Discussion on the C6 Machine Gun
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You beat me to the punch, Dangerboy. In fact, four belt boxes of .50 ammo has the same weight as the .50 with barrel and tripod. That's only 420 rounds.
As for the whole "Light Infantry" discussion, I think it's moot. We tried having "Light Infantry" in Afghanistan. We ended up making the infantry mechanised.
Of course, it's necessary to retain the ability to conduct airmobile and dismounted operations, but as we saw, the light infantry didn't have the firepower, mobility or protection of mechanised forces. This does NOT mean that "Light Infantry" is dead as a concept, but I would offer that our army is too small to dick around with a multitude of infantry-types. I would rather see us really grip the Chinooks that are coming and have an airmobile brigade than have mechanised infantry without vehicles, which is the current concept.
As for the whole "Light Infantry" discussion, I think it's moot. We tried having "Light Infantry" in Afghanistan. We ended up making the infantry mechanised.
Of course, it's necessary to retain the ability to conduct airmobile and dismounted operations, but as we saw, the light infantry didn't have the firepower, mobility or protection of mechanised forces. This does NOT mean that "Light Infantry" is dead as a concept, but I would offer that our army is too small to dick around with a multitude of infantry-types. I would rather see us really grip the Chinooks that are coming and have an airmobile brigade than have mechanised infantry without vehicles, which is the current concept.
OldSolduer
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Petamocto said:
Dangerboy got it right.
In 1979 we did a live fire coy attack and we humped the .50s 3k there and back. It wasn't "light" by any means.
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Here's a question (as the tangent beckons):
Who is more valuable in Afghanistan - 500 disciplined individuals armed to the teeth with everything they can carry OR 500 unarmed disciplined individuals equipped with radios and able to bring down the wrath of God at 5 seconds notice?
Who is more valuable in Afghanistan - 500 disciplined individuals armed to the teeth with everything they can carry OR 500 unarmed disciplined individuals equipped with radios and able to bring down the wrath of God at 5 seconds notice?
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Answer: 500 undisciplined staff officer armed to the teeth with powerpoint presentations ready to brief the various generals on how to win the war.Kirkhill said:
EDIT TO ADD: Unfortunately, the "wrath of God" takes much longer than the proverbial 5 seconds, so I would offer a majority of column "A", supported by column "B"
TangoTwoBravo
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Kirkhill said:
How precise is that wrath? Will it reliably punch a hole through the centre of the guy trying to kill me without destroying the area around him? What the heck responds in 5 seconds?
If you are saying that I have a max of 500 soldiers and I could have either 500 riflemen or 500 FOO/FACs without other weapons then I would take the 500 riflemen. If, however, I had a max of 500 soldiers and I could tailor the composition then there would probably by ten or twelve FOO/FACs in there in support of the force of riflemen (and other trades).
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Interesting thread - how did I miss this one?
1. A lot of the arguments are justifiably pointed out as being "too Afghan-centric" however I also sense a bit of "Assault-centric" arguments as well, which base views of infantry organization and employment strictly on a combined arms attack on a prepared conventional foe. Even in a war against a "near-peer" foe, it would be a stretch to assume that an infantry platoon or company would spend the whole time attacking fixed positions - so why focus on that for organization. There are numerous tasks that could be expected and the flexibility of bayonets having some sort of armoured fighting vehicle (the variant is debatable) for a variety of tasks and being able to leave it behind if desired is probably prefered..
1. Whoever mentioned ammo nailed it WRT C-6 use - I'd give every section a mortar too, if they could pack the ammo to make them useful. Rifle Platoons have access to enough C-6s to be felt on the battlefield; no sense burdening a Section with them; they can (and do) get pushed to sections (with or without extra troops) when required - smart leadership will decide when to do so.
2. Opinion seems split on dividing crew and bayonets. I used to think we should split until I was a Rifle Platoon Comd. The LAV is a tool - albeit a big tool - but a tool none the less. A good commander should view it along the same lines as vector binos or a ATGM system - use the tool to give you the best advantage. Crew tasks were interchangeable within the section. Just because a guy was the "Driver" did not mean he was always driving. I frequently rotated my drivers (and gunners and, at times, crew commanders) throughout the tour. For most operations, drivers/gunners were out on dismounted OP/ambushes and conducting patrols. Would you want to have armoured guys filling those spots when the vehicle is not required? Would you want to strip a commander of 12 pers to accomplish his mission if the vehicles weren't required. LAV driving and gunning isn't rocket science and the troops build up pretty good collective expertise in living and fighting with the vehicle. No point in separating that. To those who'd argue that it is a millstone that interferes with more traditional "bayonet" training I say BS - both in garrison and on operations, properly instituted maintenance routines take relatively little time from the section to ensure the vehicle is good to go. The mumbo-jumbo about fitness and march-and-shoot competition has nothing to do with the cost of time and energy to have integral transport assets.
3. I've asked, on these forums and in other venues, for someone to explain the "Light Infantry Missions", "Light Infantry Skillsets" and "Light Infantry Doctrine" to me, because after 9 years in the Army, I still can't really identify them. Will someone lay it out for me, as it seems to be lobbed out as a reason for keeping a certain force structure. While deployed, my platoon conducted over 130 patrols, with the lions share being without any vehicle support. My battalion conducted, at various levels, numerous airmobile operations both training and live. We operated in built up agricultural areas, complex urbanized terrain, and extremely "hilly" areas (although I wouldn't say it was quite mountain ops - but a few of our NCOs did the Shah-i-Kot thing in 2002, so it isn't much of a stretch to see us doing it), which included laying up for extended periods in traditional patrol bases. We also conducted armoured breaches when we had to. We're running out of "Light Infantry Missions" here. If parachute operations is the only aspect left, I believe all serious studies point out that most advantages of airborne operations have been supplanted by the helicopter in the last 40 years. The last unit, AFAIK, to routinely use airborne operations where the Rhodesians, and that was more due to a lack of airmobile lift for their Fire Force units. Strategic airborne insertion, as we've seen the US do in the last few years, is - properly - in the domain of CANSOFCOM. The object is to make yourself asymmetric to the enemy, not enshrine certain equipment or tactics - and only good leadership at all levels is going to do that. Remember, all these COIN guys in the US Army are largely Armoured/Cavalry officers and the British Army's one success in Basrah was by a tank commander with a creative flair. So, unless anyone can explain "Light Infantry Missions" to me, let's get on with things.
In the end, I'm a fan of William Slim's generalist approach - there is an infantry battalion and that's it. If you want it to fall out of planes, drive a truck or fight an armoured vehicle then so be it. If this means that Infantry COs and their RSMs shall maintain a certain percentage of MOI/AGIC/Para/etc/etc qualified leaders, then so be it. The trend above points to the most important aspect of a fighting organization - it's leadership that counts.
1. A lot of the arguments are justifiably pointed out as being "too Afghan-centric" however I also sense a bit of "Assault-centric" arguments as well, which base views of infantry organization and employment strictly on a combined arms attack on a prepared conventional foe. Even in a war against a "near-peer" foe, it would be a stretch to assume that an infantry platoon or company would spend the whole time attacking fixed positions - so why focus on that for organization. There are numerous tasks that could be expected and the flexibility of bayonets having some sort of armoured fighting vehicle (the variant is debatable) for a variety of tasks and being able to leave it behind if desired is probably prefered..
1. Whoever mentioned ammo nailed it WRT C-6 use - I'd give every section a mortar too, if they could pack the ammo to make them useful. Rifle Platoons have access to enough C-6s to be felt on the battlefield; no sense burdening a Section with them; they can (and do) get pushed to sections (with or without extra troops) when required - smart leadership will decide when to do so.
2. Opinion seems split on dividing crew and bayonets. I used to think we should split until I was a Rifle Platoon Comd. The LAV is a tool - albeit a big tool - but a tool none the less. A good commander should view it along the same lines as vector binos or a ATGM system - use the tool to give you the best advantage. Crew tasks were interchangeable within the section. Just because a guy was the "Driver" did not mean he was always driving. I frequently rotated my drivers (and gunners and, at times, crew commanders) throughout the tour. For most operations, drivers/gunners were out on dismounted OP/ambushes and conducting patrols. Would you want to have armoured guys filling those spots when the vehicle is not required? Would you want to strip a commander of 12 pers to accomplish his mission if the vehicles weren't required. LAV driving and gunning isn't rocket science and the troops build up pretty good collective expertise in living and fighting with the vehicle. No point in separating that. To those who'd argue that it is a millstone that interferes with more traditional "bayonet" training I say BS - both in garrison and on operations, properly instituted maintenance routines take relatively little time from the section to ensure the vehicle is good to go. The mumbo-jumbo about fitness and march-and-shoot competition has nothing to do with the cost of time and energy to have integral transport assets.
3. I've asked, on these forums and in other venues, for someone to explain the "Light Infantry Missions", "Light Infantry Skillsets" and "Light Infantry Doctrine" to me, because after 9 years in the Army, I still can't really identify them. Will someone lay it out for me, as it seems to be lobbed out as a reason for keeping a certain force structure. While deployed, my platoon conducted over 130 patrols, with the lions share being without any vehicle support. My battalion conducted, at various levels, numerous airmobile operations both training and live. We operated in built up agricultural areas, complex urbanized terrain, and extremely "hilly" areas (although I wouldn't say it was quite mountain ops - but a few of our NCOs did the Shah-i-Kot thing in 2002, so it isn't much of a stretch to see us doing it), which included laying up for extended periods in traditional patrol bases. We also conducted armoured breaches when we had to. We're running out of "Light Infantry Missions" here. If parachute operations is the only aspect left, I believe all serious studies point out that most advantages of airborne operations have been supplanted by the helicopter in the last 40 years. The last unit, AFAIK, to routinely use airborne operations where the Rhodesians, and that was more due to a lack of airmobile lift for their Fire Force units. Strategic airborne insertion, as we've seen the US do in the last few years, is - properly - in the domain of CANSOFCOM. The object is to make yourself asymmetric to the enemy, not enshrine certain equipment or tactics - and only good leadership at all levels is going to do that. Remember, all these COIN guys in the US Army are largely Armoured/Cavalry officers and the British Army's one success in Basrah was by a tank commander with a creative flair. So, unless anyone can explain "Light Infantry Missions" to me, let's get on with things.
In the end, I'm a fan of William Slim's generalist approach - there is an infantry battalion and that's it. If you want it to fall out of planes, drive a truck or fight an armoured vehicle then so be it. If this means that Infantry COs and their RSMs shall maintain a certain percentage of MOI/AGIC/Para/etc/etc qualified leaders, then so be it. The trend above points to the most important aspect of a fighting organization - it's leadership that counts.
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With Infanteer on Slim's generalists.
The reason for the question was reductio ad absurdum , taking an argument to its logical absurdity to see where the path leads. The point is, IMHO, how much faith do you put in your support? The more faith you have the less you need to carry. The less you need to carry the longer you can operate effectively. Part of the answer, of course, lies in how much faith does your support deserve. If the support precisely incapacitates the target instantaneously then it may warrant a high degree of faith. If, however, it shows up an hour late, after the target has departed, and plasters the local city centre and your section into the bargain, it might be considered less than useful.
Scots folk story time again - it has been a while since one of those.
From Killiecrankie in 1689 to Culloden in 1746 the Highlanders, waving big swords around, regularly beat the government lobsterbacks with muskets and bayonets.
It was only when the government troops changed tactics that they started winning. The problem was they couldn't shoot down the Highlanders fast enough as they closed. They Highlanders crossed the gap too fast. The muskets couldn't pump the bullets downrange fast enough and they also created a smokescreen that the Higlanders could exploit. The government troop found themselves confronted by bearded chappie in skirt, with sword and shield and him with only a bayonet. The bayonet would be trapped in the shield and the sword would be trapped in their spinal column.
The solution was to train the government troops to ignore the man to their front and kill the man to their right by slipping the bayonet under the raised sword arm of bearded chap trying to kill their mate on their right.
Meanwhile, they would have to take it on faith that their mate on their left was going to perform the same service for them with precise and timely support.
Last man had to trust in the wall, or the gunners, or the overlapping troops in the rear to protect his flank.
The reason for the question was reductio ad absurdum , taking an argument to its logical absurdity to see where the path leads. The point is, IMHO, how much faith do you put in your support? The more faith you have the less you need to carry. The less you need to carry the longer you can operate effectively. Part of the answer, of course, lies in how much faith does your support deserve. If the support precisely incapacitates the target instantaneously then it may warrant a high degree of faith. If, however, it shows up an hour late, after the target has departed, and plasters the local city centre and your section into the bargain, it might be considered less than useful.
Scots folk story time again - it has been a while since one of those.
From Killiecrankie in 1689 to Culloden in 1746 the Highlanders, waving big swords around, regularly beat the government lobsterbacks with muskets and bayonets.
It was only when the government troops changed tactics that they started winning. The problem was they couldn't shoot down the Highlanders fast enough as they closed. They Highlanders crossed the gap too fast. The muskets couldn't pump the bullets downrange fast enough and they also created a smokescreen that the Higlanders could exploit. The government troop found themselves confronted by bearded chappie in skirt, with sword and shield and him with only a bayonet. The bayonet would be trapped in the shield and the sword would be trapped in their spinal column.
The solution was to train the government troops to ignore the man to their front and kill the man to their right by slipping the bayonet under the raised sword arm of bearded chap trying to kill their mate on their right.
Meanwhile, they would have to take it on faith that their mate on their left was going to perform the same service for them with precise and timely support.
Last man had to trust in the wall, or the gunners, or the overlapping troops in the rear to protect his flank.
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Dangerboy and Technoviking,
You both belong back in the 70s with your precious mortars, mentioning how much 50 cal ammo weighs
What you meant to write (of course) is how much current gen 50 cal brass ammo weighs.
Just like the 50 cal itself weighing less, all sorts of efforts and progress are being made on the next gen ammo as well.
[Tongue in cheek] Now how about that CASW section attack!
You both belong back in the 70s with your precious mortars, mentioning how much 50 cal ammo weighs
What you meant to write (of course) is how much current gen 50 cal brass ammo weighs.
Just like the 50 cal itself weighing less, all sorts of efforts and progress are being made on the next gen ammo as well.
[Tongue in cheek] Now how about that CASW section attack!
ArmyRick
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I once had the joy of humping a box of 50 ammo that fell off the Coy weapons det tobbaggan for a live fire raid in Shilo (snowshoes) and beleive me, 50 ammo is not pleasant to hump.
Since we have to remain flexible for combat operations in Afghanistan, Canada or any other place (I foresee us battling insurgency or well armed war lords for the next while) than maybe thinking about the structure of the platoon as a whole is a good idea.
I like the idea of binning weapons det and making it "Support Weapons or stand off combat Section" and the three sections become "Assault or Close combat sections"
I would assign 2 x C6 and 2 x 7.62mm Marksman weapons to the section
SGT (Gun controller)
4 x Troops (Pte or CPL) manning 2 x C6s
MCPL and PTE with 7.62mm Rifles (HK417 maybe?)
For ops without LAVs, I would use the LAV crew (this section in my empire would have its own LAV) to help hump the extra 7.62mm and additional security.
How is this? Or I am about to pelted with "dinosaur comments" and have rotten tomatoes hurled at my skull?
Since we have to remain flexible for combat operations in Afghanistan, Canada or any other place (I foresee us battling insurgency or well armed war lords for the next while) than maybe thinking about the structure of the platoon as a whole is a good idea.
I like the idea of binning weapons det and making it "Support Weapons or stand off combat Section" and the three sections become "Assault or Close combat sections"
I would assign 2 x C6 and 2 x 7.62mm Marksman weapons to the section
SGT (Gun controller)
4 x Troops (Pte or CPL) manning 2 x C6s
MCPL and PTE with 7.62mm Rifles (HK417 maybe?)
For ops without LAVs, I would use the LAV crew (this section in my empire would have its own LAV) to help hump the extra 7.62mm and additional security.
How is this? Or I am about to pelted with "dinosaur comments" and have rotten tomatoes hurled at my skull?
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ArmyRick,
There's nothing dinosaurish at all. We've all humped our share of kit, my comment above was simply a jab at Technoviking because I always tease him about fighting the last war (which for him is against Cronje).
Ammunition has been in brass casings long enough and well within our lifetimes that will change.
Even if we didn't change ammo types, I think you are exactly right with the weapons det or heavy weapons platoon, and this can still be done in a light(ish) context. Remember, "light" only means that the vehicle doesn't take part in the fight, so whatever you want to lug that kit around in that takes if off of a soldier's back is brilliant. It can be anything from an ML to a jeep to a Gator to an AHSVS.
And while I often take a ribbing for this, the absolute best vehicle I have ever seen for humping a few hundred pounds is an ATV with a trailer. I can not for the life of me figure out why we don't have light(ish) Recce Platoons mounted on dirtbikes with ATVs with trailers in support. What does the rest of the non-military world use to go just about everywhere offroad? A dirtbike or an ATV.
At 3 RCR a few years ago we benefited from having a small pool of ATVs sent to us, and they were an absolute gem to haul kit around in. Not even just tactically, but administratively for things like hauling the heavy automated targets through the field to build complex ranges.
There's nothing dinosaurish at all. We've all humped our share of kit, my comment above was simply a jab at Technoviking because I always tease him about fighting the last war (which for him is against Cronje).
Ammunition has been in brass casings long enough and well within our lifetimes that will change.
Even if we didn't change ammo types, I think you are exactly right with the weapons det or heavy weapons platoon, and this can still be done in a light(ish) context. Remember, "light" only means that the vehicle doesn't take part in the fight, so whatever you want to lug that kit around in that takes if off of a soldier's back is brilliant. It can be anything from an ML to a jeep to a Gator to an AHSVS.
And while I often take a ribbing for this, the absolute best vehicle I have ever seen for humping a few hundred pounds is an ATV with a trailer. I can not for the life of me figure out why we don't have light(ish) Recce Platoons mounted on dirtbikes with ATVs with trailers in support. What does the rest of the non-military world use to go just about everywhere offroad? A dirtbike or an ATV.
At 3 RCR a few years ago we benefited from having a small pool of ATVs sent to us, and they were an absolute gem to haul kit around in. Not even just tactically, but administratively for things like hauling the heavy automated targets through the field to build complex ranges.
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The The Rise, Fall, & Rebirth Of The 'Emma Gees' should be everyone's source material when discussing machine guns. Part two, in particular has lots of lessons for the dismounted use of MG's (in today's context the pintle mounted GPMG's would be teamed up with the dismounted troops C-9's), but if you read carefully, you also see the flexibility of a mech company. Although they have M-113 tracked carriers with some mobility and protection, the best use of the weapons systems turns out ot be dismounted and dug in, with a few tracks as a "fire brigade" to rush extra firepower into the threatened spots.
The scenario does not explicitly call for this, and except for the magical intervention of "the Old One" and "Sgt West", the solution would have been much different (as would the outcome); the company commander simply had not considered the abilities of the weapons systems in the dismounted role. While there is no one to one correspondence between the M-113 and the LAV, some of the same principles could apply (although dismounting the 25mm chain gun is not one of them!).
This is not to say the same happy outcome would take place if we switched out the M-113's for LAVs in the story. There is a danger which I think I-6 is actually talking about; the section could be conditioned to becoming too dependent on the LAV, and fight as dismounted dragoons tied to the firepower of the vehicle. Remove the vehicle and they have nothing.
The scenario does not explicitly call for this, and except for the magical intervention of "the Old One" and "Sgt West", the solution would have been much different (as would the outcome); the company commander simply had not considered the abilities of the weapons systems in the dismounted role. While there is no one to one correspondence between the M-113 and the LAV, some of the same principles could apply (although dismounting the 25mm chain gun is not one of them!).
This is not to say the same happy outcome would take place if we switched out the M-113's for LAVs in the story. There is a danger which I think I-6 is actually talking about; the section could be conditioned to becoming too dependent on the LAV, and fight as dismounted dragoons tied to the firepower of the vehicle. Remove the vehicle and they have nothing.
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I agree with Thucydides that the article about the "Emma Gees" is invaluable aid. On the IPSWQ course I gave each student a copy of it and to a man they all said it was an excellent document. Then of course they wondered why the employment of MGs was no taught on the course. It was one of the main points on their course critique, I had no good answer why it is not. Hopefully the candidates I had will bring the document back to their home units and they will pass it around. This way we don't lose all our machine gun knowledge.
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Thucydides said:
This relates to the light/mech thread too, but I have witnessed this quite a bit in terms of how much exposure to light fighting a leader has when they make their mech plan.
It's not about light vs mech, but on some ops that begged for the use of light infantry would get pushed higher, but when it got to the level of command that had only ever been mech, he forced the lower elements to change their plan to still be attached at the hip to the LAVs.
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Petamocto said:
Preach it brother.
I saw it in Afghanistan, with not just the Canadians, and I saw it in Iraq with US forces, that missions that should have been light, got jacked up by adding vehicles that where not suited to the terrain or missions where scrubbed since the commander did not feel like being light.
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That's a function of leadership, not unit organization. There are other cases where "mech" guys, even tankers, are more than willing to get rid of vehicles and where "light guys" employ heavy assets if the job warrants it - remember the SF guys with the tanks in Northern Iraq in 2003? Bottom line is a poor estimate is not dependant on how many miles the guy has put in a turret.
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Infanteer said:
But don't people tend to default to their comfort zone? When tasked don't they tend to reduce the uncertainties by conforming to those things that have worked for them in the past? A new Platoon Leader has a different perspective than a retiring Brigade Commander. The Platoon Leader hasn't tried anything before therefore all risks are equal. Also his gamble only impacts 30 people. The Brigade Commander has 3000 on his conscience and a career of successes and failures behind him/her. Isn't the BC going to default to what he knows?
Doesn't it make some kind of sense to at least have a Mech Champion and a Light Champion on equal footing within the Battalion structure to ensure that the Battalion trains for both roles, and can operate in both roles? That assumes that you want the flexibility of a "bipolar" battalion.
PS (not minimizing the load that the Platoon Leader has on his plate - as I trust you know).
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The question then becomes "how do you condition the leadership/troops?".
A LAV battalion currently is conditioned alost by default; they get the LAVs every so often so much of their training is dismounted due to circumstances. There is also a fairly large pool of "light" or "sort-of" light troops who rotate in and out on a regular basis who bring their perspectives to the table.
I'm not sure how you could have co-equal "Mech" and "Light" champions at the HQ to decide what is best. The Light guy would be "outvoted" much of the time simply due to the sheer number of mechanized and motorized assets who would be part of the Mech tribe. Think about what would happen when the Light champion started adding Engineer, Armoured, Artillery, Logistics and other supporting arms to the plan. They are all Mech, and unless the serious plan is to transport all the dismounts on the back deck of the tanks, most of them would:
a) bring their vehicles and vehicle support to the table, and
b) suggest the Light force find a way to keep up.
Like it or not, I think Light forces might be forced into niche roles for the foreseeable future (SOF, heliborn forces to launch raids, secure high priority targets or deceive the enemy, Marine working the littorals etc.).
A LAV battalion currently is conditioned alost by default; they get the LAVs every so often so much of their training is dismounted due to circumstances. There is also a fairly large pool of "light" or "sort-of" light troops who rotate in and out on a regular basis who bring their perspectives to the table.
I'm not sure how you could have co-equal "Mech" and "Light" champions at the HQ to decide what is best. The Light guy would be "outvoted" much of the time simply due to the sheer number of mechanized and motorized assets who would be part of the Mech tribe. Think about what would happen when the Light champion started adding Engineer, Armoured, Artillery, Logistics and other supporting arms to the plan. They are all Mech, and unless the serious plan is to transport all the dismounts on the back deck of the tanks, most of them would:
a) bring their vehicles and vehicle support to the table, and
b) suggest the Light force find a way to keep up.
Like it or not, I think Light forces might be forced into niche roles for the foreseeable future (SOF, heliborn forces to launch raids, secure high priority targets or deceive the enemy, Marine working the littorals etc.).
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