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Discussion on Israeli Strategy

Not going to be me. I don't think you can quash an established guerrilla movement by force.

Students of military history know of only one force in recorded history which did this: the Romans. There is a legendary quotation which summarizes the strategy

"The Romans create a wilderness, and call it peace"

Other Empires like the Mongols did this pre emptively and avoided the problem of guerrilla warfare althogether. Few Western empires were ever able to solve the problem, the best ones temporaraly solved the problem by co-opting the conquered society.

Now our current Western "liberal" sensibilities won't allow us to create belts of scorched earth, and the idea of co-opting a society is a very long term one (the occupation and reordering of Nazi German and Imperial Japanese societies took several decades after the origional enabling societies were reduced to rubble. In fact the change of Japanese society from Feudal to "modern" also took several decades, including periods of virtual civil war). You can see the problem when you look at the propaganda spin; western forces inserted in SW Asia or East Africa, for any reason at all, are characterized as "Crusader" forces and we in the West are "Jews and Infidels". A bit difficult to wrap people's hearts and mind's around that.

On the other hand, we also know that if "our" schools, medical clinics, internet cafes, coffe shops and so on are being set up in an attempt to win the hearts and minds battle, they will become targets of suicide bombers, drive by shootings, rocket attacks and all the rest, so a military dimension is very much a part of the organizational change. I would almost suggest the best place for a stabilization force in Lebanon is not along the border at all, but to separate southern Lebanon ("Hezbollah land") from the remainder, seal the borders to prevent the influx of arms and terrorist manpower and provide a safe harbour for the Lebanese economy to regrow. (In case you think this is too harsh on the people in "Hezbollah land", they are neither participants nor interested in becoming part of a cosmopolitan Lebanon as existed before the civil wars, but would just as soon turn their rocket batteries north as south). "Hezbollah land" can either remain a closed theocracy and irrelevant to the world outside, or attempt to stir the pot, with the results as we see now.
 
I'm thinking sadly in the Arab world it's true.  Seems like the whole region has OD'd on stupid pills.
 
a_majoor said:
I would almost suggest the best place for a stabilization force in Lebanon is not along the border at all, but to separate southern Lebanon ("Hezbollah land") from the remainder, seal the borders to prevent the influx of arms and terrorist manpower and provide a safe harbour for the Lebanese economy to regrow.

Once established, if any Hezbollah activity (eg: rockets, mortars, etc) come out of the isolated area, Israel can treat it with a scorched earth plan.
 
a_majoor said:
"The Romans create a wilderness, and call it peace"

I believe that many Israelis would be satisfied with that.
Not a wilderness, but a wide - wide buffer zone, either administered by Israeli soldiers, Israeli proxies, or at a very-distant third, a competent and aggressive international force. The UN is a non-starter, for many obvious reasons.

Most of the shock and outrage directed towards Israel is the lack of concern they show towards non-Israelis.

But this is their mindset, and it is very different from ours.
Our mission in Afghanistan, for example, seeks to benefit Afghan society, and indirectly, bolster our security.
The Israeli method is almost the opposite: The bolster their security first, middle, and last, and almost as an afterthought consider international opinion or how it benefits or harms non-Israelis.
How you feel about either is a personal and moral judgement.

This makes Israel an easy target in the public opinion world, but it has worked for them since 1948 - 58 years of the foreign policy equivalent of Russian Roulette - you only lose once.

When we apply our standards of moral conduct for fighting wars, Israel can look pretty bad. But, had they been using our methods - who knows what would have happened?
When they did the 'right' thing by withdrawing from Lebanon under Barak, it bit them in the butt, and here they are, back again, nothing solved.

As Edward Campbell said, one of Israel's major concerns is calming the situation down before there is a nuclear exchange one day.
Whether Israel is thinking strategically toward that aim with their current actions, or simply 'off the rez' as has been said, really remains to be seen. I hope its the former.

I PERSONALLY think Israel is seizing the opportunity presented by the fact that both Syria and Iran feel that much of the U.S. Government would be only too happy to start a war with them right now.
Unless Iran or Syria are feeling martyrlicious right now they aren't going to do anything overt and substantive to counter Israel.

It's a great time for Israel to set up a buffer zone - and it's not a pretty process.
This is a nasty, nasty religious/ethnic war. There are no easy, and from what I can see, no peaceful solutions in the short term.

In the meantime Israel is going to do what it feels it has to do, and world opinion is just a buzzing fly in their ear. We may criticize them, but does anybody want to switch places with them?
I wouldn't.

The tragedy is, many innocents have died (Maj HvK hits close to home) and many more will.
 
probum non poenitet said:
martyrlicious

I formally request permission to use that term.  ;D

I can also picture a hilarious parody video of Beyonce's song, with booty dancers in burkhas hitting it.
 
zipperhead_cop said:
I formally request permission to use that term.   ;D

I can also picture a hilarious parody video of Beyonce's song, with booty dancers in burkhas hitting it.

All I ask is 10% royalties and first right of refusal on movie deals  ;D
 
Quagmire said:
I wonder if Hezbollah is stupid enough to use chemical warheads.

Only if they want southern Lebanon to become a radioactive wasteland.
 
a_majoor said:
.....

On the other hand, we also know that if "our" schools, medical clinics, internet cafes, coffe shops and so on are being set up in an attempt to win the hearts and minds battle, they will become targets of suicide bombers, drive by shootings, rocket attacks and all the rest, so a military dimension is very much a part of the organizational change. I would almost suggest the best place for a stabilization force in Lebanon is not along the border at all, but to separate southern Lebanon ("Hezbollah land") from the remainder, seal the borders to prevent the influx of arms and terrorist manpower and provide a safe harbour for the Lebanese economy to regrow. (In case you think this is too harsh on the people in "Hezbollah land", they are neither participants nor interested in becoming part of a cosmopolitan Lebanon as existed before the civil wars, but would just as soon turn their rocket batteries north as south). "Hezbollah land" can either remain a closed theocracy and irrelevant to the world outside, or attempt to stir the pot, with the results as we see now.

Earlier on, on one of these convoluted threads I made a similar suggestion, that Lebanon, being unable to control its territory south of the Litani should just relinquish it entirely.  Unilaterally cede it.  Perhaps temporarily but willing to accept it might be permanently, whatever permanent means in Realpolitik.

Turn it over to the UN for the UN to keep the peace, or Hezbollah, or even Syria. 

If the UN is guarantor of the Peace then Kofi has to do some fancy dancing to figure out how to stop the missiles.

If Hezbollah is "guarantor of the Peace" and they fail to keep the peace as a State then every act of war justifies the attacked state in waging unlimited war - Kill my civilians and your civilians will die.  Work by the rules and we will work by the rules.

Personally I favour plan C.  Hand the turf over to Syria and make them responsible for the actions of their people and their clients.  Damascus is out of bounds because Hezbollah is the problem of Lebanon.  If Syria got what it was apparently wanting, hegemony over the area they might suddenly find themselves in favour of digging up Hafez Assad's reconstruction plans for Hama.  The alternative would be missiles in Damascus.
 
I love this idea.  Call it "Hezbollah-land".  Make it their dominion.  They're now responsible for borders and any actions taken from within those borders.

"Welcome to grown-up land boys...."



Matthew.  ;D
 
I thought I would pass this video along. It is "sort" of relevent. (the STUPID PILL Thing)  ;)

I got tricked but some joker who named his video "Israel Lebabon Hezbollah Fighting FOOTAGE" in order to get people viewing it.

I have to admit it did make me crack a smile.

Maybe these guys should be sent in as a security force. Hezbollah would be running for the hills.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p11d7OluQl4

PS: The MODS can delete this post if they dont think it should be here.

 
Journeyman said:
....except Fallujah, despite the massive amount of damage, was never "flattened" - - the US still pulled their punches. I think Grozny is the example you want to use. But in that case, it did a pretty good job of gutting the Chechen insurgency there.

NOTE: I'm not arguing for this tactic; just pointing out some of its parameters.

Ok, ok - flattening was the wrong choice of terms; perhaps I should have used "overwhelmed" instead.  The goal of my analogy was to point out that Operation al Fajr involved the systematic encirclement and sweep by the troops of a Division+ and ended with a General stating that he had "broken the back of the Insurgency" only to see that US soldiers and Marines are still dying along the roadside of Al Anbar province.  When I read the "go in and wreck Hezbollah" line, you can see why I get suspicious of this way of combating insurgents.

Is it possible for people to say "Hearts and Minds" and "Burn 'em Out" at the same time?  This is a serious question, because I see it on these forums at times.

Anyways, more on strategy, courtesy of DNI.  Agree or disagree with it, or just find a few interesting points, but it makes for some good gray-matter stimulation - different ways to look at the same bloody news pouring out of the Mid-East:

http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_fate_of_israel.htm

The Fate of Israel

 
Part two in a series of articles about grand strategy in a 4GW Era.
Demonstrating the difficultly of distinguishing strong from weak in 4GW,
and that choosing the wrong grand strategy can be terminal for a state.


By Fabius Maximus

February 8, 2006
Revised July 28, 2006


So confident of victory were the French that many sat up late drinking, gambling and boasting about who would kill or capture whom. Some knights even painted a cart in which Henry V would be paraded through the streets of Paris!

Description of the French camp on October 24, 1415, the night before Agincourt –
the last of the three great English victories over the French during the Hundred Years War.

You are now my prisoners. Let this be a lesson to you that Americans are weak. You must realize that Japan will rule the world. You are stupid for letting your leaders take you to war.

Tetsunosuke Ariizumi, Commander of His Imperial Majesty’s submarine I-8, on July 2, 1944,
addressing captured Americans from the SS JEAN NICOLET.

No Viet-Minh cannon will be able to fire three rounds before being destroyed by my artillery.

Col. Charles Piroth, French artillery commander at Dien Bien Phu,
Hell in a Very Small Place, Bernard Fall (New York: Vintage, 1966), 102.

What we're seeing here, in a sense, is the growing – the birth pangs of a new Middle East ...

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Special Press Briefing
Washington, DC, July 21, 2006


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Introduction (July 28, 2006)

Current events in Lebanon might be of the highest importance, but not for the reasons usually given. The war shows no sign of spreading to Syria. Iran gives no sign of overt intervention. Middle East oil production appears safe from interruption from this particular conflict.

The real significance could be far greater than any of these things.

Israel appears to be losing. Of course the campaign is not over, although the rising civilian causalities in Lebanon suggest that the US might be forced to broker a cease-fire in the next few weeks. There remains time for – as Stratfor believes – a surprise move by Israel to quickly win.

Still, Israel appears to be losing. Worse, losing not to a 4GW insurgency, but to static defenses more typical of to 2nd generation warfare – which the IDF, skilled at 3rd generation war, should be able to easily defeat.

IDF exhibits the classic signs preceding military defeat:

-  Before the start, reconnaissance/intelligence failures plus underestimation of their opponents.

-  Over-emphasis on air power, in contexts under which air power has typically failed.

-  Slow progress, far below that required to meet minimum objects in the available time.

-  Public debate by senior political and military officials on strategy, which suggests that the IDF's elite officers have failed to adapt to the failure of their initial plan.

A tie by Hezbollah would be a major inflection point for the region. When the weak tie the strong it is a big psychological win for the weak. Hezbollah's prestige would be greatly enhanced. The morale of Israel's enemies (i.e., everybody else in the region) would rise. Hamas, taking notes on this campaign, would be emboldened.

A Hezbollah win – the IDF retreating while Hezbollah retains ability to fire rockets at Israel – would likely reshape geopolitics in the Middle East, intensifying the looming defeats of US in Iraq and Afghanistan.

A Hezbollah win would also mark another step in the rise of the Shiites, after centuries of defeat and oppression by both their Sunni “cousins” and colonial masters. Iran would rise in influence, nearer its probable goal of becoming the regional hegemon.

The consequences of all this are difficult to foresee, but likely large and long lasting. 


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To plan a successful grand strategy the strategist must know if he has a weak or strong position. Failure almost certainly results if he gets this fundamental fact wrong. Realist or idealist, this is the starting point for developing a grand strategy.

Unfortunately, history shows the difficulty of correctly determining weak from strong during times of rapid change.

For example, which looks stronger: a stateless people with no modern government, economy, or army—or a developed state with its vast superiority in ideas and hardware?

Israel, a western industrial nation, has rationally educated elites in a modern bureaucratic government. Israel’s army and intelligence service (the Mossad) are superior to their Palestinian counterparts in every way.

Israel has wielded these advantages to win many tactical victories over the Palestinians. For example, Col Thomas X. Hammes, USMC (Ret) describes how Israel won the second Intifadah in chapter 9 of his book, The Sling And The Stone.

The Palestinian people have none of Israel’s advantages: stateless, politically mobilized in only a primitive manner, with severe internal fractures, and a history of weak and self-interested leadership. Each year their enclaves on the Gaza Strip and the West Bank sink further into poverty and chaos.

So it seems reasonable that most analysts see Israel as strong and the Palestinians as an oppressed or weak underdog.

Here's a different perspective on this war.

No matter how many or great are its tactical successes, Israel’s strategic picture grows dark. Losing allies. Losing land. Losing people. Perhaps even losing internal cohesion.

This should surprise nobody familiar with history. Germany proved that tactical excellence cannot overcome strategic weakness. And strategically Israel is very weak.

Grand Strategy: a state’s collective policy with respect to the external world. Paul Kennedy defined it as "the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all of the elements {of power}, both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term … best interests" (from his “Grand Strategies in War and Peace”). From a Trinitarian perspective, it focuses and coordinates the diplomatic and military efforts of a state’s People, Government, and Army.


Israel’s national survival – perhaps even that of its individual citizens – depends upon a sound grand strategy to turn these strengths into victory, or at least survival. Whatever their Strategy, it’s not working.

Primal Strategy: often found in the early years of a society when its people have a “single-minded” commitment to a goal, often just a drive to grow. A “primal strategy” is an expression of a people’s core beliefs. It is non-intellectual, with no need for theories and plans.


The Palestinians show us the raw power of a primal strategy, a belief in a shared dream. They dream about the extermination of Israel. That is the official goal of Fatah, the former ruling party. Which is in turn losing strength to Hamas and Hezbollah, who seem even more dedicated to eliminating Israel. Their primal strategy forges the Palestinian people into a powerful weapon, against which Israel has few defenses.

Forging this resolve has taken generations. After Israel’s creation the Palestinians hoped that their fellow Arabs would destroy it. After Israel’s construction of atomic weapons circa 1968 and the failure of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Palestinians abandoned hope of eliminating Israel through conventional war. They chose the path of 4GW, which brings them victory – as it has for so many other peoples fighting modern western states.

Why is this so difficult to see? This quote from Col T.X. Hammes (USMC, Ret.) explains this blindness of western experts to Middle Eastern 4GW, one that applies equally well towards the Palestinians and the Iraqi insurgents.

Today’s insurgents do not plan for the Phase III conventional campaigns that were an integral part of Mao’s three-phased insurgency. They know they cannot militarily defeat the outside power. Instead, they seek to destroy the outside power’s political will so that it gives up and withdraws forces. They seek to do so by causing political, economic, social, and military damage to the target nation.

After being driven out of Fallujah in November 2004, Abu Musad al-Zarqawi wrote, “The war is very long, and always think of this as the beginning. And always make the enemy think that yesterday was better than today.”

“Dealing With Uncertainty”, Marine Corps Gazette, November 2005



The Palestinian people have, in addition to greater and more rapidly growing numbers, seven great strategic advantages over Israel.

First, the Palestinians are weaker than Israel. Not only do Americans often admire underdogs, but also weakness is in itself a profound advantage.

In other words, he who fights against the weak — and the rag-tag Iraqi militias are very weak indeed — and loses, loses. He who fights against the weak and wins also loses. To kill an opponent who is much weaker than yourself is unnecessary and therefore cruel; to let that opponent kill you is unnecessary and therefore foolish. As Vietnam and countless other cases prove, no armed force however rich, however powerful, however advanced, and however well motivated is immune to this dilemma. The end result is always disintegration and defeat ..

“Why Iraq Will End as Vietnam Did” by Martin van Creveld


Much recent 4GW literature attributes an exaggerated significance to this theoretical effect, despite many counter-examples—near-genocidal warfare waged by states against weak groups with little or no global criticism. But given the Palestinian’s support by important elements in the developed nations and most less-developed states, is a powerful advantage for them – giving themselves and their supporters belief that they have the moral high ground.

Second, entropy acts as the Palestinian’s ally. It is easier to destroy than build. Israel must defend everything, while the Palestinians in the refugee camps show their willingness to tolerate a low standard of living while waiting for victory.

He who defends everything defends nothing. Frederick The Great (1712-1786)


Third, the increasing concentration of global oil production in the Middle East strengthens the Palestinian’s allies, and weakens willingness of developed nations to challenge them. Ever since Nigeria’s 1966 blockade and starvation of the Biafran people, developed nations will tolerate almost anything to ensure reliable access to oil.

Fourth, western nations—on whose support Israel dependents for financial support and trade—hold Israel to higher ethical standards than they hold the Palestinians. Palestinians can kill Jewish children with only mild condemnation. The UN does not stop food and medical supplies to the refugee camps. The EU does not stop financial aid to Palestinian Authority. Their Arab brothers never threaten to disown them unless they follow the Geneva Conventions.

Fifth, demographic trends point to increasing and inevitable weakness of Israel vs. the Palestinians. Demographics often decide ethnic rivalries. The Palestinians’ higher fertility rates inexorability increase their advantage over Israel and might eventually give them a voting majority in Israel. Neither certain nor precise forecasts are possible due to lack of reliable data on Palestinian population, emigration rates, and fertility rates.

The events of July 2006 have revealed two more strategic advantages of Israel’s opponents:

Sixth, the success of Israel’s counter-insurgency strikes against Hamas and Hezbollah have resulted in a “Darwinian ratchet”.

Israel’s security services cull the ranks of the insurgency. This eliminates the slow and stupid, clearing space for the “best” to rise in authority. “Best” in the sense of those most able to survive, recruit, and train new ranks of insurgents. The more severe Israel’s efforts at exterminating the insurrection, the more ruthless the survivors.

Hence the familiar activity pattern of a rising sine wave, seen in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq, and a dozen other places: successes by the security forces, a pause in activity, followed by another wave of activity – but bigger and more effective. The resurgence of Hamas and Hezbollah fits this pattern, and both have obviously taken Israel by surprise.

Seventh, in 1978 Egypt dealt the IDF a serious blow, which may prove fatal for Israel. The Camp David accords eliminated any serious conventional military threat to Israel. Since then the IDF has acted as police agency, fighting various kinds of insurgents.

It is possible this combination has “rotted” away the IDF’s core competencies, explaining its otherwise baffling strategic and tactical failures in the current campaign.


How can the Palestinian people defeat Israel?

Their actions appear limited to exerting pressure – economic, terror, political – on Israel, pushing individual Israelis onto one of two tracks.

Supporting negotiations with the Palestinians. The Palestinians can sequentially renegotiate these into total victory, as we did with the American Indians, and as Rome did with Carthage. This is incremental surrender.

Emigrating, leaving Israel for safer and more prosperous lands.


Progress has been considerable on both tracks, especially the second. Immigration to Israel peaked in 1990 at over 200 thousand. In 2003 and 2004, for the first time, Israel had almost equal number of immigrants and emigrants. This powerfully magnifies the Palestinians’ higher fertility rate. For more information go to The Statistical Abstract of Israel.

Mao would have appreciated the commitment of the Palestinians as they wage a protracted struggle against Israel.

I hold that it is bad as far as we are concerned if a person, a political party, an army or a school is not attacked by the enemy, for in that case it would definitely mean that we have sunk to the level of the enemy. It is good if the enemy attacks us, since it proves that we have drawn a clear line of demarcation between the enemy and ourselves. It is still better if the enemy attacks us wildly and paints us as utterly black and without a single virtue; it demonstrates that we have not only drawn a clear line of demarcation between the enemy and ourselves but also achieved a great deal in our work. …

We still have to wage a protracted struggle against bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology.

Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong, also known in the west as The Little Red Book.



It seems obvious who will win. Israel might last 100 years if its people are both lucky and skillful. Nevertheless, in the future only historians will know that the war’s outcome was ever in doubt. Much as today’s students see the Hundred Years War between England and France, Israel’s end will seem inevitable to them.

Whatever grand strategies Israel has used since their conquest of the West Bank and Gaza—and this paper has discussed only the results, not the specifics—have failed. However theoretical the debates over a state’s grand strategy, the stakes are of the highest kind.

Can any grand strategy by Israel overcome such odds at this late date?

As Peter O’Toole said as Lawrence of Arabia in the movie of that title, “Nothing is written.” However, it seems clear how to bet. As so often in history, bet on the horrible outcome. It looks like another tragedy in the making, another destruction of Israel, and Diaspora for the Jewish people.

Israel might provide another example of a failed grand strategy proving terminal.

Could another strategy have succeeded, allowing Israel to survive? That’s a debate for historians, but a powerful warning for America.

And the tears flow on forever
Southward in silent ranks
They flow to the Jordan River
And overrun the banks.

Heinrich Heine



Please send comments and corrections to fabmaximus@hotmail.com.

 
Is it possible for people to say "Hearts and Minds" and "Burn 'em Out" at the same time? 

Yes - but you have to pick your targets. 

Somebody elsewhere facetiously recommended canvasing the neighbourhood to find out if people want to stay or go.  That isn't so facetious. Ultimately, IMHO, that is the job of the Infanteer. 

Advance to contact and if people put their hands up you send them to the rear.  If they don't, you approach with caution and force them to the rear.  If they shoot at you , you kill them.

To discourage people shooting at you it might be, on occasion, appropriate to wander into the neighbourhood in large numbers, with big guns and lots of armour plate.  You will scare the bejazus out of everybody there, probably not make any friends on the day, but you will get a chance to make friends once the frightened are separated from the shooters.

Meanwhile try not to make enemies in places where people aren't shooting at you.  Set up a guard and keep them safe.  Another job for the Infanteer.
 
I see tonight the UN coordinator for the area is pleading for a 72 hr ceasefire to get people out.

In addition, There was a Lebanese spokesperson, I missed the introduction, looking really scared that Hezbollah will not be defeated totally. He was saying that they are happy to die, we want to live, so why should we confront them (interpretation of conversation)
 
GAP said:
I see tonight the UN coordinator for the area is pleading for a 72 hr ceasefire to get people out.

In addition, There was a Lebanese spokesperson, I missed the introduction, looking really scared that Hezbollah will not be defeated totally. He was saying that they are happy to die, we want to live, so why should we confront them (interpretation of conversation)

Seems like 72 hours would be some pretty nice regroup and reorg time for Hezbollah.  As soon as the first jet dropped ordinance, they should have gotten out of there.  What could it possibly matter if there is three days left in their mandate?  Israel should put a war on hold so UN observers can finish their contracts?  ::)
As far as the Lebanese spokesman, sorry buddy.  You guys need to make a decision and live with it.  Maybe a little support from the non-terrorist part of Lebanon would help bolster the Israelis to smash through and secure a decisive win.

As far as Infanteers article, I have to imagine that people have been writing Israel doom pieces for fifty odd years, and always come up wrong.  Israel isn't going anywhere.
 
GAP said:
I see tonight the UN coordinator for the area is pleading for a 72 hr ceasefire to get people out.

Gee, I wonder what/who they will be smuggling out in burkas, disgused as women, and who knows in ambulances, more cowards and weapons no doubt. Sadly (SOME)  the locals who are really wounded or sick who actually pay the price (thats the insanity of war), and fuel the islamic propaganda war against the west.

Personally, I do not favour any temp ceasefires. All that does is give Ahmed a time to re-org, plot and rest. I say lay it on even more intense, and don't stop til the bad guys are crushed, and have been wiped out.

A victory for Israel against extreme islam is a victory for us all, and in the big picture, that many less we'll (the west)have to tangle with.

Again, just my thoughts.

Wes

EDIT: Hey Zip, look at the posting timings, two great minds think alike, eh  ;)
 
http://www.guelphmercury.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=mercury/Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article&cid=1154082908290&call_pageid=1050067726078&col=1050421501457

City man says Harper right to question UN actions

FIONA ISAACSON
GUELPH (Jul 28, 2006)

A former United Nations military observer says Prime Minister Stephen Harper is right to question why a UN post in Lebanon, where a Canadian is presumed dead after an Israeli air strike, was still manned despite being a war zone.

In such a situation, the UN observers wouldn't have been able to do their jobs properly, Guelph resident Marty Burke said yesterday.
"There's no peace to keep at that point," he said.
In 1988, Burke spent six months at the same UN post where Canadian peacekeeper Major Paeta Hess-von Kruedener of Kingston is missing and presumed dead after an Israeli jet bombed the clearly marked observation post Tuesday night.

The UN post in the town of Khiam, near the eastern end of Lebanon's border with Israel, was the site where four peacekeepers, including a Canadian and three from Austria, China and Finland, were killed during a prolonged bombardment by Israel.

Burke, who retired from the military in 2000, said in 1988 his job as an unarmed peacekeeper was to "observe and report" any infractions on either side of the border.
"It was an unstable situation then, but nothing like what it is at this time," he said of the current conflict between Israel and Hezbollah guerrillas in Lebanon that began July 12.

The policy then was that if things "got too hot for us" the UN would pull them out, Burke explained.
"That's a pretty good policy . . . There's no reason in the world why those guys, in my opinion, should have been there," he said of Tuesday's attack.

The observation post itself is only a few hundred yards from the former Khiam prison, one of the most heavily fortified buildings in the former security zone -- a "key tactical target for the Israelis and a key tactical defensive position for the Hezbollah," Burke said.

With a war all around, the UN observers would be spending more time "half underground, covered in concrete," Burke said. Harper questioning why the peacekeepers were still there Tuesday "is the perfect question to be asking at a time like this," he said.
Israel would never deliberately attack the white-washed, clearly marked UN post that has a flag that's illuminated at night, he said.

"Quite frequently" missiles can go off target, he said.
"You can't get it bang on all the time."
When asked why the post may have still been manned, Burke called the UN a "fairly dysfunctional organization in many respects."
"The UN is a great idea in theory, but in practise it needs a lot of improvement," he said.

Israeli officials have vehemently denied targeting the post. A preliminary report from the UN said before the post was hit, peacekeepers had called the Israeli military 10 times in a six-hour period to ask it to halt bombing.

Yesterday, Hess-von Kruedener's wife Cynthia said she believes the attack, which involved precision guided missiles, was intentional. She says her husband, an infantry officer with the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry for 20 years, told her that the UN site had been fired upon the site for weeks, despite the fact that their vehicles and buildings were clearly marked.

Speaking in Montreal yesterday, interim Liberal Leader Bill Graham called Harper's response an irresponsible one that risks making Canada irrelevant in the region.

"Everybody watching Canada at this time is concerned about whether or not Canada is, by its actions, making itself irrelevant in terms of being able to contribute to the possibility of a long-term peace in the Middle East," Graham said. The former Liberal foreign affairs and defence minister said Harper has signalled a shift in Canadian policy by strongly backing Israel in the conflict.

fisaacson@guelphmercury.com
 
Just as a side though...couldn't someone come up with open or glass top ambulances for these guys?  I know if I was in Lebanon and had to get around in a mini van right now, I would find a chain saw and hack the roof of my ride.  If an Apache gunner can clearly see that there is no cargo in your vehicle, or there is an actual banged up guy or elderly person, then it might not get waxed.  
Yes, I realize it would take about 45 minutes for Hezbollah to start dressing their missiles up as wounded people.   :P
 
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