Close Air Support in the CF: Bring back something like the CF-5 or introduce something with props?

[Loachman]

Put a 40mm gun in the nose and you could take out tanks, too - one per aircraft.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Why buy a specialized aircraft that can only operate in a very specific scenario (unopposed CAS)?  They would not have been used in Iraq (1990), Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011).  So, they would only have been used for a single operational deployment.  Bang for buck?

Is quite possible that we will be involved in several wars with opponents who have little or no Manpads or aircraft. I would like 80 or so top line aircraft, but if we are not getting enough and we can supplement them with lesser aircraft at a significant savings and then have enough airframes to meet all obligation and preserve the flying hours of the top line aircraft for their primary role using aircraft that can function both as operational trainer (for maintaining flight proficiency and conducting exercises) and conduct operational missions in these permissive environments then I am for it. The reality is that there may not be enough money to buy the aircraft you want to fly or to few of them, in which case the resource needs to be husbanded carefully. 

 

[Good2Golf]

There is also a case for not over-doing commonality.  An RCN comprised of 24 frigates an NO other ships wouldn't be practical.  A Canadian Army with 500 Leopard 2s and no other vehicles wouldn't be practical.  Extremes, yes, but one should not discount the potential of an appropriately layered "air effects" portfolio.

:2c:

Regards
G2G

 

[daftandbarmy]

There is also a case for not over-doing commonality.  An RCN comprised of 24 frigates an NO other ships wouldn't be practical.  A Canadian Army with 500 Leopard 2s and no other vehicles wouldn't be practical.  Extremes, yes, but one should not discount the potential of an appropriately layered "air effects" portfolio.

:2c:

Regards
G2G

Hmmm.... sounds amazingly like one of those 'Principles of War' things... like 'Flexibility' or something

 

[Eye In The Sky]

"Flexibility is the key to air power, and indecision is the key to flexibility".  ;D

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Or, an aircraft built to take a bunch of stand-off weapons (not fitted, but still possible), loitering behind the FLOT and lobbing them in either self-designated or from other aircraft closer to the fight.  Wonder if we have any of those kicking around?

Others have done it with success and with smaller, older platforms...

First Air Strike with GBU-12 Against ISIL in Iraq for French Navy ATL2 Maritime Patrol Aircraft

 

[MarkOttawa]

Air Tractor AT-802 anyone ?

http://militaryedge.org/armaments/at-802u/

Official site (note 8,000 lb load):

http://802u.com/

Latest:

Sale of Air Tractors to Kenya Approved
http://www.monch.com/mpg/news/11-air/674-sale-of-air-tractors-to-kenya-approved.html

The new Sturmovik?

http://military-historian.squarespace.com/archive-1/2016/6/22/tools-of-war-the-il-2-shturmovik

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Colin Parkinson]

As I recall the Sturmovik was exceptional well armoured for it's day. For an amateur like myself, I divide aircraft engaging the enemy ground forces into 2 groups. Air Support which is bombing/missiles from altitude from any number of different airframes. The other is Close Air Support which would be gun runs, low altitude bombing and rockets/missiles from jet/turboprop or rotary. The type of airframes for the latter definitely more niche, like the A-10, AT-102, Super Turanco, Kiowa and the Griffon (a real case of working with what you got). The threats to these aircraft are different as well. Frankly dropping bombs from altitude in a permissive environment does not require a F35, just a bomb truck with good payload, networked and good loiter time.
With the small numbers of F35's we may be getting is it really a good idea to use them for dropping bombs on a goat herder with a AKM/RPG? I don't see the RCAF doing gun runs with their F35 or any fighter we get in small numbers and risk getting a 23mm lucky BB in the wrong place. The real question is the client (army) happy with that solution?   

 

[Loachman]

It is the effect that is important, not the means to deliver it. Why is everybody getting hung up on the means?

We have moved on from horse-mounted cavalry and massed archery as well.

Technology has advanced, and low-and-slow is no longer required to put bombs and missiles on target with incredible accuracy. Gun runs are no longer required.

Close Air Support is not a helicopter function.

All sorts of aircraft - including B1s - were used to drop bombs on insurgents in Afghanistan - lots of good experience for everyone (except for the insurgent who made poor life choices). Bombs (and Hellfire, especially with thermobaric warheads, launched from helicopters or Predator/Reaper) may be expensive, but, again, they are effective, cheaper than replacing a LAV, and infinitely preferable to paying for funerals and lifetimes of medical care.

Troops are happy to see targets blow up. That is all that counts. Sure, the A10 airshow is fun, but an A10 has no greater ability than any other suitably-equipped and suitably-armed machine, and would be very vulnerable in a major war these days. Even in the Good Old Days of the Cold War, I was sceptical of their ability to survive given the tactics that I saw over three years in Germany.

Pilots for F35s and jazzed-up crop dusters will still be paid the same, except one of those Pilots will be able to deliver a greater quantity of munitions at longer ranges in both permissive and non-permissive environments, cover the air-to-air role, and stand a much better chance of ultimately collecting a pension.

We would still need the minimum number (either the Conservative sixty-five or the sudden and unexpected Liberal ninety-five) fully-capable fighters to cover NORAD and NATO high-threat scenarios, so these limited-value machines would represent an increased cost in aircraft and infrastructure and an increased manning requirement. PYs are fixed, so those would have to come out of somebody else's hide, and that hide is not going to be an HQ or badge/hat designer, as those are too-high priorities.

I would not even trade real fighters for AHs, which would be of far, far greater value than replica Sturmoviks, Skyraiders. cropdusters, and other assorted putt-putts.

 

[GR66]

It is the effect that is important, not the means to deliver it. Why is everybody getting hung up on the means?

We have moved on from horse-mounted cavalry and massed archery as well.

Technology has advanced, and low-and-slow is no longer required to put bombs and missiles on target with incredible accuracy. Gun runs are no longer required.

Close Air Support is not a helicopter function.

All sorts of aircraft - including B1s - were used to drop bombs on insurgents in Afghanistan - lots of good experience for everyone (except for the insurgent who made poor life choices). Bombs (and Hellfire, especially with thermobaric warheads, launched from helicopters or Predator/Reaper) may be expensive, but, again, they are effective, cheaper than replacing a LAV, and infinitely preferable to paying for funerals and lifetimes of medical care.

Troops are happy to see targets blow up. That is all that counts. Sure, the A10 airshow is fun, but an A10 has no greater ability than any other suitably-equipped and suitably-armed machine, and would be very vulnerable in a major war these days. Even in the Good Old Days of the Cold War, I was sceptical of their ability to survive given the tactics that I saw over three years in Germany.

Pilots for F35s and jazzed-up crop dusters will still be paid the same, except one of those Pilots will be able to deliver a greater quantity of munitions at longer ranges in both permissive and non-permissive environments, cover the air-to-air role, and stand a much better chance of ultimately collecting a pension.

We would still need the minimum number (either the Conservative sixty-five or the sudden and unexpected Liberal ninety-five) fully-capable fighters to cover NORAD and NATO high-threat scenarios, so these limited-value machines would represent an increased cost in aircraft and infrastructure and an increased manning requirement. PYs are fixed, so those would have to come out of somebody else's hide, and that hide is not going to be an HQ or badge/hat designer, as those are too-high priorities.

I would not even trade real fighters for AHs, which would be of far, far greater value than replica Sturmoviks, Skyraiders. cropdusters, and other assorted putt-putts.

:goodpost:

At one time I would have considered myself being in the "quantity has a quality of its own" camp, but the more I read and learn the more I'm in favour of fewer, high-end platforms.  That doesn't mean that in some cases there might not be overreach in new designs where the massive cost required to achieve that extra 5% performance isn't worth the cost, but in general I think we should strive to get the best equipment available.

Ultimately, the further away from the battlefield you can get your platform to provide the desired effect the better.  Less advanced platforms operating closer to the risks seems to me to be the wrong way to go. 

 

[Loachman]

:goodpost:

Thanks.

overreach in new designs where the massive cost required to achieve that extra 5% performance isn't worth the cost

Nope, but F35 offers much more than 5% better.

in general I think we should strive to get the best equipment available.

Yup

Imagine if we'd bought the jazzed-up cropduster-equivalent APC instead of the LAV.

And how many here thought/think that we should have bought a tiny (well, we did, but it could have been tinier) fleet of Leopard 2s and a batch of cheaper Stryker MGS, or - worse - just MGS as was being pushed just a few short years ago?

C'mon...

'Fess up.

And then there's TAPV, for the Army guys who are envious of Scorpion.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

and risk getting a 23mm lucky BB

Why go so small?  Others aren't!  ;D

 

[daftandbarmy]

Why go so small?  Others aren't!  ;D

Pffftttt... just another ambitious gunner trying to get a good 'leading change' score on his PER

 

[Old Sweat]

Indeed, but to this old, out-of-date gunner, that looks to be a field or anti-tank gun being porteed on a truck. Note the barrel is clamped in the travelling position and the arrangement of the wheels and shield are not what one would expect from an anti-aircraft gun. Having nit picked the valid observation, EITS is right.

 

[Good2Golf]

It is the effect that is important, not the means to deliver it. Why is everybody getting hung up on the means?

We have moved on from horse-mounted cavalry and massed archery as well.

Technology has advanced, and low-and-slow is no longer required to put bombs and missiles on target with incredible accuracy. Gun runs are no longer required.

Close Air Support is not a helicopter function.

Sorry Loachman, but Uncle Sam thinks you're wrong.

JP 3.09-3 - Close Air Support

Close air support (CAS) is air action by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.

I think you're getting just as hung up on definitions and platforms as the others.

:2c:

Effects, dear boy, it's about effects.

Scorpion (and helicopters) can provide CAS in the appropriate conditions...

Regards
G2G

 

[MilEME09]

Effects, dear boy, it's about effects.

Scorpion (and helicopters) can provide CAS in the appropriate conditions...

Well let me throw another version of the two aircraft fleet scenario, lets say we do buy F-35's but use them primarily in the SEAD, and strikes against command and control role, clearing the way for a larger bomb truck, or a greater number of cheaper bomb trucks to flood the battle space.

 

[Loachman]

Sorry Loachman, but Uncle Sam thinks you're wrong.

Not entirely.

From page I-5:

c.  RW Considerations.  RW attack assets provide the ability to maneuver and reposition firepower in response to changing situations.  They carry a wide variety of forward firing and off-axis firing munitions, are equipped with advanced sensors, have excellent response and loiter times, can conduct low altitude or nap of the earth ingress, attacks, and egress, and have an excellent capability to conduct CAS in diverse terrain and when accompanying other transport, medical evacuation, or personnel recovery assets.

(1)  Army RW assets are organic to combat aviation brigades organized and trained to be employed in unit operations, maneuvering independently or in support of ground forces as part of the Army combined arms team.  Army RW attack assets use close combat attack (CCA) procedures.  CCA is not synonymous with CAS, and the Army does not consider its attack helicopters a CAS system.  Although some Army aircrews may be proficient in CAS TTP, JTACs should not expect Army attack aviation assets to perform CAS TTP without further coordination and training, since they are normally employed using CCA as the standard attack method.

(2)  Marine Corps attack helicopters are organized in squadrons and typically operate in sections and divisions.  These units are assigned to and are integral to the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF).  Marine Corps RW attack assets are trained and equipped for CAS missions to support the ground commander’s objectives and may be tasked accordingly.  Sections normally fly in mixed configuration with attack helicopter (AH)/UH [utility helicopter] assets. Mixed sections provide the RW CAS element with the most flexible mix of sensors, communications capabilities, maneuverability, firepower, and mutual support.

I did discuss USMC use of its earlier Sea Cobras in a CAS role in an earlier post, but had not worked with them in many years and was not certain if they still did. The USMC has a different role and approaches things in ways that work best for them. The vast bulk of my experience has been with US Army Aviation, and they were always keen to differentiate themselves from any USAF connection or encroachment into their turf, hence the CCA term which appears to have been coined for Afghanistan-like operations where there was more integration. My previous statement was made in that light.

I'll continue reading through the entire document later. It is interesting.

I think you're getting just as hung up on definitions and platforms as the others.

More ownership and employment of platforms. AHs are organic to US Army Divisions, and integral to the land battle.

Scorpion (and helicopters) can provide CAS in the appropriate conditions...

Which still does not mean that we should rush out and buy Scorpion, as "appropriate conditions" are not "all conditions" or even necessarily "enough conditions", ie it would be, for us, a niche aircraft.

Griffon can provide CCA in "appropriate conditions" as well, ie suitable climate (not too cold and not too wet) and relatively permissive environment. The difference is that we adapted an existing machine to the role rather than buying it for that purpose.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Indeed, but to this old, out-of-date gunner, that looks to be a field or anti-tank gun being porteed on a truck. Note the barrel is clamped in the travelling position and the arrangement of the wheels and shield are not what one would expect from an anti-aircraft gun. Having nit picked the valid observation, EITS is right.

Unless my RECCE is way out to lunch, it is actually a S-60 57mm AAA gun.  ISIS does, however, use them on the back of flatbeds, dumptrucks, etc in the 'ground' role.

 

[Old Sweat]

Quite possible and I did have second thoughts when I considered the small diameter of the barrel.

 

[Good2Golf]

LM, I didn't say go out and buy Scorpions, but rather consideration be given to the appropriateness of having a fit into air effects.  I was also challenging your black and white "helicopters don't do CAS."  As you noted yourself, in some cases they (still) do.

Who knows, maybe we'll see Scorpion and other candidates (like Boeing's T-X) become the training platform for future aircrew training and potentially providing CAS-related FG to the CF as CATS now achieves with Alpha Jets?

One should never say never.

:2c:

Regards
G2G