Close Area Suppression Weapon (was Company Area Suppression Weapon)

[CG440]

Good Day,

I am the project director for the CASW.

I read all the posts in here.  Some are well written and very interesting.

Here is a bit of background.  In 2000, a capability deficiency record was initiated to address the obsolescence of the 60mm for which there are no spare parts and that cannot handle the high pressure of modern mortar rounds.  The 60mm we've been using (the M19) dates back to WW2 and didn't go through any life extension program.  It was in fact almost forgotten after the Korean War when we used the 81mm heavily.  It remained in our arsenal and saw a bit of revival in the late 80s as a mean of providing smoke and illum.  It really came back in favor when we went to Afghanistan for one reason: It's the only integral indirect weapon our infantry is left with.

We lost the 81mm platoon in our battalions five years ago and the tubes were sent to the artillery.  Both the infantry and the artillery are not extremely happy with this but it seems that dollars and person/year constraints were the driving factors.  There are now efforts towards regaining and improving indirect capabilities for the infantry.  This is the background on why the 60mm is sometimes perceived as essential.  It may not be the best tool but it is the only one available now in the units.  The M19 is now obsolete and unsustainable and we have to retire it.  Considering the advances of other types of weapons and the possibility of reintegrating the indirect fire at battalion level, we think it is not worth replacing it with another similar one.

The operational research looked at the options for replacing the old 60mm and it was found that a 40mm high velocity round was stable enough to actually be fired in both direct and indirect modes.  The key was getting a FCS that could compute both direct and indirect solutions and a round that would not self-destruct in the air because of the long flight times.  The ability to use programmable airburst rounds in direct fire also allows us to put rounds through windows and clear walls, corners and dead ground in complex terrain – This is a major consideration.  These issues have been resolved and there are companies out there that are ready to provide the system.  Because of the enhanced capabilities of the AGL/FCS system, we found that there was too many overlap in capabilities to keep a 60mm mortar in service.  Furthermore, the 60mm does not provide modern features like IR observation and airburst that we want to see in our new weapons.  Also, it was found that most rounds fired by the 60mm in theatre where
still smoke and illum.  This capability will be taken over by the introduction of new Carl Gustaf rounds.  The effects of the remaining HE fired just don't compare with other options available like the Carl Gustaf with airburst ammunition.  The fact is that the 60mm is just not killing much unless you get a good direct hit.

The CASW and the new CG ammo are designed to provide supremacy in the company area of influence that we figure as a 1500-2000m radius.  Using a mortar is not the preferred way when you have a direct line of sight or a mean to get at protected targets within those ranges.  Beyond those ranges, you usually need to have forward observation and you fall in the true indirect fire realm.  Insertion into an integrated indirect fire plan would have to be considered.  This alone is a huge doctrinal consideration as the ranges for long 60s reaches the 6km mark and full fire controller training is required.  We do not want to see an infantry platoon crew served weapon team burdened with this...  The application of heavy and meaningful indirect fire and air support is a specialty in itself.  They do massive damage and they carry the ammo to do it.  The low weight for the 60mm is the usual selling point but if you factor the real numbers of rounds to achieve suppression/destruction you soon find out that it is not that clear cut.

That is long-winded but that's just to explain why we are not eager to maintain a 60mm at this point.  I won’t bore you with the national procurement cap imperatives that forces us to retire old systems to introduce a new ones.  A modern AGL will serve us better in the long run.  That being said, if we were pushed hard, through an unforeseen operational requirement for example, it would be possible to buy a weapon for a specific mission.  There are special provisions associated with those kind of purchases that allows us to avoid the national procurement cap for the length of the mission.

The statement of operational requirement has been signed by the Commander of the Army and the Extended Infantry Advisory Board supports the CASW.  The CASW project is still going ahead and is the process of securing funding for implementation.

Let's start a new topic if there is interest in this.

I will check the forums from time to time and update this thread as things are moving along.

Cheers.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

"That is long-winded but that's just to explain why we are not eager to maintain a 60mm at this point."

Who is "we"?  So your saying that 2 weapon systems will do the job of the ONE its replacing?  I'll let the more eloqunet expand on your thoughts but I think the Carl G firing Illum rounds in leu of the 60 mm isn't right but I guess its the only solution.

Also what happens when the Carl G is replaced as our anti armour wpn?  Will we be getting for example a Javlin that fires Illum?

 

[ArmyRick]

Javelin is specifically an anti-armour weapon where as there are numerous types of 84mm ammunition avalible (canister, HE, HEAT, ILLUM, HEDP, etc, etc).

The one question I have had though is how do you angle the carl g with illumn rounds, fire it and not have the backblast launch you off the ground?

before anyone jumps on me, I have alot of expirience with 84mm Carl G.

I am still a fan of the 60mm mortar but the Cg440 does bring up some good points. It would take alot of rounds to get on target and unless they are troops in the open, the effect on target would not be the same.

(Put helmets on, I'm gonna brag!) Now, given that I have used the 60mm alot, I know i can get on target usually within 2-5 rounds. But then again thats simply alot of expirience with the old bad boys.

 

[vonGarvin]

The CASW is a direct fire weapon that is both unproven in combat and cannot replace a high trajectory weapon that the 60mm is.  I understand that a CASW would be awesome, but it ain't no mortar.  The 60, though old, can certainly be "replaced" with new barrels.  Simple fix to a simple problem.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

I understand that a CASW would be awesome, but it ain't no mortar.  The 60, though old, can certainly be "replaced" with new barrels.  Simple fix to a simple problem.

Exactly.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

M224 60mm Light Mortar

 

[RCR Grunt]

Someone out there makes a perfect replacement for the good ol' 60.....

Israeli 60mm Mortar Family

Perhaps we should look into this ... or maybe we already have... (cue suspenseful music track)

 

[dapaterson]

Don't forget one key constraint:  Money.  As mentioned, the national procurement budget (that pays for repairs, refurbishment and life extensions for weapons, along with the ammunition to fire) is in a world of hurt.  So bringing in new systems is a non-starter unless you're willing to give up something else, or at least reduce its capability significantly.  From a practical standpoint we can't sustain everything we want - so we have to pick and choose.

It's easy to arm-chair quarterback and say "Gimme everything".  Not gonna happen.  So we have to prioritize and make choices:  40mm ammo for the CASW or 60mm ammo for the mortars?  Which system will we have parts to fix?  Which system will we have techs available to fix?

Or which other systems are you willing to do without?

 

[vonGarvin]

Don't forget one key constraint:  Money.  As mentioned, the national procurement budget (that pays for repairs, refurbishment and life extensions for weapons, along with the ammunition to fire) is in a world of hurt.  So bringing in new systems is a non-starter unless you're willing to give up something else, or at least reduce its capability significantly.  From a practical standpoint we can't sustain everything we want - so we have to pick and choose.

It's easy to arm-chair quarterback and say "Gimme everything".  Not gonna happen.  So we have to prioritize and make choices:  40mm ammo for the CASW or 60mm ammo for the mortars?  Which system will we have parts to fix?  Which system will we have techs available to fix?

Or which other systems are you willing to do without?

Very good point.  Given the restrictions on funding, I would stick with the .50 for direct fire out to 2000 (+/-) m, refurbish the 60, and we already have the techs.  Heck, I mean, when arty tubes fire off their max EFCs, they get new tubes.  Same with tank barrels.  Same with rifles.  Same with pistols.  Why not the same with 60s when it has been proven SO WORTHY in combat over the past two years?

 

[dapaterson]

But we're not replacing all the barrels.  We're adopting concepts like whole fleet management because we can't afford everything We don't have the money.  The state of the NP budget is atrocious, and getting worse.  We've already got more than we can support; if we go forward with CASW we'll have to give up some things.  If we don't, we'll have to give up less.

 

[vonGarvin]

But we're not replacing all the barrels.  We're adopting concepts like whole fleet management because we can't afford everything We don't have the money.  The state of the NP budget is atrocious, and getting worse.  We've already got more than we can support; if we go forward with CASW we'll have to give up some things.  If we don't, we'll have to give up less.

Then I say stay with the known (60s) and forget the unknown (CASW), in order to keep more of the stuff that works (and has been proven to work)\

 

[Michael OLeary]

As some are aware, I am a fan of mortars.  Admittedly, I’ve only been a fan of mortars since first learning to lay the 81 in late 1979.  I have remained quiet throughout much of the mortar debate here, primarily because I’ve spent a lot of time in the past 25 years seeing pro-mortar arguments fall on deaf ears.

The “60”, in particular, has always been the red-headed step-child throughout my career.  When I took basic infantry training at Aldershot in the summer of 1979, it was being “phased out” and there was no ammo available for us to fire it.  It came back into use and training the next year, but was one it way out again in 1983 when I was taking Phase II officer training (and again didn’t fire it).  Oddly enough here we are, 25+ years later and that worn out weapon system is still in use and deployed on operations.

Personally, I continued to get my mortar ‘fix’ with the 81, teaching it as a Reserve NCO, taking my Advanced Mortar Course as a Reg F officer and then both commanding a mortar platoon and being SME Mortars at the Infantry School.  While at the school it came to light that some units were dragging the old 60 bipods and baseplates out of QM basements and using them in training.  I delivered a proposal to the Cmdt of the school at the time, offering to undertake rewriting mortar drills for the system (since the bipod was not the same as the 81’s and the sight was fundamentally different).  I was told to stand down because (1) the 60 belonged to the small arms wing and not mortars, and (2) the use of the 60 bipod was “not in our doctrine.”  Sadly, an ignored  doctrine trumps reality, and we missed an opportunity then to start a credible move toward a “family of mortars” training system.

Throughout much of my career I found that many in the infantry did not understand mortars or indirect fire concepts beyond the basics needed for training course. (CG440, don’t take that as an insult, it’s just the reality of my personal experience as a strong proponent of mortars for nearly 30 years.)  I suspect this is undergoing a radical change with increasing experience overseas (but this does not necessarily include everyone in the current acquisition programs).  Unlike the US Infantry, where it seemed every issue of their journal had a brief article on the actual employment of mortars, any similar discussions in the Canadian Army were non-existent.  Those who chose to “play” with mortars were allowed to; otherwise most commanders simply left issues of indirect fire to be sorted out by their BCs and FOOs.

The 60 vs. CASW is an awkward debate, generally being participated in by long-time fans of proven systems arguing against those who chose not to understand mortar capabilities and who seek to bring in a new system.  And new is always better, right?

The 60 and CASW both provide close fire support, each can provide, to one degree or, another direct or indirect fires. (In this context, I use the term “direct fires” in reference to those where the weapon operator can see his target, it is not in relation to the relative height of trajectory.)

Comparison of the weapons often falls into relative merits of the “low-tech”, “old, “worn-out” mortar versus the “high-tech”, “advanced technology”, automatic CASW.  Notably we don’t see any credible explanation why the groups examining this issue have not examined in detail the option of new light mortar systems, along with the sighting and fire control technologies that have been developed in the 40-50 years since we adopted the M19. This includes the extended range bands of newer ammunition and barrel combinations.

Similarly, we haven’t seen any realistic data on comparative dismounted movement of the CASW, mean time between failures for the equipment, or the maintenance requirements for weapon and FCS.

Perhaps most important of all, we have seen no detailed analysis of comparative logistic costs to place the same effective neutralizing weight of fire on a given target. Regardless of which system has the “better bullet”, the real measure in suppressive fire is what can be achieved with the same weight/bulk/cost of ammo, because delivery of ordnance (whether by truck, by hel or on foot) can easily be the determining factor in what will give the commander the best effect.  I seem to remember that “effects based operations” is on the current staff buzz-words card, right?

Admittedly, I haven’t been to Afghanistan, and am unlikely to go.  I am willing to accept the opinion of those who have been there as a baseline for further study.  I know mortars and I admit to a bias in that direction.  I don’t ‘know’ the CASW, but am willing to be convinced if the right information and demonstrations can be provided, and that they are effective enough to convince my combat experienced fellow infantry soldiers and officers.  Does every single one need to be convinced? No, certainly not, there will always be hold-outs.  But it does stand to reason that if the CASW program is having difficulty changing the opinions of most of the experienced mortar guys as well as those new to mortars with recent operational experience, then it is perhaps time to revisit the first principles of the case and find out where the analysis and explanations (if not the facts of the case) have gone wrong.

Remember, the Ross rifle also presented well to the Commanders and in controlled demonstrations too during the acquisition stage, but it had some slight difficulties under field conditions in the hands of the troops whose lives depended on it.  Is the CASW a Ross rifle equivalent? . . , I highly doubt that. But there could be lessons to be found there in the transition from manufacturers glossies, through controlled demonstrations on the way to operational employment.  If we generalize that the CASW is “replacing” the 60, it will only take one failure of the system to do something the 60 could have done effectively to completely undermine confidence in the weapon system.

 

[McG]

Also what happens when the Carl G is replaced as our anti armour wpn?  Will we be getting for example a Javlin that fires Illum?

PMEWS (not ALAWS) will be the Carl replacement.  PAAWS will be the M72 replacement.  If anything, ALAWS will/must replace Eryx (because apparently we can no longer get the ammunition). 

 

[Kirkhill]

PMEWS?

I assume Multi-Effects Weapons System but the P? Personal? Platoon? Primary? Preferred?

 

[KevinB]

Well all I can add if I have seen a Mk19 used ineffectually against an insurgent mortar position and the team needed to go to their 60mm (not a Cdn unit). 

I'm a hige 40mm AGL fan - but I cannot accept the "fact" that a system needs to be withdrawn to add one.  Its assinine and comepetely ignorant of asymetrical warfare.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Whatever happened to the KISS rule.  Esp in a time of war.  The .50 Cal has been around longer then most on this board.  It is a simple, effective design and has remained relatively unchanged during its life time.  The 60mm is also a simple design that has proved effective.  Tube, lever, firing pin.  Add a C2 sight, bi pod and base plate and your very effective.  No batteries, no worries of the elements.  Now we are replacing a simple, proven system with one that has a spanky fire control system.  We all know that something with all the high speed shiny features tend to fail sooner then the robust simple system.  I personally would rather see the 60 retained with new tubes and more money directed to new optics for the LAV as well as a STAB RWS for all the vehicles that are using the RWS.  I do realize that the money isn't allocated like that however I think we have more pressing issues then adding a system that seems to compliment the 50 not replacing the 60.

 

[vonGarvin]

Very well stated, quag.  About the RWS, it is "fitted for, but not with" stab.  Making it stab (on the Kongsberg, anyway) would only add to its effectiveness.

 

[tomahawk6]

My problem with the CASW concept is that comparing it to a mortar is apples to oranges. The CASW is much heavier than the mortar it seeks to replace. It will require much more ammunition which adds to the weight issue. In Canadian service I see this weapon as primarily vehicle mounted. Hauling a 75 pound crew served weapon w/ ammo/sights around the mountains of Afghanistan or anywhere else just will slow the infantry down. Fielding infantry weapons should be all about weight and reducing the burden on the infantry who already have pack loads of 100 pounds. Now if this weapon is to be mounted on a vehicle then that negates my weight argument until the infantry has to go somewhere the vehicle cant.

The US Army M224 Mortar fires the newer ammunition with a max range of almost 3500 meters.

http://www.army.mil/factfiles/equipment/indirect/m224.html

Finally this entire project claims to replace an obsolete weapon with a modern one. Cost is claimed to be a consideration,but if that were true the CF would simply buy the M224 and save money. The replacement cost of the M224 is under $11,000. The US MK19 was purchased for the NG at a cost of around $15,000. The MK 47 that the SF uses in Afghanistan/Iraq I am sure is at least that much money. Neither version has the range of the 60mm mortar.Bottom line the CF wants to replace one system that is not as capable as the so called obsolete system and weighs more to boot.

Here's a thought buy the M224 and CASW. Mount the CASW on various vehicles and give the infantry a new 60mm mortar. The cost of doing both isnt huge since you arent equiping more than 9 mortars per battalion. NDHQ wastes more money than that in a week [same with DoD]. There would be more cost to the CASW as it would probably end up on engineer vehicles, trucks ect. The infantry can do without CASW but cannot do without their 60's.

 

[Infanteer]

Good Day,

I am the project director for the CASW.

I read all the posts in here.  Some are well written and very interesting.

Good day, welcome to the forums and thanks for taking the time to explain the project.

That is long-winded but that's just to explain why we are not eager to maintain a 60mm at this point.  I won’t bore you with the national procurement cap imperatives that forces us to retire old systems to introduce a new ones.  A modern AGL will serve us better in the long run.

I've seen the studies done and the briefings at the IAB.  I will qualify my position now.  I am not a mortarman.  I am one of Mr O'Leary's "amateurs".  I do not hold any advanced qualifications on any mortar system.  I was taught the basics of the 60mm as both an Infantryman and an Infantry Officer, as well as getting a lesson on employing the 60mm with the sight. bipod and baseplate.  I do not have a stake in this.

However, like Mr O'Leary, I am concerned by what I see.  The following points he raised need, in my opinion, to be answered to justify the statement that "a modern AGL will serve us better in the long run":

Comparison of the weapons often falls into relative merits of the “low-tech”, “old, “worn-out” mortar versus the “high-tech”, “advanced technology”, automatic CASW.  Notably we don’t see any credible explanation why the groups examining this issue have not examined in detail the option of new light mortar systems, along with the sighting and fire control technologies that have been developed in the 40-50 years since we adopted the M19. This includes the extended range bands of newer ammunition and barrel combinations.

Similarly, we haven’t seen any realistic data on comparative dismounted movement of the CASW, mean time between failures for the equipment, or the maintenance requirements for weapon and FCS.

Perhaps most important of all, we have seen no detailed analysis of comparative logistic costs to place the same effective neutralizing weight of fire on a given target. Regardless of which system has the “better bullet”, the real measure in suppressive fire is what can be achieved with the same weight/bulk/cost of ammo, because delivery of ordnance (whether by truck, by hel or on foot) can easily be the determining factor in what will give the commander the best effect.  I seem to remember that “effects based operations” is on the current staff buzz-words card, right?

I've humped the 60 before; used it in both the Platoon dismounted role (Platoon commander's hip-pocket indirect fire) and the Company dismounted role (Coy "Mortar Group" of 3-4 tubes) - granted, not on a two-way range.  I'm also a former machine-gunner, and since the 40mm-AGL is essentially a large machine gun with specialized ammo, I think this comes into play.

1.  Doctrinally, where does the 40mm AGL sit in our organization?  I ask because I really cannot see a place for it in either the mounted or dismounted roles.

     a.  If our Infantry Companies are mounted in the LAVIII, they have an exceptional 25mm stabilized turret.  I can't see a AGL being mounted on the pintle due to its size and due to the fact that it will compete with (and lose to) the 25mm for ammo storage.  So are we going to have this big AGL in the back of a LAV to pull out if we need to lob a few rounds high angle to hit a target that the 25mm cannot punch?  Considering this is a tripod mounted weapon with a sophisticated fire control system, due you think that a mechanized platoon or company rolling along is going to have the time to employ this?  Manpower, along with space, also becomes an issue; two men can easily employ a mortar and pack it up and revert to riflemen by slinging the 60 onto their back in minimal time - an AGL takes three guys out of the picture.

     b.  Okay, how about a dismounted platoon or company?  An AGL is huge; looking at the pictures, the .50 cal was very unpleasant to hump in the dismounted role (thankfully, something I never had to do).  If we got a patrol moving through the mountains or jungle, you want them to hump this thing?  And the ammo?  Ever played with a can of 25mm rounds or a bandoleer of 40mm grenades?  Very awkward and very heavy.  Mortar bombs are fairly light and easy to break down within the company.  Conversely, a broken down 40mm belt is awkward and heavy (the link is the real killer in the heavier rounds) and, as with any machine-gun, continually breaking and relinking is liable to cause damage to the link and increase your rate of stoppages and misfeeds.  Having fumbled around with 25mm link, I can only imagine how un-fun 40mm link must be.  To be honest, I don't really see a dismounted role for this thing.

2.  The most likely method of employment will be on the LPV (RG-31), attached to the remote weapon station.  This is similar to how the Americans employ their AGLs - in a mix with .50 cal M2's on Humvees and other light vehicles.  This is great, and is a "nice to have" that I'd like to see.  However, as others have said, this is apples and oranges.  An AGL mounted on a remote weapon station does not seem to be a replacement for a lightweight mortar tube.  Is this relatively narrow method of employment really a good justification to do away with a weapon system like a 60mm mortar which is quite versatile?

3.  Has any consideration been given to the fact that we are putting our Infantry "indirect fire" eggs into a very sophisticated basket.  To achieve the results that the studies of your program lays out, the AGL requires a sophisticated fire-control system and programmable ammunition.  Having worked with all things sophisticated in the infantry (radios, sat phones, MNVGs, WES-gear, etc, etc) I can tell you that a safe maxim is "the more complicated a thing is, the more chances there are for it to break down when you really need it" or, more simply, Murphy's Law.  As another person mentioned, the idea of tube, pin and trigger with simple bomb is pretty foolproof.  The 60mm mortar has been much improved over the years - it's a bit unfair to compare it to the one we use today.  That's like comparing a modern assault rifle to an Enfield - not even, as the 60mm is a mortar tube and the 40mm AGL is essentially a machine-gun.  Why don't we consider a new 60mm mortar?

     All in all, I remain unconvinced that "a modern AGL will serve us better in the long run" - I've looked at the presentations and the studies and there are big holes that lead to questions - questions that have been asked here.  This whole thing reminds me of the Mobile Gun System/Main Battle Tank debate that plagued the Armoured Corps a few years back.  The MGS had some value (The Americans employ them today), but was not a tank.  We wasted time and money and did a nice pirouette and ended up with an MBT.  Until I see these questions answered, I remain unconvinced that a jacked-up machine gun, while nice to have, can take over an indirect suppressive role from a mortar.  Something else is at play here....

 

[daftandbarmy]

Bottom line - if the 40mm CASW can't root the enemy out because it can't reach far enough or get into the holes they're hiding in, infantry will have to do it at close quarters with grenades/M203. Or, they'll have to wait until other suitable indirect fire assets are available. This could lead to more casualties, a much higher demand on limited 81mm/arty/air resources, or mission failure.