Close Combat Vehicle: Canada to buy another AFV (& keeping LAV III & TLAV)

[The Bread Guy]

I've got zero inside info, but even a casual viewing of "Yes, Minister" tells me there's more than one way to "cancel" a project.  Maybe even some that make it possible for someone speaking to a columnist to say, "no, it's not completely off the table ...."

 

[Kirkhill]

I've got zero inside info, but even a casual viewing of "Yes, Minister" tells me there's more than one way to "cancel" a project.  Maybe even some that make it possible for someone speaking to a columnist to say, "no, it's not completely off the table ...."

Hark! I hear a Royal Commission in the offing...... ;D

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Well contracts have been pulled from the table minutes before offering. So pretty much anything could happen. maybe Irving or a Quebec shipyard told them that they can build the CCV domestically.....

 

[The Bread Guy]

Well contracts have been pulled from the table minutes before offering. So pretty much anything could happen. maybe Irving or a Quebec shipyard told them that they can build the CCV domestically.....

Hark! I hear a Royal Commission in the offing...... ;D

Ya see?  Between these and  "an asteroid could hit the project team, killing them all and affecting project continuity", there's LOADS of loopholes in the "it's still a go" rationale ;D

 

[MilEME09]

just because its not cancelled, doesn't mean any one is actually working on it

 

[The Bread Guy]

1)  One take:

It's going to cost the Canadian Army more than planned to house new armoured vehicles, and commanders fear they won't be able to afford basic upkeep of the fleet in the future, internal government documents say.

Reports prepared for former associate defence minister Bernard Valcourt lay out in stark detail the pitfalls associated with the purchase of 108 close combat vehicles — a program whose future is being debated at the highest levels of the Harper government.

Defence sources say cabinet may be called upon to ultimately decide the fate of the $2.1-billion program, which has apparently already passed through the federal Treasury Board.

The vehicles were conceived at the height of the war in Afghanistan as the army looked for better protection from increasingly powerful roadside bombs and booby traps, but some critics now say the program's time has passed .... Specific questions were posed to National Defence about the future of the program, as well as the concerns outlined in the documents. Public Works provided a terse response: "We continue to work with the Department of National Defence on this file." ....

The Canadian Press, 10 Oct 13

2)  Another view - highlights mine ....

A Globe & Mail National Post columnist is sharing an interestingly-worded Tweet:

Rumours that the $2B Close Combat Vehicle program has been cancelled are greatly exaggerated. Story to come.

And here's his column, shared in accordance with the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act....

The Conservative government is said to be intent on avoiding another military procurement embarrassment, as it prepares a Throne Speech expected to overhaul the way Canada buys military equipment.

At the centre of the latest potential procurement controversy is the $2-billion contract to purchase 108 Close Combat Vehicles (CCVs) for the Canadian Army. The speculation in Ottawa is that the government has been urged by the army to cancel the deal to buy the armoured vehicles so that it can use the money to offset budget cuts.

However, senior government officials confirm that the process is still alive and there have been no talks between the departments of Public Works and National Defence to cancel it.

The other rumour in Ottawa is that the government’s project management board picked the winning bidder last March, but that the decision was overturned in favour of London, Ont.-based General Dynamics Land Systems Canada, after two southern Ontario ministers were appointed to the departments overseeing the acquisition — Rob Nicholson at Defence and Diane Finley at Public Works.

The other bidders are French company Nexter Systems and Anglo-Swedish defence contractor, BAE Systems Hagglunds.

But government sources say that there has been no re-evaluation of the bids since the spring.

The purchase of the CCVs is particularly touchy for the government, after the well-publicized problems with the F35 joint strike fighter and the three-decade process to replace the Sea King ship-borne helicopters.

The CCV procurement is already around two years late, after it was sent back to the drawing board in 2012 because none of the three medium-weight infantry support vehicles passed the Department of National Defence’s mandatory requirements.

The Conservatives re-issued a request for proposals and sources suggest that the government is determined to ensure a fair, smoothly run contest this time around — even as critics like the former chief of the defence staff, Rick Hillier, suggest the Forces don’t need CCVs because they will soon have upgraded LAV 111s that will be nearly as heavily armoured.

The CCV contract is scheduled to be discussed by Treasury Board next month, although officials say it may yet be derailed by the army’s insistence that the $2-billion would be better spent maintaining existing capabilities.

But there is pressure on the government to follow through with the contract, and ensure a competitive process, because the three bidders have each spent tens of millions of dollars over the last four years pitching their vehicles.

French president François Hollande is understood to have raised the CCV issue with Stephen Harper when the two men met, and the Prime Minister is said to have assured him the contest will be fair.

While General Dynamics Land Systems already has a manufacturing plant in London, the other bidders would be required to build their vehicles in Canada as part of the industrial and regional benefit offsets program. In addition, the in-service support over the 25 year life-span of the vehicles, which accounts for around half the cost, will be supplied by Canadian operations that partner with the winning bidder.

Proponents of the CCV say that Canada’s experience in Afghanistan, where we lost soldiers at three times the rate of many allies, proves that the LAVs are too light to protect against anti-tank mines. The CCV was identified as a way of bridging the gap between the LAV and the Leopard tanks that were bought by the military in 2007.

Next week’s Throne Speech is expected to promise the government will streamline the way it buys military gear. Michael Den Tandt of Postmedia News reported in February that the government is weighing whether to set up a new agency under a single minister, or a secretariat of bureaucrats from all the departments involved.

 

[Journeyman]

....government officials confirm that the process is still alive ......

Now that is eminently possible.  The acquisition is cancelled, but the cubicle-dwellers and retired-military "contractors" are still collecting their pay, beavering away......

 

[The Bread Guy]

Now that is eminently possible.  The acquisition is cancelled, but the cubicle-dwellers and retired-military "contractors" are still collecting their pay, beavering away......

Well said, Sir Humphrey!

 

[Kirkhill]

The Government has two problems.  One is the domestic politics issue.  The other is its credibility as a purchaser.

The first is easier to fix than the second.

To fix the first all that is necessary is to declare the obvious:  the system is so badly screwed up in process that it can't deliver what is needed when it is needed.  Arguably the CCV was necessary in 2006.  In 2006 there was a willing buyer and willing sellers.  Process got in the way.  By the time the Process was navigated there was no longer a need.

The process need to be fixed.  The Government can argue they are fixing it. Again. Until the next time.

The bigger problem is constantly burning vendors is not good practice.  Sooner or later they want to see some money spent.

 

[McG]

In 2006 there was a willing buyer and willing sellers. 

There was not a "buyer" until Jan 2008.  Right from the begining, we knew we would be out of Kandahar before CCV was delivered.

To fix the first all that is necessary is to declare the obvious:  the system is so badly screwed up in process that ....

In this case, I would argue that it was not process that fail.  Ill concieved requirements doomed the project regardless of what process might have been followed.  From the very start, the CCV project could only deliver the wrong thing or nothing.

 

[Kirkhill]

There was not a "buyer" until Jan 2008.  Right from the begining, we knew we would be out of Kandahar before CCV was delivered.
In this case, I would argue that it was not process that fail.  Ill concieved requirements doomed the project regardless of what process might have been followed.  From the very start, the CCV project could only deliver the wrong thing or nothing.

I'll take your point on the timing but I stand by my point on process.

It is my understanding that once the Leo 1s were fielded it was determined that the LAVs couldn't keep up in the final movements through the fields around the villages and compounds.  Initially that prompted the deployment of the TLAVs and the start of the search for something more robust.

My argument is that less time should have been spent sweating the details and a UOR issued to lease/buy/beg/borrow/steal 16 CV90s.  This would have filled a perceived gap immediately and also have allowed the unit to be observed in action and a determination made on incorporating it in the long term plan.

You did that with many other pieces of kit (M777 and MRAPs come to mind).  It was also the form for most of the other armies out there.  Everybody was looking at everybody else's kit to see what worked better than their's.  Everybody was buying/trading penny-packets of vehicles and trying out new and old kit in unconventional roles.

It was your version of the Spanish Civil War.

After the war rationalization occurs.  This is true after every war.  People look at the results and decide everybody should club their hair and march at 120 paces to the minute.

The Americans, Brits, Aussies... Scandinavians, Dutch, French, Germans.... they are all going through the same exercise that you lot are.  The difference is that they bought when they needed them and are divesting of those they don't.

The CCV project is one that filled a speculative gap, the lack of a tracked vehicle like the CV90, and was never proven in Canadian service.  Now you don't know if the gap existed, if the CV90 would have filled the gap, if it was a significantly useful piece of kit to justify taking it into the inventory in large or small numbers and supporting it.  Now you are back to the same sterile pre-war arguments about tracks and wheels, light and heavy, without the benefit of hard data that fielding a small number of vehicles in a "timely" (there's that word again) fashion.

Timeliness is a function of Process. 

 

[GnyHwy]

My argument is that less time should have been spent sweating the details and a UOR issued to lease/buy/beg/borrow/steal 16 CV90s.  This would have filled a perceived gap immediately and also have allowed the unit to be observed in action and a determination made on incorporating it in the long term plan.

Perceived is good choice of words.  We knew we needed something, we just weren't sure what, other than something better.  At the time, it would have been difficult to communicate those ideas expediently, hence the lengthy process of identifying capability gaps and writing requirements to fill those gaps.

I have a strong suspicion that if we had bought them, and tried to use them to their best ability, that we would have found very little difference other than a tilted or tainted opinion.  There would have been very little proof of concept, either good or bad.  The one thing that would have been proved is that we would have struggled to train persons and maintain them, which may have been a good reason to nix any UOR talk.

You did that with many other pieces of kit (M777 and MRAPs come to mind).  It was also the form for most of the other armies out there.  Everybody was looking at everybody else's kit to see what worked better than their's.  Everybody was buying/trading penny-packets of vehicles and trying out new and old kit in unconventional roles.

Those two pieces don't really help your argument.  The M777 is a howitzer that we knew we could take on relatively easily and it didn't need a proof of concept check.  The MRAP was bought expediently and now we are essentially giving them away, which is hardly a success story.

The Americans, Brits, Aussies... Scandinavians, Dutch, French, Germans.... they are all going through the same exercise that you lot are.  The difference is that they bought when they needed them and are divesting of those they don't.

Not sure about their processes.  If they are more agile, then maybe there is something to be learned, but I don't think buying and divesting with flavours of the year is good for anyone.

The CCV project is one that filled a speculative gap, the lack of a tracked vehicle like the CV90, and was never proven in Canadian service.  Now you don't know if the gap existed, if the CV90 would have filled the gap, if it was a significantly useful piece of kit to justify taking it into the inventory in large or small numbers and supporting it.  Now you are back to the same sterile pre-war arguments about tracks and wheels, light and heavy, without the benefit of hard data that fielding a small number of vehicles in a "timely" (there's that word again) fashion.

Timeliness is a function of Process.

The gap still exists and we have defined it quite accurately.  I agree with what MCG has eluded to, the CV90 can't fill it, just the same as the other bidders can't fill it; and being a track, believe it or not, doesn't have a lot to do with it.  It is just likely that the "real" solution would probably be a track.

If there was a fault in our process, it wasn't necessarily timeliness.  It was either setting our standards too high, or lowering those standards when no one came forward to try and achieve them.  Maybe both.

 

[Kirkhill]

Points taken Gunny but....

Perceived is good choice of words.  We knew we needed something, we just weren't sure what, other than something better.  At the time, it would have been difficult to communicate those ideas expediently, hence the lengthy process of identifying capability gaps and writing requirements to fill those gaps.

How long did it take to write up the UORs for the Gwagens and RG31s to replace the Iltis?  Did you know that you needed the G-Wagen and not something else?  Or was it just something, anything, better?  If so why was the RG31 rapidly fielded shortly after the Gwagen was introduced?  And didn't the RG31 go through a couple of iterations after it was fielded?

I have a strong suspicion that if we had bought them, and tried to use them to their best ability, that we would have found very little difference other than a tilted or tainted opinion.  There would have been very little proof of concept, either good or bad.  The one thing that would have been proved is that we would have struggled to train persons and maintain them, which may have been a good reason to nix any UOR talk.

Again, that didn't seem to be a problem with Gwagens and RG31s.  Nor Leo 2s, LAV-RWS, anything with an RWS, nor AHSVS.  Nor the M777 or even the CH-47D.  Workarounds were found.

Those two pieces don't really help your argument.  The M777 is a howitzer that we knew we could take on relatively easily and it didn't need a proof of concept check.  The MRAP was bought expediently and now we are essentially giving them away, which is hardly a success story.

If I understand correctly you were the first force to field the M777 in action.  So while it wasn't a proof of concept issue where was the CF's  knowledge base on operations and maintenance of the system?  As to the MRAP, is it necessarily a bad thing to buy, try and divest, in a timely fashion, rather than ponder imponderables indefinitely?  You bought it. You tried it.  It field some gaps and left some others.  It may not have been any better than the LAVs but it extended the life of the LAV fleet if nothing else.  And maybe it saved a life or two in the process.  It does seem to have had an impact on the LAV upgrade programme with the decision to fit all the LAVs with V bottoms.

Not sure about their processes.  If they are more agile, then maybe there is something to be learned, but I don't think buying and divesting with flavours of the year is good for anyone.

The Brits went through the Landrover, the Snatch Landrover, the Pinzgauer, a whole kennel of dogs (Jackal 1 and 2, Coyote, Bulldog, Mastiff, Wolfhound, Foxhound .....) the BvS10 and the Warthog, not to mention re-engineered FV432s and Scimitars trying to sort out their problems.  The Dutch bought Aussie kit, the Danes bought Canadian kit and the Yanks bought whatever they could get their hands on.  Which pretty much replicates WW1, WW2 and Korea.

Planning is over-rated.  Once you get to the 70% solution that is as good as you are going to get.  Accountants detest that fact but it doesn't make it any less of a reality.

The gap still exists and we have defined it quite accurately.  I agree with what MCG has eluded to, the CV90 can't fill it, just the same as the other bidders can't fill it; and being a track, believe it or not, doesn't have a lot to do with it.  It is just likely that the "real" solution would probably be a track.

I take your point on the utility of a heavier solution than the CV90.  But how do you get it to the field?  Or, like the old time trebuchets, do we assemble lego blocks in theater to create monsters?

If there was a fault in our process, it wasn't necessarily timeliness.  It was either setting our standards too high, or lowering those standards when no one came forward to try and achieve them.  Maybe both.

We can agree here on this:  Flexibility is not quality enjoyed by government planners.

 

[McG]

How long did it take to write up the UORs for the Gwagens ... ? 

GWagons were not UORs.

And didn't the RG31 go through a couple of iterations after it was fielded?

We only did one buy and that is vehicle that served until we left Kandahar and it is the vehicle still in Kabul.

The CCV project was never a UOR.  Your arguments based on it being a UOR don't hold up.  From the start of the project there was no idea that this vehicle would see Afghanistan.  It would be yet another platform in the permanent fleet.

 

[Kirkhill]

GWagons were not UORs.
We only did one buy and that is vehicle that served until we left Kandahar and it is the vehicle still in Kabul.

The CCV project was never a UOR.  Your arguments based on it being a UOR don't hold up.  From the start of the project there was no idea that this vehicle would see Afghanistan.  It would be yet another platform in the permanent fleet.

I will stand corrected on the Gwagons and the RG31.  But surely that makes the process case stronger?  Apparently the Gwagons could be delivered in a timely fashion without the benefit of the UOR.  Therefore delay does not have to be endemic in the conventional process, if all the horses are pulling in the same direction.  You have to admit, that regardless of the forms used, for a period of time, kit deemed necessary was being sourced and delivered expeditiously.  Therefore, it is possible.  It may not thrill the Auditor-General or the good burghers of Canada and Westmount but it is possible.

As to the CCV:  I know it wasn't a UOR, and I screwed up if I made it sound like that.  My argument is that one way the advocates of the CCV project generally, and the CV90 in particular, could have advanced their cause would have been to make arrangements to acquire a limited number of vehicles for a limited time to see if it was a fit*.  It seems to me as if many projects were advanced in exactly that manner over the last decade or so. 

I agree that the proliferation of mini-micro-fleets would have, and probably did, increase some aspects of the maintenance and logistics burden in Afghanistan.  But it also provided valuable insight into capabilities, how they might be employed and which should be retained.

I have no special brief for the CCV, in any of its guises.  I am a continuing fan of "horses for courses" and so I see the merit in having a variety of tools at hand.  But equally I understand that on occasion you are better off using what is available, even if it operates outside its design envelope, rather than wishing for something you don't have and may only use once.

*to the topic - I know the Danes deployed CV9035s to Afghanistan in 2010, and the Norwegians deployed them as early as 2007.    Did Canadians have an opportunity to operate with them or alongside them or glean any information from the way allies employed them in similar operations and terrain that the Canadians experienced?

 

[a_majoor]

The IDF looks at how to deal with issues of deploying armoured forces in close terrain and comes up with an alternative solution to the CCV (although this article does not say how they use the HAPC's they do have in this construct). Perhaps rethinking the question will come up with different solutions (not necessarily a solution like this). Thanks to SMA for pointing this article out on another thread:

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131029/DEFREG04/310290016/Israel-Revamps-Armored-Units-Urban-Brush-Battles

Israel Revamps Armored Units for Urban, Brush Battles
Oct. 29, 2013 - 01:05PM  |  By BARBARA OPALL-ROME  |  Comments

TEL AVIV — Starting next month, select draftees inducted into Israel’s Armored Corps will undergo training for eventual deployment in new multi-discipline companies designed to support future battalions of main battle tanks (MBTs).

The new specialty companies, each composed of reconnaissance, observation and mortar platoons, will form an integral part of future armored battalions, which consist of two active-duty MBT companies and a third MBT company from the Israel Defense Force (IDF) reserves.

The merger of traditional infantry missions into Israel’s future armored order of battle is part of an Army-wide revamp aimed at retiring older-model Merkava MBTs and optimizing Israel’s maneuvering ground forces for urban and heavily forested arenas.

Under the plan, mortar platoons will be equipped with Keshet, an M113-based, autonomous, self-propelled 120mm mortar by Elbit Systems, according to Brig. Gen. Shmuel Olansky, IDF chief armor officer.

“We’re building in every battalion of the Armored Corps a supporting company of infantry equipped with Keshet, which knows how to provide destructive firepower at a high rate,” Olansky said in a report posted Oct. 24 on the IDF’s Hebrew-language website.

New mortar platoons, together with new reconnaissance and observation platoons, will operate “shoulder-to-shoulder” with MBT battalions, Olansky said.

In an interview with Shachar Ruppin of the IDF spokesman’s office, Olansky said budget cuts and changing battle conditions were driving the revamp, which will allow the retirement of older-model MBTs as it brings on new infantry support cadres.

“Retirement of older tanks is a process that is being implemented after lengthy discussions and simulations,” Olansky said. “It allows us, in parallel, to equip ourselves with essential combat support elements.”

Maj. Arieh Berger, operations officer for the Armored Corps’ first brigade slated for the revamp, said infantry support elements will be equipped with advanced command-and-control systems for rapid transfer of targeting data to armored formations. The revamp, he said, will maximize the IDF’s ability to operate in closed and built-up areas.

“There are no more battles where tanks face off against other tanks on an exposed hill,” Berger said in the IDF-posted story. “These new forces will be able to direct tank battalions between homes of villages or into brush, according to our needs.”

Creating integrated combined arms units an evolution I see happening in all armies, and this is one path that can take the forces down that road as well.

 

[PanaEng]

Program to be cancelled or postponed indefinitely:
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/government-won-t-buy-new-2b-armoured-vehicles-for-army-1.2470689

Fixed link - mods

 

[Jarnhamar]

It's not clear whether the government will announce tomorrow that it has cancelled the program, or whether it will simply run out the clock and allow the program to die once current industry bids expire on Dec. 23

And because it's Christmas, the three contenders will wait until January to sue the government.

 

[MilEME09]

And because it's Christmas, the three contenders will wait until January to sue the government.

Agreed its plain as day to see the defense industry is getting really sick of Canada's shit so to speak. I would be surprised if companies stopped bidding on Canadian contracts until a change of government

 

[NavyShooter]

Would a change of government also result in a change of our procurement system???

I think not....that would require a bit more housecleaning than just changing around the Members of Parliament...

NS