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Close Air Support in the CF: Bring back something like the CF-5 or introduce something with props?

suffolkowner said:
wow, that's impressive and a good thing. Is that specifically for transitioning to the F-35 or in general? I had read that the F-35 was an easy plane to fly

All modern fighters are relatively easy to fly.  Fighting (ie: managing the systems and the formation) is what makes it difficult.  A lot of the skills required to fly and fight the Hornet are transferable to the JSF.  Most of the tactical things can be effectively learned in the sim.
 
GK .Dundas said:
Actually the one thing that doesn't get mentioned much is that the UH 1 Y are almost all new builds .
It seems that Marines are play fast and loose with this programme.

You say that like it is a bad thing.

Edit: And thanks Max.

 
Just a quick google around the multiverse got me this graph of Power vs Weight for some of the helicopters under discussion.

See attachment below.

Ready for corrections.
 

Attachments

SupersonicMax said:
All modern fighters are relatively easy to fly.  Fighting (ie: managing the systems and the formation) is what makes it difficult.  A lot of the skills required to fly and fight the Hornet are transferable to the JSF.  Most of the tactical things can be effectively learned in the sim.

Do you think that having an opportunity to fly an aircraft like the A-29 on a part time basis after doing a full time stint as a pilot would appeal to many in the fighter pilot community?
 
Chris, I'm not sure where the 36 CH-147F and AH came from...I don't think that's feasible, and the mix isn't right.  Like Loachman alluded too, if we had the luxury, we'd have a blend.  If I were king for a day, I'd have 16 Chinooks, 24-32 AH and 48 UH (UH-60 class).  One Chinook unit, two AH and three(four?) Utility Squadrons.  Utility will do the greatest number of rounds, so you want them to have the greatest rotational depth.  The Chinooks may go out at sub-unit level and likely even section-level for sustained ops, so 4-6 aircraft non-surge is about as much as the unit could support on an ongoing basis.  AH should not be tied to specific numbers of escorted/protected CH/UH, but rather from how much AH capacity is required for the Area of Operations and the threat level to provide a secure means of the CH and UH o operate.  Loachman could probably provide more about that bit, but something in between the CH and UH fleet sizes is about right for what Canada could put out the door as a sustained combat-capable middle-power force if it were firing on all cylinders (which it isn't at the moment.)

:2c:

Cheers
G2G
 
Thanks G2G

The 36 CH147s came from the senate report.  As did the two conflicting statements:  "24 AH"  and "One AH per escorted CH-147"

"The government should consider a plan to keep 40 Griffons in place, and add to our helicopter
fleet 24 new attack helicopters, one to protect each Chinook, while on deployment. " p.16

"AIRFORCE INVESTMENTS (Page 13)
The air defence of the continent and the provision of an effective Air Force capability are
core requirements for the defence of Canada. A number of specific investments should be
made to support the Royal Canadian Air Force as defence spending is increased to the
required 2% of GDP by 2028. The committee recommends that these steps include:
• the renewal of the current North Warning System which is now some 30 years old;
an increase of the fighter jet fleet to 120 jets in order to meet the government’s
declared objective to defend Canada while simultaneously meeting our NORAD and
NATO commitments;

• replacement of the current fleet of air-refuelling tankers in order to support fighter jets;
• replacing the Griffon helicopter fleet with non-civilian, medium-to-heavy-lift military
helicopters with sufficient speed and lift capacity to support military needs;
increasing the number of heavy-lift helicopters to 36; and
adding new capabilities, such as a fleet of 24 attack helicopters to protect the current
Chinook helicopter fleet and our military personnel
. "  Executive Summary p vii

I also highlighted the fighter call.  If the rules have changed to NORAD AND NATO as opposed to NORAD OR NATO then the "requirement" is not 65, or even 83 but, apparently, 120.

But all of these questions are "how long is a piece of string" questions.  As long as you need it.  As long as you want it.  Are we deploying a Baltic Air Patrol, a Kosovo Squadron, a Gulf War 1 Wing or 1 CAD?
 
suffolkowner said:
My point wasn't really about the cost of the F-35 but it's cost versus the alternatives

What difference does cost make if the machine purchased cannot do the job required in a high-threat environment? We still require air defence aircraft, so that would add the costs and penalties of two fleets vice one.

suffolkowner said:
Yes, and we already have 24 Tutors, 25 Harvards, and 16 Hawks that have never fired a shot in anger

The Tutors entered service at the same time as the Sea Kings. They have no hard points for weapons, and are underpowered for an armed role. The Malaysian light attack version had a more powerful engine. Parts are scarce, so aircraft are cannibalized to keep the Snowbirds flying. The Snowbirds have a higher priority than some operational fleets.

We do not own the Harvards and Hawks. If we did, and re-roled those, what, then, would be used as trainers?

suffolkowner said:
a manned aircraft may be preferable 

If one wants to carry effective loads and do combatty things, then manned aircraft will be essential for quite some time to come.
 
Chris Pook said:
The CH-146 uses a TwinPak PT6T-3D(??) that puts out something like 932 kW total according to Wiki and that engine can keep a total mass of 5355 kg in the air until the gas runs out.

Can you use real units of measure like pounds and horsepower?

And keep this thread on topic?
 
suffolkowner said:
Yes, and we already have 24 Tutors, 25 Harvards, and 16 Hawks that have never fired a shot in anger
But that is not the cost of what you are proposing.  Those are training platforms.  Even if you replace them all with a common platform capable of dropping bombs, you still have not created the capability that you want.  Your common platform replacement would have to be taken away from its primary job to go fight an enemy that could be handled by more capable aircraft with the sole job of killing things.  If you really want a cheap aircraft to throw bombs at things, then you need to buy more and create a squadron with the mission to operate those aircraft in the combat role.  You need to allocate people, infrastructure, spare &a replacement parts, and other support equipment.  At this point, your "cheap" aircraft is stealing resources from somewhere else in the defence organization.  So what do you cut to get this?
 
What difference does cost make if the machine purchased cannot do the job required in a high-threat environment? We still require air defence aircraft, so that would add the costs and penalties of two fleets vice one.

Obviously the aircraft would only be useful in limited engagements but so are attack helicopters and ucav's

Quote from: suffolkowner on Yesterday at 08:40:42
Yes, and we already have 24 Tutors, 25 Harvards, and 16 Hawks that have never fired a shot in anger

The Tutors entered service at the same time as the Sea Kings. They have no hard points for weapons, and are underpowered for an armed role. The Malaysian light attack version had a more powerful engine. Parts are scarce, so aircraft are cannibalized to keep the Snowbirds flying. The Snowbirds have a higher priority than some operational fleets.

We do not own the Harvards and Hawks. If we did, and re-roled those, what, then, would be used as trainers?

The tutors and Hawks I am assuming are going to be replaced with a common platform T-X(?) so that would/could allow funds to be reinvested elsewhere assuming the Snowbirds continue and if we get rid of the Snowbirds even better. Alternatively Harvards/AT-6 would/could be used and benefit from the above as well.

Whether we own or lease is just an accounting decision.

Loachman, MCG don't get me wrong I'm just brain-farting I mean brain-storming [lol: at some point the cost differential in operating has to be worthwhile,especially since these platforms already in service, depending I guess on the ability of pilots to maintain qualifications on different platforms. Maybe we are just too small an airforce in which case I can't see the point in attack helicopters or ucavs either



 
One can argue that if we only get 65 fighters, then the need for a secondary attack aircraft either jet/prop/rotor is going manifest itself in the near future. The RCAF will not risk it's primary airframes in altitudes where it's at risk from ADA and Manpads. We will be dependent on our Allies even more for that function. The question would be how to build that groundattack/close support within the political, existing resources and budgetary means that we have. Buying more "trainers" that happen to have numerous hard points may be the way around the political problems and could be sold by having them built mostly in Canada through a licensed deal.       
 
Colin P said:
One can argue that if we only get 65 fighters, then the need for a secondary attack aircraft either jet/prop/rotor is going manifest itself in the near future. The RCAF will not risk it's primary airframes in altitudes where it's at risk from ADA and Manpads. We will be dependent on our Allies even more for that function. The question would be how to build that groundattack/close support within the political, existing resources and budgetary means that we have. Buying more "trainers" that happen to have numerous hard points may be the way around the political problems and could be sold by having them built mostly in Canada through a licensed deal.     

Do you qualify the instructors in the tactical roles?  If so, how do you manage to keep pilot production going?  They are already operating at near max capacity to generate the minimum of pilots every year.  Maintaining tactical proficiency is no small feat.

I disagree that we wouldn't operate our JSF in face of ADA/Manpads.  It is meant to operate in a contested airspace.  I don't see where the need for more CAS is.
 
"Trainers" would be a term used to get them approved, real usage would be different, you have to make the politicians feel comfortable if you want more airframes. I don't share your confidence in our senior commanders risking their precious aircraft in what they think is a secondary and likely unnecessary role with higher risk. I suspect any support given to ground troops will be from altitude. 
 
I'm feeling devilish this morning, and thus....

Aircraft are tools.  Pilots can fly more than one type of aircraft. Fast mover pilots are trained on slow moving planes. 

So, if the planes that the fast movers trained on, planes that were selected because they were both economical to operate and that shared characteristics with the fast movers that made the transition between planes easier, if those planes were also capable of conducting operations in a permissive environment then what would be the cost of adding more Training aircraft to the inventory?

The pilots could be the same fast mover pilots reassigned to a different platform.  ie When a six-pack or squadron gets tasked overseas then that body of pilots is lost to the RCAF/NORAD mission in North America.  Regardless of what aircraft they are flying.  They can either be flying $100,000,000 F18Es and burning them up at a capital depreciation rate of $10,000 per hour, plus operating costs in $20,000 per hour range or they can be flying the same $10,000,000 aircraft they did their primary training on at a flying cost of closer to $2,000 per hour.  That equates to 10 times more air support time over the burning sands of Araby.

Or the pilots could be Reserve pilots.

The low cost aircraft turning circles in the sky also means that the high cost aircraft will last longer, taking more years to burn up their available flying hours.
 
Chris Pook said:
I'm feeling devilish this morning, and thus....

Aircraft are tools.  Pilots can fly more than one type of aircraft. Fast mover pilots are trained on slow moving planes. 

So, if the planes that the fast movers trained on, planes that were selected because they were both economical to operate and that shared characteristics with the fast movers that made the transition between planes easier, if those planes were also capable of conducting operations in a permissive environment then what would be the cost of adding more Training aircraft to the inventory?

The pilots could be the same fast mover pilots reassigned to a different platform.  ie When a six-pack or squadron gets tasked overseas then that body of pilots is lost to the RCAF/NORAD mission in North America.  Regardless of what aircraft they are flying.  They can either be flying $100,000,000 F18Es and burning them up at a capital depreciation rate of $10,000 per hour, plus operating costs in $20,000 per hour range or they can be flying the same $10,000,000 aircraft they did their primary training on at a flying cost of closer to $2,000 per hour.  That equates to 10 times more air support time over the burning sands of Araby.

Or the pilots could be Reserve pilots.

The low cost aircraft turning circles in the sky also means that the high cost aircraft will last longer, taking more years to burn up their available flying hours.

This is what I think as well, but...

Former CASR proposal
https://defencemuse.wordpress.com/2017/01/24/rcaf-cf-156b-for-the-coin-role/
 
Chris Pook said:
I'm feeling devilish this morning, and thus....

Aircraft are tools.  Pilots can fly more than one type of aircraft. Fast mover pilots are trained on slow moving planes. 

So, if the planes that the fast movers trained on, planes that were selected because they were both economical to operate and that shared characteristics with the fast movers that made the transition between planes easier, if those planes were also capable of conducting operations in a permissive environment then what would be the cost of adding more Training aircraft to the inventory?

The pilots could be the same fast mover pilots reassigned to a different platform.  ie When a six-pack or squadron gets tasked overseas then that body of pilots is lost to the RCAF/NORAD mission in North America.  Regardless of what aircraft they are flying.  They can either be flying $100,000,000 F18Es and burning them up at a capital depreciation rate of $10,000 per hour, plus operating costs in $20,000 per hour range or they can be flying the same $10,000,000 aircraft they did their primary training on at a flying cost of closer to $2,000 per hour.  That equates to 10 times more air support time over the burning sands of Araby.

Or the pilots could be Reserve pilots.

The low cost aircraft turning circles in the sky also means that the high cost aircraft will last longer, taking more years to burn up their available flying hours.

One problem that might pop up in Canada: the government points to the cheaper planes and says 'if they do what you need them to do, then fly those instead of the expensive ones' and we lose the fast jet fleet.'
 
I suspect that is what is driving most of the internal workings of the senior RCAF command and their backers. I would say that any jet/prop ground support airframe can only come after the fighter selection has happened and the memories have faded a bit, baring a really nasty conflict where we need something but there is no political appetite to deploy top line fighters.
 
daftandbarmy said:
One problem that might pop up in Canada: the government points to the cheaper planes and says 'if they do what you need them to do, then fly those instead of the expensive ones' and we lose the fast jet fleet.'

Agreed.  That is a definite risk.
 
Colin P said:
One can argue that if we only get 65 fighters, then the need for a secondary attack aircraft either jet/prop/rotor is going manifest itself in the near future. The RCAF will not risk it's primary airframes in altitudes where it's at risk from ADA and Manpads. We will be dependent on our Allies even more for that function. The question would be how to build that groundattack/close support within the political, existing resources and budgetary means that we have. Buying more "trainers" that happen to have numerous hard points may be the way around the political problems and could be sold by having them built mostly in Canada through a licensed deal. 
So, when it is too dangerous for the Super Hornet or F-35, you would send in the cheap aircraft?  Or are you arguing an alternate CoA of buying an expensive dedicated CAS aircraft that is capable of fighting against a near-peer threat?

Colin P said:
"Trainers" would be a term used to get them approved, real usage would be different, you have to make the politicians feel comfortable …
Lying to TB and cabinet is a good way to undermine our credibility.  The CAF would forever be doubted and every new requirement fought and resisted.  We don’t want that.

Chris Pook said:
So, if the planes that the fast movers trained on, planes that were selected because they were both economical to operate and that shared characteristics with the fast movers that made the transition between planes easier, if those planes were also capable of conducting operations in a permissive environment then what would be the cost of adding more Training aircraft to the inventory?
Aside from the initial procurement cost?  The infrastructure to house more aircraft.  The technicians (and all their costs including pay & training or opportunity cost of not using the PY somewhere else).  More YFR (which means fuel, parts, etc) for pilots to maintain currency on two different aircraft types, and the cost of the ammunition that these planes will use in training.  Potentially there is trade-off on pilot proficiency when their focus is on a specific fighter platform or when they are splitting their time across two.

Chris Pook said:
Or the pilots could be Reserve pilots.
Why? What problem does this address?  Is a platform flown entirely by reservists actually deployable, or does this become a capability that exists for the glory of itself?  You still have the infrastructure, YFR, support PYs, and now Class A pay that has to go into this.  What are capability do you take away from to do this?

I get that the plane may be substantially cheaper itself as an initial capital cost, but …
When your wife comes home with a new fashion accessory that was neither needed nor wanted when she left the house, did she really save you $100 “because it was half off” or did she spend the $100 that was going to be a new saw for the basement reno?
 
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