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Conflict in Darfur, Sudan - The Mega Thread

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You talk of the problem with the Mexico drug cartels...

Thats is an issue but I think a greater issues and something that is more important to Canadians is the drug cartels coming to the north.
"CBC- Kamloops  "Dozens of homes and businesses in Kamloops, B.C., have been evacuated as police investigate three suspicious objects found near a downtown building on Saturday morning.
Mounties have found what they call three "items of concern" near the Scotiabank building at 3rd Avenue and Victoria Street — one of which is believed to be leaning against a natural gas meter.  RCMP Const. Rose Dunsmore said the RCMP's bomb squad is flying to Kamloops from the Lower Mainland to assist in the investigation.  Dunsmore said police have cordoned off and evacuated a three-block radius, from 1st Avenue to 3rd avenue and Landsdowne to Seymour streets.  "We do have Terasen [a natural gas distributor in B.C.] gas [officials] on scene as well. They have managed to shut off gas to that particular building and we're still looking at making sure that area stays clear of any kind of public individuals here," she said.
"We want to make sure everyone just stays out of that area in the interest of public safety."
The general public is advised to avoid the area until police determine whether any of the packages pose a threat.  Dunsmore said one long, closed-off pipe was found leaning against the building's gas meter. In the immediate vicinity, police also found a case with wires coming out of it and another carrying case.  Kamloops is in B.C.'s southern Interior, about 250 kilometres northeast of Vancouver."

Another article on cartels coming north
"Already this year in the Vancouver area – nicknamed the gang capital of Canada – there have been 30 shootings (with 12 fatalities) directly linked to the gang shakeout in Mexico and tracked by the Washington-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs. Some 130 gangs operate in B.C., among them Red Scorpions, United Nations, MS-13, Bacon Brothers, Hells Angels and various independents – all with ties of varying degrees to lucrative Mexican cocaine, among other drugs from other places. "Vancouver and British Columbia are unfortunately the focus of the largest number of organized crime groups in Canada," warned Peter Van Loan, federal public safety minister and solicitor-general, in a speech in Langley this year. A few days earlier, a gangster died nearby in a Mexican-style execution by machine-gun fire at the Thunderbird Village Mall.
In Mexico, where nearly 11,000 have died since Mexican President Felipe Calderón launched his government's "war on drugs" in 2006, drug-fuelled gangs impale heads on stakes and dissolve thousands of corpses in acid. 
In Tijuana, a border town almost due south down the I-5 from Vancouver, there are three, maybe four drug murders a day and cartel henchmen take down local cops for sport.
In Vancouver, police are witnessing an escalation in the brutality of killings. Recently, in an apparently targeted hit, a gangster shot a young mother in her car as her 4-year-old sat in the back seat. Once, such actions were forbidden by established drug protocol. Now, collateral damage is routine in the slaughterhouse of gangland hits." Already this year in the Vancouver area – nicknamed the gang capital of Canada – there have been 30 shootings (with 12 fatalities) directly linked to the gang shakeout in Mexico and tracked by the Washington-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs. Some 130 gangs operate in B.C., among them Red Scorpions, United Nations, MS-13, Bacon Brothers, Hells Angels and various independents – all with ties of varying degrees to lucrative Mexican cocaine, among other drugs from other places.  "Vancouver and British Columbia are unfortunately the focus of the largest number of organized crime groups in Canada," warned Peter Van Loan, federal public safety minister and solicitor-general, in a speech in Langley this year. A few days earlier, a gangster died nearby in a Mexican-style execution by machine-gun fire at the Thunderbird Village Mall.
In Mexico, where nearly 11,000 have died since Mexican President Felipe Calderón launched his government's "war on drugs" in 2006, drug-fuelled gangs impale heads on stakes and dissolve thousands of corpses in acid."  Linda Diebel,  The Star, National Affairs Writer'


The drug cartels are a police problem and something we as Canadians have not been good at solving as one can easily read about Vancouver, Windsor, Montreal and the like.

Should there be a military response?
Do we go into Mexico and the help them?
Do we go to the border of the US and Mexico and simply build and Isreali style wall and man the gates?
 
ptepaul said:
...
5. Who pays for it?
We have to not balance human life with a pocket book.
...


While I find the rest of your answers facile, to be kind, this one is completely out to lunch and indicates that you are being totally unrealistic. We always have to balance everything against our pocket books. You and I and all the other Army.ca members, decide, every days, if our children eat or not, have warm clothes or not, sleep in warm beds or not. How in the name of all that's holy sane is "human life" any different. Simple: it is not.

Now: who pays? America and much of Europe are broke or are on the verge of same; Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and Singapore and a very few others, who have some money, haven't enough, combined, to "save" Sudan, much less Africa. China has a strict policy of non-intervention which they are highly unlikely to break just because "human life" is at stake.

There is no money and, therefore, nothing can or will happen, and, perhaps, nothing needs to happen because mass starvations and genocidal outages are a fairly common part of our human history - why should Sudan be exempt?
 
If you want the easy answer Sudan pays as they sit on 1.3 trillion in oil reserves....
It can be done if there is political will.
 
ptepaul said:
...
Do we go to the border of the US and Mexico and simply build and Isreali style wall and man the gates?


That's probably the only useful short and medium term solution. The prospects of it happening are poor, though.

Most likely we will watch as Mexico slides into anarchy and takes much of Latin America with it.

 
Sudan pays for it?

The only way that is going to happen is if we mount a full scale invasion and seize the oil fields for our own exclusive benefit (ie we control the sale of oil to the highest bidder/our friends/whoever is nice to us today). I think that might raise a few eyebrows, to say the least....

Given our limited resources, any interventon anywhere needs to be strictly focused on how best to achieve aims in support of the national interest. This might even include cutting places like Haiti loose if we need to free up military manpower and resources for higher priority missions, as well as placing the Sudan and the rest of Africa on "ignore".

In the case of Mexico, the problem is so huge that military intervention is probably the last resort, and likely to be a band-aid at that. What can be done isn't clear to me, and evidently not to anyone else as well, although there are probably lots of little steps that can be takenhere and abroad to lessen the negative impact of a slide into anarchy.
 
I seriously think that at some point the US, with us as semi side dish, will offer incorruptible personnel to assist Mexico, especially if Mexico asks for help. It would be a huge blow to their macho image of themselves, but they have to do something, and pretty quick.
 
ptepaul said:
You talk of the problem with the Mexico drug cartels...

Thats is an issue but I think a greater issues and something that is more important to Canadians is the drug cartels coming to the north.
"CBC- Kamloops  "Dozens of homes and businesses in Kamloops, B.C., have been evacuated as police investigate three suspicious objects found near a downtown building on Saturday morning.
Mounties have found what they call three "items of concern" near the Scotiabank building at 3rd Avenue and Victoria Street — one of which is believed to be leaning against a natural gas meter.  RCMP Const. Rose Dunsmore said the RCMP's bomb squad is flying to Kamloops from the Lower Mainland to assist in the investigation.  Dunsmore said police have cordoned off and evacuated a three-block radius, from 1st Avenue to 3rd avenue and Landsdowne to Seymour streets.  "We do have Terasen [a natural gas distributor in B.C.] gas [officials] on scene as well. They have managed to shut off gas to that particular building and we're still looking at making sure that area stays clear of any kind of public individuals here," she said.
"We want to make sure everyone just stays out of that area in the interest of public safety."
The general public is advised to avoid the area until police determine whether any of the packages pose a threat.  Dunsmore said one long, closed-off pipe was found leaning against the building's gas meter. In the immediate vicinity, police also found a case with wires coming out of it and another carrying case.  Kamloops is in B.C.'s southern Interior, about 250 kilometres northeast of Vancouver."

I'm not sure if you knew about the update on that, but it turned out that it was some geotechnical equipment......


<from article>
But Const. Rose Dunsmore explains the equipment was actually "a magnetic electrical field sensor, used by geotechnical firms in the mining industry."

The gear was stolen before the bomb scare from the cab of a mining industry truck, but police say they don't know exactly when or where.

The white Ford F-350 with Ontario plates and Quantec Geoscience written on both sides, was first left unlocked at the Kamloops Walmart around 7 p.m. on Friday night. It was later spotted at the Esso Robo Gas station in North Kamloops and then Future Shop later in the evening.

Link : http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/2010/12/16/bc-kamloops-bomb-scare.html
 
The United Nations Security Council can do absolutely nothing, nada, not one damned thing without China's explicit approval and that is not likely to forthcoming if the UNSC wants to intervene anywhere, for any purpose, without an express invitation from the "host nation," Sudan or Ivory Coast of whatever else. It is (remotely) possible that someone can do a Pearson and implement the UN General Assembly's Uniting for Peace Resolution (UNGA Res 377(V)) but it's been attempted a few (10) times and it has actually worked on a couple of occasions, most notably in 1957, but it is unlikely to succeed again - especially not for Africa.

What ptepaul is suggesting sounds to me like a big load of Roméo Dallaireish BS. Now the good Senator talks a good game but I watch/listen to the Liberal Party with great care and I have heard nothing, especially from Liberal heavyweights, like Ignatieff, himself, Brison, McCallum and Rae, that would indicate that there is even a shred of support for a costly military intervention anywhere in Africa. Sen. Dallaire is a celebrity but he is a political lightweight with, as far as I can tell, no following in his party. It's wonderful that he and ptepaul care deeply about mankind and Africa and all that but, ultimately, it is pointless without money, lots and lots of money, and Chinese support.
 
The bomb in Kamloops may have been part of some seismic gear....

The reaction of the RCMP and the local police is proof that there is concern on our side of the border about Mexican drug cartels coming up north.

As for the sudan I agree that Chinese support is neccessary.
They are the ones who hold the leases on the oil reserves.

I know that Rwanda genocide is BS ( as per ER Campbell states) but I make no apologies for asking what Canada can do to support the UN mission and if genocide starts I would argue that we have a moral position to intervene.  As for host nation support the Southern Sudanese government would be likely allow a UN AU or NATO force to prevent any atrocities.
 
We as an armed force are getting ready to stand down from ten years of conflict in a foreign country. We have to consider the fat that we as an armed force need the time to lick our wounds, and shore up our gear. This may take time. If our current government or a newly elected one deems after a reasonable rest period to pitch us back into a mission, then so be it (although highly unlikely). My :2c:. Ubique 
 
For me I see the equipment issues and the soldiers themselves could easily transferred to a perceived or actual conflict in Africa.

The instructors will probably be using light armoured vehicles (like the Gwagen) in their new role after 2011.

I wish the Sudanese (Southern) would begin using the oil royalties to pay for their own security.
The nut in the wrench is the Chinese companies and the government.

We will see.
 
ptepaul said:
For me I see the equipment issues and the soldiers themselves could easily transferred to a perceived or actual conflict in Africa.

The instructors will probably be using light armoured vehicles (like the Gwagen) in their new role after 2011.

I wish the Sudanese (Southern) would begin using the oil royalties to pay for their own security.
The nut in the wrench is the Chinese companies and the government.

We will see.

You are taking a rather simplistic view of the situation in the Sudan.

Have you done any research at all?  Aren't you giving the Sudanese and the various factions in the Sudan and Darfur a lot less credit that they really deserve?

http://www.armyrecognition.com/News/2007/October/Military_Army_News_October_2007_UK.htm

Twenty African Union soldiers in the Sudan were killed during the attack of the Haskanita base in Darfur.

An African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) peacekeeper from Nigeria points to the blast point of a rocket-propelled grenade on a destroyed armoured personnel carrier at Haskanita military group site (MGS), October 1, 2007. Twenty AU soldiers were killed or injured and nine missing after a "deliberate and sustained" assault on the Haskanita base in Darfur on Saturday night by armed men in 30 vehicles, who looted and destroyed the base, the African Union said.
01 October 2007


Some photos of those Grizzly's that you think will do well and protect our troops should they be sent there:

 
Maybe I am simplifing the issue
Atrocities were committed on each side... as it takes to to dance.

That being said Bashir (Sudan president) is an ICC war criminal...


The pics of the Grizzly are cool and showcase the need for the Gila which i am glad they purchased for use in the Sudan.

LAV's may not be the best choice but they are better than an Iltis of toyota landcruiser.

One  Grizzly was destoryed by an RPG and another was burnt when the main gun failed and the driver rammed a Toyota technical.
www.casr.ca%2Fbg-army-armour-avgp-darfur.htm&date=2009-11-01
 
ptepaul said:
...
The nut in the wrench is the Chinese companies and the government ...
...


The Chinese are not the problem, they might be the only hope of a humane solution. China is "in" Sudan; it has vested interests in Sudan; it might decide that its interests are sufficient to take an active interest in helping Sudan solve its problems.

There are, as others have said, no Western interests in Sudan and, therefore, no good reasons for Western intervention, beyond, perhaps, helping innocent dark folks escape genocide - which few, if any, Western leaders regard as "sufficient" cause to send our troops there.

My guess is that it's China or periodic doses of massacres on the evening news.

----------

Mods: There is a perfects food Darfur/Sudan thread here where ptepaul actually started something. May I ask that you merge them so that our thoughts, such as they are, are not scattered all over Army.ca?
 
The death of innocent (i believe are a concern for all)

The Chinese have a vested interest in the Sudan as the south has the oil and the north has the refining process and port facilities.

Saying that the Chinese is the nut in the wrench simply means that they have a vested interest in the outcomes... both good or bad.
 
ptepaul said:
The death of innocent (i believe are a concern for all)
...


But are they, all those deaths, a sufficient concern to spend the lives of Australian, British, Canadian, Danish, and so on troops? My assessment is that they are not in the minds of Prime Ministers Gillard, Cameron, Harper, Rasmussen and so on; and I share their views, as do the (vast) majorities of citizens of pretty much all Western nations. I understand that you, ptepaul and Sen. Dallaire and Messers Gerald Caplan and Stephen Lewis and a few thousand others diasagree - you want to spend allied lives to save others; good luck with that.

My money is on China, if they feel it is in their best interests.
 
I am also putting my :2c: on China. And I do not disregard the ongoing efforts made by the U.S. to avoid conflict.
A long article, but well worth the read  :nod:
          ____________________________________________________________________________
China challenged over Sudan referendum

As South Sudan's referendum on independence on January 9 draws nearer, the international community is preparing for the possible division of Sudan into two independent states.

With signs of growing tensions and several issues still to be resolved by negotiations - notably agreements on the demarcation of a north-south border and the distribution of oil revenue - there is a risk of a return to the decades-long civil war fought between the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the southern-based Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) that was ended by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has called Sudan
a "ticking time bomb" and launched a fresh diplomatic drive aimed at applying pressure on both sides to avoid conflict.

Amid the uptick in high-level diplomacy, however, the role to be played by China remains a crucial but unexplored factor in discussions about the referendum and beyond.

China is the key external power in Sudan as a result of the substantial assets that one key state-owned enterprise - China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) - has developed in the country. Yet despite its apparently compelling interest in ensuring stability in Sudan, China has so far adopted a policy of "wait and see" with regards to the referendum. At the root of this hesitancy is a lack of consensus in Beijing about how to balance growing overseas economic interests and international "responsibilities" with China's traditional foreign policy doctrine of "non-interference" in another state's internal affairs. Any renewal of north-south violence in Sudan will likely put that principle under further strain.

The dilemmas of non-Interference
Non-interference has been fundamental to Chinese foreign policy since Zhou Enlai articulated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. It was designed to reflect solidarity with newly independent post-colonial states and to indicate respect for territorial sovereignty.

Although the principle was regularly violated by the support China lent to revolutionary movements across Africa and Asia in the 1960s and 1970s, it reassumed a central position under the "independent foreign policy" of the post-1978 period. China's own sensitivities about perceived external interference, particularly in the context of Taiwan and Tibet, have led it to conceive of sovereignty in traditional Westphalian terms. Today the principle of non-interference remains oft-repeated in official foreign policy rhetoric.

The policy of non-interference, however, is being complicated by China's expanding global interests. The globalization of its economy has given China a stake in the stability of a number of countries with which it previously only had limited contact. Encouraged over the past decade by the central government to "go out", state-owned and private enterprises have pursued overseas markets and new sources of natural materials, investing an estimated US$178 billion in the process.

China's rapid economic growth has also led to increasing clamor in Western capitals for it to assume the "responsibilities" requisite with global power status. Rather than "free-riding" on the security arrangements established by the United States and its allies, this argument proceeds, China should take a more proactive stance toward regional and international security issues. These dynamics are stimulating a debate within China about the continuing value of non-interference.

On one side there is concern about how China's "overseas interests" can be protected in the event of political and economic instability. Concerns are increasingly expressed about the security of the growing number of Chinese citizens working abroad following repeated incidences of Chinese workers being kidnapped - and occasionally killed - as they find themselves caught up in internal conflicts between state forces and rebel groups.

An estimated 24,000 Chinese citizens are said to work and live in Sudan alone, with comparable numbers in other African states. Solutions proffered to this problem typically focus on providing better consular protection services, engaging more deeply with international legal mechanisms, and building better intelligence about local investment environments. Yet there are calls for the government to play a more direct role, either by using its influence to shape the domestic politics of states in which China has strategic interests or even through the use of military force. The anti-piracy mission of the Chinese navy off the Somali coast is widely perceived as a first step towards developing a more assertive approach to protecting China's overseas economic interests.

Others urge a re-evaluation of non-interference because it is not a policy befitting a global power with growing international "responsibilities". Some worry that a willingness to partner with regimes that commit flagrant human-rights abuses comes with significant image costs.

International criticism during the run-up to the Beijing Summer Olympic Games of China's ties with a Sudanese regime complicit in committing atrocities in Darfur was fundamental in this sense. China's subsequent behind-the-scenes diplomacy, which was instrumental in getting Khartoum to accept a joint African Union-United Nations peacekeeping force in Darfur, has since been held up as an example of what a more proactive - and responsible - Chinese foreign policy might consist.

In that vein, Chinese scholars have since developed new paradigms, such as "creative interference" and "conditional interference", to describe how China could further expand its role in peacekeeping operations or support interventions under the rubric of "responsibility to protect". In this case, the desire to craft a policy "beyond" non-interference is shaped through engagement with international norms rather than by narrow economic self-interest.

Although the debate about non-interference is now a hot topic in China's foreign policy community, several factors work against there being any dramatic re-evaluation of the official stance. The first is a lack of capabilities and resources. China remains under-experienced in the field of conflict prevention and there exist no domestic academic or policy institutions that conduct in-depth research into these issues.

The second is a belief that non-interference has been a valuable policy tool in building burgeoning relations with African and other developing world states exhausted by the prescriptions and conditionalities of the West. Beijing is concerned that any step toward playing a more consequential role in domestic politics might be perceived as evidence of China adopting the imperialist dispositions of another "northern" power.

Responding to the referendum
Developments in Sudan over the past five years have demonstrated that debates about non-interference have had a mixed impact on policy. China's perceived interests in Sudan stem from the investments that CNPC (and, to a much lesser extent, Sinopec) have been making in its oil industry since Western companies began to retreat in the mid-1990s.

CNPC now has controlling stakes in the two biggest energy consortiums operating in Sudan, giving it an estimated 60% share of the 480,000 barrels of crude produced daily. It also constructed the 1,500 kilometer pipeline that connects the oilfields of the south, where 85% of reserves are found, to the export point of Port Sudan in the north. CNPC views Sudan as having been a successful testing ground for its overseas investment strategy, with those involved in managing its operations in Sudan since assuming senior positions elsewhere around the world.

The secession of the south will likely complicate the management of CNPC assets. A number of key leases on oil concessions originally signed with Khartoum, will soon need to be renegotiated. This will depend on the favor of the SPLM - reconstituted as the Government of South Sudan (GSS) under the terms of the CPA - who have traditionally perceived China as having underwritten the rule of the rival NCP. In any renewal of north-south conflict, CNPC-controlled oil fields may feasibly be seized by rival groups and the security of Chinese workers threatened. Since 98% of the south's revenue comes from oil, Khartoum could choose to close the pipeline knowing that the north could function - at least in the medium-term - on alternative sources of income.

Although China has not embraced the prospect of the south's independence, it has recognized the importance of reaching out to the GSS to safeguard against any damaging implications that may ensue from secession. This has required taking a somewhat pragmatic approach to "non-interference" because the GSS are not yet a formally sovereign entity.

Relations have therefore largely been cultivated at the party-party level, between the Chinese Communist Party's International Liaison Department and the SPLM. The leader of the SPLM, Salva Kiir, has twice visited Beijing and a Chinese consulate-general was established in the southern capital of Juba in September 2008. The CNPC is in the process of setting up a branch office in the city. Rumors continue to link Chinese investors to the building of a new pipeline that would link South Sudan to the Kenyan port of Luma, potentially offering an alternative export route to the north-south pipeline.

These efforts to engage the south seem to have had the desired impact. The once antagonistic GSS now urge the importance of building a "very strong relationship" with Beijing. Considering their dependence on oil, the GSS recognizes the necessity of working with China and do not see Western aid as a sufficient substitute for the mixture of loans, infrastructure investment and low-cost construction services that China can offer.

Despite its close ties with the United States, the huge developmental challenges likely to be faced by the GSS means it cannot afford to exclude potential external partners. Today, Juba remains a "NGO town", where a single Chinese-run hotel stands as the only testament to China's influence, in contrast to the very visible presence in Khartoum. But China is hoping that the ties it is has built with the south will be enough to ensure the security of its assets after the referendum.

Yet this does not amount to a conflict prevention strategy that might be expected of the external power that stands to lose the most from renewed civil war. Beijing has offered a few "carrots" of varying sizes to both north and south to dissuade them from violence. Some gestures in the direction of public diplomacy are discernible. Yet, the overall impression is underwhelming; China appears content to leave itself hostage to fortune, presuming that Khartoum and Juba will opt for cooperation because of their mutual interest in continued oil profits.

Most analysts of Sudan, however - including those, one suspects, at CNPC - are less optimistic about the signs in the run-up to the referendum. Both sides continue to disagree over the terms of the referendum and the south has been vigorously rearming, with the closet support of neighboring East African states, in apparent anticipation of trouble.

The recent history of China's role in Sudan suggests the long-standing policy of non-interference is in a state of flux. Pressuring Khartoum into accepting a peacekeeping force in Darfur and building relations with the quasi-sovereign GSS suggests Beijing can be pragmatic in its understanding of the principle.

This corresponds with the discussions and debates about the nature of sovereignty, overseas interests and international intervention that can be heard within the academic and policy community in China. Yet the limited gestures China has made in the direction of preventing post-referendum conflict in Sudan point to the limits of this evolution. Even in a country where it stands as the dominant external actor, China remains reluctant to involve itself too deeply in local politics.

Toward international coordination
China may come to rue its hesitancy if the referendum leads to a new crisis in North-South relations. Beijing will come under pressure to act if the situation in Sudan deteriorates, not only from the international community, but also from its own corporate groups.

The relationship between the Chinese political leadership and management of state-owned enterprises is complex. Some claim that state-owned enterprises do not warrant extensive support from the government because they are driven only by profit and, in instances such as Sudan, actually damage the "national interest".
Most of the oil CNPC produces in Sudan, for example, is not exported to China but sold on the world market. Yet an organization as large as CNPC clearly wields considerable influence in Beijing; its chief executive officer holds ministerial rank within the government and will have been appointed at the highest levels. Any damage to CNPC assets in Sudan will likely increase the pressure on the government to revisit its non-interference policy.

Should Beijing decide to become more engaged in Sudan, Western governments presumably want China to coordinate its efforts with their own. Barring a few sessions at the United Nations Security Council, however, international diplomacy toward Sudan appears dominated by the United States and United Kingdom.

Both China and Western governments share a fundamental interest in the maintenance of regional stability. If that point can be grasped, managing the Sudan referendum could become an area of cooperation between the United States and China at a time of otherwise growing tension in the bilateral relationship.

As China continues to evaluate the value of non-interference in light of its growing global interests, events in Sudan could come to shape the form and content of a new foreign policy doctrine. Others will want to help ensure that if China comes to consider a greater degree of "interference" as legitimate, it conceives of it in multilateral rather than unilateral terms.

                              (Reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act)

 
E.R. Campbell said:
The Chinese are not the problem, they might be the only hope of a humane solution. China is "in" Sudan; it has vested interests in Sudan; it might decide that its interests are sufficient to take an active interest in helping Sudan solve its problems.

There are, as others have said, no Western interests in Sudan and, therefore, no good reasons for Western intervention, beyond, perhaps, helping innocent dark folks escape genocide - which few, if any, Western leaders regard as "sufficient" cause to send our troops there.

My guess is that it's China or periodic doses of massacres on the evening news.

----------

Mods: There is a perfects food Darfur/Sudan thread here where ptepaul actually started something. May I ask that you merge them so that our thoughts, such as they are, are not scattered all over Army.ca?

The Chinese absolutely enabled the Arab central government in Khartoum to ethnically cleanse the Darfur region of blacks, whether they were Sunni Muslim, Christian or Animists (it's estimated they KILLED 400,000!).  How anyone could argue after that role that China should now be entrusted with protecting the stability of the region is.....let's go with "questionable".

:salute:
 
Cdn Blackshirt said:
The Chinese absolutely enabled the Arab central government in Khartoum to ethnically cleanse the Darfur region of blacks, whether they were Sunni Muslim, Christian or Animists (it's estimated they KILLED 400,000!).  How anyone could argue after that role that China should now be entrusted with protecting the stability of the region is.....let's go with "questionable".

:salute:


As I have pointed out several times China is reasonably consistent, by the prevailing international standards, in its policy of "non interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states." It is a golden rule (do unto others as you would have them do unto you) sort of thing; China rejects any outside interference in, even criticism of, its "internal affairs" and it, generally, does not interfere with others, Viet Nam, etc, notwithstanding.

That's why I said "might." Chine might, just as easily, sit back and pump oil while people are massacred; it all depends upon how they see their many and varied interests. But there will be no UN action without Chinese approval and I doubt any "great" power wants to confront China in Africa.
 
Here is an interesting graphic that demonstrates why the separation of South Sudan, assuming the vote is carried, will not bring peace:


New_Image_1102661a.JPG

Source: The Globe and Mail


The border and the ownership of the oil and gas fields are in dispute. But it is a fact that the pipelines all run North to Port Sudan.
 
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