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Combat Team of tomorrow? Mechanized Infantry Company of tomorrow?

  • Thread starter Thread starter Yard Ape
  • Start date Start date
Nope:

It sounds like we have a "Main battle tank gap" that needs to be addressed through an urgent "interim purchase".  :christmas happy:
 
I did my combat team commander's course in 1972 in an army using Centurions and M113A1s. Not surprisingly, much of it is a blur except for one trace that I did not command. We had a large combat team of a squadron and a company with the squadron commander as the combat team commander.

I was the company commander and eventually we were faced with an assault on, I think Jerusalem Ridge, in Gagetown. The squadron commander elected to command the fire base consisting of his tank and two troops of the squadron, while I was detailed to command the assault force of the company and what we called a half squadron - two troops led by the battle captain - at the time. The details are sketchy, but we got the assault force in the FUP and shaken out in time for the assault, which was deemed successful. We had to deal with some opposition during the assault, but the tanks had their act together and took it out in response to a (probably needless) order from me.

The DS who debriefed the operation were not kind to the squadron commander, who had essentially delegated the more difficult task to a subordinate and was late arriving on the objective to prepare for the next task. Be that as it may, I felt the combat team was too large and cumbersome, and we were faced what was closer to a battle group task than one suited for a combat team.

Considering the time and place, we used to do this sort of thing, but I, as did many of the students, felt our doctrine of the time was questionable. This harsh assessment, besides the lack of flexibility of a large combat team, also was based on the approach preached by the Armoured OC of the Tactics Department, who had M113s driving onto the objective (or at least the dismount area) while the tanks provided support in depth to avoid hand-held anti-tank weapons.

Maybe we were showing the results of two decades without a war back then as well.
 
Haligonian said:
It doesn't appear that any of our allies task org in this fashion and when they do it is by exception.
That is because our allies think bigger, and a square combat team is not very efficient when you are trying to maximize the combat power out of a battle group.  I have seen a few examples in US doctrine a single tank company (controlled by the Bn HQ) is able to support multiple infantry companies (as they need it) through a multi-stage operation.  The default to square combat teams is intellectually lazy, and it wishes away real world resource constraints.
 
MCG said:
That is because our allies think bigger, and a square combat team is not very efficient when you are trying to maximize the combat power out of a battle group.  I have seen a few examples in US doctrine a single tank company (controlled by the Bn HQ) is able to support multiple infantry companies (as they need it) through a multi-stage operation.  The default to square combat teams is intellectually lazy, and it wishes away real world resource constraints.

You have just reminded me of a word that is very important to various bureaucratic rice bowl Defence programs: Doctrine.

I recall, on my Cbt Tm Comd's Course, asking why they sent two troops on a right flanking against a dug in enemy reinforced section and was told 'it's doctrine', as if I'd just stepped off of the short bus.
 
Oldgateboatdriver said:
Nope:

It sounds like we have a "Main battle tank gap" that needs to be addressed through an urgent "interim purchase".  :christmas happy:

Yes, if we want three symmetrical CMBG's that can all operate at the high end against the most demanding opposition.  The other option would be to centralise all the tanks in one CMBG, in one Regiment.  We could look at dropping to three tank trps per sqn IOT to ensure there is a fourth sqn in the Regt.  Then bring on some heavy APCs for the infantry in that Bde.  Sound familiar?

MCG said:
That is because our allies think bigger, and a square combat team is not very efficient when you are trying to maximize the combat power out of a battle group.  I have seen a few examples in US doctrine a single tank company (controlled by the Bn HQ) is able to support multiple infantry companies (as they need it) through a multi-stage operation.  The default to square combat teams is intellectually lazy, and it wishes away real world resource constraints.

Agreed.
 
Old Sweat said:
I did my combat team commander's course in 1972 in an army using Centurions and M113A1s. Not surprisingly, much of it is a blur except for one trace that I did not command. We had a large combat team of a squadron and a company with the squadron commander as the combat team commander.

I was the company commander and eventually we were faced with an assault on, I think Jerusalem Ridge, in Gagetown. The squadron commander elected to command the fire base consisting of his tank and two troops of the squadron, while I was detailed to command the assault force of the company and what we called a half squadron - two troops led by the battle captain - at the time. The details are sketchy, but we got the assault force in the FUP and shaken out in time for the assault, which was deemed successful. We had to deal with some opposition during the assault, but the tanks had their act together and took it out in response to a (probably needless) order from me.

The DS who debriefed the operation were not kind to the squadron commander, who had essentially delegated the more difficult task to a subordinate and was late arriving on the objective to prepare for the next task. Be that as it may, I felt the combat team was too large and cumbersome, and we were faced what was closer to a battle group task than one suited for a combat team.

Considering the time and place, we used to do this sort of thing, but I, as did many of the students, felt our doctrine of the time was questionable. This harsh assessment, besides the lack of flexibility of a large combat team, also was based on the approach preached by the Armoured OC of the Tactics Department, who had M113s driving onto the objective (or at least the dismount area) while the tanks provided support in depth to avoid hand-held anti-tank weapons.

Maybe we were showing the results of two decades without a war back then as well.

That brought back memories. I did mine either late in 76 or early in 77 (all that I remember was that the weather was miserable) We too had a full four-troop Centurion squadron and an M113 company(+) from the Van Doos. I don't recall any esoteric discussions about doctrine at the time; ours were mostly addressing the antiquated equipment that we were using and how we'd all die. I must admit when I read the original post I did not think that our older organization was too big but was left with the distinct impression that we are underequiping and undermanning the current ones. There seem to be inadequate resources to do the primary tasks when full up much less after having suffered battle and maintenance casualties.

I do recall being impressed by one item on the Centurion. Besides the inclusion of the boiling vessel there was a small compartment providing access to what I think was the final drive which apparently ran at a constant temperature just below the boiling point and into which the crew would throw all their RP 4 cans providing them with hot food at any time. Hadn't had that in my FOO track.

:subbies:
 
One feature of my course, which was run in Gagetown supported by 2 RCR with two mechanized companies, a tank squadron and E Battery 2 RCHA (at the an independent battery based in Gagetown) providing three FOO parties less the officer,) was that the six gunner students filled all the FOO appointments besides taking our turn in the other appointments. The Commander CTC, one BGen Radley-Walters, made it clear that we would be assessed on our performance as FOOs as well as in the other appointments.

Another feature was that the course provided an "Attended" with no pass/fail or letter gradings. This was to cut down on the buddy f.cking that had developed in previous serials. I wonder if the gunners as FOOs and the "Attended" course report have survived. Many years later LGen Charlie Belzile, who just passed away, told me there was a typical Canadian Army fiddle in this; the first line of the narrative read something like "__ very easily met, easily met, met, met with difficult, or failed to met the course standard." To those in the know at the time this equated to a grading of A, B, C, D or F
 
The course is still an attend and the course report gives you and your CO an idea where you stood.  However there are no rankings or letter grades.  There's been discussions that it should be graded and my CO has mentioned that he thinks the course reports still don't say enough.

There is one FOO for the cbt tm provided by a field force unit.  Along with an ATG for the BGHQ.
 
Thanks. Again, officially we did not received a letter grade or ranking, but . . . I think my course report was at least three paragraphs long.

If you have a FOO provided, does that mean you do not have any gunner students?

And I have been retired long enough for my pension to get a CD and bar, so who or what is an ATG?
 
Old Sweat said:
If you have a FOO provided, does that mean you do not have any gunner students?

I've seen artillery officers attend the course as candidates, although it may change from serial to serial.

And I have been retired long enough for my pension to get a CD and bar, so who or what is an ATG?

Artillery Tactical Group - it's the attachment of all the bits that an affiliated Regiment brings to a manoeuvre unit; namely the BC's Party and the OP dets with FOOs and FACs.
 
Old Sweat said:
Thanks. Again, officially we did not received a letter grade or ranking, but . . . I think my course report was at least three paragraphs long.

If you have a FOO provided, does that mean you do not have any gunner students?

And I have been retired long enough for my pension to get a CD and bar, so who or what is an ATG?

Like Infanteer said.  The artillery and engineer officers are still attending but in relatively low numbers.  I think there was only 3 arty officers and 2 engineers on my course.  The other issue is that there are about one third as many armour officers to infantry officers but not all these armour officers have tank experiences.  This will be alleviated in the coming years now that armour 1.1/1.2 will feature both recce and tanks.
 
Haligonian said:
So I just finished this years Cbt Tm Comd's Course and I figured I'd take a look at this thread again.  Having re read it a few thoughts come to mind.

Thankfully we got back in the tank business.  While our ISTAR capabilities can certainly enable us to take greater risks in certain areas there will always be a requirement to gain contact and develop it in order to facilitate decisive actions.  If you can't survive that contact then decisive actions will not be able to follow or will be launched with much greater reduced understanding of the enemy and therefore suffer a much heavier cost than necessary. 

Unfortunately we didn't buy a lot of tanks, and we didn't plan to be able to immediately maintain them which results in extremely high VOR rates.  The maintenance issues are supposed to be fixed in the coming years but in the mean time there is an awful lot of tanks that are down or driving around with their turrets over the back deck.

Our tanks lack ERA and Active Protection.  This means that they are vulnerable to all manner of ATGMs, even some more antiquated ones.  They are likely also vulnerable to DPICM like munitions.  This needs to be rectified.

While we bought tanks, thereby alleviating many of the initial concerns of this thread when we thought we'd be divesting the tank capability, we still have many of the same concerns because we bought so few of them.  We have three squadrons of tanks spread between two brigades.  There is some talk of going to a sqn per bde.  Either way this doesn't provide us with the required depth.  A Bde Comd is required to decide between centralizing all his tanks under a single BG and likely advancing 1 up or splitting them and advancing two up.  The BG Comd is then forced with a similar decision.  In a peace support/COIN environment our tempo will be reduced as tanks are moved from Coy to Coy with maintenance breaks to conduct sequential vice simultaneous operations.  All this tells me that the favoured COA of square combat teams simply aren't feasible any longer.  And haven't been for some time.

Further, I'm not convinced on the validity of the square cbt tm structure in the first place.  Back in Germany days (and to this day doctrinally) the tank Regt had 4 sqns of 4 trps each.  This meant that the Bde Comd could detach two Sqns to the Inf Bn's and attach a coy or two to the Regt and still keep it as a maneuver headquarters.  Our Bde Comd's now face the choice of penny packeting out their tanks to Inf BG's or throwing them all into a single BG and leaving the others with no armour support and little anti armour capability.  The initial pages of this thread shows that conducting offensive operations against an enemy with tanks, or other serious anti armour capabilities and real IDF will be very difficult and we don't have the resources to do it nor the knowledge.  With only a squadron in the bde we've reduced the problem but not eliminated it.

As the discussion above illustrates, this paucity of tanks means that Bde/BG Comds are more likely divide out their tanks to Inf heavy BG/Cbt Tms, and yet we still seem to place this construct of the square cbt tm on a pedestal doctrinally and in Individual Trg.  The Army bends over backwards every year to get four troops into the field for CTCC.  It's time we take a look at how realistic this task org is and just when we'd want to employ it.  Further, I think there is some fundamental issues with the square cbt tm.  In terms of C2 it seems to be a risk to unity of command to have two sub units and their commander's operating towards the same objective.  Granted one is designated the Cbt Tm Comd, however, I still see this as a potential area of friction.  It also means that the Comd has designated two sub units and their HQ's to the same problem.  By doing this he's done one of two things.  He's either taken a BG problem and made it a Sub Unit comd's problem, or he's reduced his own flexibility by assigning two sub units to tackle a problem that one could achieve.  He's essentially wasting a sub unit headquarters.

It doesn't appear that any of our allies task org in this fashion and when they do it is by exception.  The US uses cross attachment to form Coy Tms.  This sees Tank Coys and Mech Inf Coys giving a platoon to the other to form Tank heavy (Tm Tank) or Inf heavy (Tm Mech) Coy Tms.  A similar process happens at unit level to create Armour or Inf heavy Task Forces, with the exception to this being the Armoured Brigade Cbt Tms which used to feature a two Mech Inf and two tank sub units.  We had a British officer come and speak to us who now lives in the Fredericton area.  He had been a Cbt Tm Comd on the march up to Baghdad and he explained that the Brits do something similar but will often attach two tank trps to a Mech Coy.  He was quite specific that it was highly unusual for a square cbt tm to be task organized.  I would suggest there is probably a reason our major allies do not task org in this fashion.

This leads me to the conclusion that the future cbt tm ain't square.  We need updated TTP's and start training our sub unit comd's to dynamically detach sub sub units and accept a sub sub unit in exchange based on the requirement of the assigned task.  We in the infantry may need to get more comfortable with the idea of assaulting without tanks as well.  The future being ADO will only strain our limited armoured resources further.  Squadrons need to be able to disaggregate as far down as the trp level.  The limiting factor here is sustainment obviously.  If we're serious about doing ADO then the tank sqn echelon needs to get even more robust and it may require some further depth in terms of C2.  Currently the ech can support dispersed half sqns to an extent and their geographical dispersion would likely be a critical factor.  The echelon needs to get to a point where operating like this is the norm and easily supported.

The LAV 6.0 is an issue.  As discussed in other places on the form we need a more protected vehicle if we're going to survive against an enemy like the Russians.  While I personally didn't have any problems I've been told by many that the difference between the LAV's mobility and the Leo's has been compounded by the 6.0.  It's increased weight and the fact that it's turbo does not kick in like the LAV 3's did makes it less mobile.  Generally, in Gagetown like terrain the LAV 6 is confined to tracks and roads to shake out at the very last moment in the assault.  Don't even think about assuming tactical formations on the advance.  The LAV needs improvements to its drivetrain to increase its mobility, and it needs an active protection system to increase its survivability.  Additional armour and ERA could be considered understanding that the increased weight would have an impact on mobility.  This could be mitigated by removing the turret, replacing it with some kind of RWS, and adopting APC TTPs.

With all the ISTAR assets out there the Coy/Cbt Tm needs an intel function.  Likely something like a Company Int Support Tm of 2 or 3 dudes tops.  In Major Combat the requirement for this will likely be reduced or at least the coy's ability to use it will be reduced due to tempo.  Dual hatting the LAV Capt and perhaps his gunner or driver will probably work, or some other similar approach.  During COIN or peace support, however, a dedicated, small, organization would pay dividends.

The paucity of IDF in the current CMBG structure means that integral mortars to the Cbt Tm would be very helpful.  ISTAR will help us to to shape objectives prior to assault but as discussed this has yet to prevent the requirement for assaults, and assaults will need IDF.  Mechanized mortars would be very helpful in this.  This will make sub units more independent during ADO and not totally reliant on Bde guns during offensive operations when they might be busy supporting an adjacent unit.

We should be looking at explosive breaching.  If we can breach with a line charge then why use a perfectly good tank ploughing through an active minefield.  MICLICs are a good thing.  Our complete lack of an under armour bridging capability is also a glaring fault.

Having said all this, the future cbt tm looks a lot like cbt tms of the past but it's not square.  It will often feel light on armour if operating in open terrain against a mechanised enemy.  It's likely a Coy with 1 or 2 trps attached or a sqn(-) with a platoon attached.  No change with the attached FOO and engineer trp.  It should have its own IDF capability, preferably able to fire from the vehicle.  It requires robust echelons that can support dispersed operations that include operations at the half sqn size and perhaps below.

I suspect that much will depend upon the Cbt Tm's ability to operate in complex terrain.  Our desire will be to operate outside of these areas but the enemy will seek to deny these areas from complex terrain through IDF and long range direct fire.  We will be forced to fight there.  In this environment what we might find the Cbt Tm lacking in is dismounted infantry.  Seven dismounts (assuming no casualties, LOB, or HLTA) per section may feel pretty light when fighting through cities, forests, or mountainous terrain.  In such terrain an additional armoured vehicle without additional dismounts will only be a liability.

Not one;y is the square combat team a resource hog, it is an old organization which is based on the idea that tanks provide the firepower and infantry are escorted by the tanks (and switch to escorting the tanks upon dismounting). The idea fails to take into account the ever increasing power of the weapons available to the infantry, nor the ability using modern C3 to tie into many more resources. It even discounts the increasing abilities of tanks.

Otters changes have taken place over my career. When I joined near the end of the Cold War, digging in, having hides and harbours and moving to various run up positions and other things were matter of course and potentially allowed you to survive the storm of heavy metal the Red Army would use to clear the path ahead of them ("Fire Corridors").

In the last several years during the MR series of exercises, I have seen first hand how UAV's and other technologies strip away much of the ability to hide form observation, and how "smart" rounds essentially negate much of the effect of digging in. When a 155mm is "plinking" tanks with single rounds from 20km away, you realize that things really are different.

While we don't have these things, tanks can also fire smart rounds. The Korean Smart Top-Attack Munition (KSTAM) allows a tank to engage NLOS targets at up to 8km, and Israeli LAHAT rounds can be used out to 13km, making tanks mobile and protected SP artillery under the right circumstances. Swedish 155 "Archer" SP guns fire from magazines and it can engage out to 60km with the proper shells, and fire at rate up to 3 rounds in 15 seconds if needed. So combat teams (or whatever their future descendants are called) need to be designed to face that sort of firepower, and ideally should be able to dish it out as well. "Third Offset" theory and technology will supposedly allow commanders to call in sensors, fires and effects from off board their own platforms , or even groups (for example a Marine F-35 spotted a target and then launched and controlled a SAM from a nearby Navy ship in a test).

Far more challenging will be the integration of vast amounts of real time data from sensors both on and off board the various systems in the combat team, attachments of close range AAA/C-RAM systems and engineers and other enablers to deal with complex terrain and a robust logistics system to keep things going in the field. In essence, this will evolve into a mini battle group.
 
But when that big EM burst happens and technology fails, you are left with the basics.  Then your "basics" have to be be better than the enemy's.
 
George Wallace said:
But when that big EM burst happens and technology fails, you are left with the basics.  Then your "basics" have to be be better than the enemy's.

Couldn't agree more even though you don't even need a big EM to take down some of the hi-tech stuff. EW is getting more and more sophisticated and our networked systems will always be going through cycles of vulnerable/secure/vulnerable/secure.

In my day we trained to rely on paper maps and grease pencils as a fall back when the computers went down. After decades of fighting unsophisticated enemies we may have lost the skills to go back to the basics.

:subbies:
 
In the same vein

http://www.sciencealert.com/the-scary-practical-reason-the-navy-is-once-again-teaching-celestial-navigation

The scary, practical reason the US Navy is once again teaching celestial navigation

You can't hack the sky.

Though I have to say protecting your smart phone by turning it off, restarting it after the event, taking a snap of the sky then comparing it to sky charts in memory, does have its attractions.
 
Thucydides said:
Not one;y is the square combat team a resource hog, it is an old organization which is based on the idea that tanks provide the firepower and infantry are escorted by the tanks (and switch to escorting the tanks upon dismounting). The idea fails to take into account the ever increasing power of the weapons available to the infantry, nor the ability using modern C3 to tie into many more resources. It even discounts the increasing abilities of tanks.

Otters changes have taken place over my career. When I joined near the end of the Cold War, digging in, having hides and harbours and moving to various run up positions and other things were matter of course and potentially allowed you to survive the storm of heavy metal the Red Army would use to clear the path ahead of them ("Fire Corridors").

In the last several years during the MR series of exercises, I have seen first hand how UAV's and other technologies strip away much of the ability to hide form observation, and how "smart" rounds essentially negate much of the effect of digging in. When a 155mm is "plinking" tanks with single rounds from 20km away, you realize that things really are different.

While we don't have these things, tanks can also fire smart rounds. The Korean Smart Top-Attack Munition (KSTAM) allows a tank to engage NLOS targets at up to 8km, and Israeli LAHAT rounds can be used out to 13km, making tanks mobile and protected SP artillery under the right circumstances. Swedish 155 "Archer" SP guns fire from magazines and it can engage out to 60km with the proper shells, and fire at rate up to 3 rounds in 15 seconds if needed. So combat teams (or whatever their future descendants are called) need to be designed to face that sort of firepower, and ideally should be able to dish it out as well. "Third Offset" theory and technology will supposedly allow commanders to call in sensors, fires and effects from off board their own platforms , or even groups (for example a Marine F-35 spotted a target and then launched and controlled a SAM from a nearby Navy ship in a test).

Far more challenging will be the integration of vast amounts of real time data from sensors both on and off board the various systems in the combat team, attachments of close range AAA/C-RAM systems and engineers and other enablers to deal with complex terrain and a robust logistics system to keep things going in the field. In essence, this will evolve into a mini battle group.

Thanks for this.  So I struggled with this as I wrote the original post.  Is a combat tm still relevant in a world where we can find and precisely destroy individual AFVs and fighting positions?  If most of the time we need to defeat an adversary's will to resist vice destroying them incrementally then do we need to assault?  If we can reach out thousands of kilometers with precision munitions do we still need to seize ground and is holding terrain viable?

I think our most recent operations, the Stephen Biddle article on lessons learned from Afghanistan is a good example, show that we will still be forced to close with an enemy in order to find them.  In Desert Storm the majority of Iraqi fighting vehicles were also destroyed by Abrams and Bradley fire vice air delivered munitions and that was in a desert against a conventional enemy with us having air supremacy.  This will be exacerbated by our enemy forcing us to fight in complex terrain.  In such operations tanks, and tank infantry cooperation will remain effective if not required.  Defeating our ISTAR efforts will be a major effort by our enemies.  Further, ISTAR takes time.  COIN and Peace Support are likely to give us the time to conduct ISTAR "soaks" and what not.  Major Combat, however, will likely push the tempo which means the time between decisive actions and shaping ISTAR actions are likely to be shorter.  This will place the onus on maneuver forces to gain and develop contact.

I would also propose that precision munitions are low density items.  Against a real opponent such as a Russia or China how long before the west goes bingo on PGMs and how long and how much does it cost to get production ramped up.  Further, the platforms that deliver those munitions are low density and maintenance intensive.  So perhaps we execute some impressive shaping operations in Ph 1 of campaign A.  What happens if Campaign A doesn't win the war?

The question of how do Cbt Tms face this kind of fire power may be moot.  I'm saying that there is still a requirement for an assault and that likely isn't going away.  I'm also saying that combined arms, with tank infantry cooperation as the center piece, at the sub unit level in the form of a cbt tm (not square) still seems like a good approach.  To assault or hold terrain requires mass.  The Cbt Tm provides this in terms of its ability to mass fires, both direct and indirect at the right time and place, defeat and lay obstacles, and provide the ability to assault the enemy in order to effect destruction or seize terrain.  In the defence it provides the ability to hold terrain or effect destruction through mobile operations in depth.  But to do all this it has to mass.  This massing has to be protected.  This means conditions setting must take place.  Air and potentially sea superiority must be gained, C2, and fires assets must be disrupted and the arty/c-btry battle must have been won.  I don't think that is all that different from what we've done since WW 2 really.  Once we've cleared the skies of enemy air and ISTAR assets, and disrupted their ability to control and actually fire their IDF systems then we have an environment that allows for the massing of high signature combat power.

Another question is just what technological fixes are being pursued to the problem of vehicle, and maybe even personnel, signatures to ISTAR assets?  Is it possible to make a Cbt Tm invisible to thermal?  If we could do that reliably and at a reasonable price then we would have a bit of a game changer.  On a more feasible note, we should be buying vehicles that can run turret watch for hours/days on batteries without having to start the engines.  The LAV 6.0 is horrible for this.  To run the radios she pretty much needs to run all night.  This would make us much more survivable in the defence.
 
Very good points, Haligonian.

As for the Engr and Arty candidates, there are few, mainly because they won't be employed as combat team commanders.  Having said that, having them on the course (either as candidates or as "non-assessed attendees") is, in my opinion, essential.  It allows the Tank and Infantry candidates to interact with them throughout the course to get their vital points of view on everything at that very low but important tactical fight.  As for the field portions, going back a year, a FOO party ("ATG") is but one element and is included as part of the "clag" that deploys.

As for the notion of the square combat team; I realize it's essentially a Canadian thing nowadays; however, it's not a passé notion either.  We aren't the US Army and we ought to stop comparing ourselves to them.  We don't have the resources.  So, looking at the force employment concept, I know that 7 years ago we used combat teams that were rectangular (not quite square, of course), but the square model is viable.  As a training vehicle, it forces the candidates to task out the various number of elements based on their varying capabilities.  As a fighting unit, I would offer that the combat team could take on a Russian-style battlegroup and win, 10 times out of 10.  Notwithstanding the 2-OC problem, it is a tight-knit and very powerful unit.  Of course, they aren't of much use in Operations Other than War.  But I would offer that if you're bringing tanks to a fight, there's a reason for them, so there's that.

And yes, we need more of them, they need active and reactive armour, and all that goes with it.  As well as an infantry fighting vehicle that can keep up to them.

Anyway, great discussion all round!  :salute: 
 
Technoviking said:
As for the Engr and Arty candidates, there are few, mainly because they won't be employed as combat team commanders.  Having said that, having them on the course (either as candidates or as "non-assessed attendees") is, in my opinion, essential.  It allows the Tank and Infantry candidates to interact with them throughout the course to get their vital points of view on everything at that very low but important tactical fight.

I hope that the "won't be employed as a combat team commander" observation doesn't reflect some new official training concept (probably fiscally based).

Again going back to the days when Old Sweat and I still had testosterone, artillery officers and engineers were loaded on these courses in significant numbers not just because we provided indirect fire support knowledge to the other candidates (not to mention dignity), but because it was essential for us to understand and master the organizations and tactics that we had to support with our fires.

Book learning and a couple of weeks a year on exercise provide a veneer of familiarity but the only way that you truly understand how combat teams, battle groups and higher formations function is by attending specific courses such as the Combat Team Commander's Course, the old Army Command and Staff Course and similar courses hand in hand with all the main actors who will be involved (Hell! Even air, aviation, log etc have their roles on these courses).

It's true that artillery officers rarely command cbt tms or BG's but there were a whole slew of them that have commanded Bdes, Divs, Armys etc including in combat. Understanding and perfecting the fundamentals at the basic building block level is critical to all cbt arms offrs.  :2c:

:subbies:
 
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