So I just finished this years Cbt Tm Comd's Course and I figured I'd take a look at this thread again. Having re read it a few thoughts come to mind.
Thankfully we got back in the tank business. While our ISTAR capabilities can certainly enable us to take greater risks in certain areas there will always be a requirement to gain contact and develop it in order to facilitate decisive actions. If you can't survive that contact then decisive actions will not be able to follow or will be launched with much greater reduced understanding of the enemy and therefore suffer a much heavier cost than necessary.
Unfortunately we didn't buy a lot of tanks, and we didn't plan to be able to immediately maintain them which results in extremely high VOR rates. The maintenance issues are supposed to be fixed in the coming years but in the mean time there is an awful lot of tanks that are down or driving around with their turrets over the back deck.
Our tanks lack ERA and Active Protection. This means that they are vulnerable to all manner of ATGMs, even some more antiquated ones. They are likely also vulnerable to DPICM like munitions. This needs to be rectified.
While we bought tanks, thereby alleviating many of the initial concerns of this thread when we thought we'd be divesting the tank capability, we still have many of the same concerns because we bought so few of them. We have three squadrons of tanks spread between two brigades. There is some talk of going to a sqn per bde. Either way this doesn't provide us with the required depth. A Bde Comd is required to decide between centralizing all his tanks under a single BG and likely advancing 1 up or splitting them and advancing two up. The BG Comd is then forced with a similar decision. In a peace support/COIN environment our tempo will be reduced as tanks are moved from Coy to Coy with maintenance breaks to conduct sequential vice simultaneous operations. All this tells me that the favoured COA of square combat teams simply aren't feasible any longer. And haven't been for some time.
Further, I'm not convinced on the validity of the square cbt tm structure in the first place. Back in Germany days (and to this day doctrinally) the tank Regt had 4 sqns of 4 trps each. This meant that the Bde Comd could detach two Sqns to the Inf Bn's and attach a coy or two to the Regt and still keep it as a maneuver headquarters. Our Bde Comd's now face the choice of penny packeting out their tanks to Inf BG's or throwing them all into a single BG and leaving the others with no armour support and little anti armour capability. The initial pages of this thread shows that conducting offensive operations against an enemy with tanks, or other serious anti armour capabilities and real IDF will be very difficult and we don't have the resources to do it nor the knowledge. With only a squadron in the bde we've reduced the problem but not eliminated it.
As the discussion above illustrates, this paucity of tanks means that Bde/BG Comds are more likely divide out their tanks to Inf heavy BG/Cbt Tms, and yet we still seem to place this construct of the square cbt tm on a pedestal doctrinally and in Individual Trg. The Army bends over backwards every year to get four troops into the field for CTCC. It's time we take a look at how realistic this task org is and just when we'd want to employ it. Further, I think there is some fundamental issues with the square cbt tm. In terms of C2 it seems to be a risk to unity of command to have two sub units and their commander's operating towards the same objective. Granted one is designated the Cbt Tm Comd, however, I still see this as a potential area of friction. It also means that the Comd has designated two sub units and their HQ's to the same problem. By doing this he's done one of two things. He's either taken a BG problem and made it a Sub Unit comd's problem, or he's reduced his own flexibility by assigning two sub units to tackle a problem that one could achieve. He's essentially wasting a sub unit headquarters.
It doesn't appear that any of our allies task org in this fashion and when they do it is by exception. The US uses cross attachment to form Coy Tms. This sees Tank Coys and Mech Inf Coys giving a platoon to the other to form Tank heavy (Tm Tank) or Inf heavy (Tm Mech) Coy Tms. A similar process happens at unit level to create Armour or Inf heavy Task Forces, with the exception to this being the Armoured Brigade Cbt Tms which used to feature a two Mech Inf and two tank sub units. We had a British officer come and speak to us who now lives in the Fredericton area. He had been a Cbt Tm Comd on the march up to Baghdad and he explained that the Brits do something similar but will often attach two tank trps to a Mech Coy. He was quite specific that it was highly unusual for a square cbt tm to be task organized. I would suggest there is probably a reason our major allies do not task org in this fashion.
This leads me to the conclusion that the future cbt tm ain't square. We need updated TTP's and start training our sub unit comd's to dynamically detach sub sub units and accept a sub sub unit in exchange based on the requirement of the assigned task. We in the infantry may need to get more comfortable with the idea of assaulting without tanks as well. The future being ADO will only strain our limited armoured resources further. Squadrons need to be able to disaggregate as far down as the trp level. The limiting factor here is sustainment obviously. If we're serious about doing ADO then the tank sqn echelon needs to get even more robust and it may require some further depth in terms of C2. Currently the ech can support dispersed half sqns to an extent and their geographical dispersion would likely be a critical factor. The echelon needs to get to a point where operating like this is the norm and easily supported.
The LAV 6.0 is an issue. As discussed in other places on the form we need a more protected vehicle if we're going to survive against an enemy like the Russians. While I personally didn't have any problems I've been told by many that the difference between the LAV's mobility and the Leo's has been compounded by the 6.0. It's increased weight and the fact that it's turbo does not kick in like the LAV 3's did makes it less mobile. Generally, in Gagetown like terrain the LAV 6 is confined to tracks and roads to shake out at the very last moment in the assault. Don't even think about assuming tactical formations on the advance. The LAV needs improvements to its drivetrain to increase its mobility, and it needs an active protection system to increase its survivability. Additional armour and ERA could be considered understanding that the increased weight would have an impact on mobility. This could be mitigated by removing the turret, replacing it with some kind of RWS, and adopting APC TTPs.
With all the ISTAR assets out there the Coy/Cbt Tm needs an intel function. Likely something like a Company Int Support Tm of 2 or 3 dudes tops. In Major Combat the requirement for this will likely be reduced or at least the coy's ability to use it will be reduced due to tempo. Dual hatting the LAV Capt and perhaps his gunner or driver will probably work, or some other similar approach. During COIN or peace support, however, a dedicated, small, organization would pay dividends.
The paucity of IDF in the current CMBG structure means that integral mortars to the Cbt Tm would be very helpful. ISTAR will help us to to shape objectives prior to assault but as discussed this has yet to prevent the requirement for assaults, and assaults will need IDF. Mechanized mortars would be very helpful in this. This will make sub units more independent during ADO and not totally reliant on Bde guns during offensive operations when they might be busy supporting an adjacent unit.
We should be looking at explosive breaching. If we can breach with a line charge then why use a perfectly good tank ploughing through an active minefield. MICLICs are a good thing. Our complete lack of an under armour bridging capability is also a glaring fault.
Having said all this, the future cbt tm looks a lot like cbt tms of the past but it's not square. It will often feel light on armour if operating in open terrain against a mechanised enemy. It's likely a Coy with 1 or 2 trps attached or a sqn(-) with a platoon attached. No change with the attached FOO and engineer trp. It should have its own IDF capability, preferably able to fire from the vehicle. It requires robust echelons that can support dispersed operations that include operations at the half sqn size and perhaps below.
I suspect that much will depend upon the Cbt Tm's ability to operate in complex terrain. Our desire will be to operate outside of these areas but the enemy will seek to deny these areas from complex terrain through IDF and long range direct fire. We will be forced to fight there. In this environment what we might find the Cbt Tm lacking in is dismounted infantry. Seven dismounts (assuming no casualties, LOB, or HLTA) per section may feel pretty light when fighting through cities, forests, or mountainous terrain. In such terrain an additional armoured vehicle without additional dismounts will only be a liability.
