically useful capability for those days when "routine" services are overwhelmed.

Various portions of that pool can be hired under various NTM regimes.  Arguably, for the Army, I would suggest that foreign excursions on 72 Hrs NTM or less are the realm of the Special Ops types.  Domestically, some portion of the pool could be retained as civilians with a 72 hour call up requirement. 

2 week to 2 month NTM regimes are an arguable grey area of what, how many and for how long.

 

[RCPalmer]

:rofl:

edit:  I'll quantify that emoticon with the statement that the CAF as a whole needs to figure out how to best spend its money effectively.  I doubt the money could be better spent as it can't even spend what it currently has effectively.

Agreed.  To provide a bit of context as the overall cost of the reserve force has been talked around in this thread, a fairly comprehensive estimate of the cost of the reserve force for FY 13/14 can be found here:

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-report-plan-priorities/2014-reserve-force.page

To summarize, the total cost of the PRes (including RSS PYs, pay, infrastructure and equipment) is approximately 1.3 billion dollars, or 7.2% of the 18 billion dollar defence budget.  Unfortunately, this type of cost capture was not published for the years before or after, so there is no easy way to do a year over year comparison.  Viewed in this context, I would offer that the PRes offers excellent value for the money. 

I would further offer that even if you disbanded the PRes tomorrow, and the defence portfolio somehow realized that 1.3b in savings, you wouldn't see much in the way of capability growth in the RegF.  LGen Leslie's 2011 transformation report concluded that most of the funding growth realized in the 2000's not directly related to the war in Afghanistan went into personnel costs that did little to enhance capabilities or readiness.  This is why he was making the case for a leaner, more efficient force.  Until we take some steps to achieving such a force, we really have no idea whether anyone in defence needs more money. 

In terms of comparing forces, the Australians manage to maintain all of the capabilities we do (and a number of capabilities we don't) with a 55,000 person full-time component.  Assuming a CAF funded to 68,000, that is a 20% manning difference of 13,000 full time personnel.  Employing a $100,000/person/year SWAG for the incremental cost of a full time paid member (think pay, benefits and training only), that personnel delta alone (without accounting for the capability deltas which would widen that chasm) accounts for $1.3 billion dollars, equivalent to the cost of the entire PRes. 

It is undeniable that the PRes requires significant structural reform, particularly if an increase in PRes roles and missions is desired in the context of the needs of the overall force.  There are inefficiencies all over the place. However, the cost of those inefficiencies are absolutely trivial compared to those that exist in the full time component. 

The last point I will make (and to echo FJAG) is that the people empowered to make decisions regarding reform of the PRes are without exception members of the RegF.  There are no PRes commanders above CBG level. My hope is that within the CAF there would be discussions about reform on all fronts to make the entire force more efficient.  Instead, what I hear (both from an institutional perspective and to a certain extent on this forum) are parochial discussions of the PRes not providing value for money, and a requirement for the PRes to grow while simultaneously becoming more accountable and efficient without any of the structural changes necessary to actually make that happen.  To summarize, from the shop floor it looks like we (the PRes) are being set up for failure as an excuse to justify the status quo.  Whether that is true or not, the perception exists and it is a morale crusher.  Until we as a force find a way bring the full and part time components together to move forward together as a team, we are just spinning our wheels.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Wasnt our cold war role keeping the north atlantic free from soviet subs? Thus our ASW forcus

Sent from my LG-D852 using Tapatalk

The Atlantic and other bodies of water were never free of soviet surface or sub-surface vessels...international waters and all...the goal was to track them and let them know you were there...more of less.  Unless they're in territorial waters, that kind of thing...not much else you can do.

...sorry...back to Army stuff...

 

[daftandbarmy]

Agreed.  To provide a bit of context as the overall cost of the reserve force has been talked around in this thread, a fairly comprehensive estimate of the cost of the reserve force for FY 13/14 can be found here:

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-report-plan-priorities/2014-reserve-force.page

To summarize, the total cost of the PRes (including RSS PYs, pay, infrastructure and equipment) is approximately 1.3 billion dollars, or 7.2% of the 18 billion dollar defence budget.  Unfortunately, this type of cost capture was not published for the years before or after, so there is no easy way to do a year over year comparison.  Viewed in this context, I would offer that the PRes offers excellent value for the money. 

I would further offer that even if you disbanded the PRes tomorrow, and the defence portfolio somehow realized that 1.3b in savings, you wouldn't see much in the way of capability growth in the RegF.  LGen Leslie's 2011 transformation report concluded that most of the funding growth realized in the 2000's not directly related to the war in Afghanistan went into personnel costs that did little to enhance capabilities or readiness.  This is why he was making the case for a leaner, more efficient force.  Until we take some steps to achieving such a force, we really have no idea whether anyone in defence needs more money. 

In terms of comparing forces, the Australians manage to maintain all of the capabilities we do (and a number of capabilities we don't) with a 55,000 person full-time component.  Assuming a CAF funded to 68,000, that is a 20% manning difference of 13,000 full time personnel.  Employing a $100,000/person/year SWAG for the incremental cost of a full time paid member (think pay, benefits and training only), that personnel delta alone (without accounting for the capability deltas which would widen that chasm) accounts for $1.3 billion dollars, equivalent to the cost of the entire PRes. 

It is undeniable that the PRes requires significant structural reform, particularly if an increase in PRes roles and missions is desired in the context of the needs of the overall force.  There are inefficiencies all over the place. However, the cost of those inefficiencies are absolutely trivial compared to those that exist in the full time component. 

The last point I will make (and to echo FJAG) is that the people empowered to make decisions regarding reform of the PRes are without exception members of the RegF.  There are no PRes commanders above CBG level. My hope is that within the CAF there would be discussions about reform on all fronts to make the entire force more efficient.  Instead, what I hear (both from an institutional perspective and to a certain extent on this forum) are parochial discussions of the PRes not providing value for money, and a requirement for the PRes to grow while simultaneously becoming more accountable and efficient without any of the structural changes necessary to actually make that happen.  To summarize, from the shop floor it looks like we (the PRes) are being set up for failure as an excuse to justify the status quo.  Whether that is true or not, the perception exists and it is a morale crusher.  Until we as a force find a way bring the full and part time components together to move forward together as a team, we are just spinning our wheels.

Well said.

So it looks like you went through the RESO program too, eh?

 

[Eye In The Sky]

The last point I will make (and to echo FJAG) is that the people empowered to make decisions regarding reform of the PRes are without exception members of the RegF.  There are no PRes commanders above CBG level.

Just for clarity...did you mean CMBG level?  It's been some time, but when I was at a CBG HQ, the Comd was PRes, the Bde Sgt-Major was PRes;  the unit COs were PRes.  What was at the PRes HQ, as the HQ CO and COS was a Reg Force Lt Col and the HQ was a mix of Cl A, B and B(A) Pres with some Reg Force in there to...the G3, Supt Clerk, etc.  Each learned from each other and we had a pretty good HQ.

 

[Remius]

Just for clarity...did you mean CMBG level?  It's been some time, but when I was at a CBG HQ, the Comd was PRes, the Bde Sgt-Major was PRes;  the unit COs were PRes.  What was at the PRes HQ, as the HQ CO and COS was a Reg Force Lt Col and the HQ was a mix of Cl A, B and B(A) Pres with some Reg Force in there to...the G3, Supt Clerk, etc.  Each learned from each other and we had a pretty good HQ.

there are no CMBGs at the PRES level.  The M is for Mechanised.  The PRES is at best motorised.  With busses. 

 

[RCPalmer]

there are no CMBGs at the PRES level.  The M is for Mechanised.  The PRES is at best motorised.  With busses.

Civilian contracted buses that is ...Yep, I am referring to the PRes Canadian Brigade Groups (CBGs) and opposed to the RegF Canadian Mechanized Brigade Groups (CMBGs).  I draw attention to that because those CBG Comds are the highest command appointment held by the PRes members.  There some other notable PRes positions at higher levels, to include the Div DComds, COS Army Reserve, and Director Reserves and Cadets, but my point is that top level PRes commanders are pretty far down the chain.

Well said.

So it looks like you went through the RESO program too, eh?

I did. It is too bad we've killed off some of the best parts of that program.  As I understand it, all non-degree holding officers in the PRes are technically still enrolled in the RESO program.

 

[MilEME09]

Our PRes is most definitely in my opinion a motorized element, using trucks and other transport to move around. We also do a bad job of being a brigade too, at best we are battalion plus, just like everything else in the PRes, we are called what we are not.