Discussion on the C6 Machine Gun

[SeanNewman]

But don't people tend to default to their comfort zone?

I think that is a bang-on assessment and quite brilliant in its simplicity.

And we're all guilty of it until we can say that we've worn every uniform and cap badge, really.

 

[KevinB]

Sounds like Journeyman should be CDS 

 

[Kirkhill]

The question then becomes "how do you condition the leadership/troops?".

A LAV battalion currently is conditioned alost by default; they get the LAVs every so often so much of their training is dismounted due to circumstances. There is also a fairly large pool of "light" or "sort-of" light troops who rotate in and out on a regular basis who bring their perspectives to the table.

I'm not sure how you could have co-equal "Mech" and "Light" champions at the HQ to decide what is best. The Light guy would be "outvoted" much of the time simply due to the sheer number of mechanized and motorized assets who would be part of the Mech tribe. Think about what would happen when the Light champion started adding Engineer, Armoured, Artillery, Logistics and other supporting arms to the plan. They are all Mech, and unless the serious plan is to transport all the dismounts on the back deck of the tanks, most of them would:

a) bring their vehicles and vehicle support to the table, and
b) suggest the Light force find a way to keep up.

Like it or not, I think Light forces might be forced into niche roles for the foreseeable future (SOF, heliborn forces to launch raids, secure high priority targets or deceive the enemy, Marine working the littorals etc.).

If the LAV/Lt issue is being decided by consensual indecision then that surely is a problem with leadership at large and battalion leadership in particular.  It seems to be indicative of a lack of a plan.

As to the Light and LAV Champions: how about this for a thought?

Take the LAVs from the Companies (stop screaming and hear me out for a second)
Assign whatever LAVs are allotted to Combat Support Company
Designate OC Combat Support Company as OC (Heavy)
Create a comparable OC (Light) responsible for the Rifles.
Remove Recce from Combat Support Company (if that isn’t already the practice) and place it directly under the CO at HQ.
OC (Light) and OC (Heavy) are responsible for fighting their corners.
CO is responsible for deciding who wins today, whether it is a training or operational issue.

Take a hypothetical tasking:  Any task.
CO issues Wng O and tasks Recce Pl
OC (Lt) and OC (Hvy) are tasked with preparing two separate plans for the CO’s consideration.
CO picks one OR CO directs DCO to grip OC’s Lt and Hvy and come up with a workable plan using both.

This puts CO in the same position as a Brigade Commander who mixes and matches resources available to suit the mission (or to reject the mission in the absence of necessary resources).

The secret to success for the CO AND the Brigade Commander is to ensure that he/she maintains as many options as possible and that means training for as many eventualities as possible.  If they want the Rifles to act as Dragoons and Dragoons only then by all means permanently attach LAVs at the lowest possible level.  If they want the Rifles to be incompetent in mounted ops then put the LAVs into the Bn Park and leave them there.  If they want Rifles and LAVs to know each other then they will balance the two extremes and ensure that they regularly work together, have permanent liaisons and will train in various fighting configurations.

Just as a Brigade Commander used to mix and match his tank squadrons and infantry companies, sometimes creating Tank Heavy Combat Teams and other times Infantry Heavy Combat Teams, so could the Battalion CO.

Why couldn’t some of the training be dedicated to assigning different Rifle manning levels to the LAVs?
2 Rifles / LAV, 4 Rifles / LAV, 7 Rifles / LAV, or at the other end of the spectrum, 4 LAVs / Pl or 8 LAVs / Coy or 14 LAVs / Coy.

The secret to effectiveness would be how often the troops work together.  If the LAVs are in Support Company but train with the Rifles one week out of two are they more or less likely to be effective as a team than if the LAVs are held at Section level but only get onto Shirley Road once every 6 months?

I don’t accept that the effectiveness of a unit is a function of whose empire is biggest, or even where the administrative divisions are.  Effectiveness is a function of the training conducted and that, like managing the dividing lines between empires, is the function of the CO.

It is also a function of Politicians being willing to understand the need for spending money on bullets, gas, tires and clutches for effective training to occur.

I can’t remember any more.  Is it “Concentration of Forces” then “Economy of Effort” or the other way round?

There are always going to be more jobs for you lot to undertake than you have numbers to take them on.  If you always default to “I need all available support for every job” and “Unless I have all available support then I can’t do the job” then you are going to leave major chunks of the battlefield to the enemy to exploit.  If you haven’t built up a history of developing comfort zones by taking controlled risks at times of your own choosing then you are likely to find yourself forced into taking uncomfortable and uncontrolled risks at a time and place of the enemy’s (or worse, the Politicians') choosing.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

If the LAV/Lt issue is being decided by consensual indecision then that surely is a problem with leadership at large and battalion leadership in particular.  It seems to be indicative of a lack of a plan.

As to the Light and LAV Champions: how about this for a thought?

Take the LAVs from the Companies (stop screaming and hear me out for a second)
Assign whatever LAVs are allotted to Combat Support Company
Designate OC Combat Support Company as OC (Heavy)
Create a comparable OC (Light) responsible for the Rifles.
Remove Recce from Combat Support Company (if that isn’t already the practice) and place it directly under the CO at HQ.
OC (Light) and OC (Heavy) are responsible for fighting their corners.
CO is responsible for deciding who wins today, whether it is a training or operational issue.

Where are you getting that there is a lack of a plan?  What is this plan for?  What are you basing this on?  I think that infantry officers are capable of conducting an estimate and employing their resources appropriately without having a dichotomy in the battalion officers.  There are certainly infantry commanders who park their LAVs when their estimate leads them to do so.

So, under your plan there would be a company commander with nine rifle platoons and another company commander with some 50 LAV IIIs?

 

 

[Infanteer]

Where are you getting that there is a lack of a plan?  What is this plan for?  What are you basing this on?  I think that infantry officers are capable of conducting an estimate and employing their resources appropriately without having a dichotomy in the battalion officers.  There are certainly infantry commanders who park their LAVs when their estimate leads them to do so.

Thank you.

I just don't see this light/mech dichotomy that people speak to.  When we speak of LAVs, we speak of resources.  Lump them in with helicopters, tanks, UAVs and the numerous other options available to an OC or a CO on today's battlefield.  Implying that one's background puts in such a huge bias that it overrides his ability to conduct effective planning is a pretty big statement when used to argue for completely overhauling a battalion.

As well, people seem to assume that if a battalion has LAVs then all it does is goes to the field to play Blitzkrieg.  On the last four major exercises I did, every one contained a significant "LAV-less" component and three had large aviation elements.  COs, in designing training, are smart enough to know that the infantry needs to be well-rounded.

No one has yet to respond to my RFIs on "Light Infantry Missions" or "Light Infantry Tasks".  Training is the answer here, not creating specialty companies to do task "X" (even if we had the resources and manning to do so).

 

[Kirkhill]

Oh well. Here I go again.  In for  a penny, in for a pound.
Perhaps I misconstrued what Thucydides was saying but I inferred from his statement that LAV allocation issue had largely been determined by default.  I understand that there is a defined distribution of resources.  If I remember correctly the manning levels were established early on in the Kandahar deployment when Hillier was CDS.

However I also have inferred from reading many of the threads round about here that:
A – not all battalions at home have a full suite of LAVs with which to train
B – not all platoons in the field are manned at full strength throughout the tour due to leaves etc
C - not all missions require a full slate of all resources every time
D – that some missions are inhibited by the inclusion of some resources that might be inappropriate to the task
E – that the limited force available to the CF to conduct the tasks assigned really has to maintain a MaxFlex stance.

I’m criticizing nobody.  I’m commenting ... and opening myself for criticism.

I’m sure that the Infantry, and for that matter, the Armoured, Arty and Engrs are quite capable of making effective appreciations and allocating resources appropriately.

And as to the organization, OC (Lt) would be responsible for the training of the 3 Rifle Companies of 9 Platoons under their existing commanders.  The OC (Hvy) would be responsible for whatever LAVs, ATGMs and (given TV2 gets lucky) Mortars that the Battalion is assigned, as well as being responsible for coordinating the actions of any other assigned resources, like tanks.
For me, looking at the situation that seems to be described round about here, you seem to be facing a continuous spectrum of tasks across an infinitely variable geography.  Some tasks seem to require a whole battalion to move on its wheels and maneuver continuously.  The Yanks run to Baghdad comes to mind.

Some tasks require heavy forces operating out of a fixed base.  Some tasks require low man-power patrols out of a fixed base.  Some tasks require large numbers of bodies operating in environments where wheels and armour cannot go or are not available.
In all cases the troops on the ground are supported but not all missions are supported the same way.

Wouldn’t it be an effective training tool to treat the LAVs as just another tool in the support kit bag that the CO can use to train his troops to be able to effectively use?

For instance: 
A helicopter substitute for a simple relocation
A tank substitute for a direct support
An arty/mortar/MG substitute for coordinating indirect fires.

And yep, I know that helicopters fly, tanks have tracks and guns fire shells for miles.
I am also planning on sleeping at a Holiday Inn Express in the next week or two.

 

[SeanNewman]

...There are certainly infantry commanders who park their LAVs when their estimate leads them to do so...

Yes in theory, not always so in practice.

Reference OC putting forth his dismounted coy-level ConOp, having the BG CoC take over the plan and make it a BG operation (at company level), but it's now...you guessed it...mechanized!  I saw this on multiple occasions.

And the very rare occasion where the OC was allowed to make his approach dismounted, it was under the conditions that he had to marry up with the LAVs immediately once Ph2 got started for fear that (god forbid) a soldier would have to (gasp) not be tied to a LAV for 12 hours.

 

[KevinB]

Extended Mountain Operations.
  Unless you got a big block and tackle - I'm guessing the LAV ain't the sort of item you want to bring up...
Airmobile Ops - Airborne Ops.

Way back when regular Inf units used to practise layback patrols and troops actually knew how to nav with a map and compass.

Specific items that are optimized for Light Operations are not usually carried by LAV units

Secondly while EVERY other country is looking into a LW 7.62mm LMG, the CF seems to wondering where the SF kit is for the C6.
  So yeah given every other Army I go see is looking for similar items, and the CF is playing ostrich, yeah I think there is a gap better Light and Mech.

I'm pretty sure I am seeing the Forest and the Trees, but I think the CF is stuck in a copse.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Yes in theory, not always so in practice.

Reference OC putting forth his dismounted coy-level ConOp, having the BG CoC take over the plan and make it a BG operation (at company level), but it's now...you guessed it...mechanized!  I saw this on multiple occasions.

And the very rare occasion where the OC was allowed to make his approach dismounted, it was under the conditions that he had to marry up with the LAVs immediately once Ph2 got started for fear that (god forbid) a soldier would have to (gasp) not be tied to a LAV for 12 hours.

Why would it always be so in practice?  Should you always park the LAVs?

Just because a CO over-ruled an OC doesn't establish anything beyond the command dynamics of that situation.

I've seen LAV companies/platoons leave their LAVs both in training and on operations.  Sometimes it was for short periods (use the LAVs to get fairly close and then go in on foot), while in others it was for much longer periods to include mountains. 

 

[KevinB]

My other specific LI role is the METT teams for the ANA.
  Now how does a LAV element teach dismounted infantry, and better yet, how does it keep morale up with the ANA, when they get in a Ford Ranger, 5 Ton, or they walk, and you get in a LAV.

 

[ArmyRick]

That applies to leadership (mentorship?) by example IMO.

Reading an earlier post by Kirkhill, I do not agree with rigid or set in stone ORBATs. I beleive we should (our senior leadership) do a generic combat estimate of most likely conflicts we could be involved with, draft up a very general ORBAT and then customize to the mission.

Its the mission requirements that dictate what you do, how you do it and what you do it with.

I remember one company attack we did many years ago using grizzlies. The dismounts left early in the morning and humped about 5-6 KM to the line of departure and than just prior to the attack, the grizziles moved up into a fire base position and used their MGs to suppress while we moved in. naturally it was an exercise so of course we magically won and saved the day.

My point is this, our OC, did NOT just do something because "its the way its done". He did an estimate and figured out what would most likely lead to mission success.

Bottom line, you must do your combat estimate as best you can, look at all your COAs and enemy COAs (most dangerous/most likely being key) and figure out what will lead to success.

Maybe you use LAVs, maybe you don't. Maybe you use some LAVs, or extra LAVs. Mission requirements dictate what you do. Thats what they teach on Infantry DP1.1 and 1.2 as well 3B. Some people forget it or are not familiar with it.

* Important note for the above statement, when I say grizzlies, I do not mean Ursus Arctos Horribilus, the big brown furry bears, I am refering to the AVGPs

 

[Infanteer]

Extended Mountain Operations.
Unless you got a big block and tackle - I'm guessing the LAV ain't the sort of item you want to bring up...

Airmobile Ops

Airborne Ops.

Way back when regular Inf units used to practise layback patrols and troops actually knew how to nav with a map and compass.

My other specific LI role is the METT teams for the ANA.
Now how does a LAV element teach dismounted infantry, and better yet, how does it keep morale up with the ANA, when they get in a Ford Ranger, 5 Ton, or they walk, and you get in a LAV.

This is pretty much the list I came up with, and I addressed all of those in my original post.  Most of those do not require much specialized training, only a core of knowledge within a unit.  I argue that these knowledge levels are possible to maintain with a proper training cycle and do not require specialized organizations.

As for the OMLT, it has its own vehicles, which may or may not include LAVs.  The OMLT uses its vehicles to move with the ANA who now have a mix of Rangers and Armoured Humvees.  I don't know how a LAV would interfere with the training and mentoring requirement?  I've worked with mentored and unmentored ANA and ANP and if we drove somewhere we drove somewhere - I just had to take the mobility of their vehicles into account when route planning.

You'll get a kick out of the fact that the current OMLT is manned by an Armoured Unit.... 

I'm pretty sure I am seeing the Forest and the Trees, but I think the CF is stuck in a copse.

I don't think you and I are looking at the same patch of trees, my friend.

 

[SeanNewman]

Why would it always be so in practice?  Should you always park the LAVs?

No, of course not.  Parking the LAVs out of spite should get that commander a code red from his troops who had to hump the extra weight for nothing.

What bothers me is not the LAVs (which are great), but the opinion of some that it is absolutely impossible and too risky to do anything without them. 

To achieve surprise there it either has to be done with a nighttime dismounted approach where you get lucky or airmobile; any vehicle approach will result in hours of "stand to" time.

The sad part is that the way we conducted business for so long meant that the LAVs became self-important almost like manifest destiny.  Instead of living with the people, we went from FOB to Op to patrol to FOB to op, covering lots of terrain that did nothing but get us glued to the roads/bypass routes or driving through farmers' fields and p!ssing them off.  But since we were covering such long distances we were forced to drive and become IED targets.

That's not the fault of the LAV though, but the way we moved around the battlespace.

It would be very stupid of a modern commander to state that he had no purpose for LAVs, but they must be a tool no different than helicopters or a breaching kit.  You use them when the mission calls for it; you don't make the vehicles the mission.

That's the only thing that separates the infantry, really.  Every other trade is about people manning equipment, where as Infantry is supposed to be about kit supporting the soldier.  Take that away by making us do nothing but man the LAV and we can't say we're better than Armour anymore 

 

[Kirkhill]

...Every other trade is about people manning equipment, where as Infantry is supposed to be about kit supporting the soldier....

The Infanteer is the only government employee hired expressly to go out and meet people whose reactions are at the unpredictable to hostile end of the spectrum.  The old line "close with and destroy" should be replaced with "close with and destroy, if necessary (and you get to decide)".

Meanwhile everybody else (those not carrying a bayonet) are laying back and saying: "Carry on, Lass, we're right behind you."

And that includes everyone from the LMG gunner, the grenadier and the DM chap, through the armour, the guns, the air force and the navy, all the way back to the politicians and the voters.

See the world, meet strange people and drop us a line if they don't kill you before you kill them., if you have to

 

[Kirkhill]

You know, it occurs to me as I post that last, in the bad old days the Crown used to hire a pile of young officers to go out and make those decisions.  They supplied a fighting tail of troopies who DID only have to worry about "Closing and Destroying" if and when the boss said so.  It wasn't their job to sweat the details.  Now everybody is expected to act as if they hold a Commission.  Forget the "Strategic Corporal".  We are now observing the "Commissioned Private".

The difference, in my view, is that when a Lieutenant went into a village with 30 followers the locals could relate to a man, an individual, that commanded and held the respect of 30 other men, individuals.

Now, even though a fire team can deliver more death and destruction, and thus constitute more of a threat than that old platoon ever could,  the authority of the fire team is not as clear, as demonstrable , as the authority  of that old time colonial Lieutenant with his thirty man fighting tail.

 

[SeanNewman]

[C6 GPMG]

 

[Journeyman]

Sounds like Journeyman should be CDS 

Hey, I've always said nice things about you Kev. (But I caught your meaning  8) ) 

I'd have to turn it down anyway though; I'm too honest for the politics and parades aren't my strong suit.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Thread back on target - Lay!

Here's some recent footage of a GPMG in action care of 'The Scum'.

Not sure why they took the weapon out of the fight just because the No. 1 was wounded. 'Back in the day' I'd have got a big kick in the nads for trying something like that. Then again, it looks like the gun might have been damaged by the incoming. Ah, armchair QB'ing can be so satisfying...

http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/campaigns/our_boys/3038479/Heroism-in-Helmand-is-captured-on-video.html

 

[aesop081]

Meanwhile everybody else (those not carrying a bayonet) are laying back and saying: "Carry on, Lass, we're right behind you."

And that includes everyone from the LMG gunner, the grenadier and the DM chap, through the armour, the guns, the air force and the navy, all the way back to the politicians and the voters.

I'm sorry but that is a load of poo.

Although some tasks i carry out are in direct support of the infantry, my main reason for being ( remember that i am indeed air force) is to search for, identify, track and destroy enemy naval units. My primary job is to be a combatant in every sense of the word, which is why my airplane carries a belly full of offensive weapons.

 

[SeanNewman]

...my primary job is to be a combatant in every sense of the word, which is why my airplane carries a belly full of offensive weapons.

But you personally are not the "thing" that does the stuff; you man the airplane that has the stuff (as per artillery, tanks, etc).

Infantry is the only combat trade* where it is the person himself who is the fighter, and kit is attached to him to fight as opposed to him being attached to the weapons.

*Note* "Combat" being the key word here, all sorts of other trades are based on the person such as medic, PAO, JAG, etc.