Cutting the CF/DND HQ bloat - Excess CF Sr Leadership, Public Servants and Contractors

[Teeps74]

We do excess staff work for the sake of doing excess staff work.  The op order for D-Day was 22 pages; that would not even cover of the envrionmental annex to most modern ops orders.  I believe it's Storr who observed that "modern" staff systems resulted in the UK op order for the attack on Bagdad being issued roughly 24 hours after the city had fallen.  Our staff processes (administrative or operational) are sub-optimal and largely process driven. 


I'll pick on the Army's headquarters bloat.  For 20K Regular and 20K reserves, we have:

Four geographically-based HQs, three of which are double-hatted as regional commands for dom ops.  (Unity of command is apparently passé)

Three Reg F Bde HQs

Ten Res F Bde HQs

Four Area support group HQs

One training command HQ

One subordinate training formation HQ

One higher formation HQ (1 Can Div) with a small number of enablers attached, but no combat power.


If we were to assume only 50 pers per HQ, that's 1200 FTEs tied up - of which only the CMBG HQs and 1 Can Div are notionally deployable.  And some are larger than 50 pers, meaning the total personnel bill is even higher.

There are economies to be found there.  There is staff work that can be eliminated to no ill effect.

Actually, the staff work is currently backlogged at all those levels. The nature of the staff work would have to be dramatically changed before you can start the slash and burn, else the paper tiger just eats itself, and everyone scratches their collective heads as to why pay is all screwed up, and no one has bullets. (Yes, I am simplifying things, however, a lot of HQs have already been gutted as a result of spending cuts that have already occurred... These cuts have impacted training to a degree already, and makes it difficult to properly staff IT requirements).

The dot com model is about operational effectiveness. It is NOT about economic effectiveness. We have to choose. Do we want to save five dollars? Or do we want to take that five dollars and add a task? To date, our nation has been very lucky. Picture us running an operation similar to ATHENA, while trying to staff a PSO in Africa AND two natural disasters here on the home front? With the dot com model, this is not an outrageous request, in fact, it is theoretically easily done.

So, I put to you, before any hacking and slashing is done, a defence policy needs to be published. A proper "White Paper", and this policy would have to be followed.

ETA: In the attack model, we do not just jump to a "left flanking" without first doing our combat estimate and issue orders. The left flank might be heavily mined...

 

[dapaterson]

Actually, the staff work is currently backlogged at all those levels. The nature of the staff work would have to be dramatically changed before you can start the slash and burn, else the paper tiger just eats itself, and everyone scratches their collective heads as to why pay is all screwed up, and no one has bullets. (Yes, I am simplifying things, however, a lot of HQs have already been gutted as a result of spending cuts that have already occurred... These cuts have impacted training to a degree already, and makes it difficult to properly staff IT requirements).

Why is work backlooged?  Because (a) we have managers, not leaders, in key positions, whose timorous bleating prevents delegation of authority and responsibility to lower levels; (b) we have never modernized processes, so we still think a piece of paper is needed for everything, and must have a covering letter (properly formatted) before being sent along - we're stupid enough to print documents, sign the, scan them and send them along, where the next level prints them and repeats the process; (c) no one is empowered to speak truth to power - for example, "CDS, you can't order reservists to attend a function in uniform and simultaneously tell them they are not on duty and not entitled to pay"

The dot com model is about operational effectiveness. It is NOT about economic effectiveness. We have to choose. Do we want to save five dollars? Or do we want to take that five dollars and add a task? To date, our nation has been very lucky. Picture us running an operation similar to ATHENA, while trying to staff a PSO in Africa AND two natural disasters here on the home front? With the dot com model, this is not an outrageous request, in fact, it is theoretically easily done.

You owe me a new keyboard.  The dot coms are not operationally effective.  Their staffs are bloated (oh, sorry, "are designed with surge capacity in mind").

Op Athena was a reinforced battalion.  That's it.  No more.  Not a corps in Europe.  We contributed a token sized force to an international operation.  The staff work to support a battalion is not onerous or overly demanding - except we chose to make it so.

So, I put to you, before any hacking and slashing is done, a defence policy needs to be published. A proper "White Paper", and this policy would have to be followed.

We have plenty of policy.  Nowhere does it say "We need operational HQs in an industrial park, right beside a compressed gas storage facility".  Nowhere does it say "The Army can't do FE for Dom Ops."  Nowhere does it say "General Rick's obsessive Americanism was the right model to adopt".  In fact, we've even got three retired generals who assessed what was done and said, essentially "Um, you might want to rethink this..."

 

[Teeps74]

The current model reflects the current policy. That simple. Want to slash? We need a new policy. That simple. We must NOT, however, slash without a proper definition for what is expected of us... We have made THAT particular mistake way too many times.

Once again, in the attack, we do not just simply do a left flanking. We do an estimate, followed by orders, then we pick a method of attack. To just randomly do stuff is statistically suicide.

 

[dapaterson]

The current model reflects the current policy. That simple. Want to slash? We need a new policy. That simple. We must NOT, however, slash without a proper definition for what is expected of us... We have made THAT particular mistake way too many times.

Once again, in the attack, we do not just simply do a left flanking. We do an estimate, followed by orders, then we pick a method of attack. To just randomly do stuff is statistically suicide.

There was no considered estimate in establishing the dot coms.  There was no considered estimate in "Sure, recruit more infantry".  We are suffering from the after-effects of cult of personality known as Hillierism.

 

[Teeps74]

There was no considered estimate in establishing the dot coms.  There was no considered estimate in "Sure, recruit more infantry".  We are suffering from the after-effects of cult of personality known as Hillierism.

The dot coms are a result of the insular nature of the branches.  The former CDS recognized the necessity for the Army, Navy and Air Force to work together from time to time, and that their efforts could not be realistically managed as insular institutions.  These difficulties have been popping up for decades, despite the best efforts of Unification.

The joint nature of today's operations has to continue to be addressed, and Canada COM and CEFCOM do exactly this. Can they do it better? Sure... We can all do stuff better. I feel strongly that the CF must continue to grow in a joint model, failure to do so will just lead to failure. When all the bugs are worked out (remember, the dot coms are just 6 years old...), we will see the possibility of operational effectiveness and some economic effectiveness.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Actually, the staff work is currently backlogged at all those levels. The nature of the staff work would have to be dramatically changed before you can start the slash and burn, else the paper tiger just eats itself, and everyone scratches their collective heads as to why pay is all screwed up, and no one has bullets. (Yes, I am simplifying things, however, a lot of HQs have already been gutted as a result of spending cuts that have already occurred... These cuts have impacted training to a degree already, and makes it difficult to properly staff IT requirements).

The dot com model is about operational effectiveness. It is NOT about economic effectiveness. We have to choose. Do we want to save five dollars? Or do we want to take that five dollars and add a task? To date, our nation has been very lucky. Picture us running an operation similar to ATHENA, while trying to staff a PSO in Africa AND two natural disasters here on the home front? With the dot com model, this is not an outrageous request, in fact, it is theoretically easily done.

So, I put to you, before any hacking and slashing is done, a defence policy needs to be published. A proper "White Paper", and this policy would have to be followed.

ETA: In the attack model, we do not just jump to a "left flanking" without first doing our combat estimate and issue orders. The left flank might be heavily mined...

From my soft, old, word out seat, far outside the problem I must disagree: I think the best, perhaps the only way, to reform the staff system is to slash and burn, massively, so that commanders and principle staff officers, no matter how weak, must reform or die resign in disgrace.

I do not fear mass resignations (or, better, firings) of GOFOs: I am convinced that half the RCN captains and CA/RCAF colonels are already well prepared to be MGens and, since I believe the CF is, generally, over-ranked by one level in most higher HQs, we can afford a huge exodus of what is, in some (fairly large) measure, deadwood.

BUT: not all the nonsense staff work is the CF's fault. Our, Canadian, political and bureaucratic leadership is also both weak and, worse, inept. Even 20 years ago we were burdened with excess management and measurement by the bureaucratic centre and no one in DND or the CF, not successive MNDs, not any DM after Fowler, and no CDS, as far as I knew, was willing to go to the centre (cabinet, PCO, TB and some agencies) and say "This is BS and we are having none of it and I am ready, willing and, indeed, happy to resign over it." (Only VAdm Chuck Thomas got close, and he resigned, publicly and (briefly ~ because the media isn't interested) loudly over the issue of the CDS refusing to own up to the many and varied problems that faced the CF and, in effect, toeing the government's line even when it was military rubbish. Thomas' beef was with Prince John de Chastelain, not with the Department or the government which, he agreed, was allowed to make silly decisions, absent clear, honest military advice.)

I will not profess to say how we should be organized, except to say that having 20± level 1 (three star (equivalent)) organizations is too rich for an institutions with about 130,000 military (full and part time) and civilian members. I understand that the DM, like all DMs, has a requirement for some very senior civil servants to manage major functions like policy, finance, materiel and human resources and I understand that the CDS can only exercise command through a national HQ (one or two more L1s) and some (maybe only four or five?) subordinate HQs. Surely we can get by with 10-15 L1s, not 20. (And I am suggesting that, no matter what, CSEC survives along with a JAG, a Surgeon General a chief defence scientist and a PR machine ~ but they needn't ALL be at the "top table.")

 

[Edward Campbell]

The dot coms are a result of the insular nature of the branches.  The former CDS recognized the necessity for the Army, Navy and Air Force to work together from time to time, and that their efforts could not be realistically managed as insular institutions.  These difficulties have been popping up for decades, despite the best efforts of Unification.

The joint nature of today's operations has to continue to be addressed, and Canada COM and CEFCOM do exactly this. Can they do it better? Sure... We can all do stuff better. I feel strongly that the CF must continue to grow in a joint model, failure to do so will just lead to failure. When all the bugs are worked out (remember, the dot coms are just 6 years old...), we will see the possibility of operational effectiveness and some economic effectiveness.

Then we should have a single joint staff in Ottawa and some, say four, unified/joint commands scattered across the country into which nearly all RCN, Army and RCAF formations and units fit. Maybe we need professional heads of service (CNS, CGS and CAS) in Ottawa to handle special to service doctrine, training and equipment requirements matters and a Chief of Military Personnel to handle postings and careers and joint career courses and maybe we need a separate, joint Special Operations Organization, but I am convinced that we you the CF can do more, better and faster, with a lot less than they have now.

 

[Loachman]

The dot coms are a result of the insular nature of the branches.  The former CDS recognized the necessity for the Army, Navy and Air Force to work together from time to time, and that their efforts could not be realistically managed as insular institutions.  These difficulties have been popping up for decades, despite the best efforts of Unification.

The joint nature of today's operations has to continue to be addressed, and Canada COM and CEFCOM do exactly this. Can they do it better? Sure... We can all do stuff better. I feel strongly that the CF must continue to grow in a joint model, failure to do so will just lead to failure. When all the bugs are worked out (remember, the dot coms are just 6 years old...), we will see the possibility of operational effectiveness and some economic effectiveness.

I completely disagree.

I have yet to see any positive effect from the establishment of the dot.coms.

The only effects that I have seen are confusion and delay and self-justifying busy-work.

I spent eight years as the Helicopter Booking Guy at LFCA HQ, as a Class A Reservist. I turned down several offers of Class B, as there wasn't enough work to justify that. As a result of the establishment of the dot.coms, I was replaced by a full-time LCol, full-time Maj, full-time Capt, part-time Capt, full-time WO, and a handful of 2Lt OJT guys.

The Land Force Area system was established largely to handle domestic ops. It replaced the earlier regional system, wherein the six regions were commanded by the biggest HQ located within their boundaries. It was recognized that the Army should take the lead for all land-based domestic ops, supported by the other two environmental commands as required. The other two environmental commands were responsible for their traditional roles - air defence and SAR and maritime ops. I saw no logical reason to change it.

I never saw any indication of a lack of willingness for one environmental command to support another as appropriate. My first time working at LFCA was during the Ice Storm, and we had Air Command pushing far more airframes at us, of all varieties, than we could employ.

 

[Pusser]

We do excess staff work for the sake of doing excess staff work.  The op order for D-Day was 22 pages; that would not even cover of the envrionmental annex to most modern ops orders.  I believe it's Storr who observed that "modern" staff systems resulted in the UK op order for the attack on Bagdad being issued roughly 24 hours after the city had fallen.  Our staff processes (administrative or operational) are sub-optimal and largely process driven. 


I'll pick on the Army's headquarters bloat.  For 20K Regular and 20K reserves, we have:

Four geographically-based HQs, three of which are double-hatted as regional commands for dom ops.  (Unity of command is apparently passé)

Three Reg F Bde HQs

Ten Res F Bde HQs

Four Area support group HQs

One training command HQ

One subordinate training formation HQ

One higher formation HQ (1 Can Div) with a small number of enablers attached, but no combat power.


If we were to assume only 50 pers per HQ, that's 1200 FTEs tied up - of which only the CMBG HQs and 1 Can Div are notionally deployable.  And some are larger than 50 pers, meaning the total personnel bill is even higher.

There are economies to be found there.  There is staff work that can be eliminated to no ill effect.

No arguments here.  However, the problem we often see with the hack and slash approach to savings is a complete lack of thought or rationalization.  I have often seen staff processes eliminated because one party thought they were useless, but never bothered to consult with other parties that in fact, needed them.  CFSS Upgrade is a prime example.  Sure, the system needed upgrading and replacement, but what we got in return was a far less effective system for which we are still paying the cost.

I'm all for finding efficiencies and eliminating unnecessary processes, but  we need to put more thought into it than "look at all the people we've got in HQs.  They're obviously top heavy."  Some offices are indeed overstaffed (I've been in one), but others are grossly understaffed.  We first need to rationalize the processes, then we can look at the numbers and adjust accordingly. 

We also need to be willing to slaughter a few sacred cows...

 

[GAP]

We also need to be willing to slaughter a few sacred cows...and empire builders...

 

[Old Sweat]

I wish there was a simple solution, but there is not. Let me drag a favorite dead horse out of the stable. The unified training system, which was touted as performance oriented when it first appeared, was designed to provide meaningful career progression, instead of, at least in the army, to fill an operational need. Maybe that is just semantics, and I suspect equipment is technical enough to require more specialization, but we used to get by without the masses of paper involved in the CTS and CTP system. Some of our "trades" got screwed around in the sixties because the MND of the time decided it would be a neat thing to reduce the number of NCM trades to 100 from the umpteen zillion or how so many there were.

Is there an answer that would work without putting you folks through the same horrendous mess that drove Edward and me to drink? (That's our excuse, anyway.) I don't think so, and I wouldn't put anybody except maybe the Taliban through what we endured. However, maybe there are steps that could be eliminated or streamlined in the various procedures we do without invoking the law of unintended consequences or breaking the Financial Administration Act or whatever.

 

[GAP]

Is that not what Leslie was doing?

 

[armyvern]

... CFSS Upgrade is a prime example.  Sure, the system needed upgrading and replacement, but what we got in return was a far less effective system for which we are still paying the cost.
...

Well, I can assure you that back when I was a Cpl and the visits began by the project staff to the bases on CFSSU, we troops told them that their plan would not work after their briefings. Paperworkless? Not when TB requires a signature for audit purposes. Problem was, unless the TB is going to change the rules on what is required, CF projects deemed to make things efficient while neglecting that certain rules of policy exist have the opposite effect. Instead, we now have 3 pages of 8.5 X 11 printing off for a single transaction instead of a measley 2.5 X 8.5 piece of paper.

In the old days, before this "cost effective, cost-efficient, and enabling" CFSSU was rolled out, I could receipt, issue and distribute a triwall of assorted nuts, bolts and screws from 7 CFSD in a matter of minutes with minimal paperwork. That same task now takes hours and costs an entire tree it's life. So much for the supposed cost savings.

I often wonder just how much the expenditures on photocopy paper have gone up in the CF over the past decade since the roll out. Where we used to keep a single pallet of it in the normal warehouse, we now have to hold shelves full of it.

By my estimation, the project gawds probably missed all this important policy stuff because the CFSSU coincided with the rise of powerpoint (a sacred cow!!) and the quick following death by it. Now known as "slide-decks" of course because it sounds so much more professional. I'm quite sure the CF could also benefit both financially, and personnel wise, should we cut our quota of "necessary and critically important to all manner of doing business" slide decks by a few thousand a year (and the trees killed by them too with the requirement to print them out in all their glory because people can't simply take notes anymore).

 

[fraserdw]

Is that not what Leslie was doing?

Leslie was quitting and he knew it.  His report was for his historical reputation not current consumption.  Up to a few years ago he was one of the big spenders.

 

[George Wallace]

By my estimation, the project gawds probably missed all this important policy stuff because the CFSSU coincided with the rise of powerpoint (a sacred cow!!) and the quick following death by it. Now known as "slide-decks" of course because it sounds so much more professional.

> I still have Slide Decks at home.  All 35 mm.  What is old is new again.  Even have the projector.  Go figure. 

 

[George Wallace]

Is that not what Leslie was doing?

I was under the impression that he was recommending that there be massive cuts (The Class B cuts weren't enough) to Staffs, Regular Force and Civilian employees and contractors within DND, not just the CF.  At the same time, is he not looking at coming back as a 'consultant' under contract to fullfill that task?

 

[McG]

No arguments here.  However, the problem we often see with the hack and slash approach to savings is a complete lack of thought or rationalization. ...

I'm all for finding efficiencies and eliminating unnecessary processes, but  we need to put more thought into it than "look at all the people we've got in HQs.  They're obviously top heavy."  Some offices are indeed overstaffed (I've been in one), but others are grossly understaffed.  We first need to rationalize the processes, then we can look at the numbers and adjust accordingly.

We also need to be willing to slaughter a few sacred cows...

And we must not fall into the trap of "share the pain."  If a process or HQ does not need to exist, then eliminate all the positions associated with that.  The idea that everyone should take a 10% hit is the easy escape.

Between CANADACOM, CEFCOM, and CANOSCOM, we probably could do better with a single OPSCOM or a revived DCDS.  There are also a selection of intermediate HQs that could be removed from largely linear chains of command.

 

[Infanteer]

Between CANADACOM, CEFCOM, and CANOSCOM, we probably could do better with a single OPSCOM or a revived DCDS.  There are also a selection of intermediate HQs that could be removed from largely linear chains of command.

My question is "how do we know this"?  Every time I see proposals for organizational changes (or most other changes in the CF) there is a lot "we need this, that is better, or this will be optimal" with no quantifiable reasons as to why.

Is the goal to simply reduce staff size/positions?  Or is to enable more streamlined staff communication?  At what levels and for what subject matter?

Don't get me wrong, I'm one of the biggest proponents of cutting needless positions and organizations - not for the sake of efficiency but because much of the literature points to the reality that leaner staffs are more effective (i.e. timely and responsive).  But first it needs to be determined exactly what effective is - Armyvern and Loachman have brought some interesting examples up.  Once we have this, we can start taking an objective look at processes to determine what needs to be cut and what doesn't.  Effectiveness should be based upon the two tasks of the staff.

The second part is to determine a method to instill some institutional discipline so that when we get a system that has quantifiable proof that it is effective and optimal, some guy can't tinker with it (i.e. expand) without first proving, with a little bit of rigour, that the expansion will actually improve the organization as opposed to simply act as a large employment mechanism.  I don't know why staffs and HQs are so susceptible to tinkering when something like an Infantry Battalion has featured the same organization and numbers for the last century.

 

[Edward Campbell]

My question is "how do we know this"?  Every time I see proposals for organizational changes (or most other changes in the CF) there is a lot "we need this, that is better, or this will be optimal" with no quantifiable reasons as to why.

Is the goal to simply reduce staff size/positions?  Or is to enable more streamlined staff communication?  At what levels and for what subject matter?

Don't get me wrong, I'm one of the biggest proponents of cutting needless positions and organizations - not for the sake of efficiency but because much of the literature points to the reality that leaner staffs are more effective (i.e. timely and responsive).  But first it needs to be determined exactly what effective is - Armyvern and Loachman have brought some interesting examples up.  Once we have this, we can start taking an objective look at processes to determine what needs to be cut and what doesn't.  Effectiveness should be based upon the two tasks of the staff.

The second part is to determine a method to instill some institutional discipline so that when we get a system that has quantifiable proof that it is effective and optimal, some guy can't tinker with it (i.e. expand) without first proving, with a little bit of rigour, that the expansion will actually improve the organization as opposed to simply act as a large employment mechanism.  I don't know why staffs and HQs are so susceptible to tinkering when something like an Infantry Battalion has featured the same organization and numbers for the last century.

But if you try to do that, the part in big yellow, then you will spend millions - likely several tens of millions - on consultants and it will take years and years ~ slashing and burning a whole level or two, quite arbitrarily, is more likely to produce equally good, maybe even better results, with less pain and much, much more quickly.

 

[Infanteer]

But if you try to do that, the part in big yellow, then you will spend millions - likely several tens of millions - on consultants and it will take years and years ~ slashing and burning a whole level or two, quite arbitrarily, is more likely to produce equally good, maybe even better results, with less pain and much, much more quickly.

It shouldn't - we are a profession for a reason.