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Close Air Support in the CF: Bring back something like the CF-5 or introduce something with props?

SeaKingTacco said:
Journeyman,

............ I've seen too much tribalism in the CF in my 24 years too believe anymore that an Infantry (or Armoured or Artillery) General Officer would sell his corps down the river to preserve something as "weird" as helos. 


I was aghast a few years back to see the CDS, a former CO of mine, sell TANKS down the drain, with a full page blurb in the Ottawa Citizen in praise of the MGS.  Don't let your memories fade.  Things like this do happen.
 
Yeah, George, but it was still the wrong decision (without picking the scab off of the 40-odd page MGS vs tank debate).


 
When I weighed in on this topic.....my concluding point was: 
Journeyman said:
If the Canadian Army requires CAS, we really ought to own/deploy CAS assets.
...based upon two examples in that post, wherein I cited my grievances with USAF, Dutch, and French fixed-wing CAS in-theatre. In a subsequent post I "suggested," from experience, that there may not always be adequate XCAS/GCAS available.

By "we," in that quote, I meant Canada. I was arguing that Canada deploy CAS dedicated primarily to Canadian ops. And yes, I understand how the 'pool' works; this was the discussion I had with LGen Watt -- while we're all "allies," if there's two TICs in progress, planes with US flags respond more quickly to US TICs -- our troops on the ground should have a Canadian option to do the same.


Now, the care and feeding of aviation by the Canadian Army.....that's a separate topic, and not where I was going with my input.
 
MCG said:
I don't know about ATOC, but pilots do get on AOC regularly.

Ahh, right.  Now we just need one to command a CMBG.... :)
 
JM, your point about XCAS is very valid.  There is no denying that there is some influence that the providers of the assets can effect through either the CAOC directly or through the RC's tasking staff.  Can't saying as I can blame the folks though, that's perhaps human nature.  One could ask the same question in parallel regarding RW tpt...Canadian assets are declared to NATO, thus could be used for any mission in the Region...odds are the assets will likely have a flavour in support more of CA troops than others (beyond proportionality of troops ratios in the Region, I mean).  It would be nice to have Hornets in location, but they have an even bigger tail that rotary assets and the required offset against other elements of the Can TF might not be deemed acceptable to the overall force composition.

Cheers
G2G
 
Journeyman said:
When I weighed in on this topic.....my concluding point was:  ...based upon two examples in that post, wherein I cited my grievances with USAF, Dutch, and French fixed-wing CAS in-theatre. In a subsequent post I "suggested," from experience, that there may not always be adequate XCAS/GCAS available.

By "we," in that quote, I meant Canada. I was arguing that Canada deploy CAS dedicated primarily to Canadian ops. And yes, I understand how the 'pool' works; this was the discussion I had with LGen Watt -- while we're all "allies," if there's two TICs in progress, planes with US flags respond more quickly to US TICs -- our troops on the ground should have a Canadian option to do the same.


Now, the care and feeding of aviation by the Canadian Army.....that's a separate topic, and not where I was going with my input.

There are also possible scenario's in the future where Canadians may be deployed with even less capable forces than ourselves, then we will have no CAS at all. I have to admit I like the Warsaw Pact idea of mutli-tasked helo's capable of either troops or weapons or a mizx of both. I would like to see a replacement for the Griffion that gives us some abilty for organic air support. The current configuration is better than nada.
 
Colin P said:
There are also possible scenario's in the future where Canadians may be deployed with even less capable forces than ourselves, then we will could have no CAS at all.
Canada does possess the capability to provide CAS: the CF-18, and when it deploys it does so under CEFCOM.  The government decides to deploy it or not.  Buying a duplicate capability to be force generated by CLS will not change this.
 
Not to rehash an old argument, by the time another deployment roles around, the CF-18's will likely be gate guards. Judging by choices offered their replacements will be few and costly, wave goodbye to any in the weeds CAS from those platforms.
 
Some background info from USA Today to inform the discussion, stating basically that the Taliban are a pretty adaptive group, have learned to estimate CAS response times, and are reacting accordingly.


Shared in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2009-01-19-airstrikes_N.htm

Afghan insurgent tactics shift to dodge airstrikes
By Tom Vanden Brook, USA TODAY

BAGRAM AIR BASE, Afghanistan — Afghan insurgents have learned to attack U.S. troops and scatter before they can be hit by airstrikes, a change in tactics that creates new pressure on coalition ground forces, say defense officials and military experts.
Insurgents "have a pretty good idea of how long it takes for close-air support to arrive," Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell said. "We've seen some indications that they will fight for as long as they believe they have until close-air support will likely arrive on the scene."

Military records show U.S. aircraft conducted a record number of aerial raids over Afghanistan in 2008 but dropped fewer bombs and missiles than they did in 2007.

The changing insurgent tactics have the potential to limit the effectiveness of air power and put more pressure on U.S. and coalition ground troops, said Loren Thompson, a military analyst at the Lexington Institute.

"The war in Afghanistan is not the kind of conflict where air power can be used to maximum advantage," he said. Finding insurgents "has proven devilishly difficult, and in Afghanistan that often requires sending ground troops to flush them out."

There are now about 32,000 U.S. and 28,000 coalition forces in Afghanistan. Military leaders, including Gen. David McKiernan, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, say the U.S. presence will grow to about 60,000 troops and could stay that size for four years.

Intercepted insurgent communications confirm they fear the airstrikes, which hit a record number in 2008, said Air Force Brig. Gen. Michael Holmes, commander of the 455th Air Expeditionary Wing here.

In one instance, he said, militants retreated from an ambush, saying, " 'No, stop. The birds are back.' "

McKiernan said insurgents realize the propaganda value of civilian deaths, so they often attack coalition troops from areas crowded with civilians.

"When the insurgency creates those casualties, they do it on purpose to create fear and intimidation to support their ambition," McKiernan said.

Coalition jets flew 19,603 close-air support missions in Afghanistan in 2008 and dropped bombs or fired missiles 3,369 times, about 17% of the time. In 2007, coalition aircraft flew 13,965 missions and dropped munitions 3,572 times, or about 26% of the time.

Airstrikes likely will increase in 2009 as U.S. forces push into areas held by the Taliban and other militants, says Tom Ehrhard, a military analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and retired Air Force colonel. That raises the potential for more accidents.

Ehrhard also predicts an increasing need for surveillance, supply and medical evacuation flights. Demand for aircraft that collect intelligence rose 44% in 2008 in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to Air Force data.

The watchdog organization Human Rights Watch reported in September that airstrikes in Afghanistan inadvertently had killed more than 650 civilians since 2006. That pales in comparison to the more than 3,000 Afghan civilians killed in deliberate attacks by insurgents.

The group also reported last year that insurgents hid among civilians and used them as "shields" from airstrikes.

The rugged, expansive terrain of Afghanistan makes it impossible to fight without airstrikes, says Marc Garlasco, a military analyst at Human Rights Watch and former intelligence analyst at the Pentagon. Although he expects more bombing in 2009, Garlasco says civilian casualties can be minimized with an effective counterinsurgency strategy.
 
Colin P said:
Judging by choices offered their replacements will be few and costly, wave goodbye to any in the weeds CAS from those platforms.

Not to rehash it further but you are assuming that by that time, we will do CAS the same way we do it now.
 
Off topic but an interesting tone coming from USA Today:

...The watchdog organization Human Rights Watch reported in September that airstrikes in Afghanistan inadvertently had killed more than 650 civilians since 2006. That pales in comparison to the more than 3,000 Afghan civilians killed in deliberate attacks by insurgents.

The group also reported last year that insurgents hid among civilians and used them as "shields" from airstrikes.

The rugged, expansive terrain of Afghanistan makes it impossible to fight without airstrikes, says Marc Garlasco, a military analyst at Human Rights Watch and former intelligence analyst at the Pentagon. Although he expects more bombing in 2009, Garlasco says civilian casualties can be minimized with an effective counterinsurgency strategy.

Taliban are explicitly bad guys and our guys are doing what has to be done AND minimizing civilian casualties.

Not a take that has been apparent in the Canadian media nor, for that matter the US press these last seven years.

Stand by for: "We must finish what we started" rhetoric.  - Not that I disagree with that.
 
Journeyman said:
Afghan insurgent tactics shift to dodge airstrikes
By Tom Vanden Brook, USA TODAY

BAGRAM AIR BASE, Afghanistan — Afghan insurgents have learned to attack U.S. troops and scatter before they can be hit by airstrikes, a change in tactics that creates new pressure on coalition ground forces, say defense officials and military experts.
Insurgents "have a pretty good idea of how long it takes for close-air support to arrive," Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell said. "We've seen some indications that they will fight for as long as they believe they have until close-air support will likely arrive on the scene."
As I read this, it appears to me that we are better off with more XCAS consisting of faster & farther reaching aircraft.  Diluting our efforts on budget aircraft dispersed in FOB as GCAS, well that just sees to be more favourable to the current enemy.

That being said, I have been told that one US General (I suspect Gen James Conway, USMC) has also identified a requirement for V-22 to counter this insurgent tactic.  While I have not been able to find the comment linking the V-22 to countering these new insurgent tactics, I have found that he is calling on Marines to think of Afghan-Bound Osprey as more than just helicopters in order to get the most from their potential and I have found a few other thoughts of his:

Conway said the expected Marine deployment to Afghanistan would include at least one squadron of tilt-rotor MV22 Osprey aircraft, the half-airplane half-helicopter made by Textron Inc. and Boeing Co..

"It's made for a place like Afghanistan," he said, adding that the Marines and U.S. special forces were installing a belly gun to the Osprey to make it more effective against insurgents in Afghanistan.
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=10808&pop=1&page=0
and:
The first squadron [of MV-22] has just recently come home from Iraq, a seven-month deployment with VMM-263. We were very pleased with the first combat deployment of that aircraft in that squadron. I will be honest. We purposefully downplayed the success they were having throughout the seven months because we wanted to finish the deployment. We wanted to make sure that our initial assessments were correct and that the airplane was going to be everything we wanted it to be in replacing the venerable CH-46 and our CH-53 Deltas. It has done that. The availability rates, the mission performance, the way that all Marines, both aviation and ground, are attracted to the new capabilities of the airplane is just incredible. And we are delighted with the success that we have seen. We now are opening to the media and to the congressmen on the Hill, the success of that deployment.

Let me give you one example of the capability of the airplane. When we crossed the line in ’03, I said to my boss, General McKiernan, let me make sure you remember that if you need 1,000 Marines anywhere on the battlefield within 100 miles of where we are located, we will come out of our tracks, into our helicopters, and be there for you in 12 hours. Today if the Marine commander were to make that same promise, it would be anywhere 300 miles on the battlefield. That is the tremendous additional capability that this aircraft gives to us.
http://www.marines.mil/units/hqmc/cmc/Documents/2008%20May%2022%20-%20%27%27This%20Week%20in%20Defense%20News%27%20Interview.pdf

On [the Osprey's] initial seven-month deployment, VMM-263 recorded a mission availability rate of around 70% and a monthly flying rate per aircraft of around 65h

I know, others have argued the V-22 is a USMC vehicle that was designed for USMC requirements supporting over the horizon littoral warfare, and therefore we don’t need it.  I’ve never bought this argument.  Our BG AO are growing with every new theatre to the point that the expanses between APOD, FOBs, SPs, Pl houses, etc is just as expansive as the over-the-horizon littoral operations for which the V-22 was designed.  The ability to fly faster and farther to the extent of the V-22 is a fairly significant capability.  Getting a QRF into a fight sooner (or emplaced as cut-off sooner) can be decisive in a COE engagement.  It is also particularly important to reach out farther to recover casualties and return them faster to a role 3 facility.  The real reasons not to go with tilt rotor would be the capabilities we have to trade-off.  V-22 are expensive and I do not know that we could afford to buy them without forgoing other (potentially more important) requirements.  I also suspect there are things a true helicopter can do which a tilt-rotor cannot do.

So, why have I brought-up mention of the aircraft in a CAS thread? Well, one reason is that others have steered this discussion to including a whole Army Aviation analysis.  The V-22 potentially fills a role complimenting various helicopters, as an effective intra-theatre resupply, medevac, or CSAR platform.  Without an escort able to match its speed, the Osprey may not be the best for landing under fire. Despite that, its role in supply runs could be carried out rather easily (and still exploiting its speed and reach).  If our Hercs in theatre can go in alone and still manage to drop beans and bullets (sometimes even landing to pick-up / drop-off) then the Osprey can too. 

The other reason I mention tilt-rotors is that in this thread we keep returning to the idea of FOB CAS.  I still do not think FOB CAS is the right way to go.  However, if it were introduced, the aircraft would need to offer something that we cannot get from the faster & farther reaching ‘jet’ CAS nor from AHs.  We will not get this something from vulnerable, short-legged, slow, fixed-wing, budget platforms.  Attack tilt-rotor aircraft might provide something that fills a capability niche between AH and CAS.  Here again, there is a bigger dollar value attached and we probably will not like to pay the cost (in other capabilities lost/forgone). 
 
It may also be an excellent aircraft for missions such as Dafur, where you have long distances and limited infastructure. As for it's use in CAS, Afghanistan represents it's first real deployment (Iraq use was more of a test of aircraft and figuring out how to use it best) If it continues to perform well and is capable of operating after recieving a fair bit of damage, then it may start filling a CAS role in a limited role. If I recall the belly gun was more designed with suppressing fire in mind than with it's use as a primary attack weapon.
 
The V-22 is a transporter, so I see it as complimentary to the ground force and CAS. As noted you can move men and equipment quickly around the battlefield, establish cut offs or insert troops unexpectedly.

As for the CAS or support role, Bell actually floated a souped up version of the V-15 (an early proof of concept vehicle that led to the V-22) as an attack aircraft early in the LHX program. A small one or two seat tilt rotor built around the V-22 wings and engines is possible, and would be related to the V-22 like the Cobra was to the UH-1 "Huey".

WRT getting inside the OODA loop; if the Taliban and their supporters have determined how long they have before the arrival of CAS, then two solutions suggest themselves:

1. Have long duration armed UAV's on station for every manouevre element, or
2. Go with Kirkhill and organize long range rocket artillery that can strike targets throughout the AOR with minimum delay

A combination of the two would provide instant response from the UAV, and the UAV can be used to guide the follow on strikes from the other means (this may be rockets dispensing "brilliant pebble" submunitions, conventional CAS using bombs and rockets or airmobile troops inserted to contain and shape the battlefield)

The long duration UAV is obviously "flavor of the month", most of these jobs could also be done with an O-2 "Skymaster" or other FAC, although larger planes would have endurance and stealth issues.
 
Thucydides said:
Have long duration armed UAV's on station for every manouevre element,

There is, currrently, no such thing. Add the weight of bombs and/or missiles, and one is forced to remove the equivalent weight of fuel. I was quite surprised to learn how short Reaper's armed missions were, and what it's actually carrying on them. The specs in the shiny brochure may give a maximum weapon load and maximum endurance but they don't necessarily mean anything under real operating conditions. You get long endurance or armed but not both. And there'd better not be any cloud or icing conditions, either.

There will not be one "on station for every manouevre element". You can't crowd these into limited airspace, and there aren't enough anyway.

With conventional manned aircraft, augmented with tankers if necessary or rotated, however...

Rather like we do now...

Don't count on "instant response from the UAV". It takes time to acquire and confirm a target, and there is no guarantee that the target will be acquired and/or confirmed. This counts for manned aircraft as well. Some of the delay in CAS response is due to that. The bomber can be right overhead, but spec bombing is not a tactic.

O2s won't give long endurance or carry a useful weapon load, and you have to train a pilot whose skills would be put to better use flying something with more practical value. They are also a niche aircraft that could well be completely irrelevant in future conflicts. This is not Vietnam, geographically, threat-wise, or technologically any more than it is WWII, WWI, or Agincourt, and I see no value in resurrecting ancient machinery of any sort. F15s and B1s can do what they can do, and carry real weapons too, and perform in a full-blown modern war. As for "stealth issues", I've yet to see a Talib react before it was too late. Have you ever heard a jet pass overhead at 20,000 feet? They might hear the bomb at the last second, but they're not going to outrun it at that point.

The Marines want V22 because they need to cover longe distances from ship to shore as quickly as possible. At the shorter distances at which we are operating, either in the current conflict or a more traditional one, those distances are not an issue. As I have said elsewhere, most likely in this thread, you are looking at just a few minutes difference at 80 km and we are not operating at those distances too much anyway. It is not worth adding another niche aircraft for the once or twice per century that three minutes might be critical, and losing some flexibility in the process. Would we buy this, or Chinook? Can the V22 sling a load? I don't know, and I'm not interested enough in this aircraft to bother finding out. It's certainly not going to be doing that at anywhere near its max cruise speed however - but if zipping home empty once the load's been dropped is crucial, then there's some benefit, I suppose.

"FOB CAS" or "FOB AH"...

You don't want to have to deal with defending the size of the area that this would take up, or dealing with the movement of fuel and parts in huge quantities, the increased losses of machines and likely crew, or, initially, in the construction of the infrastructure required for no benefit whatsoever. Either the machines are in the air before they are needed, or time is going to be lost starting (including post-start checks), manoeuvring prior to take-off, and working into the situation in progress if it's not over by then. And if they are going to be in the air before being needed, they can operate from a major base like KAF and leave one minute earlier for every three to four k that they need to go (in the case of helicopters, and much less for jets), like ten minutes for forty k, which would be pretty close to the time required to start and take off.

There are sometimes good and valid reasons for not doing things.
 
Loach

Even though I agree with most of your post, to say the MQ-9 isn't carrying a significant load over there might be a little misleading, as compared to the DE guys yea not much, but pretty comparable to everything else flying(fighters) and more than enough to deal with a TIC or two I would think.
 
Yea I can imagine, seen some of that stuff too, some of those guys were all very good friends of mine not too long ago,lol.
 
But seriously, I didn't say that Reaper didn't carry a significant load, I said that I was surprised to learn what it's actually carrying, and how short its missions were when carrying it.

If those Taliban didn't all run in different directions...

My main point, though, is that we can pack a whole lot more onto regular bombers (and I'm including the ones that start with "F") if we want to, and cram a whole bunch more of those bombers into smaller airspace than an equivalent number of UAVs.

Each has its place, and that's why each is gainfully employed.
 
In the what goes around comes around category, the US is investigating the potential for either a re-vitalised or new-build Bronco style aircraft.  Seems that their mission capability is not replicated by anything in the current inventory and both Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated the need for such an aircraft.  Hence interest in aircraft such as the Toscano.
 
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